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Summary
The thesis is a detailed study of the debates of the Italian Constituent Assembly on 
the question of the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts of 1929 and the constitutional and 
practical ramifications with regard to the condition of the religious minorities.
Section A briefly outlines the changes in the role of the papacy from the mid 
19th century until the end of World War II, the emergence of political Catholicism 
and the significance of the Lateran Pacts. Religious freedom for Protestants over the 
same period is then discussed, focussing in particular on their legal position. This is 
followed by an analysis of Catholic religious freedom as established by the Catholic 
Church and of the relationship between the Vatican and the Christian Democrats.
In Section B the debates on the articles dealing with the inclusion of the 
Lateran Pacts and religious freedom for the minority religions are discussed. Draft 
article 5 of the Constitution is the basis for the analysis, the individual clauses of 
which have been treated separately. Methodologically, this was the most appropriate 
way of tackling the extremely complex issues linked to the various clauses.
In Section C, the most significant conclusions to emerge are the 
determination with which the Catholic deputies fought for the inclusion of the Pacts, 
frequently using religious arguments while ignoring juridical advice, and the 
Communist leadership’s decision to vote with the Christian Democrats for inclusion 
of the Pacts. For the minority religions, the crucial factor in their continued 
oppression after the war, apart from the Communist’s decision, was the lack of will 
in the Assembly to draw up clear guidelines that would allow for changes in the 
Fascist legislature that controlled the actions of the minority religions, thus ensuring 
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There has been no detailed study, to my knowledge, of the debates as they were 
conducted at the Constituent Assembly on the question of the inclusion of the 
Lateran Pacts in the Italian Constitution, and of how their inclusion affected 
constitutional provisions on the broader issues relating to religious freedom in 
general, and religious minorities in particular.
In order to put the debates into context, I have taken as a starting point for the 
thesis the end of the period of temporal stability for the Catholic Church in the mid­
nineteenth century. Beginning with the Albertine Statute of 1848, which was 
effectively the Tull before the storm’ of Italian unification, and led to the difficult 
period for the Holy See of the loss of its papal States, I will take the reader through 
the period of self-imposed isolation from the 1870’s, past the Church’s internal 
restructuring and centralisation policies, through to the Fascist collaboration that 
gave birth to the pivotal Lateran Pacts.
Throughout this same period I will examine the condition in which the 
minority churches found themselves and trace the effects of the rather inadequate 
legislation that regulated their activities. This is followed by an analysis of Catholic 
religious freedom as established by the unique juridical position of the Catholic 
Church, its policy of making concordats and Catholic social and political ideologies.
In the debates section (Section B of the thesis), the lion’s share of my 
analysis will be devoted to the debates on draft article 5, the core of which became 
articles 7 and 8 in the final approved articles of the Constitution. Arguments relating 
to the other important article in the Constitution relevant to our topic (draft article 14 
which became final article 19) were also mostly covered in the debates on draft 
article 5, although some further discussion took place on draft article 14, which will 
also be dealt with towards the end of Section B. In other words, most of the debates 
leading to the eventual approval of all these articles was conducted around draft 
article 5.
The debates were not undertaken by topic or theme. Many topics and themes 
came up randomly throughout the course of the debates as and when any given 
speaker felt he had a point to make, sometimes with days or even weeks between 
two parts of the same debate. Thus the layout of the debates was very disorderly. 
Making sense of this disorder, as far as possible, for reasons of clarity, was my 
primary concern in laying out the sections of the thesis. This led to another problem:
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putting order into the discussions, without unnecessary repetition, is not an easy task. 
Some repetition of topic is unavoidable simply because the themes and topics 
continually interlock, although when this does occur it will be a different aspect of 
the topic which is being treated.
I would like to make one further point regarding my research. In the autumn 
of 2002, an article appeared in the Guardian newspaper criticising Silvio 
Berlusconi’s government for removing archive material from Italian state libraries 
that could be contrued as ‘sensitive’ to the Holy See. The article was signed by a 
number of academics including Umberto Eco, who all agreed that it was not in the 
interests o f ‘transparency’ and ‘openness’ to remove such documents and would 
hinder any subsequent academic research. When I arrived in Rome in January 2003,
I saw evidence of the removal of this ‘sensitive’ material at first hand while working 
in the Archivio Centrale dello Stato. Fortunately, the missing files had already been 
consulted and published in various works which I subsequently discovered quite by 
accident. These files are referred to in Section A2 of the thesis.
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SECTION A: ISSUES PRIOR TO THE DEBATES 
A1 The Papacy in a changing world
(i) The Roman Question
The single most important event to affect the Catholic Church in the nineteenth 
century was the annexation of the Papal States (which stretched across Italy from 
Rome to Marche) to the Kingdom of Italy at the time of unification.1 This became 
known as the Roman Question, the repercussions of which would last for almost a 
century and affect Church policy, Italian legislation and even the new Republican 
Constitution of 1948.
At the heart of the problem was the concept of sovereignty: since Unification, 
Vatican City had not had sovereign status. Up to the Risorgimento, the term ‘Roman 
Question’ had referred to the problem of the existence on Italian territory of another 
state at the head of which was the Pope. The issue assumed a more concrete political 
dimension after the events of 1859-1860, during which Marche and Umbria, 
previously belonging to the Vatican, were also annexed to the newly unified 
Kingdom of Italy. The Prime Minister of the time, Cavour, attempted to resolve the 
difficulties this action posed for Church/State relations: his deal involved the Pope 
ceding to Italy his remaining temporal powers in the form of the last two papal states 
of Rome and Lazio. In return he would receive guarantees of full independence to 
operate in his role as Head of the Catholic Church and an end to State interference in 
Church legislation. Not surprisingly, the deal was completely rejected by the
•y
Vatican. However, Pius IX’s refusal to cooperate made little difference to the 
unification process, and on 2nd October 1870 Rome and Lazio were annexed to Italy. 
The loss of the last two states meant the end of the Vatican’s temporal power and the 
loss of territorial income that it had enjoyed for over a thousand years. Italian liberal 
opinion, on the other hand, considered this to be the liberation of the Church from a 
useless and anachronistic duty which had prevented it from dedicating itself fully to 
its spiritual magisterium. Not surprisingly, Pius IX and his successors interpreted the 
loss differently and effectively went into exile in the Vatican, not emerging until the 
conciliation of 1929. Having accepted the impossibility of negotiating with the 
Vatican on the matter, the Italian State established the independence and spiritual 
sovereignty of the Pope by an internal law (the Law of Guarantees -  discussed in full
1 See A C. Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia dalla unificazione ai g iom i nostri, Torino: Einaudi, 1977.
2 For more detail see S.M.Marottoli, La Santa Sede nelD iritto Intemazionale, www.studiocelentano.it 
(Thesis published on the Internet).
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later). The law was unilateral and non-negotiable and was again rejected by the 
Pope.3
(ii) The centralisation of Papal authority
After the French Revolution, the republican mood that swept across Europe focussed 
the Vatican's attention on the defence of the traditional order while attacking 
liberalism, republicanism and socialism. During the pontificate of Pius DC (1846 - 
78) and as a direct consequence of the Unification of Italy, the papacy came into 
greater focus as the organisational and spiritual centre of the Catholic faith. From 
this position Pius DC and his successors were able to redefine Catholic orthodoxy. 
Bolstered by his hostility to the unification of Italy in 1859 - 60, Pius DC rejected - 
notably in the ‘Syllabus of Errors’ published in 1864 -  any suggestion that 
individualism and representative government could be in any way compatible with 
Christian teaching.4
The marginalisation of the Church by the liberal governments, coupled with 
the tendency towards secularisation, led to a desire in Vatican circles for 
centralization of Church authority in the bishops and, particularly, in the Pope 
himself. Yet alongside this greater centralisation came a more inclusive role for the 
Catholic laity: the appeal to the layman was effectively the Church sponsoring large 
scale organizations in which and through which the layman was called to actively 
support the Church’s general policy.5
Formed during the 1874 Catholic Congress in Venice, the Opera dei 
Congressi was “a loose federation of parochial societies of committed laymen”. One 
of its early tasks was “organizing political dissent on religious grounds” holding its 
main meetings at the yearly congresses.6 Its organisation mirrored that of the Church 
with parochial societies at grass roots level, regional and diocesan societies at 
intermediate level and a general standing committee which organised the annual 
meetings led by a president appointed by the Pope. Such dependence on the Church 
hierarchy was considered to be vital to ensure strict control of its work.7 Gradually 
through the late 19th century, some lay members of the Opera began to show signs of 
wanting more independence. Consequently, Pius X, fearing the radical reform
3 Marottoli, La Santa Sede, Chapter 2.1.
4 M. Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe: 1918-1945, London: Routledge, 1997, p.21.
3 G. Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology o f a Sponsored Organization, Stanford. Stanford 
University Press, 1967, p. 11.
6 Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p. 16.
7 Ibid.
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programme of the Christian democrat political movements and the heretical 
modernist tendencies of some of its leaders, dissolved the Opera shortly after 1903 
and reorganised it into various associations more directly dependent on the
Q
hierarchy. The Vatican’s insistence on exercising authority over its satellite 
organisations was an important factor in Eugenio Pacelli's (later Pius XII) redrafting 
of the Church's Code of Canon Law, published in 1917. The new Code was arranged 
in such a way as to ensure that future popes could control the Church from the 
Roman centre. Consequently, the papacy enjoyed unprecedented power over a huge 
amount of European, and especially Italian, public and private life well into the 20th 
century.
But despite its structural and organisational changes during the first thirty 
years of the twentieth century, the Church maintained its centuries-old hostility to 
democratic practices, remaining intolerant of internal and external debate.9
(iii) Catholic Action
One of the most important of the associations to emerge from the reorganisation of 
the Opera dei Congressi in 1903 was Catholic Action. Being much more firmly 
under the control of the Vatican than the Opera dei Congressi the new priorities 
bestowed on Catholic Action by the papacy (particularly during the inter war years 
under Pope Benedict XV) were more focussed on spirituality and proselytising than 
on politics.10
Pius XI had a more relaxed attitude to political involvement and this 
manifested itself in the structural changes he made to the association from the start 
of his papacy in 1922 (discussed in section iv). A key feature of this new structure of 
Catholic Action throughout the reign of Pius XI was an increase in the participation 
of laymen at the various coordinating levels. To facilitate this aim, Pius XI set up the 
Catholic University of Milan as the intellectual hub of the Italian Catholic World and 
of Catholic Action in particular.11
Nothing changed in this regard in the new Catholic Action Statutes of 
January 1932, despite the crisis in relations between the Fascist government and the 
Holy See of 1930-31. The movement was still led by the lay-dominated Giunta
8 J.F. Pollard, Italy in T. Buchanan, & M. Conway, (Eds.) Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918- 
1965. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 79.
9 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 99.
10 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 43
11 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 34
12
1 9Centrale in Rome. It was only when Cardinal Pacelli succeeded Pius XI as Pope in 
September 1939 that any major changes were made. With the outbreak of hostilities, 
Pius XII became concerned about discipline among its members and the effect any 
ensuing problems might have on the association. Another concern was the problem 
of the ex-popolari inside Catholic Action. Both problems were resolved in the 
Statute he approved in June 1940 which totally subordinated the more politically
13compromised of the lay leaders to the authority of a commission of Cardinals.
The drive towards centralisation had almost reached its zenith. In taking 
control away from the lay element of the organisation, the Vatican was now in full 
command of all its forces, both lay and ecclesiastical, not only on a national level, 
but thanks to its concordats, also on a European level. And as a result of the 
protection afforded to Catholic Action by the Lateran Concordat, at the end of the 
war it was the biggest and most influential voluntary organisation, with offices in all 
24,000 of Italy’s Catholic parishes.14 Add to this the constant stream of politically 
aware and highly spiritual Catholics emerging from the University in Milan who 
would take prominent positions not only in Catholic Action but more importantly in 
its collateral political wing, the Democrazia cristiana, and one can begin to 
appreciate the extent and power of the Vatican-led political machine that emerged to 
secure the Holy See’s hold on the country after the chaos of Fascism and the 
disastrous condition Italy found itself in at the end of the war.
In the new atmosphere of political freedom after the war, the Vatican felt the 
time was right to ‘legitimize’ Catholic Action again and promptly re-instated lay 
members to its chain of command, but with overall control remaining with the 
commission of Cardinals and, ultimately, the Pope.15
(iv) The emergence of political Catholicism
Although Catholic political development had originally been impeded by papal 
opposition to the unified Italian state, when the Non expedit was relaxed in 1905 
Catholic deputies entered parliament for the first time.16 Catholic deputies elected to 
parliament thereafter were clearly divided between ‘Christian democrats’ and a 
group of mainly bourgeois deputies willing to collaborate with the Liberal and
12 Ibid., p. 162
13 Ibid., p. 162. For more details on this period see Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p.26 and Pollard, 
The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 191.
14 Pollard, Italy in Buchanan & Conway, Political Catholicism in Europe, p. 87.
15 Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p. 28.
16 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 25.
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i n
conservative ruling elite. Despite the apparently relaxed stance of the Vatican 
towards the new phenomenon of Catholic politicians, Pollard suggests that the 
introduction of Catholics into Italian political life was a carefully controlled 
experiment, closely supervised by the local bishops and by the Pope himself.
Guiding the opinions and actions of both the Catholic electorate and the Catholic 
deputies was the Unione Elettorale, one of Pius X’s creations, bom out of the re­
organisation of the whole Italian Catholic movement between 1903 and 1905.18
Don Luigi Sturzo, founder of the Partito popolare italiano considered the 
Unione Elettorale to be a cynical manipulation of the Catholic vote for the benefit of 
Giolitti and as such was highly critical of it.19 It is thus evident that the policy of 
central papal primacy, considered by all the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century popes to be essential to the stability and future of the Holy See, was a 
hindrance to politically motivated Catholics who did not subscribe to the Vatican 
line.
Catholic Action’s structural stasis during the reign of Pius XI, belied a whole 
raft of organisational, ideological and diplomatic changes that took place during the 
same period. The first two were relatively straightforward to achieve, in that the 
Vatican had total control over them, whereas diplomacy was a much more sensitive 
affair, particularly as a result of the politicisation of Catholic Action. Militant 
factions of Catholic Action were not afraid to criticise Mussolini’s government; this 
at a time when negotiations were under way with the Fascists to resolve the Roman 
Question. The Church struggled at times to keep the lid on these militants while 
assuring the government that it was fully committed to the Lateran Pacts. Ironically 
the Pacts gave Catholic Action a greater level of independence than it had ever had -  
the full protection of the Church and guarantees from the Fascists to let it operate 
freely -  officially only on a spiritual and moral plane. But this freedom allowed it to 
secretly formulate its plans for the post-Fascist political future of Italy.
The Catholic political activists of the 1930’s found new alliances with forces 
to the left and right in the fight against Fascism. During this period they also became 
increasingly convinced that only Catholicism offered real solutions to the many
17 Ibid., pp. 26-7. As Conway points out, it is worth remembering that before 1914 and in many cases 
during the 1920’s and 1930’s the term ‘Christian democrat’ was used to express the populist nature o f  
these new political movements and did not necessarily signify adherence to the principles o f a 
democratic political system, as Pope Leo XIII was keen to stress in his encyclical Graves de comuni 
o f 1901.
18 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 18.
19 Ibid., p. 19.
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problems facing both Italy and Europe.20 In fact, European Catholic politics during 
the inter-war period reflected the trends of Italian Catholic politics, both remaining 
focused on two central themes: the protection of the Church and its institutions 
against its real or imagined enemies, and the instigation of what it considered to be a 
distinctive manifesto of Catholic-inspired policies based principally on papal 
encyclicals.21
(v) The Partito Popolare
From the time of Pius EX, the Vatican had encouraged a distrust of social democracy 
as a precursor of socialism, and hence of communism. Consequently, the Vatican’s 
attitude to political parties was coloured by how they stood in relation to the 
communist threat. Therefore, after the first World War the emergence of a solidly
democratically-inspired political Catholicism did little to attract the support of the
22papacy. This can be clearly seen in the Vatican’s attitude to Don Luigi Sturzo’s 
Partito popolare formed in 1919 : its antipathy towards the Ppi and its Liberal 
bedfellows was exacerbated by the election of Pius XI in February 1922.23
In February 1922 and again in July of that year, amid the deepening 
parliamentary crisis of the Liberal State, the King asked Filippo Meda, veteran 
Catholic politician and leader of the parliamentary caucus of the Ppi, to take over as 
Prime Minister. To Sturzo’s dismay, Meda refused, unwilling to take upon himself 
the responsibilities of the office. As a consequence his party was deprived of the 
opportunity to play an important role in politics, but more importantly, squandered 
the last real chance to preserve Italian democracy. The resulting parliamentary crisis 
of October 1922 led to the Fascist march on Rome at the end of that month. The 
restoration of political stability was deemed to be crucial by the Vatican and thus the 
Ppi were pressurized into supporting the government formed by Mussolini at the 
beginning of November.24
However the Vatican had underestimated the Ppi’s strong desire for 
independence from Vatican directives. And it was far from isolated in the Catholic 
world: it had the support of almost all the Catholic unions, the press, the peasant
20 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 48.
21 Ibid, p. 100. See also section A3 o f this thesis.
22 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 40
23 Pollard, Italy in Buchanan & Conway, Political Catholicism in Europe, p. 81
24 Ibid., p. 81
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leagues and the majority of the parochial clergy. The Vatican had in fact, since the 
emergence of the Ppi, lost control over most of the old Catholic movement. 
Nevertheless, the fortunes of the Ppi were linked inextricably to the attitudes to it of 
Popes Benedict XV and his successor, Pius XI. Benedict was supportive of the 
formation of the party, assuming he would be able to use it to further his own 
political agenda. Pius XI was simply suspicious of it, particularly since, by the start 
of his reign in 1922, Don Sturzo’s party was displaying a dangerous disregard for the 
views of the Holy See. Pius was also concerned about some of its social and 
economic policies, while being himself attracted to a ‘strong-man’ strategy for 
defeating bolshevism. The advent of Mussolini was thus both timely and auspicious 
in the eyes of the Pope who expected to be well rewarded for helping to smooth 
Mussolini’s path to power. But it was a two-way deal and they both held the same 
bargaining chip -  Don Sturzo’s Ppi -  which was immediately deemed expendable by 
the Vatican.
When Mussolini began to put pressure on the Ppi in the summer of 1923 the 
Vatican had a clear choice to make: to be politically neutral -  thus assuring the 
independence of the Ppi, or support Mussolini, necessitating the emasculation of the 
Ppi. It chose the latter partly due to Mussolini’s threat of violence against Catholic 
clergy and institutions, but also due to a shrewd calculation: at least in the short term, 
Fascism offered protection against the Communist threat, social peace and political 
stability, and most importantly an enormous amelioration of the Church’s condition 
compared to its experiences under the Liberal governments.
Although Pius XI, like his successor Pius XII, was keen to protect the 
Church from what he perceived to be the evils of democratism, communism, 
socialism, secularism and ideally even fascism, support for the latter was, in the 
circumstances, necessary to protect the Church’s longer-term interests. To this end, 
Pius XI discouraged, ignored and rejected Don Sturzo's Ppi, facilitating its eventual 
dissolution. Ostricised by both the Fascists and the Catholic Church, the eventual 
collapse of the Ppi was inevitable and essential for the subsequent triumph of 
Mussolini and Fascism.
In the face of Fascist harassment Don Sturzo went into exile in New York 
and Alcide De Gasperi chose the same path but was arrested, imprisoned but
25 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 21
26 Ibid., p.29.
16
eventually released at the request of the Vatican 27 In 1929, the year of the Lateran 
Pacts, Alcide De Gasperi, on his release from prison, was given a poorly paid post in 
the Vatican library. But why was this? Was he being held in reserve? Was the 
Vatican already making preparations for the post-Fascist political landscape? With 
its customary eye to the future, the Vatican was already building links with Europe's 
fascist dictators in order to strengthen its position at the heart of European politics. 
Now the gap between its political and spiritual goals was really narrowing: 
transforming the Church into an apostolic organisation committed to the re-christian- 
isation of modem society became the call-to-arms of both the clergy and the new 
generation of Catholic political activists being clandestinely schooled in the ranks of 
Catholic Action.28 It would not be long before the ‘laicist’ tradition of Sturzo and the 
popolari would be lost to this new generation of Catholic activists.
(vi) The Lateran Pacts
The advent of Fascism not only usurped any hope of political democracy in Italy, it 
also caused major problems for the Catholic Church. From as early as 1922 it found 
itself the victim of repression by the Fascist police with the main target being the 
Catholic Action youth groups and sports associations which were perceived to be in 
competition with the Fascist Balilla (youth organisations). Given the forthright 
nature of the legislation being pushed through Parliament to establish the Balilla, it 
was the very survival of Catholic youth groups that was a major concern for Pius XI. 
This goes some way to explain his decision to take the initiative in seeking a
29definitive solution of the Roman Question in the spring of 1926.
Reconciliation of the Roman Question was for Pius XI, as for his second-in- 
command Gasparri, a major objective of his reign:30 restoring some kind of temporal 
power to the Catholic Church would add a sense of legitimacy to its political 
ambitions. While negotiations for the Lateran Pacts were under way, Pius XI 
declared that he wanted a Treaty which would accept for the Holy See a tme, proper 
and real territorial sovereignty, something which he considered to be self-evidently 
necessary and due to an institution which cannot be subject to any earthly 
sovereignty.31
27 Pollard confirms this action by the Vatican in ibid., p. 49.
28 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 40.
29 Pollard, The Vatican cmdItalian Fascism, p. 38.
30 Ibid., p. 23.
31 Pio XI, Discorsi, 1929-1933, II, Cittk del Vaticano 1985, p. 9.
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This theme was taken up in a letter from Pius XI to Cardinal Gasparri dated
i.L
30 May 1929, a matter of days after the Pacts had been ratified:
Anche nel Concordato sono in presenza, se non due Stati, certissimamente 
due sovranita pienamente tali, cioe pienamente perfette, ciascuna nel suo 
ordine, ordine necessariamente determinato dal rispettivo fine, dove e appena 
d’uopo soggiungere che la oggettiva dignita dei fini, determina non meno 
oggettivamente e necessariamente Tassoluta superiorita della Chiesa.32
The concept of Church superiority over the State33, which from a Catholic 
perspective goes back centuries but was ‘legitimised’ by the 1929 Pacts according to 
the Church’s interpretation of them, is one of the elements of Church/State relations 
under Fascism criticised vehemently by Jemolo. Jemolo denounces what he calls the 
‘conditioning of our time’, in other words, the limits imposed by the authoritarian 
regime on one’s freedom to challenge opinions; the statement that lacks critical 
debate; and the prevalence of a tendency that favours the predominance of the rights 
of the Church over those of the State (i.e. canon law over ecclesiastical law).34
With his part in the Lateran negotiations, Mussolini had only compounded 
these issues: he had made huge concessions to the Vatican that no Liberal 
government would have even contemplated. This ties in with Pollard’s assessment of 
the Vatican’s manipulation of the Fascist government to resolve the ‘Roman 
Question’ as ‘opportunistic’.35 Hebblethwaite agrees: the Pacts were signed with ‘the 
Italian State’ not Fascism.36 The Vatican simply used Fascism to guarantee, by 
means of the Pacts, its future spiritual, juridical, financial and political stability. For 
all its bullying and bravado, Fascism had no response to the astuteness of the 
Catholic Church, which negotiated for itself a position of strength which was 
massively underestimated by Mussolini.
Even so, when the Vatican insisted on a clause banning excommunicated 
priests from holding public office it was fiercely resisted by the government, and its 
proposals on marriage required such drastic amendments to Italian matrimonial law
32 F. Pacelli, Diario della Conciliazione (con verbali e appendice di documenti), Citta del Vaticano, 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana: 1959, p. 550.
33 This was an extremely important concept which, during the 1930’s and 1940’s, had become 
embedded in the Italian psyche.
34 C. Mirabelli, L ’appartenenza confessionale, Padova, Cedam, 1975, p.80. Gianni Long also 
considered Jemolo’s contribution to reawakening interest in the debate on both aspects o f law dealing 
with Church/State relations to be significant, even though the debate had little exposure. See G. Long, 
A lie origini del pluralismo confessionale: II dibattito sulla liberta religiosa nell ’eta della Costituente 
Bologna, IlMulino: 1990, pp. 312-3.
35 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, pp. 57-8.
36 P. Hebblethwaite, Paul VI: The first modem Pope, London, Harper-Collins: 1993, p. 189.
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37that Mussolini fought them until the last moment. But the most difficult problem, 
and one that nearly shipwrecked the negotiations on at least two occasions, was the 
question of the future of Catholic Action and in particular its youth organisations.38 
Indeed, even the final version of the Pacts failed to resolve this issue, and so from 
the moment the Pacts were signed in February 1929, there followed two years of 
tension between the Fascist government and Catholic Action, the most prominent of 
the remaining religious organisations with any influence. There was constant 
bickering over interpretations of the Lateran Pacts and a stream of accusations and 
denials regarding the political orientation and activity of the organisation.
Despite the enormous impact the Pacts were to have on Church/State 
relations, the negotiations themselves had been shrouded in secrecy.39 It appeared 
that even the Pope harboured doubts and concerns right up to the last minute. Only a 
very restricted circle was aware of the negotiating process: the chief negotiators for 
the Lateran Pacts were, for Italy, the lawyer and Consigliere di Stato, Domenico 
Barone (whom Mussolini considered to be ‘a faithful Fascist’) and for the Holy See, 
Francesco Pacelli, brother of Mons. Eugenio Pacelli, later Cardinal Secretary of 
State under Pius XI and then Pope, Mons. Borgoncini-Duca, Secretary for 
Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs and later first Nuncio in Italy, and his deputy 
Mons. Pizzardo.40 It was, according to Jemolo, a surprise to the Italian people and 
apparently, even to the foreign ministers of  other countries when the signing of  the 
Pacts was announced on 11th February 1929.41 Even those working in the Secretariat 
of State, like Monsignor Giovanni Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI, 
employed at the time as a junior minutante or clerk, did not hear about the 
negotiations until the beginning of 1929.
37 For details on this, the biggest stumbling block the negotiators faced, see Pollard, The Vatican and 
Italian Fascism, pp. 67-70.
38 Ibid., p. 44.
39 For various accounts o f the sequence o f events that led to the signing o f the Lateran Pacts in 1929, 
see. Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, pp. 225-228; D. Veneruso, II seme della pace. La cultura 
cattolica e il nazionalimperialismo tra le due guerre, Roma, Studium, 1987, pp. 9 Iff; Pio XI, 
Discorsi, 1929-1933, Vol. I, Citta del Vaticano 1985, p.647; A. Giovagnoli, La cultura 
democristicma: La Chiesa cattolica e identita italiana (1918-1948) Bari, Laterza: 1991, p. 41 and 
especially Francesco Pacelli, Diario della Conciliazione. For evidence that the negotiations that led to
the Lateran Pacts had begun with pre-Fascist Liberal governments, see F. Margiotta Broglio, Italia e
Santa Sede dalla grande guerra alia Conciliazione, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1966.
40 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 48.
41 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, p. 229.
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The Lateran Pacts were passed as law (no. 810) on 27th May 1929.42 Jemolo 
claims that in the Lateran Accords the Vatican saw a charter, that of the political 
influence of the papacy and of foreign Catholic parties, put at the service of future 
Italian foreign and colonial policy, for which the Vatican had high hopes. Among the 
political classes there was the impression that the Pacts were significant not for what 
they eradicated from the past, but for the opportunities they presented for the 
future.43 But the great triumph of the Lateran Pacts -  at least in the eyes of those who 
signed it -  was the resolution of the Roman Question, bringing peace and 
reconciliation and even the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between two 
very different kinds of international body -  the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See. 
The latter was at best an anomaly in the international order, for although the Papacy 
had been relieved of its territorial, ‘temporal’ power during unification, in its ensuing 
conflict with the Italian State it had succeeded in retaining the attributes of 
sovereignty in the eyes of the other European powers.44 This was due mainly to the 
enormous spiritual and moral authority it enjoyed as a result of its position at the 
head of the universal Catholic Church 45 Indeed, the Lateran Pacts gave rise to what 
became known as the Dualist Theory : the principle of this theory is considered to be 
the basic premise of the Lateran Treaty, by which the Holy See considers and affirms 
itself to be the holder of a dual international legal personality; that is, as the supreme 
institution of the Catholic Church and as sovereign of its own state.46
For the ratification of the Pacts only two days of parliamentary 
‘deliberations’ were allocated. Within five days the Pacts were ratified. In the 
discussions the Treaty was given prominence since it constituted a tangible success 
for the government, while the Concordat, which had reinvested the Church with long 
lost and even unhoped-for legislative powers, was, naturally, given less 
parliamentary time for debate47 The only speech opposing the Concordat was made 
by Benedetto Croce. With, surprisingly, no objection to the conciliation as a whole 
and the Treaty in particular, he concentrated his attack on the Concordat. With the 
Concordat, the State had totally abandoned a previously secular tradition which, he
42 See Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism for the text o f the Treaty, the Concordat and the 
Financial Settlement in English. The original can be found in Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei 
Decreti del Regno dTtalia (a cura del) Ministero per la Giustizia, Rome, pp. 5468-5493.
43 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, p. 231.
44 See Mario Falco: The legal position o f the Holy See before and after the Lateran Agreements (Two 
lectures delivered in the University o f Oxford by the author) translated by A.FI.Campbell, London: 
1935.
45 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 79.
46 Marottoli, La Santa Sede nel Diritto Internazionale, Ch. 1.6.
47 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, pp. 239-241.
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claimed would re-ignite squabbles and sterile arguments over issues long-considered 
dead and buried 48
I would take issue with Pollard’s comment that “there was nothing very 
special or unusual about the Italian Concordat of 1929, except for the fact that 
whereas all the others had been concluded with more or less democratic regimes, this 
one had been agreed with a Fascist dictatorship.”49 To the Holy See it was a 
landmark Concordat, bringing into ecclesiastical jurisdiction key areas of Italian 
legislature, such as the employability of apostate priests in the public sector, 
important aspects of matrimonial law and religious education in schools. Thanks to 
the Treaty and its reincarnation as a temporal sovereign entity, the Holy See was able 
to defend and fight for implementation of the terms of the Concordat in a much more 
vigorous way than it could have before.
But in 1929, support for the Pacts was far from unanimous even in Catholic 
circles. Giovanni Battista Montini, as spiritual director of FUCI (Federazione 
universitaria cattolica italiana) had considerable influence over its members and 
was to a large extent responsible for the strong reservations they expressed about the 
Pacts at their 1929 Congress. Although, like many others close to the Vatican 
hierarchy, he did not officially know that negotiations for the Pacts were taking place 
until late in the process, Montini had been voicing doubts about the value of a 
concordat even before the negotiations were completed -  ‘If the liberty of the Pope 
cannot be guaranteed by the strong faith of a free people, and especially by the 
Italian people, then no territory and no treaty will be able to do so.’50
The Pope, on the other hand was overjoyed by the agreement. In a meeting
iL
with students and professors of the University of the Sacred Heart on February 13 
1929, Pius XI referred to Mussolini as “un uomo come quello che la Prowidenza Ci
48 Ibid., pp.246-7. Jemolo’s own position on the Concordat was unique. He made a clear distinction 
between his preferred outcome and the route to take should that outcome not be realised. Ideally he 
would have preferred a Church that did not want Concordats, but liberty for all, a Church which 
renounced its mediaeval structures and the rigid division o f the social classes. In exchange the State 
would commit itself to expanding the boundaries o f Vatican City State and improve the deplorable 
economic conditions of the diocesan priests by means o f an additional tax on those who declare 
themselves members o f the Catholic Church (A.C. Jemolo, Per la pace religiosa d ’Italia, Firenze, La 
Nuova Italia, 1944, p.38-9). This proposal was similar to that actually put in place by the revision of 
the Concordat in 1984. The latter, however, was not based on an additional tax paid by the members 
o f a given confession, but on a share between State, Catholic Church and other churches who signed 
up to the scheme (Assemblea di Dio in Italia and Unione delle chiese awentiste del 7° giom o) o f a 
predetermined amount o f the tax on one’s personal income, based on one’s personal choice declared 
on one’s tax return. Jemolo knew that his vision was unrealistic, but in fact the position o f the Catholic 
Church was even more entrenched than even Jemolo could have imagined: the Church gave way on 
neither the Concordat nor on anything else.
49 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 4.
50 Cited in Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 54.
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ha fatto incontrare” and to the Concordat as “certo tra i migliori che si sono fin qua 
fatti; ed e con profonda compiacenza che crediamo di avere con esso ridato Dio 
all’Italia e l’ltalia a Dio.”51 Mussolini’s reaction to the Treaty gave a different 
interpretation. In a speech he gave to the Italian parliament on May 13th 1929, he 
said.
Nello Stato la Chiesa non e sovrana e non e nemmeno libera. . .
Non abbiamo risuscitato il potere temporale dei Papi: lo abbiamo sepolto . . .  
gli abbiamo Iasciato tanto territorio quanto bastasse per seppelime ii 
cadavere.52
In response to the Duce’s speech was a letter53 from the Pope to Cardinal Gasparri 
dated 30th May 1929 of which the following are extracts:
‘Stato cattolico’, si dice e si ripete, ma ‘Stato fascista’; ne prendiamo atto 
senza speciali difficolta, anzi volontieri, giacche cio vuol indubbiamente dire 
che lo Stato fascista, tanto nell’ordine delle idee e delie dottrine quanto in 
ordine alia pratica azione, nulla vuol ammettere che non s’accordi con la 
dottrina e con la pratica cattolica; senza di che Stato cattolico non sarebbe ne 
non potrebbe esistere.54
The quest to make Italy a Catholic State was dear to Pius XI and this meant the 
subordination of all other religions in Italy55. Even though other religions were 
‘permitted’ or ‘admitted’ or ‘tolerated’, only Roman Catholicism was officially 
recognised by the State as laid down in Article 1 of the Treaty.
The chirograph ended with a series of prises de position regarding the 
interpretation of the Lateran Pacts. It was not true, declared the Pope, that the 
Concordat had reserved to the State the right to veto ecclesiastical appointments. It 
was not true that ecclesiastical organisations had to apply to the State for legal 
recognition. In particular, the idea that the Treaty and the Concordat could be 
separated, that the one could remain effective while the other lapsed, was 
inadmissible:
teniamo . . .  a ricordare e dichiarare che secondo i patti sottoscritti il Trattato 
non e il solo che non pud piu essere oggetto di discussione: o per spiegarci 
meglio, che Trattato e Concordato, secondo la lettera e lo spirito loro . . .
51 Cited in Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, p.233.
52 Ibid., p. 234.
53 Cited in full in Francesco Pacelli’sD /on o  della Conciliazione (Appendix XLII -  Lettera del Santo 
Padre al Cardinale Gasparri, 30 maggio 1929).
54 Ibid., p.554.
55 Discussed more fully in Section A2 (iii) o f  this thesis.
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sono Funo complemento necessario delFaltro e Funo dalFaltro inseparabile e 
inscindibile.
Ne viene che simul stabant oppure simul cadent; anche se dovesse per 
conseguenza cadere la ‘Citta del Vaticano’ col relativo Stato.56
This comment shows how important the Lateran Pacts were to the Church 
in 1929, and how their importance must have grown by 1946 with the onset of the 
new democratic Italy and the uncertainties the new democracy brought with it for the 
Vatican.
Mussolini’s parliamentary attack on the Holy See had given Pius XI the 
opportunity to reiterate in vigorous language the most radical historical affirmations 
of the Church’s pre-eminence, to clearly delineate the Holy See’s interpretation of 
certain passages in the Concordat, and above all to enunciate his thesis on the 
indissolubility of the unity of the Treaty and the Concordat.57 The Pope’s 
intransigence on the matter of the Pacts stems from a deep-rooted desire to prove to 
the world that the Holy See was now truly independent of Italy.58 This 
intransigence, encountering at least as much obstinacy and bravado from Mussolini, 
led Church and State into a crisis between 1930 and 1931 which markedly changed 
the dynamic of their relationship, although according to Jemolo it remained, on the 
whole, cordial.59 But the question of the Holy See’s independence as a result of the 
resolution of the Roman Question, has generated its own polemic: was the self- 
inflicted isolation of the late 19th and early 20th century Popes as damaging a 
problem as the Church would like us to think? Jemolo points out that there was 
general scepticism with regard to the Holy See and a Fascist Government settling the 
Roman Question, which he claims was “a grievance which all knew to be without 
substance.”60 Scoppola, on the other hand, argues that the Pacts bridged the divide 
between Church and State that had opened up during the Risorgimento.61
Pallieri throws the cat among the pigeons by raising doubts as to whether the 
Pacts actually solved the Roman Question at all when both participating sides put 
such diametrically opposing interpretations on them. He argues that to understand
56 Pacelli, Diario della Conciliazione, p.556.
57 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, p. 236.
58 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 160.
59 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, p. 270. For information on the crisis o f 1930-1931 see Poggi, 
Catholic Action in Italy, pp.25-30, Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, pp.250-258 and Pollard, The 
Vatican and Italian Fascism. For analysis o f how leadership changes on both sides were to have a 
bearing on the outcome o f the crisis, see Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism pp. 76, 134-5, 153 
& 161.
60 For more see Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, pp. 226-228.
61 Scoppola, La repubblica deipartiti, p. 158.
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such diverse analyses one must go back and examine the historical events that led to 
the fall of the Papal States in 1870. The problem arose, he explains, from the fact 
that the soldiers of the Italian State did not actually set foot inside St. Peter’s or any 
building within the confines of the Vatican itself. As the Vatican claimed, the troops 
did not enter because the new Italian State respected the sovereignty of the Vatican 
which, it claimed, continued to exist even after the annexation of the Papal States. 
However, between 1870 and 1929 the Holy See did not have sovereignty over the 
Vatican, which was itself much smaller than the State of Vatican City that emerged 
following the Lateran Pacts. Moreover, the Italian State did not see the need to 
encroach on the Vatican itself to impose State sovereignty over it, since all that Italy 
had allowed was de facto extra-territoriality -  like the status of an embassy.62
This non-invasion of the Vatican is the root of the polemic over the Lateran 
Pacts: according to the Holy See, the Treaty only served to reaffirm its sovereignty, 
whereas the State considered that Vatican sovereignty was created by the Treaty.63 
Pallieri agrees with the Holy See’s argument on this point:
Le truppe italiane si astennero dal penetrare nella residenza del Pontefice non 
tanto perche ritenessero inutile ai fini della occupazione, quanto piuttosta per 
reverenza o per timore per le conseguenze che il fatto avrebbe provocato; 
perche comunque, se debellate erano le armi, tutt’altro che diminuita era la 
autorita del Pontefice.64
During the years of the liberal governments, Pallieri notes that at no time did the 
Holy See make official complaints to the various governments regarding its lack of 
sovereign status: presumably it was biding its time until more favourable 
circumstances emerged.
When Mussolini came to power, the favourable circumstances came with 
him. The Church immediately became more vociferous on the issue of the 
incomplete and ineffectual occupation of Vatican territory and this became one of 
the fundamental premises on which the Pacts were negotiated. The Pacts, according 
to Pallieri, did not resolve the Roman Question but rather allowed both sides the 
opportunity to emerge from a distasteful diplomatic impasse with a degree of honour 
-  even though none of the causes of the original dispute had actually been resolved.65 
Questions have in fact been raised regarding the validity of the Holy See’s
621 am indebted to Professor John Pollard for this information.
63 G.B. Pallieri, La Sovranita Temporale della Santa Sede e i Trattati del Laterano in Chiesa e Stato, 
Vol.n, Studi Giuridici, Milano, Unione Tipograflca, 1939, p. 5.
64 Pallieri, La sovranita Temporale della Santa Sede, p. 6.
65 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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legal status at the time of the signing of the Pacts. This could be yet another reason 
for delaying negotiations throughout the liberal years in anticipation of a more 
sympathetic government. Professor Arangio-Ruiz, the eminent constitutionalist, 
stated in 1929 that
per la conclusione del Trattato bastava che la Santa Sede fosse persona nel 
diritto intemo italiano; non era necessario fosse allora persona giuridica 
intemazionale.66
Ruffmi argues that the Holy See should have been a ‘persona giuridica 
intemazionale’ when the Pacts were signed, but only became such after the Treaty 
had been signed, although he and other law experts of the day were not convinced by 
Arangio-Ruiz’s argument:
non possiamo comprendere che un vero trattato intemazionale possa 
conchiudersi fra uno soggetto o persona di diritto intemazionale ed un 
soggetto o persona di semplice diritto intemo, che acquisti il carattere 
intemazionale e sovrano soltanto al momento della ratifica del Trattato 
medesimo.67
In other words the Vatican, prior to and during the negotiations for the Pacts, did not 
have sufficient legal status (i.e. was only a ‘persona di semplice diritto intemo’) to 
enter into and undertake such negotiations. And as for Vatican City State the fact 
that it did not exist prior to the signing of the Pacts is evident from the fact that the 
state only came into being as a result of the Lateran Treaty.
(vii) After Fascism
A number of factors ensured that the Church would emerge from the war relatively 
unscathed and as the only national institution remaining intact and able to give 
guidance on the country’s choice of political leadership. As Fascism moved closer to 
Nazism, the Catholic Church chose to adopt a more cautious stance with Mussolini’s 
regime; early in the war the Church’s persistent appeals for peace and its neutral 
position had helped ease from the ‘social memory’ of Italians the fact that it had 
openly encouraged Fascist intervention in Ethiopia and Spain; Catholics participated 
in the Resistance movement and there was the Church’s assistance, albeit arguably 
sporadic, for Jews and political offenders; the organizational resources offered by Ac
66 Arangio-Ruiz, La Citta del Vaticano, in “Rivista di dirittopubblico”, 1929, fasc. VI, from p.600.
67 F. Ruffini, Relazioni tra Stato e Chiesa: lineamenti storici e sistematici, Bologna, II Mulino, 1974, 
p. 196.
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to the Christian Democrat Party gave it a huge advantage over other parties that had 
been effectively shut down under Fascism; the post-war constitutional crisis in Italy, 
the disastrous state the country was in and the concept of Church superiority over the 
State that had been drip-fed into the Italian psyche dissuaded political parties, 
especially of the Left, from demanding that the Church pay the price for its support 
of Fascism; the traditional ‘moderate’ political parties in Italy had been thoroughly 
compromised with the Fascist regime leaving them very weak when the regime 
broke down, thus leaving the door open for the Dc party to present itself as the new 
‘moderate’ party; and finally there was the Church’s ability to overcome crises, to 
give of its best in difficult situations, to appear as a moral force of the first 
magnitude in the face of social and political upheaval68
Giovagnoli claims that the Church hierarchy was itself surprised by the 
Church’s post-war esteem and ensuing status. He talks of an “unexpected revival of 
the influence of the Church in Italian society, in spite of its support of Fascism.”69 
Such a comment seems to me to be either misguided or a little too modest an 
analysis of an organisation which had been steadily planning for such an opportunity 
since unification. Centralization of papal authority had been achieved and 
furthermore, both Pius XI and Pius XII had openly expressed the desire that Italy 
should be governed within a framework of Catholic principles.
The Lateran Pacts had secured for the Church a juridical status that was at 
least on a par with, if not superior to, state legislature. This came principally from 
the concept, as championed by Guiseppe Dossetti in the Constituent Assembly, of 
the Church as an independent and sovereign entity -  an ‘ordinamento originario’ -  
the legal system of which is unique, and not derived from that of any other state. 
Effectively, as a result of the Lateran Pacts, and the creation of Vatican City State in 
1929, the Vatican was considered in international law as a sovereign and indepenent 
state.
In relation to the position of the Church, very little changed under the new 
Republican Constitution simply because the very same Pacts were ratified by the 
Constituent Assembly (i.e. by their inclusion within the body of the Constitution) 
and state laws remained largely untouched for at least two decades thereafter.
68 Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p. 27-8.
69 A. Giovagnoli, Ilpartito  italiano: LaDemocrazia Cristiana dal 1942 al 1994, Roma, Laterza: 1996,
p. 28.
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One cannot ignore the influence of Pius XII in helping the Church to emerge 
from the ravages of war in Italy with such an elevated status. The Church had 
responded to a widespread identity crisis within Italian society during the demise of 
Fascism: particularly in Rome, but also elsewhere, the charismatic figure of the Pope 
became the substitute for the Duce70 Pacelli, despite being accused of being weak 
and ineffectual in his dealings with his own people as Secretary of State, as Pope 
was a very effective strategist. The main trait in his strategy was authority: in the 
film Pastor Angelicus (1942), he is presented as the supreme leader, a more 
authentic version of Mussolini.71 For his part in conceiving and stage-managing the 
idea of Pius XII as ‘The Angelic Shepherd’, the Pope nominated Luigi Gedda, then 
President of G.I.A.C., Commendatore of San Gregorio.72 Gedda had an unusually 
close relationship with the Pope, and was to be instrumental in delivering the 
landslide victories enjoyed by the Dc party from 1946 to 1948.
This relationship developed due to the close links between the Holy See and 
the leadership of Catholic Action. The significance of the internal organizational 
expansion of Ac (set in motion by a direct request of the Pope before the end of the 
war)73 has been correctly noted by the Marxist historian Candeloro:
the Church . .. has sought above all to strengthen Catholic Action, to make it 
into an organization that would be able . . .  to stimulate and control the 
political, labour and economic activities of the Italian Catholics; to organise 
their activity of propaganda and penetration into all social milieus, and the 
watch they keep on the press, the theatre, the film, the radio and sports .. . 
Beginning in 1944, ACI began to extend its activity to various spheres from 
which it had been barred during Fascism, both directly and through a series 
of dependent, coordinated and adherent organizations. It thus seeks to 
penetrate into all fields and to reach, through a variety of methods, the 
various strata of the population.74
The crisis of 1931 had proved to Pius XI and his successor that there were 
limitations to their joint goals of clericalisation and confessionalism under the 
Fascist Regime, despite the fact that under that same regime the Lateran Pacts had 
established the basis of a clerical, confessional state. It was only after the collapse of 
Fascism, and with the emergence of a Catholic ‘ruling class’ that their dream would 
come to fruition between the late 1940’s, and early 1960’s.
70 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 100.
71 McCarthy, The Crisis o f  the Italian State: From the origins o f  the Cold War to the Fall o f 
Berlusconi and Beyond, London: Macmillan, 1995, p.23.
72 C. Falconi, Gedda e VAzione cattolica, Firenze, Parenti: 1958, p. 296.
73 See Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p. 190.
74 Cited in Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p. 189.
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A2) Religious freedom for Protestants
(i) The legal position of protestant denominations prior to Fascism
The one aspect of the minority religions’ legal relationship with the State that 
remained constant throughout the nineteenth century was the total lack of uniformity 
in the relevant legislature with little desire to deal with the problem at a national level 
even after unification.75 In fact, the relationship between each minority religion and 
the State was largely based on its own attempts to establish a position as far as 
possible in line with its own doctrines, or at least on attempts to use its own specific 
criteria to adapt itself to particular situations determined by state laws.76 This 
difficulty in adopting any kind of uniform approach to dealing with the minority 
religious groups was further hampered by their demography and by the fact that they 
consisted of little more than 1% of the population. The Waldensians (or Valdesi) had 
the most clearly defined locus, concentrated mainly in the Val d’Aosta region of 
Italy. Other groups such as the Pentecostals, the YMCA, the Salvation Army and the 
7th Day Adventists were scattered right across the peninsula, with small groups of 
each denomination being particularly active in the poorer regions of the South.
Falzone undertakes a useful examination of the legal status of the minority 
religions and gives examples from old Italian constitutions and other ecclesiastical 
legislation. Article 1 of the Piedmontese civil code (20th June 1837) stated: “La 
religione cattolica apostolica e romana e la sola religione dello Stato. Gli altri culti 
attualmenti esistenti nello Stato sono semplicemente tollerati secondo gli usi e i
77regolamenti speciali che li riguardano.” An amendment to the Constitution of Sicily 
conceded by Pius DC on July 1st 1848 stated that “la professione della religione 
cattolica era condizione necessaria per il godimento dei diritti politici.”78 In 1848, 
apart from the Kingdom of Lombardo-Veneto where Jews and Protestants enjoyed 
freedom to operate under the Austrian imperial laws, it was only in Tuscany that “gli 
altri culti ora esistenti sono permessi conformemente alle leggi” (Statuto 
fondamentale toscano: 15th February 1848, art. I).79 In the other regions the pre­
existing state of intolerance continued to be observed, a situation affirmed notably by
75 For a useful but limited analysis o f the juridical position o f all the minority religions in Italy up to 
the early 1930’s, see M. Piacentini, I culti ammessi nello Stato italiano, Milano: Hoepli, 1934.
76 G. Peyrot, La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose diverse dalla cattolica in P. D ’Avack (Ed.), La 
legislazione ecclesiastica, Milano: Istituto per la scienza dell’amministrazione pubblica, 1967, pp. 
521-547.
77 Cited in Peyrot, La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose, p. 521.
78 Ibid., p. 522.
79 Ibid.
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the Neapolitan constitution which stated in article 3: “L’unica religione di Stato sara 
sempre la cristiana, cattolica, apostolica e romana, senza che possa essere permesso
fhmai l’esercizio di alcun’altra religione” (Costituzione napoletana: 10 February 
1848).80
a) The Albertine Statute
Piedmont’s Statute fondamentale del Regno of March 4th 1848 (known as the 
Albertine Statute after King Carlo Alberto) reaffirmed the pre-existing state of 
limited tolerance of the religious minorities as laid out in the Piedmont civil code of 
1837.81 The statute, which was adopted in 1870 as the Constitution of the new 
unified Kingdom of Italy, was arguably the most significant piece of ecclesiastical 
legislation of the 19th century: article 1 not only made Piedmont and then the whole 
Kingdom of Italy a Catholic confessional state, but also ensured, in varying degrees, 
the subordination of the country’s minority religions for the next 120 years. Article 1 
stated: “La religione cattolica, apostolica e romana e la sola religione dello Stato. Gli 
altri culti ora esistenti sono tollerati conformemente alle leggi”.82 The phrase ‘ora 
esistenti’ contains an implicit prohibition of the creation or admission of new 
religions, but they were not banned. In fact, by 1929, there were more minority 
religions in Italy than there had been in 1848. This was one of the reasons for 
considering article 1 of the Statute to be obsolete, particularly after the Law of 
Guarantees of 1871 had stated in article 2 clause 4 that “la discussione sulle materie 
religiose e pienamente libera.”83
The status of the minority religions from the time of the Albertine Statute 
onwards is complex and even the eminent Protestant commentator Giorgio Peyrot is 
at best unclear on the matter.84 The two largest minority religions -  the Waldensians 
(or Valdesi) and the Jews -  would soon after be treated independently: the Valdesi 
would be considered ‘emancipati’, by Regio Decreto 29.03.1848, no. 688 and the 
Jews ‘resi liberi’ by Regio Decreto 19.06.1848, no. 735. In fact, the Valdesi had been 
granted letters of permission to this effect on 17th February 1848, three weeks before 
ratification of the Statute. So even then there was a discrepancy of status between the
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Cited in Falzone, Vittorio, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, Milano: A.Giuffre, 1953, p. 9.
83 Cited in Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, p. 9.
84 See Peyrot, La legislazione suiie confessioni religiose, p. 544 and G. Peyrot, Religious liberty and  
conditions o f  Evangelical People in Italy, Rome, Ferraiolo, 1957, p. 24. For a clearer analysis o f  the 
situation, seel. Soffieti, Lo Statuto Albertino, Torino, Giappichelli, 1999.
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Statute and the law. Moreover, following the promulgation of the Albertine Statute, 
the legge Sineo (19th June 1848, n.735) was passed which ‘removed all doubts about 
the capacity of non-Catholic citizens to fulfil their civil, political and military 
duties’.86
In 1849, following an initiative by the Piedmontese government, the Ministry 
of the Interior set up a commission to look into the possibility of unifying the 
legislature dealing with the Valdesi and the Jews. However, due to the diverse needs, 
doctrines and demands of each group, the commission only succeeded in drawing up 
two separate sets of provisions, neither of which improved the position of the 
respective religions. The degree of religious freedom envisaged in these provisions 
highlighted the limits within which the idea of tolerance was conceived in the 
Albertine Statute of 1848: a tolerance which at that time was not yet open to the idea 
of full religious freedom.88 Although the new provisions were not presented to 
parliament until 1854, in September 1849 the Tavola valdese made its position very 
plain: “the Valdese Church, being such by virtue of its rule of faith and by its 
constitution, must govern itself in a totally independent way according to its 
principles and within the limits of common law; every obstacle or restriction 
imposed by the State on its activities or on its internal development, threatens its
on
right of autonomy and misrepresents it as a Church, leading to its destruction.”
The other notable amendments to the laws dealing with ecclesiastical bodies 
and their operation, the ‘Law of Guarantees’ of 1871 and the 1889 amendments to 
the laws dealing with public security, actually applied to Catholic ecclesiastical 
functions as well as to those of the minority religions.
85 In theory, the Albertine Statute remained in force until the 1948 Republican Constitution replaced 
it. So, constitutionally, all the minority religions remained ‘tollerati’ for 100 years. However, as far as 
ordinary law is concerned their position changed in 1929-30 with the Lateran Pacts and the 
accompanying civil laws (discussed later). At this time the Jews and the Valdese with their 
‘emancipate status became ‘ammessi’ along with every other non-Catholic religion. This was a 
backward step on paper for the ‘big two’ but an improvement for the others who had emerged under 
the liberal governments as merely ‘tollerati’.
86 Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, pp. 9-10.
87 Peyrot, La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose, p. 538.
88 Ibid., p. 539.
89 Dicharazione della Tavola valdese del 27 settembre 1849, in Peyrot, Rapporti tra Stato e Chiesa 
valdese in Piemonte nel triennio 1849/51, in ‘II diritto ecclesiastico’, 1955, pp. 11 Iff. The statement 
was very similar in tone and wording to the one made on 3rd September 1943, by the Valdese Synod, 
in response to the fall o f  Fascism. The Jewish community would be equally unimpressed by the new 
laws. For a detailed account o f the reaction o f both the Valdese and Jewish communities, see Peyrot, 
La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose, pp. 538-542.
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b) The ‘Law of Guarantees ’
The Law of Guarantees (R.D. 13.05.1871, no. 214)90 was so-called as it was an 
attempt by the Italian government to offer sufficient guarantees to the Holy See to 
pacify it following the annexation of the Papal States. However the way it was 
presented did more to further antagonise the Vatican: its title was “Legge sulle 
prerogative del Sommo Pontefice e della Santa Sede .. ”,91 in other words, the State 
was granting concessions to the Church and in so doing was implicitly subordinating 
the Church to the State. Article two of the law was thus considered by the Church to 
be particularly belittling: “L’attentato contro la persona del Sommo Pontefice e la 
provocazione a commetterlo sono puniti colle stesse pene stabilite per l’attentato e 
per la provocazione a commetterlo contro la persona del Re.”92 Catholic political 
doctrine at the time considered that the State was subordinate to the Church and so 
putting the heads of each institution on the same juridical plane was considered to be 
a grave insult to the Pope. Furthermore the final clause of article two, the most 
famous (or infamous) of the document: “La discussione sulle materie religiose e 
pienamente libera”, was perplexing to the Catholic Church in that it again 
undermined its authority by opening the door to Protestant propaganda. Article 17 
also contained a major put-down for the Catholic hierarchy:94 appeals against 
decisions made by the ecclesiastical authorities had to be made through the civil 
courts and in matters where ecclesiastical law overlapped or contravened civil law, 
the latter took precedence over the former. Hence, on a legal level, the Church was 
indeed subordinate to the State and, although it could argue that it was an 
‘ordinamento originario’, it was not an ‘ordinamento indipendente’.95 This situation 
was changed only by the Lateran Pacts.
In 1871, during the discussions for the Law of Guarantees, the Camera dei 
deputati was presented with the opportunity to deal definitively with the problem of 
the religious minorities by transforming the limited tolerance afforded to them by the 
Albertine Statute into full religious freedom. Instead, they drew back from such a 
bold move and in doing so let slip a golden opportunity to create national legislation
90 Raccolta Ufficiale, pp. 1014-1022.
91 Ibid., p. 1014.
92 Ibid., p. 1015.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., p. 1021.
95 See Section A3 (ii) o f this thesis.
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regarding the religious minorities, and left Italian law on the subject uncoordinated.96 
This shows that the Italian parliament had had the same reticence in 1871 as later in 
1948 to deal definitively with this question. However, in spite of the parliamentary 
vote of 1871 offering little improvement to the lot of the minority religions, it did 
reaffirm the principle of the non-interference of government in their day to day 
affairs.
c) The 1889 Public Security Law
Titolo I, Capo II of the Public Security law of 188997 contains 3 articles that apply to 
religious bodies which deal with meetings, gatherings and processions held outside 
churches. For example, article 7 states:
Chi promuove o dirige ceremonie religiose, o altro atto di culto fuori dei 
luoghi a cio destinati, owero processioni ecclesiastiche o civili nelle 
pubbliche vie, deve dame awiso, almeno tre giomi prima, all’autorita locale 
di pubblica sicurezza.
Nowhere in this decree does it suggest that the instructions applied to one group or 
another and so one must assume that they applied to all religions including Roman 
Catholicism.
According to Peyrot, with the provisions of the 1871 Law of Guarantees and 
the 1889 Public Security Law, as the 19th century drew to a close, the non-Catholic 
confessions found themselves in a position of full freedom and equality with the 
‘religion of State’, at least in relation to the exercise of and legal protection for their 
religious activities.98 This situation remained unaltered until the advent of Fascism, 
although during the same period Catholicism remained the official religion to which 
the State had recourse for State ceremonies.99
After World War One, the principal evangelical churches set in motion steps 
towards unification, or at least of federation, which culminated in the first Italian 
Evangelical Congress held in Rome in 1920. The outcomes of the congress were 
disappointing with regard to any form of union between the various churches.
96 See F. Scaduto, Guarentigiepontificie e rapporti tra Chiesa e Stato, Torino, 1884, pp. 396-397 and 
Peyrot, La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose, pp. 531.
97 R.D. 30.06.1889, no. 6144: Raccolta Ujficiale, pp. 2189-2192.
98 Falzone confuses the issue o f the status o f the minority religions by claiming that the 1889 law 
changed the old status o f ‘semplicemente tollerati’ or just ‘tollerati’, introducing the formula o f  the 
‘culti ammessi’: but none o f these terms actually appear anywhere in the body o f the law.
99 See Peyrot, La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose, p. 532 and Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti 
non cattolici, p. 12.
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However, as regards the theme of religious freedom, it actually recorded a consensus 
on a motion calling for the suppression of article 1 of the Albertine Statute, in the 
name of equality for all religions under the law and the complete separation of all the 
churches (presumably referring to evangelical churches and the Catholic Church) 
from the State.100
(ii) Protestants and the Fascist regime
As has already been mentioned, the Protestants had enjoyed relative freedom under 
the liberal governments. But in 1926, the same year that the secret negotiations to 
resolve the Roman Question were initiated, the Fascist government introduced the 
Testo unico delle leggi di Pubblica Sicurez2a approvato con R.D. 6 novembre 1926 
n. 1848. Article no. 232 of this law dealt with bad language, blasphemy and offences 
against religions.101 The Testo unico shattered the principle, in force up to that point, 
of equal punishment for such offences for all religions. The law created harsher 
punishment for offences against the Catholic faith and clergy than for the same 
offences committed against the non-Catholic religions. This raises an important 
question: was this law introduced as a pre-condition for starting discussions of the 
Lateran Pacts? The Vatican commission charged with assessing the possibility of a 
conciliation was set up in November 1925 with formal discussions beginning in 
March 1926. Thus, by the time the Law was passed in November 1926, discussions 
were well under way. Given the nature of the law it seems possible that it was either 
a pre-requisite for starting negotiations or at least formed part of them.
a) The ‘culti ammessi ’ laws
In his speech at the opening of the new Parliament on 21st April, 1929, the King 
announced that the implementation of the Lateran Concordat would require 
enactment of a series of legislative measures: one for the regulation of marriage, one 
to deal with ecclesiastical corporations and one to regulate the activities of the culti 
ammessi. Whilst the first two bills were a necessary consequence of the Concordat, 
as Pollard points out, the introduction of the culti ammessi bill was emphatically not: 
nothing in the Concordat necessitated the introduction of such a measure, as Rocco
100 Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale, p. 247.
101 Cited in Peyrot, La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose, p. 532.
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was forced to admit to the Vatican representatives on the Implementation 
Commission when they questioned him about it.102
At the end of April 1929, a fortnight before the ratification of the Lateran 
Pacts, the bill dealing with permitted religions was passed by the Fascist government. 
The wording of the Bill was as follows:
Riservata, com’e giusto, una particolare situazione giuridica alia Religione 
cattolica, che e la Religione dello Stato, devesi consentire, in omaggio al 
principio della liberta di coscienza, che nessuno Stato modemo potrebbe 
repudiare, il libero esercizio di tutti i culti, le cui dottrini o i cui riti non siano 
contrario alTordme pubblico o al buon costume.103
The law on the culti ammessi (Legge 24.06.1929, no. 1159)104 was announced 
simultaneously with the Pacts specifically to alleviate the concerns raised among the 
religious minorities by article 1 of the Treaty, according to which ‘Italia riconosce e 
riafferma il principio consacrato nell’art. 1 dello statuto del regno 4 marzo 1848, pel 
quale la religione cattolica, apostolica e romana e la sola religione dello Stato.’ 
Significantly, article 1 of the Statute also stated that ‘gli altri culti ora esistenti sono 
tollerati conformemente alle leggi’, but this clause did not appear in the Treaty, since 
it was an agreement purely between the Catholic Church and the Italian State. 
Theoretically the clause did, however, remain valid at a constitutional level, since 
throughout the Fascist years, the Statute remained the official Constitution of Italy. 
However, the culti ammessi laws would have much more impact on the minority 
religions than the Statute ever had: although the minorities had all been put on a level
102 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 65.
103 Cited in Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, pp. 248.
104 De Martino, V., Leggi d ’ltalia (Testo Vigente) XVEdizione Novara: De Agostini Giuridica, 1999, 
pp.315-6. The first six articles deal specifically with the culti ammessi and state: Art. 1: Sono ammessi 
nel Regno culti divers! dalia religione cattolica apostolica e romana, purche non professino principi e 
non seguono riti contrari all’ordine pubblico o al buon costume. L’esercizio, anche pubblico, di tali 
culti e libero; Art. 2: Gli istituti di culti diversi dalla religione dello Stato possono essere eretti in ente 
morale, con regio decreto su proposta del Ministro per la giustizia e gli affari di culto, di concerto col 
Ministro per Tintemo, uditi il Consiglio di Stato e il Consiglio dei ministri. Essi sono soggetti alle 
leggi civili concementi l’autorizzazione governativa per gli acquisti e per l’alienazione dei beni dei 
corpi morali. Norme speciali per l ’esercizio della vigilanza e del controllo da parte dello Stato possono 
inoltre essere stabiliti... ; Art. 3: Le nomine dei ministri dei culti diversi dalla religione dello Stato 
debbono essere notificate al Ministero della giustizia e degli affari di culto per 1’approvazione; Art. 4: 
La differenza di culto non forma eccezione al godimento dei diritti civili e politici ed alia 
ammissibilita alle cariche civili e militari (As seen in the L. 19.06.1848, no. 735 which ‘emancipated’ 
the Jews and had also appeared in the Albertine Statute o f March o f that year; Art. 5: La discussione 
in materia religiosa e pienamente libera (apart from the phrase: ‘sulle materie religiose’ this was the 
same wording as in the Law o f  Guarantees -  article 2 last clause); Art. 6 :1 genitori o che ne fa le veci 
possono chiedere la dispensa per i propri figli dal frequentare i corsi di istruzione religiosa nelle 
scuole pubbliche.
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legal playing field as far as ordinary law was concerned,105 at a constitutional level 
they were left high and dry by what had become, prior to but especially during the 
Fascist years, a toothless and effectively defunct Statute. Although some 
commentators consider the 1929 law to be on the face of it quite liberal in nature, 
there was contained within it a definite tendency towards restricting the activities of 
the Protestant organisations, with the law being left deliberately ambiguous so that 
more detail could be added at a later date (See footnote 106).
Article 5 was the most important and, from a Catholic point of view, most 
contentious: ‘La discussione sulle materie religiose e pienamente libera’. As Jemolo 
pointed out, the special Commissions set up (by the Camera dei Deputati and the 
Senato) to carry out the terms of the Pacts and the subsequent adjustments to the 
penal code forcefully denied that there was any conflict between the laws and the 
freedom they afforded minority religions. However, the reports of the Commissions 
were by no means favourable to the culti ammessi: a report by the special 
commission of the Chamber of Deputies specified that freedom of discussion, ‘che 
deve svolgersi nei limiti di serena ed elevata discussione, e sottoposta 
all’applicazione delle generali norme di polizia’; and warned against certain ‘audace, 
pretesa propaganda religiosa di parte di qualche organizzazione protestante’, who 
had shown themselves to be ‘insidiosa verso l’unione e la saldezza delle forze 
spirituali del regime’. The report ends: ‘Non puo dubitarsi che le autorita proposte 
sapranno vigilare.’106
The Boselli report for the special Committee of the Senate was equally harsh, 
outlining concerns from a number of sources regarding the thorny issue of 
propaganda:
per verita, nell’esercizio dei culti entro i propri templi la libera predicazione e 
legittima ediflcazione e presidio della propria fede. Al di fuori, agevolmente 
diviene pubblica perturbazione ed insidia contro la fede altrui, tanto piu se la 
propaganda popolarmente si diffonda fra ceti ignoranti e inconsci,107 e fra le 
disperazioni della poverta e i patimenti delle miserie occulte e vergognose.
Vi fu nella vostra Commissione chi volontieri avrebbe introdotta nella legge 
un’aggiunta per impedire un illecito proselitismo fra gli orfani di genitori 
cattolici, ovvero frapersone bisognose, deboli ed inesperte.m
105 See Falzone, La costituzione e d i  culti non cattolici, p. 13.
106 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, pp. 249-250.
107 This wording is similar to that used by the Pope in his letter to Cardinal Gasparri cited in Pacelli, 
Diario della Conciliazione, pp. 55Off..
108 Jemolo’s italics. Cited in Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, pp. 249-250.
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This idea of freedom of propaganda inside their churches but not outside begs the 
question of whether freedom of discussion as reiterated in the culti ammessi laws 
included freedom of propaganda and proselytism. As soon as the bill on the culti 
ammessi was announced, the Holy See made its own position on the matter clear; in 
particular, the Pope attacked the change in the status of the Protestant churches from 
culti tollerati (and also ‘emancipate and Tiberi’ respectively in the case of the 
Valdesi and the Jews) to culti ammessi which, whilst it involved some State 
intervention and regulation of their affairs, also meant official, legal recognition. In 
the letter to Gasparri, published in Osservatore Romano on 30th May 1929 (three 
weeks before the new law came into force), Pius XI begins with a defence of the 
position of the Catholic religion which “non e puramente e semplicemente un culto 
permesso ed ammesso, ma e quello che la lettera e lo spirito del Trattato e del 
Concordato lo vogliono.” The Pope is here detaching himself from the argument and 
placing the Catholic Church above the fray by saying that it is the Treaty and 
Concordat that determine the status of the Church in Italy.
But in the Church’s eyes the most dangerous part of the new law was article 5 
regarding freedom of discussion in religious matters. This almost word-for-word 
reproduction of Article 2 of the Law of Guarantees undermined those Catholics who 
had imagined that with the signing of the Pacts, and the consequent abrogation of the 
Law of Guarantees, the propaganda and proselytising activities of the Protestants 
could be controlled by the (albeit ineffectual) Albertine Statute. In the letter to 
Gasparri, the Pope’s position was unequivocal:
Piu delicata questione si presenta quando con tanta insistenza si parla della 
non menomata liberta. di coscienza e della piena liberta di discussione. Non e 
ammissibile che si sia intesa liberta assoluta di discussione, comprese cioe 
quelle forme di discussione, che possono facilmente ingannare la buona fede 
di uditori poco illuminati, e che facilmente diventano dissimulate forme di 
una propaganda, non meno facilmente dannosa alia religione dello Stato, e, 
per cio stesso, anche alio Stato e proprio in quello che ha di piu sacro la 
tradizione del popolo italiano e di piu essenziale la sua unita. Anche meno 
ammissibile Ci sembra che si sia inteso assicurare incolume, intatta, assoluta 
liberta di coscienza. Tanto varrebbe dire che la creatura non e soggetto al 
Creatore; tanto varrebbe legittimare ogni formazione o piuttosto 
deformazione della coscienza, anche le piu criminose e socialmente 
disastrose. Se si vuol dire che la coscienza sfugge ai poteri dello Stato, se si 
intende riconoscere, come si riconosce, che, in fatto di coscienza, competente 
e la Chiesa, ed essa sola in forza del mandate divino, viene con cio stesso
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riconosciuto che in Stato cattolico, liberta di coscienza e di discussione
devono intendersi e praticarsi secondo la dottrina e la legge cattolica.109
The last sentence in the above quotation, which appears in Jemolo but is, for 
some reason, not quoted by Falzone,110 is indicative of the Catholic Church’s view of 
freedom of conscience at the time. But despite the vitriole of the Vatican, the 
government did not allow itself to be drawn into the polemic with the Holy See on 
the issue and the law was passed through parliament unchallenged.
Surprisingly, as Gianni Long points out, the law was greeted with satisfaction 
by the Protestant leaders, for reasons which are not easily explained, but which are 
perhaps to be linked to the declarations of the Fascist government, favourable to the 
maximum religious freedom and absolutely against any form of confessionalism.111 
This was the first of a number of examples of the political inexperience of the 
Protestant leaders during the 1930’s and 1940’s: here it is evident in their failure to 
realise that such declarations were not to be taken at face value. The culti ammessi 
laws and the subsequent amendments passed from 1930 onwards, far from 
ameliorating their position, served only to drastically curb their freedom, while 
simultaneously bolstering the Vatican’s dream of a Catholic confessional state.
(iii) Repression of the Protestants
Although this section of the thesis deals only with the treatment meted out to 
Protestant religious groups under Fascism, it is important to point out that any social 
or religious group was considered by the Fascist regime to be a potential threat to its 
control over all aspects of religion and society and would consequently have been 
subjected to state regulation and regimentation. Furthermore, with regard to the 
minority Protestant religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses or 7th Day 
Adventists, Fascist attitudes to them were not so much dictated by their threat to the 
Catholic Church, as by suspicions regarding the fact that almost all of them had 
foreign origins, allegiances and financial backing with many also having strong 
Masonic links. It should also be remembered that the treatment of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses detailed in this and other sections of the thesis by the Fascists is consistent 
with their treatment by other totalitarian regimes such as Hitler’s Germany, Mao’s
109 Ibid., p. 236. The whole letter appears in Pacelli, Diorio della Conciliazione, pp. 549-557.
110 Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, p. 16.
111 Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale, p. 248.
37
China and Stalin’s Russia which can be attributed to their unwillingness to accept 
secular authority.112
In order to achieve his objective of obstructing Protestant propaganda and 
penetration of society, Pius XI sought the collaboration of the Fascist government.
He pointed out to Mussolini that the Protestant sects were not part of the ‘Italian 
tradition’.113 Using this argument he was able to call for the defence of the ‘national 
religion’ and the ‘national culture’ in the same way as he had previously gained 
Fascist recognition of the rights of the Catholic Church. This alliance centred around 
the fight against the rise and development of pluralist opinions and positions among 
the reformist (Protestant) religious groups, perceived by both Catholics and Fascists 
to be a threat to the unity of Italian society.114 Thus, the condition of Protestant 
groups in Italy under Fascism was effectively the result of three factors: the 
Regime’s directives, the manoeuvring of the Catholic organisations and, particularly 
after the fall of Fascism when they had for a brief period slightly more room to 
manoeuvre, the actions of the Protestant minorities.1151 will briefly examine these 
three factors to illustrate the situation in which they found themselves.
a) The Regime's directives
As mentioned above, the negotiations for the Lateran Pacts began in 1926, the same 
year in which the Fascist law increasing the punishment for crimes committed 
against the Catholic Church was introduced. Then between April 1927 and 
December 1928 the first phase of monitoring of the evangelical organisations took 
place with the Pentecostals coming under particular scrutiny. Even before the Pacts 
appeared the authorities were already demonstrating a high regard for Vatican 
wishes: an article in Osservatore Romano, the Vatican’s official newspaper, dated 8th 
November 1928 in which the expansion of Protestant propaganda in Italy was 
denounced, resulted in the Minister of the Interior inviting the local authorities to 
exercise greater control over the relevant Protestant churches.116 In fact, Scoppola 
goes further, suggesting that all it took were merely complaints by Catholics to
1121 am indebted to Professor John Pollard for this information.
113 Pacelli, Diario della Conciliazione, p. 552.
114 Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiana, p. 53.
115 P. Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche in S. Fontana (a cura di) IIfascismo e le 
autonomie locali, Bologna. Il Mulino, 1973, pp. 331-394, pp. 331-332.
116 Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Serie P.S. 1920-45, Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G .l, busta 155, 
fascicolo 116, sottofascicolo 2, ‘Corrispondenza varia’.
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117achieve such intervention. After this period all the churches were placed under 
increasing pressure from police authorities with many of their activities and rituals
110
requiring police approval, and frequently being banned. On the occasion of the 
signing of the Pacts, which determined the religious orientation of the regime, the 
police hierarchy put out a series of memoranda explicitly stating that the evangelical 
churches should be considered as suspect, even if they could not be accused of doing 
anything concrete against the Fascist regime.119 The memoranda proposed various 
levels of surveillance depending on the perceived threat of the individual group. For 
example, the Salvation Army was not considered to be dangerous to public order, 
influential on a political level, or a challenge to the religious convictions of the 
regime, and so simple ‘continual monitoring’ was advised. The Pentecostals, on the 
other hand, although acknowledged by the regime as having no political ambitions
1 Of )and a ‘purity of intent’, had a particularly aggressive memorandum put out 
concerning their activities.121 The controls became harsher after the Pacts were 
signed: on the 29th February 1929 a memo from Police Headquarters in Rome 
referring to recent operations underlined the need to continue increasing surveillance 
on the evangelical churches due to their undoubted ‘ostilM latente’ towards the 
regime ‘tanto piu d’ora in avanti. . .  in seguito alia riconciliazione awenuta fra la 
Chiesa cattolica e lo Stato.’122
Rochat had some interesting observations to make on the origins and 
application of the Fascist laws dealing with religious minorities: firstly, policy was 
defined on the whole by the civil servants in the Ministry of the Interior, without any 
form of debate or public control, but with overwhelming pressure from Catholic 
authorities to drastically reduce religious freedom. The only political interventions 
were by Mussolini, who occasionally gave instructions directly to the Chief of
117 Scoppola, 11 fascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 335.
118 G. Rochat, Poliziafascista e chiese evangeliche in I  Valdesi e I ’Europa (pp.407-434) Torre 
Pellice: Brandoni, 1982, p. 413.
119 Memoranda cited in Rochat, Polizia fascista e chiese evangeliche, pp. 414-416.
120 Ibid., p. 415.
121 “Pur rilevando la limitata importanza del fenomeno e pur non risultando provata l’esistenza di 
forme morbose del culto, e da considerare che trattasi di un culto contrastante con la religione dello 
stato, importato di recente e circoscritto in alcune provincie di Sicilia e della Puglia, regioni nelle quali 
la religione cattolica e profondamente sentita e professata, insegnata e appresa da ignoranti. In queste 
condizioni un culto del genere non solo non risponde ad un sentito bisogno spirituale, ma puo 
rappresentare un pericolo e pertanto si presenta la necessita di riesaminare lo stato di tolleranza 
vigilata in cui e stato finora tenuto.” Cited in Rochat, Polizia fascista e chiese evangeliche, p. 416.
For details o f the Associazione cristiana dei giovani (ACDG, known in the UK as the YMCA) and its 
treatment under fascism see ibid., pp. 420-425.
122 Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Serie P.S. 1920-45 (Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G .l, busta 
155, fascicolo 116, sottofascicolo 11, ‘Societa biblica e forestiere’. See also Scoppola, II fascismo e le 
minoranze evangeliche, p. 335.
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Police. Even then there was no coherent policy, but rather a series of tactical 
reactions to different situations, though generally as a consequence of what he terms 
the ‘evoluzione dei rapporti tra stato fascista e chiesa cattolica’.123 Under the culti 
ammessi laws, responsibility for religious freedom was devolved to ministerial 
bureaucrats and to the local and regional police authorities who, in the interpretation 
and application of the law, were granted extremely wide-ranging discretionary 
powers.124 The leaders of the Protestant churches were not able to argue their case, 
but had to accept the situation and deal with the defence of their religious freedom 
directly with the Chief of Police, or even with what Rochat calls ‘il principale 
strumento della repressione di tutte le liberta civili e politiche’, in other words, the 
Fascist government. In these dealings, the evangelical churches were starting ftom a 
position of considerable weakness: they did not have the political leverage of the 
Catholic Church and, moreover, they had to reckon with overt hostility from the 
‘religion of state’. For the civil servants, the only benchmark for religious freedom 
was maintaining public order and the defence of the dictatorship. If they paid heed to 
Catholic demands it was not, according to Rochat, because of any religious 
conviction or crusading spirit, but because of the liberal tradition of indifference or 
neutrality in religious matters, and a realistic evaluation of the difference in the 
political strength of the Catholics and the Protestants; also because the Catholic 
Church was duty bound, at all levels, to defend the Fascist regime with a conviction 
and effectiveness that the evangelical churches could not have.126
Scoppola also has an interesting view of the context in which the culti 
ammessi law was passed: in response to the requests of the Church there was, in the 
attitude of the regime, a continuous alternation between the Church’s wishes being 
readily accommodated, with sometimes even a hint of servility, and concerns about 
regaining some distance from the Vatican. Scoppola claims that looking after the 
religious liberty of small minorities was of no consequence at all to an authoritarian 
regime; it was much more interested in its relationship to the Catholic Church, 
seeking to gain its backing to reaffirm the autonomy and sovereignty of the State and 
its totalitarian character. It is, he says, against this background that one must locate 
the culti ammessi law, which was inspired by the need to rebalance (‘riequilibrare’)
123 Rochat, Polizia fascista e chiese evangeliche, p. 416.
124 Ibid. Rochat points out that this type o f allocation o f duties was not unique under fascism.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., pp. 416-417.
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the situation created by the agreement with the Catholic Church.1271 would question 
this assessment of the creation of the culti ammessi law: if he means rebalancing the 
situation between the Catholics and the Protestants, then it is hard to see how a series 
of repressive laws that created massive amounts of bureaucracy for the minority 
churches (particularly their leaders) can be considered as rebalancing a situation 
where a Treaty and a Concordat created a new state, guaranteed independence for the 
Catholic Church and allowed it freedom to operate outside of State influence. If he 
means that the law was passed to create distance between the regime and the Church, 
then that would have been best achieved by ignoring the demands of the Catholic 
Church on the subject of the Protestants, since the Vatican had already been granted 
everything it could have wished for in the Pacts. Indeed, as Rocco, the Keeper of the 
Seals, was forced to admit, the culti ammessi laws were a totally unnecessary 
consequence of the Concordat.128
Despite the controls placed on Protestant denominations by the culti ammessi 
laws, their new legal status meant that the Church and Catholic Action felt 
themselves obliged to ‘intensify resistance to Protestant propaganda’ as Pollard puts 
it.129 To this end they received the full support of the Fascist government: between 
1930 and 1940, Fascist irritation with the Protestants combined with the Catholic fear 
of their perceived threat to Holy Mother Church as a consequence of their new-found
freedom to proselytise, and led to a series of restrictions being imposed in subsequent
110amendments to the culti ammessi laws. R.D. 28.02.1930, no. 289 dealt with 
ministers’ rights and crimes against the religion of State and against culti ammessi; 
R.D. 30.10.1930, n. 1731131 revoked the freedom of the Jewish communities; R.D. 
18.06.1931, no. 773132 contained 224 articles on public security, of which three (25,
127 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 341.
128 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 65.
129 Ibid., p. 110.
130 Article 1 obliged ministers o f minority religions not only to apply to the Ministry o f Justice for 
permission to open new places o f  worship, but to prove that ‘il tempio od oratorio 6 necessario per 
soddisfare effettivi bisogni religiosi di importanti nuclei di fedeli ed e fomito di mezzi sufficienti per 
sostenere le spese di manutenzione.’ Article 7 stated that ministers could be exempt from military 
service but only ‘su attestazione del procuratore generale del re presso la Corte d’appello, il quale 
dichiari che l’opera loro e assolutamente indispensabile e insostituibile per l’assistenza religiosa dei 
fedeli affidati alle loro cure.’ The definition o f ‘importanti nuclei dei fedeli’ and o f their work being 
‘assolutamente indispensabile’ was left to the discretion o f the local authorities thus providing the 
loophole for future clamp-downs on the organisations. Articles 402 and 405 legislated for crimes 
against both the religion o f state and the culti ammessi, but article 406 reduced the punishment for 
crimes against the culti ammessi. De Martino, Leggi d'ltalia, pp. 317-320. See also Jemolo, Chiesa e 
Stato in Italia, p. 251.
131 De Martino, Leggi d ’ltalia, pp. 157-164.
132 Ibid., p. 833. See also Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, p. 18. This law also 
reproduced the corresponding articles o f the law o f November 6th 1926: Article 25: ‘The Questore
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26 & 27) gave local Questori extended powers and increased fines to clamp down on 
illegal religious ceremonies and civil or religious processions held outside places of 
worship. The amendments thus resulted in the creation of a whole network of 
surveillance and legal controls on the day-to-day running of the non-Catholic 
religious groups which, according to Peyrot, blatantly ignored the policy of ‘non­
interference’ affirmed by the parliamentary vote of 1871 which passed the ‘Law of 
Guarantees’.133 However, this was inevitable since the Lateran Pacts and the culti 
ammessi laws had together effectively abrogated the Law of Guarantees.
The high profile persecution of the Jews between 1938 and 1943 in Italy was 
preceded by persecution of the Pentecostals. The laissez faire approach to the latter 
from 1931 changed markedly just four years later. In a Ministry of the Interior 
circular promulgated on 9th April 1935, the Pentecostals were no longer referred to as 
a ‘recognised faith’, but as an ‘associazione di fatto’ (i.e. with no legal rights). The 
faith professed by such associations, which the circular claimed was not recognised 
by article 2 of the culti ammessi law (the law says nothing to this effect), was no 
longer to be admitted in the kingdom, since ‘expression of the faith results in 
religious practices that are contrary to social order and harmful to the physical and 
psychological integrity of the race’.134 The Pentecostals were hit hard by Fascist 
reprisals at the start of the war because many were also conscientious objectors. 
Catholic bishops and archbishops often played a decisive role in their repression. 
Details of meetings supposedly held in secret were divulged to the ecclesiastics who 
freely passed the information on to the police. Their institutions and places of 
worship were immediately destroyed or shut down citing reasons of ‘racial health’. 
Other religious faiths such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses were then also shut down for 
allegedly collaborating with anti-fascist groups in America who were supposedly 
using them to disseminate anti-fascist propaganda in Italy. The authorities accused 
these groups of brainwashing their devotees to the point where they ‘no longer had a 
grasp on the realities of life’. Even after the war had begun, those groups still 
operating had their mail vetted by the police authorities.735
must be given three days notice o f any meetings or rallies held outside churches: punishment is three 
months in prison or up to 500 lire fine’. And article 26: ‘The Questore has the right to veto or control 
such gatherings giving organisers 24 hours notice. ’ Both o f these laws referred both to non-Catholic 
and Catholic organisations although there can be little doubt as to which group suffered most.
133 Peyrot, La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose, p. 537.
134 Cited in Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, p. 21.
135 Ibid.
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With regard to this period of increased activity against the Protestant 
churches, Scoppola makes a quite remarkable statement:
Escluderei nettamente -  mi riferisco sempre agli anni anteriore al ’39 -  che 
possa parlarsi di persecuzione, anche solo larvata. Non si dimentichi che uno 
dei piu ampi e approfonditi studi sulla legge per i culti ammessi fu quello del 
1934 di Mario Piacentini, giurista di chiara fama e di altrettanto sicura fede 
evangelica: lo studio riconosce con larghezza i merit! della legislazione 
fascista e i progressi che essa ha segnato rispetto al passato.13
The obvious point to make here is that Piacentini’s study was published the year 
before the first serious clamp-down on the evangelical activities in 1935-36. In his 
footnote Scoppola quotes another two authors who he says are in agreement that 
initially the laws were well received by the Evangelicals.137 In the early years they 
were indeed, in some protestant circles, considered to be an improvement of their lot. 
However, the openness of the laws to interpretation in any way that local authorities 
saw fit, combined with Fascist and Catholic intimidation and attacks, both verbal and 
actual, must cast serious doubts on the validity of these initial analyses. Nevertheless, 
Scoppola persists with his line that, initially, the evangelical groups were not badly 
treated: for the first ten years after the laws were introduced
gli evangelici in definitiva sono vissuti in quegli anni sotto il fucile puntato da 
una assidua vigilanza di polizia, continuatamente sollecitata da informatori e
1 -JO
da ambienti cattolici, ma il fucile ha raramente sparato.
Three points need to be made here: firstly, the gun does not have to fire to be hostile 
and oppressive yet Scoppola seems quite unmoved that they had to live with this
1 qQ
fear. Secondly, Catholics would have protested about the action of evangelical 
churches whether they were being shown leniency or not. Their’s was the religion of 
State and any group acting contrary to that, whether behind closed doors or not, 
would have been considered as antagonistic to the Church. Thirdly, even though the 
laws were hostile to the minorities, more hostile was the constant police harassment 
and the punishment for acting contrary to the law. Consequently, the evangelicals 
were in an impossible position: the laws put so many restrictions on them that by 
following them they found it almost impossible to operate; failing to act within the
136 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 346.
137 G. Miegge, L Eglise sous le jougfasciste, Geneve, 1946; and E. Ay as sot, I  protestanti in Italia, 
Milano, Area, 1962.
138 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 347.
139 See also Roehat’s response to this statement by Scoppola: “va precisato che vivere sotto un fucile 
puntato e comunque piuttosto duro”, in Rochat, Polizia fascista e chiese evangeliche, p. 425.
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laws brought about the closing down of churches, the deportation of foreign 
ministers and, particularly in predominantly Catholic areas, evangelicals found 
themselves ostracised from society. Scoppola blames the evangelical groups for 
inciting the Fascists to act against them by constantly putting out pacifist 
propaganda. Scoppola seems to imply that there was an inevitability about Fascist 
clamp downs on these groups and to a certain extent that was true, but Scoppola 
appears to be exculpating these actions.
From September 1940 Fascist repression became more intense right across 
the religious spectrum, now also targeting Catholic organisations that were not 
wholly committed to the idea of a Fascist victory, even banning prayers that had been 
widely used in Catholic churches during World War One.140 With this new change of 
direction in its attitude to religious freedom, one can only wonder at the ferocity of 
Fascist attacks on the evangelical churches. The most threatening example of the new 
Fascist clamp-down came directly from the Secretary of the Fascist Party, Adelchi 
Serena, who on the 30th July 1941, sent a letter to the Prefect of Turin making a 
series of spurious claims about the Valdesi in the area: they were outspoken anti- 
Fascists, they were taking all the local government positions and forcing the local 
Catholic population to live in a state of utter humiliation.141 The Prefect of Turin took 
three months to conduct an in-depth survey of the Valdese valley. The reply was very 
detailed and quite categorical in its denial of the accusations levelled at the region by 
Serena.142
Scoppola claims that it was only during the Second World War that the gaps 
allowing a wider interpretation of the culti ammessi laws appeared in the legislature
140 For more on this see F. Malgeri, La Chiesa italiana e la guerra 1940-45, Roma: Studium, 1980.
141 The following are extracts from the letter: ‘Viene denunciato l’irriducibile antifascismo dei valdesi, 
accentuatosi nelle valli Pellice e Germanasca dopo la conciliazione col Vaticano ed il ritomo 
dell’insegnamento religioso. Tali valdesi -  a quanto viene riferito -  non dissimulano di sentirsi 
stranieri in Italia, ostentano di parlare soltanto in lingua francese, seguono gli awenimenti politici e 
militari e li commentano solo in fimzione dei loro sentimenti antitaliani. La popolazione cattolica 
vivrebbe in tali valli in stato di vera umiliazione, anche perche i valdesi sembrano essere riusciti 
assicurarsi tutti i posti direttivi della vita pubblica. Si attendono al riguardo esaurienti informazioni. ’ 
ACS, Fondo Ministero degli interni, Direzione generale di pubblica sicurezza, Divisione affari 
generali e riservati, Categoria G. 1 (1920-45), Chiese evangeliche valdesi, busta 11, fascicolo 136; file 
missing in January 2003, but cited in Rochat, Polizia fascista e chiese evangeliche, p. 434.
142 The following are extracts from the reply: ‘non sono risultati elementi specifici che potessero 
essere interpretati come manifestazioni di sentimenti antitaliani, o piu precisamente filoinglesi. I 
podesta della zona sono tutti cattolici ad eccezione di quello del comune di Massello . . . e di Prali. 
Non risulta poi assolutamente rispondente a verita che la popolazione cattolica viva in uno stato di 
vera umiliazione, in quanto l’elemento valdese non ha alcuna influenza sulla popolazione cattolica.’ 
ACS, Fondo Ministero degli interni, Direzione generale di pubblica sicurezza, Divisione affari 
generali e riservati, Categoria G. 1 (1920-45), Chiese evangeliche valdesi, b. 11, f. 136; file missing in 
January 2003, but cited in Rochat, Polizia fascista e chiese evangeliche, p. 434.
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as a result of the unstable political situation.143 This is only true to a certain extent: in 
reality, there had been wide discrepancies in the application and interpretation of the 
laws from the moment they hit the statute book in 1929 depending on the region, the 
police, the Questore, the local judiciary, the levels of evangelical activity and the 
degree of militancy of the local Catholic organisations. There is, however, evidence 
that the war did indeed focus the Fascists’ attention on the Protestants:144 R.D. 
06.05.1940, no. 635145 (articles 19 -  32) further increased the restrictions and 
complicated the application procedure for religious activities outside churches. This 
law appears to have been passed in anticipation of Italy entering the Second World 
War, clamping down even more firmly on those organisations deemed dangerous to 
the regime, in that they were funded or organised from abroad.146 In 1941, a 
committee set up for the spiritual assistance of valdesi within the forces was 
denounced by the Ministero delVInterno as motivated by ‘soliti sentimenti pacifisti e 
pietistici’ and immediately outlawed.147 Evangelical headquarters were shut down 
under wartime laws, places of worship closed and authorisations for individual 
pastors were revoked. The Salvation Army was disbanded by a provision dated 17th 
August 1940 and its leader, Carmelo Lombardo, was sent into exile for five years. 
From a private note made on 2nd October 1940, it emerges that the Papal Nuncio to 
the Italian Parliament, Borgongini Duca praised the provision closing them down.148 
The regime did not limit its surveillance to evangelicals and others on home territory : 
its foreign diplomats, particularly those in the USA were also monitored for their 
political and religious activities.149
Scoppola interprets other examples of authorities hampering the work of the 
protestants as protecting them against the unwanted attentions of the Catholic 
Church. In the summer of 1930 at Gaeta a 7th Day Adventist pastor, Sig. Cupertino, 
wanted to move his church from the suburbs into the town centre. The Prefect 
summed up the situation in a letter to an unnamed Minister in Rome.150 Although the
143 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 346.
144 See Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, pp. 18-19.
145 De Martino, Leggi d ’ltalia, pp. 1276-1277.
146 See Rochat, Polizia fascista e chiese evangeliche, pp. 416-417.
147 Telegram dated 25th February 1941, ‘N. 10833 Culti’, in ACS, SerieP.S. 1920-45, Divisione 
A.G.R., Categoria G. 1, b. 147, f. 27; file missing in January 2003, but cited in Scoppola, IIfascismo e 
le minoranze evangeliche, p. 352.
148 ACS, Serie P.S. 1920-45, Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G .l, b. 149, f. 65; file missing in January 
2003, but cited in Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 353.
149 Ibid., p. 336.
150 The following are extracts from the letter:“Naturalmente la notizia desto allarme nel rione, abitato 
esclusivamente da cattolici, e per tale motivo chiamai in ufficio il Sig. Cupertino, facendogli 
comprendere l’inopportunita della scelta del locale, pregandolo percio di trovame altro non vicino a
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local Archbishop was naturally against such a move, the Minister agreed with the 
Prefect’s opinion that the proposals of the Archbishop were not consistent with the 
law as it stood. However, the Archbishop had the last word, as the pastor found no- 
one in the town centre prepared to rent him anywhere to open a new church.151
I would agree with Scoppola’s view that during the Fascist years the 
profoundly illiberal nature of Fascism and the exhaltation of a national sense of unity 
of faith reignited a crusading spirit, dormant but not extinguished, in many Catholics 
and in the hierarchy of the Church itself. This coincides with Pius XI’s vision of an 
Italy governed along Catholic lines and with a Catholic national identity. However, 
Scoppola underestimates the impact and implications of the Lateran Pacts when he 
calls the Catholic confessional resurgence in Italy during the thirties an ‘illusion’: 
Pius XI himself wanted “un concordato che assicurasse 1’influenza cattolica nel 
Regno d’ltalia” and sought personal guarantees that the Catholic faith “fosse 
effettivamente e non solo di nome la religione dello Stato”.152 However, I believe 
Scoppola is correct in his assessment that this confessional resurgence, whether an 
illusion or not, nurtured the spirit of intolerance among the Catholic laity and was 
also a necessary pre-requisite for the success of the regime’s ecclesiastical policies 
and in particular the culti ammessi laws.153
Falzone, like Gianni Long, claims that up to 1940 these laws were applied in 
a quite relaxed manner and were quite favourable to the culti ammessi,154 although I 
have found much evidence to the contrary. However, what is clear, though 
nonetheless difficult to justify, is that at government level the laws were accepted for 
almost four decades: the laws of 1929 and the subsequent implementation additions 
remained on the statute book well into the 1960’s, before it was considered necessary 
to make amendments to bring them into line with the supposedly renewed climate of
chiese cattoliche, cio che egli promise di fare. In seguito . . . il Cupertino ha trovato un locale idoneo 
per trasferirvi la chiesa, ma, a quanto pare, il proprietario, per consiglio del proprio parrocco, rifiuto 
poi di concludere l’affitto. In merito ho ritenuto opportuno stamane sentire il parere di S.E.
1’Archivescovo, il quale pero mi ha detto che non potrebbe tollerare il trasferimento della chiesa 
awentista nell’abitato, anche se in locale distante da chiese cattoliche, non avendo il pastore 
awentista motivi plausibili nel fare tale trasferimento per mancanza dei fedeli nel centro, aggiungendo 
che tale suo proposito aveva fondamento su precise istruzioni ricevute dal Vaticano . . .  Poiche tale 
proposito di S.E. 1’Archivescovo contrasta con le disposizioni vigenti, ho ritenuto opportuno portare 
quanto sopra a conoscenza di codesto On. Ministero.” ACS, Serie P.S. 1920-45, Divisione A.G.R., 
Categoria G .l, b. 147, f. 26, sottofascicolo 2; file missing in January 2003, but cited in Scoppola, II 
fascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, pp. 338-9.
151 Ibid., p. 339.
152 Cited in Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiana, p. 46.
153 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 367.
154 See Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, pp. 18-19; and Long, Alle origini del 
pluralismo confessionale, p. 248.
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religious freedom of the time, and the institutional autonomy that had been granted to 
these minority religions by the Republican Constitution of 1948.
b) The manoeuvring o f the Catholic organisations
Following the signing of the Lateran Pacts, Giovagnoli claims that there was a shift 
in the approach of the Vatican to Catholic supremacy: rather than promoting the 
theological argument of the ‘Catholic truth’ in contrast to the ‘pretensions’ of the 
other confessions, in the letter to Cardinal Gasparri from Pius XI, published in the 
Vatican newspaper Osservatore Romano on 30th May, 1929, it was rather the 
political concept of the Catholic confessional state that was more clearly defined. 
Although the Protestant presence in Italy was in fact very limited and hardly a 
concern for the overwhelming Catholic majority, this presence represented what was 
perceived to be a worrying symptom: the Protestant Reformation was considered to 
be at the heart of Europe’s disintegration, of liberalism, industrialism and ultimately 
socialism. Thus, in Italy, the struggle against this minority took on the symbolic 
value of a wider call to arms against a ‘secular’ and ‘pluralist’ society, and in defence 
of a situation in which religious pluralism would be non-existent, the religious unity 
of the people would form the basis of social life, and the teachings of the Church 
would become universally accepted in society.155
As a direct result of the protection given to the Catholic Church by the Pacts, 
the most important and newest aspect of the situation after 1929 undoubtedly centres 
around Catholic hostility towards the evangelicals, which manifested itself in the 
increased and often powerful Catholic pressure on the public authorities.156 In 
Catholic circles there was considerable dissatisfaction with the perceived new levels 
of freedom afforded the minorities and they were not afraid to address the issue. 
Camillo D’Alessandro was an evangelical pastor in Formia. Working in coalition 
against him were the military Commandant Piero Brandimarte and Bishop Dionigio 
Casaroli. Scoppola says that the pastor must have been a very effective proselytiser 
because included in his flock were several people considered by the authorities to be 
militants. Consequently the Bishop wrote to the General of the Fascist Militia calling
1 57in no uncertain terms for the pastor to be given a ‘change of air’! A few weeks
155 Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiana, p. 46.
156 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 336.
157 His letter is dated 20th April 1929, from which the following are extracts: ‘dietro la segnalazione 
fatta nel giomo del nostro primo incontro, ha compiuto per arrestare in questa mia Arcidiocesi la 
subdola propaganda del protestantesimo, (e dunque) sento il dovere di esprimerle tutta la mia piu
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later the two major Catholic newspapers, ‘L ’Osservatore romano’ and ‘L ’Awenire 
d ’Italia" denounced the extension of evangelical propaganda and called for action 
against it.158 The ‘appropriate action’ was indeed taken by the Chief of police and the 
Prefect of Bologna.159
Unrest was particularly widespread in the ranks of Catholic Action and this 
had not gone unnoticed by the regime. Inside information had been received by 
Police headquarters in Rome of unease even in the Vicariate of Rome, where, in a 
meeting held at the end of February 1930, Cardinal Marchetti Selvaggiani said he 
was saddened that, after the Lateran Accords, the national government had given too 
much freedom to the Protestants. He concluded that rather than the Holy See 
renewing its protestations, which would perhaps have little effect, ‘the Catholic 
youth should think about opposing this revival of Protestant propaganda’.160
When the electoral lists for the collegio unico nazionale were announced in 
1929, Padre Tacchi Venturi, working in the Vatican Secretariat for Ordinary 
Ecclesiastical Affairs (the equivalent of the Home Office), approached Mussolini 
directly to remove the names of those whom it was felt would not offer sufficient 
guarantees from a Catholic point of view, presenting in their place ‘un elenco di 
alcuni candidati di sani principi e specchiata condotta morale da inserire, ove non lo 
fossero, nella lista del collegio unico.’ In this list there were, amongst others, two 
nominees ‘proposti in altemativa a quello di un valdese, dal quale . . .  i cattolici non 
vogliono essere rappresentati, e di un ebreo.’161
The support of the Catholic Church in the March 1929 plebiscite embarrassed 
Mussolini who did not want the population or his party to think that he was relying 
on the Catholic vote for his survival. Consequently, in the speech he gave to the 
Camera on 13th May 1929 he strongly reaffirmed the principle of the freedom of the
sincera gratitudine, ben riflettendo che senza l’autorevole suo intervento, l’esiziale evangelizzazione 
avrebbe gia preso considerevoli proporzioni. D ’altra parte . . . il lavorio dello pseudo pastore di 
Formia e quanto mai assiduo ed alacre per cui sarebbe necessario trovar modo di fargli respirare altra 
aria, perche qui mi va pervertendo parecchi giovanetti di belle speranze con le sue lusinghiere 
attrattive specialmente di sport a cui non si pud fare concorrenza.’ For the letter in full see: ACS, Serie 
P.S. 1920-45, Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G .l, b. 147, f. 26, sottofascicolo 6; file missing in January 
2003, but cited in Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 337.
158 ‘II pericolo protestante in Italia’, in Osservatore Romano, 19th June 1929; ‘La propaganda 
protestante’, in L ’Awenire d ’ltalia, 2nd July 1929.
159 ACS, Serie P.S. 1920-45, Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G .l, b. 155, f. 116, sottofascicolo 2; file 
missing in January 2003, but cited in Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 340.
160 ACS, Serie P.S. 1920-45, Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G .l, b. 155, f. 116, sottofascicolo 5; file 
missing in January 2003, but cited in Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 342.
161 ACS, Segretaria particolare del Duce (SPD), Carteggio riservato, b. 64, f. 404/R, ‘Tacchi Venturi 
padre Pietro’, sottofascicolo dal ’24 al ’31, inserto F, anno 1929, file missing in January 2003, but 
cited in Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 340.
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non-Catholic religions. Pius XI responded immediately in the letter to Cardinal 
Gasparri on 30th May insisting that the new ‘culti ammessV status did not imply 
freedom of propaganda for those groups. A feeling of unease was becoming evident 
in the Vatican hierarchy: the collaboration between the Church and the Fascists was 
not wholly to the satisfaction of the Pope. During the thirties, the Fascist State, 
despite the pressure it put on Protestant organisations, was not always as 
accommodating to the demands of the Church as the latter would have liked. Indeed 
Alfredo Rocco, although interested in preserving the national character, was not 
always so keen to preserve a national religious identity. In 1931, the confrontation 
between the Church and the Fascists over Catholic Action and education also 
included differences of opinion over the issue of the Protestants. The year after, in an 
audience with Mussolini, Pius XI took the opportunity of the renewed truce to once 
more raise the question of the Protestants and to re-emphasise that the religious 
monopoly in Italy was the prerogative of the Catholic Church.162 Scoppola claims 
that at no time during the moments of major tension with the Vatican (1931-2: the 
restructuring of Catholic Action; and 1938: the Fascist alignment with Nazi 
Germany) did the Fascists exploit this obviously sensitive issue.163 The reasons for 
this are, in fact, quite simple: no matter what state relations were in, the regime was 
acutely aware of the Church’s influence over the Italian populace and its ability to 
help maintain national unity; the evangelical churches, on the other hand, were tiny, 
uncoordinated and thus inconsequential to a regime obsessed by great numbers and
164power.
Apart from random complaints by Catholics regarding the activities of the 
Protestants, there was also a more sinister, organised campaign against the Protestant 
denominations during this period, organised by Catholic Action. The success of this 
campaign was such that Mussolini felt obliged to send a telegram to Italian 
embassies abroad on 29 May 1931 claiming that ‘the Church’s exaggerated and 
presumptuous complaints against the activities of the Protestant Churches was the 
main cause of the conflict’ of that year. He also accused the Catholic Church of 
seeking ‘the suppression of Protestant propaganda and of freedom of worship’.165 
What he failed to mention was that his government had been collaborating with the
162 Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiana, p. 54.
163 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 332.
164 Ibid., p. 333.
165 Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 108.
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Catholic Church against the Protestants on this issue -  possibly from as early as 
1926.
The situation worsened for the Protestants in 1935-1936 during which time 
Catholic Action youth groups were responsible for direct attacks on Protestant 
churches. In June 1936 the Prefect of Matera informed the Minister of the Interior 
that a local parish priest was inciting his youth group to join with him in his quest to 
‘distruggere i protestanti del luogo’ with the warning that if the authorities did not 
stamp them out, then the Catholic youth would make them ‘ruzzolare per la 
montagna.’166 Scoppola suggests that to understand the individual actions of priests, 
bishops and other ecclesiastics
sarebbe necessario risalire agli stati d’animo, alia mentalita e alia cultura che
hanno determinato quegli atteggiamenti. Ritengo che apparirebbe, nella
maggior parte dei casi, la buona fede e I’onesta.167
He calls on us to be sympathetic to the demands, theology, hierarchical pressure and 
juridical position of the Catholic Church and attempts to rationalise its intolerance 
‘come una espressione logica e storicamente coerente di un certo tipo di 
religiosita.’168
Despite the increase in activity against the Protestants over the latter part of 
the 1930’s and into the early 1940’s, gradually, after 1938, there was disseminated in 
Catholic intellectual circles an idea that maybe religious liberty, even among non- 
Catholic denominations, was indivisible from the other liberties. Such a philosophy, 
however, contradicts the vast body of evidence of Catholic collaboration with the 
regime against the evangelical churches that occurred at the same time. Scoppola 
explains this dichotomy as being a slow process that appears to have evolved from 
the confusion of war and the start of the resistance movement, but which was more 
evident among the Catholic elites, such as the Movimento laureati or FUCI, than 
among the Catholic masses.169 Such views were certainly not evident in the 
mainstream Catholic press, which continued to campaign vociferously throughout 
the 1940’s and beyond against the ‘liberal’ concept of liberty as proposed by the
166 ACS, Serie P.S. 1920-45, Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G .l, b. 146; file missing in January 2003, 
but cited in Scoppola, II fascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 344. For more examples o f Catholic 
ecclesiastics’ role in the oppression o f the evangelicals, see Scoppola, II fascismo e le minorcmze 
evangeliche, pp. 362-363 & ACS, Serie P.S. 1920-45, Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G .l, n. 703, b. 76, 
fascicolo sulle associazioni sowersive, Pentecostali ed altre sette religiose.
167 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, pp. 367-368.
168 Ibid., p. 368.
169 Ibid., p. 366.
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Protestant churches. Perfectly illustrating its position was a list of modem liberties 
worthy of condemnation which was published in Civilta cattolica in 1945:
II Liberalismo per ‘liberta di pensiero’ intende non gia soltanto la liberta di 
quel pensiero illuminato e saggio, che e scorta al ben vivere e al ben operare, 
ma anche del pensiero fuorviato per i sentieri rovinosi dell’errore; per ‘liberta 
di parola e di stampa’, il diritto di esprimere con la parola e con gli scritti 
qualsivoglia dottrina in materia morale, religiosa e sociale, benche infetta di 
impieta e immoralita . . . di ammaestrare indifferentemente nelle vie di virtu e 
di vizio; per ‘liberta di coscienza’, il diritt
o di onorare Dio o di non onorarlo; per ‘liberta di culto’, il diritto di 
professare qualsiasi culto, anche se essa viola i dettami della morale, anche se 
viene riprovato da Dio; per ‘liberta di religione’, la completa indifferenza 
delle leggi e delle istituzioni civili verso qualsivoglia forma di religione; per 
‘liberta di associazione’, il diritto di unirsi ad altri per qualunque fine anche 
illecito.170
c) The actions of the Protestant minorities
Prior to the fall of Fascism, the minority religious groups, as we have seen, had little 
or no room for manoeuvre in their day-to-day operations, especially outside the 
confines of their places of worship. For a few months after July 1943, the political 
climate allowed them to become more active. Indeed, various valdese youth and 
intellectual groups, influenced by the teachings of the Swiss theologian Karl Barth, 
organized a number of ‘giomate teologiche del Ciabas’. One of these, held on 2nd to 
3rd September 1943, two months after the fall of Fascism, had as its theme the 
Concordat and Church/State relations. A final declaration containing a strong 
‘separatist’ element was unanimously agreed:
La Chiesa Valdese dichiara:
- la Chiesa Cristiana deve reggersi da se, in modo assolutamente 
indipendente;
- la Chiesa Cristiana non deve pretendere per se alcuna condizione 
di privilegio;
- la Chiesa Cristiana non pud pero rinunziare alia rivendicazione della piu 
ampia liberta di coscienza, di culto, di opinione, di propaganda, di 
proselitismo per tutti;
- la Chiesa Cristiana deve rivendicare il principio della separazione nei 
rapporti tra chiesa e stato, con il regime nel quale, meglio che in ogni altro, 
essa puo svolgere la propria opera con quella liberta che proviene dalla Parola 
di Dio;
- la Chiesa Cristiana deve riaffermare ehe qualsiasi ingerenza o restrizione 
esercitata dallo stato sulle sue attivita o sullo sviluppo della sua vita interiore,
170 A.Oddone, ‘Liberta modeme’, in Civilta cattolica, 1945, IE, pp.75-6.
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al pari di qualsiasi privilegio, lederebbe il suo diritto e la sua autonomia, la 
falserebbe come chiesa e tenderebbe a distruggerla. Senza questa completa 
liberta civile lo stato non potra mai trovare la chiesa consenziente a motivo 
della fedelta al suo divino mandato.171
Although this declaration had little status initially, on 8th September 1943 it 
was presented to and approved by the Sinodo valdese and, with some ‘mutilations’ as 
Long puts it, it became the official viewpoint of the whole Valdese Church. The 
main sections omitted were the expressions ‘liberta di opinione, di propaganda, di 
proselitismo’ which were substituted by the more generic ‘liberty di testimonianza’ 
and the entire fourth point relating to separation of Church and State -  something 
that would certainly have caused consternation in the Catholic Church. This 
document would become the blueprint for all future debate on Church/State relations 
for the Valdese Church. This, along with the new post-Fascist political climate,
172created a short-lived optimism for the future of the minority religions in Italy.
The optimism was short-lived because of the creation of the Repubblica di 
Salo which covered those areas of Italy that were still under German occupation in 
the autumn of 1943. At the Congresso di Verona, the new Partito Fascista 
Repubblicano presented a manifesto known as the Carta di Verona, approved on 17th 
November 1943, which acted as the new regime’s constitution. In this constitution, 
articles 6 and 7 were of particular significance. According to article 6, “La religione 
della Repubblica e la cattolica apostolica romana. Ogni altro culto che non contrasti 
alle leggi e rispettato.” In article 7, “Gli appartenenti alia razza ebraica sono stranieri.
173Durante questa guerra apartengono a nazionalita nemica.” Clearly the first clause 
of article 6 would be a cause of major concern for Protestants. Although the second 
clause claimed to respect other religions, it would have been little comfort to them 
that this was provided they did not conflict with existing legislation. But there were 
also reasons for the Catholic Church to have reservations about this article. In the 
first place, it weakened the formulation in the 1929 Treaty according to which it was 
the only religion of State. Secondly, the Church would have been aware of the strong 
Nazi influence of the document as a whole, and there were good reasons from its 
experience in Germany not to place too much faith in Nazi good-will towards the 
Vatican. Additionally, the Vatican had by now become an important interlocutor
171 Resoconti delle Giornate teologiche del Ciabas dedicate al tema: Concordato e separazione nei 
rapporti tra Chiesa e Stato, special edition o f the magazine L ’Appello, 1943, pp. lxxvii -  lxxviii. See 
also Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale, pp. 249-250.
172 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 251.
173 For the full text o f the Carta di Verona see www.romacivica.net/anpiroma/rsi/rsicartadiverona.htm.
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with the U.S. State Department on the future of Italy. It was for these reasons that the 
Vatican refused to recognise the Carta di Verona. Although in article 7 it was the 
Jews who were officially classified as a foreign race, this was a clear intensification 
of national suspicion which the Protestants had also experienced under Fascism.
That the situation had deteriorated in this respect, is clearly argued by 
Brunello Mantelli, who points out that following the Carta di Verona deportations 
increased significantly. More than 9000 Jews (8000 of whom died) were deported to 
extermination camps, mainly Auschwitz, and more than 30,000 other Italians, as 
opponents of Fascism and National Socialism, were deported to other camps such as 
Mauthausen and Dachau. Fewer than one tenth of these survived.174
Added to these reasons for Protestant apprehension was a massive expansion 
and recruitment drive by Catholic Action across the whole of Italy in 1944. Thus, the 
optimistic mood that had permeated the minority religions in the summer of 1943 
had changed to one of alarm by 1945. But even after liberation, Long points out that 
too many elements of the old regime were still in force: from profoundly 
compromised personalities still occupying positions of responsibility to residues of a 
typically fascist mentality, certain obstinate aspects of which remained opposed to
1 n c
change. Scoppola agrees that fundamental and deep-rooted opinions needed to be 
changed before true freedom and equality between the religions was realised: the 
lingering hostility in Catholic circles towards the evangelicals even after the fall of 
Fascism and the fact that such hostility would last until the Second Vatican Council, 
makes one reconsider the effectiveness of the new democratic Republic’s 
constitutional guarantees.176 What was more important was the development of a 
widespread and deep-rooted understanding of the value of true religious freedom. 
Without this, intolerance would continue to plague the lives of all non-Catholics.
In an article published in the Baptist newspaper ‘Testimonianza’ in 1945, its 
editor, Manfredi Ronchi, took up the argument:
One has to say that it is very strange that, since the fall of Fascism, the culti 
ammessi laws should continue to be interpreted by those same circulars and 
dispositions that allow implementation of the laws in a restrictive and police- 
orientated manner. We understand that at the moment of transition between 
governments, it was not possible to abrogate the laws, but we do not 
understand why the Ministry of the Interior, or whomsoever is acting on its
174 For more detail see B.Mantelli “Repubblica sociale italiana”, in B.Bongiovanni and N. Tranfaglia, 
Dizionariostorico d e ll’ltalia unita, Roma/Bari, Laterza, 1996, pp. 756-769.
175 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 254.
176 Scoppola, IIfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, p. 367.
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behalf, is still waiting to abrogate those various Fascist inspired 
administrative dispositions; and why it is still waiting to issue a new circular 
abolishing all the administrative apparatus surrounding the laws and the 
relative regulations which put religious freedom at the mercy of the 
Prefects.
In 1945, with the support of the Sinodo valdese, there was another attempt to 
bring all the Protestant churches under one organisation with the hope that it would 
bring an end to ‘ogni residuo di Stato confessionale’.178 In the spring of 1946, the 
Consiglio federate delle Chiese evangeliche was formed, one of its principal early 
functions being to lobby the Constituent Assembly. Initially it only included a few of 
the major Protestant churches with more asking to be represented in 1948.179 
Immediately after the war, the Protestants looked not only to the Constituent 
Assembly, but also outside Italy, for support. In America committees for religious 
liberty in Italy were set up and, to counterbalance the lack of faith they were 
beginning to have in the Italian government, great confidence was placed by the 
Protestants in the ability of the United Nations to intervene at an international level 
on their behalf.180
An important point to consider here is how widely was the suffering of the 
Protestants known? The vast majority of the population, even in Protestant 
strongholds such as the Valdese region and the Val D’Aosta, were Catholic and 
would therefore consider them at best an irritation and at worst would be actively 
trying to shut them down, possibly informing the police of their activities. In such 
cases, who could the Protestants turn to? They did not consider themselves to be 
adequately protected by the police under Fascism. Hence their desire for action at a 
European level to ameliorate their situation. So, in Italy, recognition, let alone 
acceptance, was proving to be an uphill struggle for the Protestant denominations. In 
January 1946, Manfredi Ronchi, editor of the Baptist newspaper ‘II Testimonio’, sent 
a letter to the National Council of the Christian Democrats, as well as to the Central 
Committee of the Socialist Party, both of whom were meeting the same day, calling 
for both organisations to put religious freedom on the agenda at their forthcoming
177 My translation o f M. Ronchi, ‘Punti e linee’, in Testimonianza, 1945, p. 124; cited in Long, Alle 
origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 254.
178 Ibid., p. 252.
179 The denominations that formed the Federal Council o f Evangelical Churches in 1946 were the 
Valdesi, the Episcopal Methodist and the Wesleyan Churches (later unified)* the Baptist Evangelical 
Church o f Italy and the La Spezia Mission. In 1948 the 7th Day Adventists, the Pentecostals, Church 
o f the Brotherhood and Salvation Army asked to be represented. See Long, Alle origini del pluralismo 
confessionale, p.253 for more information.
180 Ibid., pp. 255-256.
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congresses. Ronchi makes clear his disappointment that the question has, up to that 
point, been ignored by the big political powers, but hopes that the issue will soon be 
discussed as all other freedoms are based on it.181 In an article for the Protestant 
journal ‘Testimonianza’, Ronchi limited his proposals on religious liberty to four 
main points; ‘equality among citizens, freedom of association for religious ends, 
freedom of propaganda, freedom to choose one’s faith only within the limits of 
morality and not public order (since the profession of a faith other than that of the 
majority can not be considered a provocation or a mockery).’182 Such apparently 
reasonable proposals were a rarity, with the Protestant press continuing to campaign 
belligerently. Having irritated the Catholic Church, Protestant newspapers were now 
straining relations between their denominations and the political parties in the run-up 
to the institutional elections: ‘se le elezioni, come e sperabile, ci daranno la 
Repubblica, ed una repubblica democratica, questa impone la separazione della 
Chiesa dallo Stato’, was typical of their bullish, undiplomatic approach to the
183argument.
Although conditions for the religious minorities were difficult under Fascism, 
and post-Fascism their entrenched, hard-line tactics did little to help their condition, 
worse was to come under the Vatican-backed Christian Democrat regime of the late 
1940’s and 1950’s when the systematic harassment of the non-Catholic minorities 
reached a new level of intensity, as we shall see in section C(v)a).
181 Ibid., p. 262.
182 ‘Per la liberta religiosa’, in Testimonianza, Feb. -  March 1946, p.27ff; cited in Long, Alle origini 
del pluralismo confessionale, p. 262.
183 ‘Liberta o accordi’, in Unione evangelica, 15th March 1946.
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A3) Religious freedom for Catholics
(i) The Vatican on ‘religious freedom’
The general position of the Vatican on the subject of religious freedom had been 
established towards the end of the 19th century in one of the major encyclicals of Leo 
XIII, Libertas (1888),184 whose ideas remained valid until the Second Vatican 
Council in 1963. But there was one key difference between the concept of religious 
freedom as viewed from a Protestant perspective and from that of the Catholic 
Church: whereas the Protestants were keen to be inclusive in their approach to the 
issue (in other words they wanted equality of status for all religions including 
Catholicism), the Vatican was much less magnanimous in that all of its 
pronouncements on the issue from unification up to the 1950’s were made purely in 
relation to the wholeness of the truth on faith and morals as taught by the Catholic
1 RSChurch. This was due partly to the fact that after the newly unified Kingdom of 
Italy had wounded the Vatican’s pride with the annexation of the Papal States, the 
Vatican felt the need to reclaim for itself a position of spiritual and moral authority. 
More importantly it needed to re-establish its temporal sovereignty which it 
eventually achieved via the Lateran Treaty creating Vatican City State in 1929. It 
then turned its attention to what it perceived to be the greatest threats to the Church 
and the Italian people: secularism, liberalism, atheist Communism and Protestantism 
-  in short, anything that was not Catholicism. Often, Fascism is also included in this 
list of threats to the Church, but I would suggest that even though they were 
uncomfortable bedfellows, with at times a mutual suspicion of each other’s 
intentions, there was also the sense of a shared aim -  to govern Italy absolutely by 
their own principles and to the exclusion of all other political and religious 
influences. Such an aim led to what Conway calls a
ghetto mentality. . .  in which the faithful were enclosed as far as possible 
within a self-contained network of Catholic social and cultural organisations, 
and contact with those beyond the faith was seen either positively as an 
opportunity for evangelism or negatively as a source of danger, but rarely as 
an opportunity for mutual discussion.18
184 Carlen, C. (Ed.), The Papal Encyclicals (5 Volumes), Raleigh (U.S. A): The Pierian Press, 1990, 
(Vol.: 1878-1903), pp. 169-181.
185 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 211.
186 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe: 1918-1945, p. 100.
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This sectarianism, exploited by the Church particularly through the work of Catholic 
Action, manifested itself in the integralist ambitions of the Christian Democrat 
deputies during the years of the Constituent Assembly and was only tempered under 
the pontificate of John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council.
In criticizing the Church’s social doctrine, Gramsci suggested that
the Church is willing to fight only to defend its own particular organizational 
freedoms (those of the Church as a church, an ecclesiastical establishment), 
that is the privileges that it declares to be owed to its divine essence . . . .  
Everything else is of relatively minor importance unless it somehow affects 
the conditions of the Church’s existence. Thus by ‘despotism’ the Church 
only means the exercise of state power to limit or suppress Church privileges, 
not much more than that. The Church recognises any de facto power 
whatsoever, and is willing to legitimise it provided it does not encroach on 
those privileges. Indeed, if it should be willing to increase those privileges, 
then the Church will exalt it and declare it providential.187
The reciprocal collusion between the Church and Fascism was seen by Gramsci and
others among the laity as illustrating how the Church had been ‘irrimediabilmente
ridotta a mero instrumentum regni, che difende i suoi interessi e la sua stessa
188presenza storica con le sue organizzazioni e con la politica concordataria’.
During the war, the Church’s attitude to religious freedom remained 
unchanged. Ironically, after the war, one fundamental principle regarding religious 
freedom was trumpeted by the Catholic Church: no-one could have a faith forced 
upon them. This was particularly significant for the non-Catholic religions who, in 
spite of this ideal, continued to suffer both at the hands of the authorities and the 
Catholic Church. But why would the Church risk making itself look foolish in the 
light of current, recent and even historical events? Firstly, the Church was keen to 
make the distinction between itself and totalitarianism; and, secondly, the average 
Italian Catholic voter would have had little or no knowledge of what was happening 
in the rest of Europe at that time and so the Church was able to make such a 
statement as a timely repost to those Taici’ who accused the Church of being against
1 QQreligious freedom. The position was reaffirmed in October 1946 by Pius XII in a 
speech given to mark the opening of Tanno giudiziario della Sacra Rota’ :
187 My translation o f A. Gramsci, Note sul Macchiavelli, sulla politica e sullo stato 
modemo, Torino: Einaudi, 1949, p.239; cited inPoggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p. 9.
188 N. Antonetti, L ’ideologia della sinistra cristiana: I cattolici tra Chiesa e comunismo (1937-1945), 
Milano: Franco Angeli Editore, 1976, p. 36.
189 Long, Aile origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 214.
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I sempre piu frequenti contatti e la promiscuita delle diverse confessioni 
religiose entro i confini di un medesimo popolo hanno condotto i tribunali 
civili a seguire il principio di ‘tolleranza’ e della ‘liberta di coscienza’. Anzi 
vi e una tolleranza politica, civile e sociale verso i seguaci delle altre 
confessioni, che in tali circostanze e anche per i cattolici un dovere morale. 
Nessuno venga costretto contro la sua volonta ad abbracciare la fede 
cattolica. Questo canone, che riproduce le parole del nostro grande 
predecessore Leone XIII nell’enciclica Immortale Dei del 1° novembre 1875, 
e Leco fedele della dottrina insegnata dalla Chiesa fin dai primi secoli del 
Cristianesimo.190
Leaving out of consideration the Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition, Pius’ 
speech ignores the forced and brutal mass conversion to Catholicism of Jews, 
Muslims and other faiths in Croatia during the war. In fact the Jewish Question as 
tackled by the Nazis was only surpassed by the horrors perpetrated by Dr. Ante 
Pavelic’s Ustasha troops in Croatia. Although Pavelic had received an audience with 
the Pope in 1941, once the true extent and horror of his actions were realised by the 
Vatican, his exhalted status changed to that of an embarassing liability; and despite 
Pavelic’s frequent subsequent attempts to receive a further audience with the Pope, it 
is clear that from May 1943 onwards, Vatican officials did everything in their power 
to prevent such a meeting and to avoid the inevitable damage to the Holy See’s 
image as a neutral, benevolent institution.191
(ii) The Catholic Church as an ‘ordinamento originario’
The term ‘ordinamento originario’ refers to any institution or body whose juridical
1 09authority is not derived from any other institution. The concept of the Church as
1 09an ‘originary’ institution with its own juridical system goes back centuries.
However, the Church’s claim to originarieta is ontological in nature rather than 
chronological, and so, notwithstanding arguments over its roots, it is worth noting
190 Cited in ibid., p. 215.
191 Blet, P., Martini, A., Schneider, B., (Eds.) Actes et documents du Sainte Siege relatifs a  la seconde 
Guerre Mondiale (ADSS), Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1965-1981, Vol. IV, Docs. 
351, 352 & 354-358, pp. 493ff; and Vol. VII, Doc. 193, p. 337.
192 Stefano Riccio (Dc) gave a clear description o f the term during the Constituent Assembly debates: 
‘La originarieta dell’ordinamento giuridico della Chiesa significa che esso e a se, distinto ed 
indipendente. La Chiesa ha una potesta normativa che non le deriva dallo Stato, ma che e ad essa 
propria ed originaria, in quanto essa si presenta come una istituzione organizzata e che ha conseguita 
una giuridica unita, la quale oltrepassa i confini dello Stato. I caratteri della indipendenza e sovranita, 
fissati cumulativamente, indicano precisamente la originarieta di quest’ordinamento, cioe l ’asseita, nel 
senso che essa e un ordinamento per se stante, il cui fondamento non deriva dal riconoscimento di un 
altro ordinamento. La sovranita della Chiesa, che non e legata al territorio, ma e un dominio spirituale, 
e, percio, supera ed abbraccia il territorio del singolo Stato, e una realta storico-sociale, ormai non piu 
disconoscibile’. CRAC, Vol. 1, pp. 387-8.
193 Reese, Father Thomas J. (S. J.), Inside the Vatican: The politics and organisation o f  the Catholic 
Church Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press: 1996, p. 279.
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that originarieta became a major issue for theologians following the annexation of 
the Papal States between 1859 and 1870. The latter was effectively a challenge by 
the Italian State to this concept of ordinamento originario, which implied that the 
Catholic Church, in the same way as any other religion, should be free to operate 
within the juridical and authoritary confines of the State. Cavour put this quite neatly 
when he said there should be a Tibera Chiesa in libero Stato’. This idea was 
denounced vehemently by Pius X as interference by the State in Church matters with 
the ensuing impasse becoming known as the Roman Question. 194
While negotiations to end the problem in the form of the Lateran Pacts were 
under way, Pius XI declared that he wanted a ‘Trattato inteso a riconoscere .. . alia 
Santa Sede una vera e propria e reale sovranita territoriale’. Sovereignty, he declared, 
‘e evidentemente necessaria e dovuta a Chi . . .  non puo essere suddito di alcuna 
sovranita terrena’ . 195
Giovagnoli suggests that from the encyclical Quas primas (promulgated on 
11th December, 1925) and from the doctrine of the Kingship of Christ, it was possible 
to trace elements of religious opposition to reactionary movements and regimes 
across contemporary Europe. The most striking and significant aspect of that 
opposition was a vigorous reaffirmation of the primacy of religion over politics and 
of the Church over the State -  the natural consequence, in the opinion of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, of the idea of the Church as an ‘ordinamento originario’ . 196 
This idea of the superiority of Church and religion over State and politics is reflected 
in the predominance of Vatican biased articles in the Lateran Pacts and was also a
197key theme for Catholic politicians during Italy’s post-war political reconstruction. 
This is not to argue that the Church was seeking direct legislative authority. The 
Church’s teachings that the Church and State are each sovereign in their own 
spheres, and that the laity are required to obey the legitimate authorities, are quite 
compatible with it seeking increased influence, since it had also traditionally taught 
that its own teachings in matters of faith and morals should be followed not simply
194 See Section A l (i) o f this thesis.
195 Pio XI, Discorsi, 1929-1933, vol. II, Citta del Vaticano 1985, p. 9.
196 Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiana, p. 42.
197 However, by the time o f the Constituent Assembly, the Church was putting out mixed messages as 
to whether Church or State was dominant. The following is an extract from a letter published in
L ’Osservatore Romano on 19th September, 1946: ‘I sovrani Pontefici hanno affermato a piu riprese 
che la Chiesa non intende menomamente ingerirsi negli affari politici dello Stato. Essi hanno 
insegnato che lo Stato e sovrano nel suo proprio dominio. Hanno rigettato come una calunnia che una 
propaganda perfida attribuisce alia Chiesa di volersi impadronire del potere politico e dominare lo 
Stato. Essi hanno ricordato ai fedeli il dovere della sommissione ai poteri stabiliti.’
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by individuals but also by temporal rulers. Given the wide purview of what is 
covered by these qualifications, the Church could aspire to exercise considerable 
hegemony. And the Lateran Pacts were a step in achieving such hegemony.
The juridical nature of the Treaty required a ‘moral completion’: in order to 
achieve this Pius XI wanted ‘un concordato che assicurasse I’influenza cattolica nel 
Regno d’ltalia’ and sought to guarantee that ‘la religione cattolica fosse
1 Q fieffettivamente e non solo di nome la religione dello Stato’. As we have seen, the 
Lateran Pacts returned a small amount of temporal power and territory to the Church 
in the form of Vatican City State, but the prestige it regained as a sovereign state was 
immeasurable. Consequently, the Church revived its claim to be an ordinamento 
originario and this became a key theme in the Debates over article 7 in the 
Constituent Assembly.
According to Gianni Long, it was an illustrious figure in Italian ecclesiastical 
law, Santi Romano, whose theory of the Catholic Church as necessarily independent, 
having its own ordinamento originario and thus needing relations with the State 
based on concordats, whose influence permeated the culture of the costituenti and 
can be clearly seen in the wording of final articles 7 and 8  of the Constitution. 199
tViIn fact, in an article written for the Dc newspaper ‘II Popolo’ on 4 March 
1947 Aldo Moro said that two of the great achievements of the Dc deputies in the 
Constituent Assembly are the ‘affermazione dell’indipendenza della Chiesa e della 
originarieta del suo ordinamento’ and the ‘richiamo costituzionale dei Patti 
Lateranensi’. These issues, ‘sincerely defended by Christian Democrat deputies’, 
constituted for Moro ‘una concreta garanzia di quella democraticita del nuovo Stato, 
la quale sembra essere nei voti di tutti’ .200
(iii) The role of concordats
Despite the huge emphasis Pius XI placed on the development of Catholic Action 
organisations throughout Italian society, at a political level he preferred diplomatic 
action -  usually in the form of concordats -  to action from below by a Catholic 
political movement.201 In fact, during the inter-war years, he signed forty diplomatic
198 Cited in Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiana, p. 46.
199 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, pp. 308-9. See also Dossetti’s speeches in the 
Constituent Assembly (collected in such works as G. Dossetti, La ricerca cosiituente: 1945-1952, 
Bologna: II Mulino, 1994; G. Dossetti, Costituzione e Resistenza, Roma: Sapere, 1995 and CRAC 
(8 Volumes) cited above.
200 Moro, A. L 'apporto democristiano alia nuova Costituzione, in 7 / Popolo’, 4th March 1947, p. 1.
201 Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p. 21.
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concordats with national governments including Poland in 1925, with Mussolini’s 
Italy in 1929 and, most controversially, with Nazi Germany in 1933. Concordats 
were only the first step in Pius' plans for the Church. They guaranteed the legal 
independence of the Church from state control, thereby providing ‘the freedom for its 
spiritual and cultural organisations to pursue their apostolic work’ .202
One of the key players in creating and negotiating these concordats was 
Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII. The single aim that ran through 
Pacelli’s diplomatic policy from the Serbian Concordat negotiations of 1913 to the 
conclusion of the Reich Concordat in 1933 was that the Code of Canon Law should 
be the foundation of the essential legal presupposition of the concordat.203 This 
involved not only official recognition by the government in question of the 
legislation of the Church, but also the adoption of many provisions of this legislation 
and the protection of all Church legislation. In Pacelli’s eyes, the historic victory of 
the Reich Concordat was entirely the Holy See’s; for the treaty emphatically did not 
mean the Holy See’s approval of the Nazi state, but, on the contrary, the total 
recognition and acceptance of the Church’s law by the state. In fact, the Church 
claims that it was critical of these regimes in the encyclicals Quadragesima Anno 
(1931) and Umani Generis Unitas (1939). However, Gianni Long makes an 
interesting point regarding such claims:
non poche difficolta sono create da Stati che hanno recentemente stipulate 
con la Chiesa dei concordati per essa molto favorevoli. E cio appare evidente 
sia nella Non abbiamo bisogno (1931) in cui e criticato il fascismo italiano; 
sia nella Mit brennender Sorge (1937) il cui obiettivo e costituito dal nazismo 
tedesco. Gli argomenti avanzati nelle due encicliche suonano condanna dei 
due regimi; ma esse sono specificamente rivolte a protestare per le angherie 
subite dai cattolici (soprattutto in materia scolastica) e per le violazioni delle 
norme concordatarie. Non sono il nazismo e il fascismo in se ad essere 
condannati, ma i loro comportamenti anticattolici204
It may be tempting to dismiss these comments by Gianni long, himself a Waldensian, 
on the basis of what can certainly be argued to be a faulty conclusion, and a 
misleading presentation of the purpose of the encyclicals in question. But this would
202 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 41.
203 Pacelli himself was a member of the Commission set up by Pius X in 1904 to revise the old Acta 
apostolicae Sedis and played a major role in creating the new Code o f Canon Law which was ratified 
on 19th May 1918. The new Code contained all ecclesiastical laws still in force, condensed into 2414 
canons in five volumes, ostensibly for ease o f consultation: but the new codex also served the much 
more significant function o f focussing ecclesiastical authority on the Pope. For more information see 
www.iubilatedeo.it/storiachiesa/BenedettoXV. htm
204 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, pp.212-13.
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be to miss the main point of his comments. Let us analyse the argument, dealing in 
the first place with the more questionable aspects of what he states.
The encyclicals in question, unlike Pius XI’s Divini redemptoris (1937) on 
Communism and its conflict with Catholic social teaching as such, were not 
primarily directed at doctrinal issues. Non abbiamo bisogno (1931) was specifically 
‘On Catholic Action in Italy’ and Mit brennender Sorge (1937) was ‘On the Church 
and the German Reich’. Given the purpose of the encyclicals, the Pope could 
hardly be blamed for focussing on the problems faced by Catholics. In the case of the 
1931 encyclical, it responded to attacks on Ac in the Fascist press, and to a campaign 
being conducted to disband separate Catholic youth and student associations. 
Doctrinal issues never surfaced, and condemnations of the regime are limited to its 
bullying, intimidation, lying and violence. By 1937 in Germany, however, attacks on 
the Church were not simply of the latter kind, but Nazism had developed a 
substantial corpus of powerful but pernicious ideas in its ideology.
It is perhaps at this point that Long’s comments are most open to question. A 
millennial tradition of papal encyclicals has bred an attention to context and focus, 
and a reluctance to step outside these boundaries, which often produces in the reader 
(both Catholic and non-Catholic) an impatience with what seems an excessive 
caution. Encyclicals are rarely a straightforward letter from the Pope himself, but the 
end-product of drafts by trusted officials and experts attentive to the orientation and 
complexities of papal requirements at the time. It is thus not surprising that attacks 
on Nazism, in Mit brennender Sorge, should arise in the contingent context of 
relations between Catholics and the Reich.
Having said this, and taking account of the encyclical’s purpose, it is difficult 
to see that its attacks on ‘pantheism’ (section 7 in Carlen’s edition); on the exaltation 
of race, people, the state or forms of the state (section 8 ); on doctrines of race and 
blood, and on ‘patriotic’ forms of religion (section 23); on the idea of the so-called 
‘German type’, can be seen as anything but condemnations of Nazism at root. The 
encyclical may be careful to link these ideas with the experience of Catholics in 
Germany, no doubt in order to keep within the terms of its chosen remit, but the 
condemnations are on the basis of broad Christian principles which are not sectarian, 
and leave little doubt about their purpose.206
205 These are the subtitles provided in Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals, Vol. III.
206 1 am indebted to discussions with Professor Gino Bedani on these matters.
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Long has made the mistake of succumbing to the ‘impatience’ referred to 
earlier in connection with papal encyclicals, and opened himself to the charge of 
unfairness to an institution which, in other respects, was his own oppressor. He could 
have made the real substance of the point he was intending to make in connection 
with concordats and the problems this causes the Church, which was in effect a 
sympathetic point, more effectively. He could justifiably have pointed towards the 
limitations imposed on the German encyclical, in terms of both space and context, 
given to its condemnations of Nazism, by the Church’s own political involvement 
with regimes, by comparing it with its ability to devote a whole encyclical, in the 
same year, to a full blooded attack on atheistic Communism, where it was free of 
such restraints (Divini redemptoris).
In reality, of course, the Church was keen to project the Pacts as a victory for 
Catholicism, but as Scoppola points out,
cultura e mentalita cattolica erano state tuttavia profondamente segnate dalla 
esperienza delle ‘compromissioni’. ..  con il regime: l’idea che lo Stato 
dovesse assicurare alia Chiesa una condizione di privilegio legale era radicata 
nell’episcopato e nel clero. La difesa del Concordato del ’29 diventera percio 
uno dei cardini delle rivendicazioni cattoliche nella fase costituente.207
The Lateran Pacts, like all the other concordats signed during this period, are less of 
a comment on the Church’s propensity to collaborate with governments of any 
political ilk, but rather an indication of its ability in times of strife and upheaval to 
see beyond the present and lay solid foundations on which to build its future political 
and spiritual ambitions. Jemolo makes an apposite comment when he says that
negli Accordi lateranensi vedono soprattutto una carta, quel la della influenza 
politica del papato e dei partiti cattolici stranieri, posta al servizio della futura 
politica estera e coloniale italiana, e . . . che gli Accordi lateranensi valgono 
non per quello che liquidano del passato, bensi per cio che impegnano del 
futuro. 20
207 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 99.
208 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, p. 231.
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(iv) Catholic social and political ideologies: their roots in papal encyclicals
a) Integral ismo
Papal encyclicals were a major source of Catholic integralist ambition which 
manifested itself principally in the work of Catholic Action.209 As Pius XI said in his 
inaugural encyclical UbiArcano Dei in 1922 and reiterated in many of his later 
pronouncements, Catholic Action groups were 'the organised participation of the 
laity in the hierarchical apostolate of the Church, transcending party politics for the 
establishment of Christ's reign throughout the world' .210 There was in fact a common 
ideology that linked the Vatican with most Catholic working class groups: they all 
wanted to nurture the confessional interests of Catholicism, and both ‘remained 
convinced that only the establishment of a society based on Catholic principles 
offered a durable solution to the sufferings of the working class’ 211 This was a 
relatively novel feature of inter-war Catholicism.
The rapidly expanding Catholic student culture was strongly influenced by 
the militant nature of Catholic Action, which in turn were motivated by such figures 
as the French theologian and philosopher Jacques Maritain, whose work sought to 
emphasise the autonomy and distinctiveness of Catholic beliefs. 212 In 1939, in his 
first encyclical Summi pontificatus (Of the Supreme Pontificate), known in English 
as ‘Darkness over the Earth’, Pius XII condemned the growth of secularism and what 
he called laicism, and called for a new world order in which all nations recognised 
the kingdom of Christ.213
The integralism of the Vatican’s political and spiritual objectives was 
reflected in and supported by its disciplined internal organisation: by the time of the 
pontificate of Pius XII, the internal life of the Church had become so centralised that 
the direction taken by those at the bottom of the hierarchical edifice perfectly 
reflected the instructions that came from the top .214 These instructions from on high 
came traditionally in the form of encyclicals. The problem was that they were usually 
very long, complex theological documents and very often beyond the comprehension 
of the ordinary person. During the war, the Vatican realised the need to speak 
directly to the population at large to comfort them and prevent the ravages of war
209 For more see I. Giordani, (Ed.), Le encicliche sociali dei Papi, da Pio IX a  Pio XII (1864-1946), 
Roma: Studium, 1946.
210 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 41.
211 Ibid., p. 40.
212 Ibid., p. 43.
213 Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals (1939-1958), pp. 6-7.
214 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 104.
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from leading them away from Holy Mother Church. Broadcasting directly to the 
nation via the Christmas radio messages -  which became known as Pius XII’s 
‘progetto storico’ -  was the ideal means to do this, and it was a defining moment in
9 1 Sthe Vatican’s approach to self-marketing.
b) Laicita and laicismo
Although the antithesis of integralismo, the concepts of ‘laicita’ and ‘laicismo’ are 
nevertheless inextricably linked to it. During the period of the discussions in the 
drafting committees for the Constitution in 1946, Aldo Moro denounced state 
‘laicismo’ as something the Italian people did not want
quel laicismo che per forza di cose non pud restare una formula di neutrality 
giuridica in omaggio alia liberta di coscienza e prima o poi diventa una 
posizione attiva, per distruggere con l’aiuto dell’indifferentismo religioso il 
patrimonio di religiosita del popolo italiano. Non intendiamo naturalmente 
accentuare le polemiche, ma crediamo di poter richiamare uomini e partiti in 
questa materia delicatissima che tocca la sensibilita religiosa del popolo, a dar 
provadi saggezzaedi toUeranza216
This speech is Moro at his iriost integralist: the stato laico and the scuola laica 
deemed essential pre-requisites for religious freedom by the non-Catholic religious 
groups in Italy -  are anathema to him. To Moro such a State renders itself
pericolosamente estraneo alia coscienza morale delle persone che lo 
compongono, distruggendo in fatto il valore delle istituzioni, delle attivita, 
delle Ieggi. Cio tanto piu in Italia, ove una straordinaria compattezza di 
confessione religiosa rende del tutto inattuale il problema della libera 
convivenza di credenti in diverse fedi.217
He is effectively saying here that religious freedom for the minority religions is an 
inconsequential matter that the political parties need not bother themselves about.
In September 1946, in an article regarding the Church’s involvement in State 
affairs, L 'Osservatore Romano cites a speech made by Schumann (a deputy in the 
French parliament) on 13th November 1945.218 The speech, supported by the Bishops
215 Ibid, pp. 24-5.
216 Archivio della Camera dei Deputati (ACD), Camera dei Deputati, Inventario d e ll’Assembled 
Costituente, Quademi dell’Archivio storico -  No.6, Roma, Camera dei Deputati: 1999, Busta 74, 
Fascicolo 1, Commissioneper la Costituzione: 10 Sottocommissione. Relazione del Deputato Aldo 
Moro sui 'Principii dei rapporti sociali (culturali), p.91.
217 Ibid, pp. 91-2.
218 The speech was reported as follows: E tempo di dissipare un equivoco che rischia di nuocere 
gravemente alia unita nazionale. Esso si riferisce ad una espressione che e usata da moltissimi 
correntemente in molti e differentissimi sensi: la laicita dello Stato. Se con queste parole si intende 
proclamare la sovrana autonomia dello Stato nel suo dominio dell’ordine temporale, il suo diritto di
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of France, claims that the Church had no intention of meddling in State affairs, that 
the State is sovereign and autonomous, that subsequent Popes have always 
maintained that the Church has never sought to appropriate political power or to 
dominate the State, and that it has reminded the faithful of their duty to subject 
themselves to the will of the political authorities. It is not clear if this original letter 
was supposed to refer specifically to the French situation or whether it was intended 
to be taken more as a general, theoretical position. However, the fact that 
L 'Osservatore Romano deemed it necessary to offer a response to it strongly 
suggests that the subject matter was indeed relevant to the situation in Italy in 1946. 
In response to the speech, L 'Osservatore Romano says:
Ecco in quale senso i cattolici possono accettare la parola e l’idea di laicita. E 
in un altro senso ancora: nel senso che lo Stato lasci ai cittadini il diritto di 
praticare liberamente la propria religione e adotti una sistema costituzionale 
in cui la differenza di culto e di opinione religiose o filosofiche non formi 
eccezione al godimento dei diritti civili e politici e alia ammissibilita alle
0 1Qcariche civili e militari.
Sulla laicita cosi definita ed intesa non c’e ragione di contendere, 
specie sul terreno politico ove e necessario trovare punti di convergenza tra le 
opposte parti e ridurre al minimo i contrasti. Per prendere la recente 
dichiarazione di un rappresentante socialista italiano, notiamo che la 
convergenza e evidente quando egli dice: ‘Per laicismo intendo 
Findipendenza del potere civile da quello religioso e l’indipendenza del 
potere religioso da quello civile.’ A parte F ‘ismo’ che noi rifiutiamo perche il 
concetto di laicismo e amplificazione e degenerazione del concetto di 
‘laicita’, la formula 0 esatta. . .
Later in the article it says:
. .. uno scrittore azionista, il Salvatorelli, sostenendo la tesi dello ‘Stato 
laico’, scriveva: ‘Le chiese -  e in Italia principalmente la cattolica -  non sono 
qualche cosa di indifferente per lo Stato. Lo Stato puo e deve riconoscere la
govemare da solo tutta la organizzazione politica, giudiziaria, amministrativa, fiscale della societa 
temporale e, d’una maniera generale, tutto cid che si riferisce alia tecnica politica ed economica, noi 
dichiariamo nettamente che questa dottrina 6 pienamente conforme alia dottrina della Chiesa. /  
sovrani Pontefici hanno affermato a piu riprese che la Chiesa non intende menomamente ingerirsi 
negli qffari politici dello Stato. Essi hanno insegnato che lo Stato e sovrano nel suo proprio dominia 
Hanno rigettato come una calunnia che una propaganda perfida attribuisce alia Chiesa di volersi 
impadronire del potere politico e dominare lo Stato. Essi hanno ricordato ai fedeli il dovere della 
sommissione a ipo teri stabiliti. Nonostante tutte queste precisazioni si continua ad agitare di fronte 
alle masse il vecchio spettro di clericalismo. Se il clericalismo e la ingerenza del clero nel dominio 
politico dello Stato, o quella tendenza che potrebbe avere una societa spirituale a servirsi dei poteri 
pubblici per soddisfare la sua volonta di dominazione, noi dichiariamo altamente che condanniamo il 
clericalismo come contrario alia autentica dottrina della Chiesa. ‘Laicita dello S ta to \ in L 'Osservatore 
Romano, 19th September 1946, p.l. (My italics.)
219 Italicised section is identical to article 4 o f the law dealing with permitted religions (24 June 1929, 
no. 1159).
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loro utilita sociale, il loro valore morale, tutelame le condizioni di esistenza e 
d’attivita, sempre entro i limiti, naturalmente, della liberta religiosa e della 
parita dei cittadini innanzi alia legge.
Laicita, dunque, non vuol dire ignoranza .. . Lo Stato modemo, 
dunque, che non ignora nulla, dovrebbe ignorare solamente il fatto religioso?
La laicita non puo e non deve impedire alio Stato di valutare ed 
utilizzare . . .  i contributi che la Chiesa puo recare alia vita spirituale della 
nazione. Essa deve significare ‘distinzione’ dei due poteri e non ignoranza 
reciproca e non separazione. 220
The reference to Italian legislation clearly brings the response, if not the 
original letter, into the sphere of Italian, not French, politics. Nevertheless, both Pius 
XI and Pius XII had clearly stated on many occasions that the Church and divine law 
were on a superior plane to the State and civil law . 221 So here we have an example of 
a clear discrepancy between the official policy of the Vatican, as delineated by the 
Pope, and the pronouncements it was promulgating to the general public.
The relationship between the State and the non-Catholic religions was more 
complex and religious freedom in its true, pluralist sense was at the heart of the issue. 
Gianni Long considered that for the lay parties, religious freedom meant the equality 
of all citizens. For Christian Democrats ‘freedom’ consisted of the fact that the State 
should consider the minority churches as such. ‘Equality’ would imply an agnostic 
State: but a State which considers all religions as equal is, in itself, removing one’s 
freedom, according to the Christian Democrat concept, by questioning the right of 
Catholics to be the dominant religion. 222
c) Personalismo
As laid out in the encyclicals of Pius XI, according to Long, the traditional freedoms 
of the Church consist, above all, of the denunciation of the concept of the separation 
of Church and State, of the defence of the articles of the Concordat and of the 
ecclesiastical prerogatives outlined therein. But there also emerged hints of a more 
general defence of the ‘persona umana’ and its rights.223 In fact, the concept of the 
dignity of the human person appears first in Pius XI’s encyclical Divini redemptoris 
(1937), in relation to the Communist threat: in it he says that communism ‘divests the
220 A clear reference to the French situation. ‘Laicita dello Stato’, L ’Osservatore Romano, 19th 
September 1946, p.l.
221 See section A3 (v) o f this thesis on ‘anticlericalism’; see also M. Casella, Cattolici e Costituenti: 
orientamenti e iniziative del cattolicesimo organizzato (1945-1947), Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche 
Italiane, 1987, pp. 288-291.
222 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 47.
223 Ibid., p. 212.
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human person of dignity and of all self-control’ .224 During the thirties, French 
Catholic thinkers like Congar, De Lubac and Jacques Maritain were also pushing 
Italian Catholics towards a re-evaluation of the rights of the individual within the 
Catholic religious freedom argument. Left-wing factions of the Church’s Catholic 
Action such as the dossettiani were influenced by both Maritain and the plethora of 
papal writings, and put a great emphasis on the concept of ‘the dignity of the human 
person’ which, incorporated with Catholicism’s political aims, became an area of 
possible convergence between different cultures and different political forces.225
A turning point in Vatican social politics was Pius XII’s Christmas 
message of 1942 on ‘Z, ’ordine interno delle nazioni\ In the message he rejects 
totalitarianism because of its disregard for the importance of the person. He also 
reaffirms the subjection of politics to morality and states that the aim of every 
society and every organisation should be ‘lo sviluppo e il perfezionamento 
della persona umana’ .226 It is on this line that Pius XII exceeds some of the limits of 
previous Church social doctrine, especially in relation to the Church’s traditional 
indifference to democracy, which dated from the time of Leo XIII and especially in 
his encyclicals ‘Diutumum’ of 1881 and ‘Humanum genus’ of 18 84.227 Moreover, 
the Christmas message, according to Igino Giordani, was an important step forward, 
clearly introducing the principle of the dignity of the human person as the benchmark 
for political and social order as a whole.228 On this basis Catholic political thought 
would develop throughout the following years, finally overcoming its traditional 
indifference towards various forms of government and attributing a ‘privileged moral 
value’ to political democracy. But in 1942 it was still a case of laying down a 
blueprint for future development. The Christmas message did not in fact go any 
further than a simple indication in favour of social structures in which a full personal 
responsibility was made possible and guaranteed (that is, responsibility to uphold 
Catholic values) . 229
So, the primacy of the person, the basis of political personalismo -  a trend 
already apparent in minority Catholic cultural groups of the thirties -  offered the
224 Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals (1903-1939), p. 539.
225 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 27.
226 De Gasperi, on the other hand, considered freedom and political democracy to be the fundamental
elements of society. Scoppola, La proposta politica d i De Gasperi, Bologna: II Mulino, 1988, p. 83.
227 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 24. For details o f  the main achievements and major 
encyclicals o f recent popes see: www.testimoni2000.it/storiachiesa/papil8002000.htm.
228 See I. Giordani, Insegnamento sociale dei Papi, Roma: A.V.E., 1944.
229 See also Giovagnoli, llpartito  italiano, p. 24.
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possibility of putting a moral value on democracy as a form of government.230 But 
such an aim was not without its difficulties: the leader of the dossettiani and 
prominent member of the emerging Dc party, Giuseppe Dossetti, lamented the fact 
that a ‘turba di conservatori del nostro partito’ were complaining that in the draft 
constitution the concept of the dignity of the human person was being applied too 
insistently and in too abstract a manner.231
For the Catholic Church, the crisis of the modem world had been brought 
back to its philosophical roots, with the abandoning of the two founding principles of 
social order: God and the human person. The reconstruction had to begin from these 
two poles which were brought together in the vision of Pius XII, in the idea of a 
natural order. And the actions of the State were subject to this natural order. 232 The 
last element in the doctrinal construction of Pius XII centres around the need for a 
juridical system within which the rights of the person are recognised and 
guaranteed. 233 In this way Pius succeeds in reviving the fundamental idea of the 
liberal-democratic tradition of a properly established constitutional and legal order, 
but within the organic conception and the metaphysical vision of society, which is 
exactly in line with traditional Catholic social doctrine. In this vision the Church has 
a directive duty: to guarantee the moral picture, to encourage the education of 
individuals, citizens and governments to be aware of their responsibilities and to 
assess their historical accomplishments. The ‘civilta cristiana’ would be established 
at precisely the time when these accomplishments conform to the values of which the 
Church is guarantor and guardian.234
(v) Anticlericalism and antichristianism
It is worth mentioning here the difference between anticlericalism and 
antichristianism. Antichristianism, or more correctly, antireligionism was a feature of 
Russian Communism feared by the Catholic Church: but Russian Communism was 
not the same as Italian Communism. Whereas the Catholic Church, like all other 
churches in Russia, had suffered at the hands of the Politburo, in Italy the situation
230 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 24.
231 Dossetti, Costituzione e Resistenza Rome: Sapere, 1995, p. 91. For a detailed examination o f the 
Catholic theory o f the persona umana, see Giorgio La Pira’s speech in Segretario Generale (Ed.) La 
Costituzione della Repubblica nei lavori preparati della Assemblea Costituente, Roma, Camera dei 
Deputati, 1970, volume 1, pp. 314-9.
232 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, pp. 25-26.
233 Pio XI, Discorsi: 1929-1933, (Vol. VI), Citta del Vaticano: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1961, 
pp. 235-251.
4 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 26. For more on personalismo, see A. Acerbi, La Chiesa nel 
tempo, Milano. Vita e pensiero, 1979.
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was different. Communists lived and worked alongside Catholics, many had Catholic 
relations or had been confirmed into the Catholic faith in their youth before turning 
to Communism. Thus, in Italy the relationship dynamic was different. There was, of 
course, a mutual suspicion and even periods of conflict and violence between 
Catholic Action and many left-wing political groups, but largely thanks to the 
calming influence of political leaders of all parties anxious not to antagonise the 
Church, such periods never escalated into a national problem. So it was primarily 
the Russian situation that formed the basis of the Catholic Church’s concerns, with 
the problem for Italy being largely the same: the Church’s one dimensional view of 
Communism as an evil which, if it took hold, would destroy the spiritual hegemony 
in which the Catholic Church held Italy during the post-war period, a position 
necessary to fulfil the Vatican’s dream of a country run on Catholic principles. Thus 
anyone espousing antichristian propaganda was naturally considered by the Church 
to be either a Communist, or a laico, and certainly an enemy. 236 And whilst the laid  
were a threat with which the Church had by now become accustomed, Communism 
was perceived as a more combative enemy, given the Soviet Union’s declared 
atheism of state. Protestations by the Italian Communists that they did not embrace 
this ideological position, and even the declaration in the Pci statutes that religious 
belief was no bar to membership of the party, were simply swept aside as tactical 
deception.
By 1944 the threat posed by Communism had become ‘an obsessive concern 
of the papacy’ , 237 and papal paranoia extended into the realms of Catholic politics: 
left-wing Catholics keen to bridge the gap between themselves and the Communists 
and Socialists were strongly criticised by Osservatore Romano for colluding with 
these anti-religionist groups. But since Russia had been a major player in the allied 
victory in Europe the Vatican had to be careful how it voiced its anti-Communist 
beliefs -  at least in the short term .238 However, it was not only because of 
Communism that the Church had to exercise caution in this interim period. In the 
immediate post-war period, many left-wing groups, some linked to the Action Party, 
the Socialists and the Communists, considered that the Church was interfering too 
much in political matters. An anticlerical backlash was the result and, as the term
235 ADSS, Vol. XI, Doc. 292, pp. 453-456.
236 In Italian political discourse, the term ‘laico’ tends to refer to an individual or party historically 
opposed to the Church. In the religious context, however, it refers to  the ‘laity5 as distinct from the 
‘clergy’.
237 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 93.
238 Giovagnoli, IIpartito italiano, p. 30.
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suggests, was aimed principally at clerical interference in matters which were the 
concern of political, administrative and civil institutions. It did not necessarily imply 
hostility to religion as such when exercised within its legitimate sphere.
The Catholic Church had had to deal with anticlericalism in one form or 
another from the various governments since unification. The Fascist government 
had proven, to a certain extent, to be no different: among its upper echelons there 
had been factions who had displayed a latent anticlericalism, at all times suspicious 
of the Church. Despite these tensions, the Church had, on the whole, an extremely 
cooperative relationship with Fascism leading some to believe that once the regime 
had fallen there would be a wave of anticlerical reprisals. But, on a political level at 
least, nothing was further from the truth. Neither the Liberal leader Benedetto Croce 
nor the Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti proposed the suspension of the Lateran 
Accords, nor any measure which could be construed as hostile to the Church.
According to Jemolo, not only was there a tacit intention to postpone any 
discussion of the problem of Church/State relations until after all constitutional 
questions had been resolved, but there was also no sign of the confrontational stances 
evident in other problem areas of the future Constitution.240 Indeed, there was a 
sincere desire on the part of all in the left-wing parties in the period before the 
Constituent Assembly debates to avoid a return to the old anticlericalism. The 
conciliatory mood of the Left was matched by the Dc deputies: even those who later 
enjoyed prominent positions in government and showed the greatest inflexibility on 
the insertion of the Lateran Pacts into the new Constitution appeared, to those who 
spoke to them at that time, to be full of moderation and to display a real spirit of 
conciliation and goodwill.241 However, although the left wing parties on the whole 
denied any wish to return to the radical secularising policies of the pre-Fascist era, 
Catholic suspicions of atheist and freemasonic influences on these parties remained 
strong and tempered the willingness of Catholic parties in France, Belgium and Italy 
to collaborate with parties of the centre left.242
When anticlerical feelings began to emerge in Italy in 1946, it was at a local 
level, as a backlash against the Church’s interference in Italian politics, and was 
aimed principally at the clergy. The Church, however, vociferously denied that it had
239 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, pp. 188-189.
240 Ibid., p. 283.
241 Ibid., pp. 284-285.
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any reason or ambition to meddle in Italian politics. In an article written for the 
Vatican’s official newspaper, L 'Osservatore Romano, it stated:
Nonostante tutte queste precisazioni si continua ad agitare di fronte alle 
masse il vecchio spettro di clericalismo. Se il clericalismo e la ingerenza del 
clero nel dominio politico dello Stato, o quella tendenza che potrebbe avere 
una societa spirituale a servirsi dei poteri pubblici per soddisfare la sua 
volonta di dominazione, noi dichiariamo altamente che condanniamo il 
clericalismo come contrario alia autentica dottrina della Chiesa.243
However, this statement from the official Vatican newspaper, although 
claiming to be the official Vatican line on political interference by its clergy, was 
belied in practice, as one event in particular clearly shows. At the time when the 
Commission of 75 was concluding its preliminary draft of the new Constitution prior 
to discussion in the full Constituent Assembly, there was in Italy, according to 
Falconi, a ‘scatenamento di violenza contro il clero e la religione’ which, after the 
cross-party truce of 1945, characterised the second half of 1946 and reached a truly 
alarming climax during the settimane a cavaliere of December 1946 and January 
1947.244 The main reason for this unrest was the huge campaign of the education of 
the masses embarked on by the clergy at the time. As Casella explains:
Non c’e dubbio: nell’eta della Costituente, clerici e laici organizzati svolsero, 
sotto la guida della gerarchia, una massiccia e capillare azione politica; 
un’azione certamente meno organizzata e coordinata di quella che sarebbe 
stata poi svolta alia vigilia del 18 aprile 1948, ma non per questo meno estesa, 
intensa ed incisiva.245
The situation was exacerbated with the announcement of the legge elettorale (and in 
particular article 6 6  of the law banning ecclesiastics from taking part in political 
propaganda) prior to the institutional elections of 2nd June 1946. During the months 
leading up to the elections the various Catholic Action groups held rallies, congresses 
and ‘settimane social i' , one the most significant of these being the first postwar 
Congress of the ‘Movimenti Laureati’ in Rome from 3rd to 8 th January 1946 where 
speeches were made by, among others, De Gasperi, Fanfani and Moro. An arguably 
more significant settimana sociale was held in Naples from 24th February to 3rd 
March on ‘aspetti concreti dei vari problemi sociali in sede di Costituente’. The week 
was presided over by Cardinal Alessio Ascalesi and Monsignor Lanza with the most
243 ‘Laicita dello Stato’, in L 'Osservatore Romano, 19th September 1946, p.l.
244 C. Falconi, Gedda e I ’Azione cattolica, Firenze: Parenti, 1958, p. 119.
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significant outcome being a unanimous motion of absolute condemnation of article 
6 6  of the forthcoming electoral law, which was conveyed to De Gasperi and the 
president of the Consulta246
This bitter condemnation of the electoral law put De Gasperi in a very 
uncomfortable position: as president of the interim government he was responsible 
for the law which was intended to attack anticlericalism at its source -  Catholic 
clerical interference in political affairs. But he was also Secretary of the Dc party, 
whose main source of financial and organisational support was the Vatican. 
Consequently, under pressure from the left-wing parties in the government, he had to 
be seen to be acting positively to discourage the clergy from interfering in political 
affairs, while at all costs avoiding any act that could be construed as antagonistic to 
the Vatican. De Gasperi’s attempts to quell the threat of anticlericalism were dealt 
another blow with pressure from the right-wing Uomo qualunque party: the 
aggressive anti-left/anti-Dc/pro-Catholic electioneering of the Uq party prior to the 
administrative elections at the end of 1946 appealed greatly to the southern 
electorate, led to landslide victories for the party in the south and, more significantly, 
attracted the support of the Vatican, thus threatening De Gasperi’s and the Dc’s 
position as its preferred choice. 247 The leader of the Dc also had to intervene during 
the debates in the Constituent Assembly to avoid the diffusion of anticlerical feelings 
which could potentially have led to a denunciation of the 1929 Pacts, a renewed 
position of isolation for the Church and the Dc left high and dry with no chance of
9/18any future electoral success, at least in the short term.
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(vi) Montini, the dossettiani and De Gasperi
The young Giovanni Battista Montini was firmly convinced that the Catholic laity 
should ‘uscire dalle sacrestie’ in which the Fascists had confined them, in order to 
reorganise themselves into an active political militancy.249 He felt it was time for 
Catholics to revive the political calling that had been interrupted by the liquidation of 
the Ppi. But it had to happen, on the one hand, with a much stricter collaboration 
between ecclesiastical institutions and Catholic militant groups; and on the other 
hand, the resurgence of political activity had to cultivate policies less ‘insular’ and 
more ‘national’. In fact, Montini had contributed greatly to the dissemination of 
Jacques Maritain’s ideas throughout Italy, preparing the ground in the Catholic 
Action intellectual groups for De Gasperi’s democratic proposals. 250 Montini thought 
in terms of a Catholic ruling class which was close to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, but 
simultaneously able to pursue ‘national’ interests, carrying out in the country an 
effective unitary function which had been lacking in Italian history. 251 This aim of 
Montini mirrored the dreams of Pius XI and Pius XII. But up to 1944 this vision was 
only one of a number of political blueprints for the country: Tardini, for example, 
was in favour of a dissemination of the Catholic electorate among the various 
political parties, an idea favoured by De Gasperi throughout the Fascist years.252
Montini’s role was enhanced just after the war: Catholic Action was brought 
back under papal control, having been delegated to the Italian bishops in 1940 to 
spare the Vatican from being directly involved in its clandestine anti-Fascist 
activities. The Pope also reclaimed responsibility for the appointment of its leaders: 
the appointment of Vittorio Veronese as its first post-war leader was a huge boost to 
the influence of Montini, as they had been close friends in FUCI, the Catholic 
Students Organisation.253
Scoppola, like many other commentators, believes that Montini was the 
single most constant and effective link between De Gasperi and the Vatican; a close
249 For information on Montini’s background see Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, 
Bologna: II Mulino, 1988, p. 121 and Hebblethwaite, Paul VI: The first modern Pope.
250 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 121. Montini’s work during the thirties begins to 
emerge from a study o f the events o f 1931 (the rupture between Mussolini and the Vatican) and o f  the 
Catholic Action intellectual groups (see the essay by M.C.Criuntella, 1fa tti del 1931 e laformazione 
della ‘seconda generazione, in P. Scoppola, andF. Traniello, (Eds.) I  cattolici frafascism o e 
democrazia, Bologna: II Mulino, 1975, pp. 185-223 and R. Moro, La formazione della classe 
dirigente cattolica, 1929-1937, Bologna, II Mulino, 1979.
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personal friend of De Gasperi, he was almost the natural ally in the effort to have De 
Gasperi’s policies accepted by the Pope; policies which substantially reflected 
Montini’s own long-held convictions. 254 But Montini’s task was much more complex 
than simply trying to persuade the Pope of the benefits of supporting De Gasperi’s 
party. Montini was responsible for masterminding the huge operation to manoeuvre 
the majority of the Catholic population behind the Dc party; but also within his remit 
was responsibility for imposing the Vatican’s directives on the Dc leadership. It was 
in this more sinister role that on 12th December 1946, amid the anticlerical backlash 
of that year, Montini held a dramatic meeting with De Gasperi: the assistant to the 
Vatican Secretariat gave notice in no uncertain terms that the collaboration with the 
anticlerical parties, not only in Rome but also in the government, was ‘no longer 
allowed’ .255 He gave a blunt warning: if the Dc party continued with such 
collaboration, it would be considered to be hostile to the Vatican. The alternative was 
also made clear: there would be 207 Catholic deputies -  if they joined forces with the 
Uq party. 256 De Gasperi was thus, against his better judgement, forced by the Vatican 
to collaborate with parties to the right of the Dc. Such actions by Montini could be 
taken as either an indication of his true political views, or alternatively as an 
indication of the pressure he was under and the delicate position he was in: obviously 
his main allegiance was to the Pope; but if one adds into the equation his close 
personal friendship with De Gasperi, his adherence to the left-wing socio-political 
views of Jacques Maritain and his links by age and ideology to the dossettiani, one 
begins to appreciate the complexity of the web he was weaving and the delicacy of 
his position.
Montini’s status in the Vatican was undoubtedly aided by his close links 
with the new generation of politicians: as Hebblethwaite explains, “he had a network 
of friends who would actually set up and control the political arrangements of 
democratic Italy. ” 257 Hebblethwaite names a number of these friends and 
accomplices of Montini in and around Vatican circles, among whom were Mario 
Cordovani, the official papal theologian, and probably his most important ally, the 
Oratorian Paolo Caresana, Montini’s spiritual director. Caresana was also the
254 Scoppola, Proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 121.
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spiritual guide to the dossettiani who “acted as a left-wing ginger-group within the 
Christian Democrat Party” and, like the Communists, viewed the resistance 
movement as a second Risorgimento 258
However the dossettiani, despite having their roots firmly embedded in 
Catholic Action, were not afraid to call for fundamental changes to the Church’s 
approach to its new political responsibilities. Dossetti’s own assessment of the ‘realta 
italiana’ was uncompromising:
II primo principio e fondamentale e che il problema italiano e soprattutto 
problema del cattolicesimo italiano, ddVEcclesia italiana. E inutile, assurdo e 
colpevole pensare che il problema italiano sia innanzitutto problema del 
govemo, dello schieramento politico, dell’organizzazione e della riforma 
sociale, della forza comunista in Italia. II problema italiano e essenzialmente 
qui: la Ecclesia italiana ha in gran parte mancato il suo compito negli ultimi 
decenniP9
The relationship between Dossetti and De Gasperi is an interesting one. The 
cultural worlds of De Gasperi on the one hand and of Dossetti and his companions on 
the other were very different: there was a generation gap which made any dialogue 
very difficult, even with Montini as mediator.260 It is plain to see from their 
correspondence that despite there being mutual respect, acclaim and affection at 
times, their relationship was dominated by friction, the root of which was De 
Gasperi’s decision (which, in one letter, Dossetti claims he took without consultation 
with his party) to hold the institutional referendum before the Constituent Assembly 
was inaugurated. 261 De Gasperi’s tendency to make unilateral decisions comes in for 
more criticism in the same letter:
. . .  nessuna delle cose importanti da me proposte o richieste per dare 
compattezza e razionalita di struttura e di azione al corpo del Partito, ha 
trovato attuazione; ho dovuto constatare che io, come del resto altri membri 
formalmente piu qualificati della Direzione, siamo stati costantemente, 
estromessi da tutte le decisioni di maggior rilievo, da ogni possibility di 
influsso sulla politica del Partito .. 2 2
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If Dossetti was sometimes irritated by De Gasperi, then the reverse is also true: as 
regards the aims of Catholic political integralists, such as perhaps the dossettiani and 
especially the Vatican itself, De Gasperi said in a letter to Sergio Paronetto on the 
10 December 1943, that politically speaking, we need space ‘per difendere la 
relativa bonta della democrazia e far tacere i cercatori del bene assoluto’ .263
After their success in the 1946 institutional and Constituent Assembly 
elections, the dossettiani began to plan Italy’s future. They set down their 
programme in a document called ‘Questa che domandiamo’ .264 A gap had developed 
in Italy between non-practising and committed Catholics; a gap which had to be 
closed by remedying the ‘defective education’ of the clergy and transforming 
Catholic Action. With the revival of a Catholic political party, clericalism became a 
real threat: the Dc risked appearing subordinate to the Church, while the clergy were 
acting as party recruiting agents.
The dossettiani attempted to avoid this situation by emphasising the 
autonomy of politics: in other words, its freedom from clerical interference. With 
Montini’s support and guidance, the dossettiani were seeking to create a new society 
partly based on the teaching of Maritain and especially his work Humanisme 
Integrate. Maritain’s ‘new Christendom’, like that of Pius XII, was seen as a political 
‘third way’, but Maritain’s was to be found somewhere between Soviet Communism 
and American Liberalism. To some high ranking officials in the Vatican, like 
Alfredo Ottaviani, Maritain’s writings were considered to be dangerously liberal. But 
with Maritain now in Rome as French Ambassador to the Holy See and closer to 
Montini than ever before, he was able to help the dossettiani at close hand.265
The dossettiani"s influence on the final manifesto of the Dc party is clear: by 
1946 the latter saw itself as the party ‘committed to practical justice and social 
reform’. As Hebblethwaite points out they would inevitably fall short of this ideal; 
and inevitably there would be opposition. The Vatican was not alone in wanting the 
Dc to be ‘merely the Italian Conservative Party at prayer’.
263 Cited in Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 71.
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(vii) An uncomfortable coalition: the Vatican and the Dc in the new Italy
a) The vision o f the ecclesiastical hierarchy
During the 1930's, Catholicism had developed its own unique political ideology and 
proceeded to promote it as a practical and morally sound alternative solution to the 
innumerable problems faced by inter-war Europe.267 The vast array of papal 
encyclicals espousing its political theories were not only a major source of Catholic 
integralist ambition, but they also enabled the Catholic leaders of the 1930’s to ‘insist 
that they were heirs to a distinctive Catholic political tradition’ .268 Rejecting the evils 
of Liberal individualism and Marxist or Fascist totalitarianism, they claimed that 
such a tradition offered a 'third way' for European politics.
Having ‘denounced’ Nazism and Fascism in previous encyclicals, it was in 
his encyclical Divini redemptoris promissio (1937) that Pius XI first suggested an 
alternative political programme based on the teachings of the Church. It offered a 
‘Programme for the solution of the Social Question and the defeat of Communism’.
It then called for, among other things, a renewal of Christian life, detachment from 
earthly goods, the spread of Christian charity, social justice and even had a section 
on ‘distrust of Communist tactics’ .269 Much more cautious was the first encyclical of 
Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus (1939), which explained how the Church had not the 
slightest intention of replacing state authority, but wanted rather to support it. The 
emphasis in Summi Pontificatus returned instead to the theme of the freedom of the 
Church, claiming for itself‘piena liberta di compiere la sua opera educatrice, 
annunziando alle menti le verita, inculcando la giustizia, e riscaldando i cuori con la 
divina caritd di Cristo’ .270 In fact, according to Scoppola, the point reached by Pius 
XII’s magisterium was the most coherent and most advanced possible within the 
philosophical categories and cultural premises of the traditional social doctrine of the 
Catholic Church. However, precisely because it came within those parameters, it 
remained within the anti-modernist culture, firmly holding on to the negative view of
971the processes of secularisation.
The fluctuating political landscape of Europe and in particular the occupation 
of Austria by nazi Germany in 1938 had put an end to the popular Catholic dream of
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a united front of Catholic nations as a bulwark against both Communist atheism and 
Nazi paganism. It had also brought to an end any Vatican sympathies for Mussolini’s 
fascist government. However, the Holy See’s dream of a country run on Catholic 
principles was far from over. As Scoppola puts it: ‘al momento della caduta del 
fascismo l’ipotesi, non realizzata negli anni trenta, riemergeva spontaneamente’ .272 
When the prospect of the defeat of the axis powers and the end of the Fascist regime 
became apparent, pontifical messages began to be interpreted as a Catholic ‘call-to- 
arms’ with a view to a new ‘social crusade’. Giovagnoli claims that the Holy See 
avoided intervening directly in the Italian political situation, in spite of American 
encouragement to do so.273 This does not imply, of course, that influence was not 
exercised in less direct ways.
At the end of the war, the Catholic Church emerged as a potent force ready to 
act and as an effective focus for mediation. According to Scoppola, this and nothing 
else explains American interest in the opinion of the Vatican on the future of post- 
Fascist Italy. 274 However, a close relationship was developing between President 
Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII which further contributed to the possibility of the 
Vatican acting as a trusted advisor in the decisions about the future of Italy. 275 In 
fact, as early as 1942 the Vatican began presenting De Gasperi to the Americans as a 
postwar leader and in February 1943 American and Vatican representatives began 
tackling the problem of the future Italian government in earnest.276 Scoppola gives
977the sequence of events: Myron Taylor (US representative to the Vatican) had
97Rapproached the apostolic delegate to Washington, Amleto Cicognani, to elicit 
“l’opinione prevalente circa la forma di governo da dare alia medesima nazione” in 
the event of the fall of Fascism, at that time considered inevitable and imminent.279 
The request, sent to the Vatican Secretariat of State, appeared delicate and 
embarassing: whatever reply was forthcoming would have been tantamount to 
blatant Vatican intervention in internal Italian politics; not responding would be to 
lose a potentially unique opportunity. The reply was entrusted to Monsignor 
Domenico Tardini who prepared the following four point proposal: the Holy See’s
272 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 53.
273 Giovagnoli, IIpartito italiano, p. 30.
274 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 46.
275 Giovagnoli, IIpartito italiano, p. 29, Buchanan and Conway, Political Catholicsm in Europe, 
p. 87.
76 McCarthy, The Crisis o f  the Italian State, p. 23.
277 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 48.
278 Cicognani also discusses the possibility o f De Gasperi becoming Prime Minister in February 1944 
in Washington. ADSS, Vol. XI, Doc. 51, pp. 154-155.
279 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 48.
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detachment from any question relating to internal Italian politics; the Italian people’s 
allegiance to the monarchy;280 the constitutional duty of the king to appoint the head 
of government;281 finally, the impossibility of indicating names of individuals (i.e. 
favoured by the Vatican) . 282
After his foray into the world of politics in 1943, Monsignor Tardini 
continued to be influential: in December 1945 he complained that the Dc party had 
drifted too far to the left, while in the same month he urged them to help make De 
Gasperi a successful Prime Minister. But what kind of democracy and what kind of 
state did the Vatican want for Italy? To find the answer, one must consider the 
Pope’s priorities and the Church’s view of the state.
As to the Pope’s priorities, they were wholly bound by what was best for the 
Church. The Lateran Treaty, Concordat and Financial Convention were a lesson in 
opportunism and unique in assuring for the Church political, spiritual and financial 
stability in spite of the massive political and financial consequences for the Italian 
State. However, such considerations were irrelevant to the Vatican. As a result of the 
indignities it had suffered at the time of unification, it had viewed the Italian State -  
and indeed any democracy -  with deep suspicion. According to Poggi,
the self-image of the Church has historically inspired it to make two major 
claims: ( 1 ) that it’s peculiar powers, grounded on its participation in the 
nature of the Godhead, are its title to a unique, exclusive position in the 
world; (2 ) it is the keeper of a total message, which ought to be taken as the 
principle of a regeneration of worldly reality in all its aspects. 283
280 After the institutional referendum this point became irrelevent.
281 This duty was included in the Albertine Statue, and also became irrelevant after the institutional 
referendum.
282 This point had already been made irrelevant by Vatican support for De Gasperi, which had been 
obvious to the Americans since the previous year; subsequently other names would also be suggested 
by the Vatican. Before this four point proposal was passed to the Pope for ratification, Cardinal 
Maglione made several corrections to the first three points and removed the fourth. On 19* May 1943, 
the Pope remarked to Tardini that it would be more worthwhile ‘to put everything into the hands o f  
the informants and public opinion’ and that the question o f supplying names could not be ignored, in 
as much as it showed deference towards the Holy See. Monsignor Tardini then reworked the text, 
replacing the fourth point and adding the names o f Orlando, Marshall Castiglia and Federzoni, all 
considered by the Vatican to be capable o f leading at least an interim government. Tardini, however, 
felt it necessary to add a proviso to the fourth point: not supplying names would require an 
explanation on behalf o f the Holy See; but it appeared to Tardini that to supply names would 
constitute a major indiscretion, risking a backlash from Fascists, Germans, or indeed anyone aspiring 
to succeed the Regime. He was also concerned as to how the Holy See could guarantee the integrity o f  
the intentions and the ability o f those named. On 21st May, 1943, Maglione passed Tardini’s 
observations to the Pope, who considered the advice and subsequently suppressed item four. (My 
translation of) ADSS, vol.VII, p.34-5.
283 Poggi, Catholic Action in Italy, p. 46.
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If one contrasts the above position with the generally pluralistic and increasingly 
secular nature of Western culture during the 20th century one can appreciate the 
dilemma with which the Church was faced: to give way to some extent and accept a 
new, less powerful position in the world, or continue promoting its unique identity 
and push itself increasingly towards a position of hegemony. The former was later 
favoured by John XXIII with the Second Vatican Council being convened by him for 
that purpose, whereas the latter had been pursued by most of the other modem popes 
and particularly Pius XI and Pius XII.
Indeed, it was during the pontificates of Pius XI and Pius XII that the Vatican 
finally became a massive (some might say cumbersome) and powerful institution. As 
such it displayed its determination to retain the power it had gained in 1929 and to 
have the Lateran Pacts (which gave the Church much power over education and 
marriage as well as much freedom from paying taxes), written into what, after June 
1946, it recognised would be a Republican constitution. But in the 1940’s 
Communist and Catholic defects complemented one another: both entities created 
mass parties that were supposed to instil democratic values and yet the Church and 
the Pci had what could be termed ‘Leninist’ cultures. Although poles apart in their 
jealously guarded ideals, each saw itself as the model the state was supposed to 
represent. Whether intentionally or not, the consequences of their actions during the 
post war period left the Italian state structurally and administratively weak.284
However, I believe the Vatican was more culpable in the creation of a weak 
state than some commentators admit: given their predisposition to plan and lay 
foundations for future events, it is possible that they were aware of the damage they 
were causing to the Italian state, but subordinated this to regaining political influence 
not enjoyed for centuries. Moreover, McCarthy, for example, is unconvinced by the 
notion of Catholic hegemony. He argues that if the term is used to indicate not 
merely possession of power but the use of that power to guide the whole of society
}OC
toward defined goals, then the Catholics were not hegemonic. In my opimon this is 
a weak argument because possession and use of political power was precisely what 
Pius XI and XII had been advocating -  or at least they were the means necessary to 
achieve their aims. How else can one describe integralism if not as hegemonic? How 
else can one describe the many papal encyclicals (from both Pius XI and Pius XII) 
dealing with Catholic political ambitions whose stated aim was precisely ‘to guide
284 McCarthy, The Crisis o f the Italian State, p. 40.
285 Ibid.
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the whole of society toward defined goals’ (in other words a society run along 
Catholic principles and ideals)? Finally, given this aim, how else can one describe 
the Catholic domination of Italian political and social life and the oppression of the 
Protestants and the Left during the decades following the creation of what was 
supposed to be a new ‘democratic’ Republic?
Furlong confirms this opinion to some extent when he claims that since the 
end of Fascism, the Vatican had been showing a distinct willingness to consider a 
future Italian State governed by a more authoritarian version of a liberal 
democracy. 286 Even Pius XII, a belated convert to the idea of ‘democracy’, 
confirmed this opinion: unlike the dossettiani, he did not hold the view that the 
resistance movement could be seen as a new Risorgimento: he was in favour of 
democracy in Italy -  provided it was led by Catholics.287
Thus, the Vatican’s vision was clear-sighted and doubtless it considered that 
it was creating a strong Italy, endowed with religious and moral authority and 
capable of resisting international Communism. In fact though, it was contributing to 
the creation of a state that, while different from earlier versions, did not resolve their 
shortcomings. 288 To explain why this was so, we must consider the Church’s view of 
the Italian political situation. The Dc, the dominant party of government in the new 
Republic, was initially at least, dependent on the Church’s organisation to get itself 
elected. Moreover, from a Catholic perspective, political legitimacy was subordinate 
to religious legitimacy, which resided in the Vatican.289
Guido Gonella, who was minister for education in 1946 calls for freedom of 
religion for the individual and then moves without transition to state that Catholicism 
must be the state religion: ‘the fundamental institutions of the state 
must be based on Christian ethics. Either the schools teach religion or else they will 
be areligious, which for practical purposes means anti-Christian’. Giorgio La Pira, 
Dossetti’s friend and ally, denied there could be a lay state: ‘man had a religious 
nature and social institutions must reflect it’ .290
The Dc’s close links with the Vatican were the prime cause of the new state’s 
weakness. Instead of acquiring legitimacy through representation and efficiency, it 
received legitimacy from the papacy. McCarthy stops short of condemning the
286 P. Furlong, M odem Italy: Representation and Reform, London: Routledge, 1993, p 55.
287 Hebblethwaite, Paul VI: the first modem Pope, p. 208.
288 McCarthy, The Crisis o f  the Italian State, p. 24.
289 Ibid.
290 Cited m ibid., p. 25.
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Vatican for putting its stranglehold on Italian politics, claiming that no other force 
could have filled the 1943 vacuum. But in the 1946 elections the Dc neither had 
control over the ecclesiastical hierarchy nor over its electorate and so it had to rely on 
the Vatican to deliver the vote with its doctrine of Catholic unity.
Following the turbulent relations between the Vatican and the Ppi, Pius XII 
was not convinced of the need for a Catholic party. According to Buchanan and 
Conway, it was only the insistent lobbying of Montini and the Dc's 1946 electoral 
success that persuaded the Pontiff to ditch earlier plans to resuscitate a clerico- 
moderate alliance between the Catholics and a leading liberal politician such as 
Orlando. They claim that it was not until 1947 that the Vatican dropped its 
reservations -  presumably following the Communists departure from government.291 
However according to Scoppola:
L’evoluzione dell’atteggiamento della Chiesa in favore della Democrazia 
cristiana si colloca . .. nel periodo fra la fine del 1944 e la conclusione della 
guerra di liberazione con le sue immediate conseguenze, nel periodo finale 
cioe della Resistenza.292
I would concur with Scoppola’s date here, but my own feeling is that the party 
received the invaluable backing of the Vatican only once its manifesto complied with 
the Vatican’s vision for the new Italy, as defined in the Dc documents that emerged 
from 1944 onwards. In the constant manoeuvring undertaken by the Vatican at this 
time one can not ignore the fact that the Vatican was pro-actively involved in its 
alliance with the Dc via Montini and the Catholic Action groups. Moreover, the Dc's 
electorate consisted principally of Catholic voters and its policies were necessarily 
constrained by the influence of the Bishops and the Vatican. Pius XII, meanwhile 
was displaying a keen interest in the development of Italian domestic politics, 
particularly from 1943.293
b) The vision o f the political hierarchy
In a charmingly optimistic, though hopelessly nai ve view of a future democratic 
Italy, Don Luigi Sturzo, exiled leader of the Partito popolare considered that 
“Christian Democracy, with its ethical concept of political life, its spirit of initiative 
and moderation, and its character of a centre party, will contribute much to Italy’s
291 Ibid., p. 87.
292 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 138.
293 Furlong, Modern Italy, p. 58.
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well-being. ” 294 In order to better assess the vision of the political hierarchy in 
shaping Italy’s future, one must examine the contribution made by Alcide De 
Gasperi. He had made a name for himself as the last political secretary of the Ppi 
from May 1924 to December 1925 prior to being arrested by the Fascists, imprisoned 
and then released following an intervention by the Vatican. He was then given a post 
in the Vatican library where he worked until 1945. In a critique of Benedetto Croce’s 
Storia delVEuropa nel secolo decimonono, published in 1932, he denounced Croce’s 
anticlericalism, underlining instead the contribution made by ecclesiastical 
institutions in the course of history towards the development of freedom.295 This 
stance helped De Gasperi establish for himself a position much more in tune with the 
new era of Catholicism than the other ex-popolari in exile, and allowed him the 
opportunity to plan for the political future of Italy, working on the formation of the 
new Dc party from 1942.
According to Buchanan and Conway, his first ‘stroke of luck’ was to be 
chosen as a compromise candidate for the premiership when Ferruccio Parri's 
administration was brought down by the conservatives in December 1945. As the 
first ’Catholic' prime minister and also as minister of the interior, the key ministry 
controlling the prefects or provincial governors and the police, De Gasperi was 
able to exploit the enormous political and ultimately electoral advantage which these 
two great offices gave an Italian politician. 296
Unlike Pius XII’s overweening desire to see the creation of a civiltd cristiana, 
and his belief that the basis of every society and every organisation should be To 
sviluppo e il perfezionamento della persona umana’, De Gasperi’s more modest 
proposal was that freedom and political democracy should be the foundation stone’s
907of the new Italy. In fact, De Gasperi was quite attracted by the principle of 
religious tolerance and by the idea of a pluriconfessional state. Indeed, he even 
feared the consequences of Catholic intolerance of other Christian confessions. 298 He 
could have pursued the issue by calling for a review of the Lateran Concordat,299 or 
changes to the current laws dealing with the permitted religions, but these were
294 L. Sturzo, The Catholic Church and Christian Democracy in L. Pope and K. Underwood (Eds ), 
Social Action, vol.X, no. 5, New York: The Council for Social Action o f the Congregational Christian 
Churches, May 15 1944, p.41.
295 Cited in Giovagnoli, IIpartito italiano, p. 3 6.
296 Buchanan & Conway, Political Catholicism in Europe, p. 86. As already mentioned, it is widely 
accepted that it was not so much the political presence o f De Gasperi that conquered the electorate, 
but rather the influence o f the Church.
297 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 83.
298 Giovagnoli, IIpartito italiano, p. 37.
299 In fact, De Gasperi did exactly this in the first Dc manifesto.
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sensitive issues for the Vatican, on whose support he was relying heavily. Such 
antagonistic proposals might have been totally counter-productive and might have 
undermined his and the party’s political future. However, De Gasperi’s earlier vision 
of Catholics forming a number of different political parties, argues Scoppola, 
substantially followed Maritain’s philosophy, but did not imply in itself Catholic 
political unity. Moreover, it denied that unity of faith was a sound enough basis on 
which to construct any form of political unity and rejected any mandate obtained 
only from Catholics. Nevertheless, he was very aware, once he had formed a single 
party of Catholics, that the Vatican was non-committal and, in some quarters, hostile 
towards the Dc. The Church’s official line was indicated by Montini in a letter to 
Padre Gemelli in May 1947:
la eventuale formazione di una durevole e organizzata azione politica e cosa
che riguarda i fedeli in quanto cittadini, salvo il diritto della Chiesa
d’intervenire, per l’osservanza e la tutela dei principi cattolici.300
However, there were also factions within the Vatican which rejected Catholic 
political unity, preferring not to rule out alternative forces to the right of the Dc 
party. Encompassing both of these options -  represented by Montini on the one hand 
and by Tardini and Ottaviani on the other -  was the Pope’s own preference for 
Catholic unity under the guidance of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. 301
In 1944, as the Dc documents cited below indicate, De Gasperi acquiesced to 
the pontiffs vision of Vatican-led Catholic unity, shelving his ideal of Catholic 
political pluralism. However, in the 1946 referendum De Gasperi resisted papal 
pressure to call on Dc supporters to vote for the retention of the monarchy and by 
that same year, De Gasperi felt it was time to try to reduce his party’s ideological 
reliance on papal orthodoxy. 302 But De Gasperi’s apparent desire for independence 
from the Vatican should not be exaggerated. One of the lessons he had learned from 
his Ppi years was that the tie with the Vatican was essential: without it the Ppi had 
been easy prey for Mussolini; moreover, he did not have the power to move far from 
Pius XII who could exert great influence over the Dc electorate. Despite its reliance 
on the Church, and the consequent charges of “aretratezze e contradizioni” with 
which the Catholic Church was associated, the Dc party was still an attractive
300 Cited in Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 128.
301 Ibid.
302 Ibid., p. 33 and Furlong, M odem Italy, pp. 68-69.
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proposition for the Italian Catholic electorate.303 In fact, across most of the country, it 
was the only viable option, as pointed out by the Catholic clergy and hierarchy ad 
nauseam to the people of Italy.
Although discordant with his own idea of a political democracy, De Gasperi 
realised the importance of maintaining good relations with the Pontiff, and 
throughout much of the period of the Constituent Assembly he even showed a 
willingness to listen with deference to Papal suggestions. The following is an extract 
from an undated letter sent by De Gasperi to the Pope during this period: ‘. . .  sempre 
disposto a prestare Torecchio ai preziosi suggerimenti che mi venissero dati e pronto 
ad assumere innanzi a Dio e alia storia la responsabilita che m’incombe . . . ,304 This 
shows that De Gasperi understood his duty and position: subservient to God and, 
curiously, to history (with no mention of the State nor the electorate).
As mentioned above, De Gasperi’s own political views are evident in the 
early documents of the Dc. The Idee ricostruttive della Democrazia Cristiana signed 
by De Gasperi under the pseudonym ‘Demofilo’, states that it is of particular interest 
to the democracy (i.e. of the new Italy)
che la missione spirituale della Chiesa Cattolica si svolga in piena liberta, e 
che la voce del Romano Pontefice, levatasi cosi spesso in difesa della dignita 
umana, possa risuonare liberamente in Italia e nel mondo. Contro ogni 
intolleranza di razza e di religione, il regime democratico serbera il piu 
riguardoso rispetto per la liberta delle coscienze. E in nome di essa . .. che lo
Stato riconosce efficacia giuridica al matrimonio religioso e assicura la liberta
•>n<;
della scuola che pud essere mortificante strumento di partito.
This document, simply dated July 1943, shows a deep consideration for the freedom 
of the Pope but also clearly indicates empathy for a pluralistic approach to religious 
freedom and even education -  both points being contrary to the terms of the 
Concordat. This appears to be a further indication of De Gasperi, if not working 
alone, then imposing his own ideas on the document, since it closely reflected his 
own views on democracy, education and Church/State relations.
The Dc’s Programma di Milano was promulgated on the 25th July 1943 under 
the heading ‘Per un’Italia democratica e cristiana’. In this document, unlike its more 
generic earlier cousin, De Gasperi’s own views are squeezed out as a result of a 
collaboration with ex-guelflsti like Piero Malvestiti, Edoardo Clerici and Enrico
303 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 104.
304 De Gasperi, De Gasperi Scrive, Vol II, p. 107.
305 A. Damilano* (Ed.) Atti e Documenti della Democrazia Cristiana (1943 -  1967), Roma: Edizioni 
Cinque Lune, 1968, p. 9..
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Falck. They tended towards Pius XIFs more consciously Catholic ‘third way’ 
between capitalism and communism (though without any corporatist overtones). 
After further collaboration between De Gasperi, Giuseppe Spataro and Guido 
Gonella many ideas of the Programma di Milano would later be incorporated into 
the Republican constitution.306 As a result of this wider consensus, the Programma di 
Milano was worded to conform more closely to the ideals laid out in the papal 
encyclicals; but there is still a sting in the tail of point two, which reads:
Indipendenza e sovranita della Chiesa e dello Stato, in ordine ai loro fini 
rispettivi. Rispetto della coscienza e professione dei singoli. Ispirazione 
cristiana nell’attivita dello Stato e nella vita nazionale. Intangibilita 
sostanziale del Trattato del Laterano. II Concordato mantenuto nella forma 
attuale fino a che le altre Parti non ritenessero di modificarlo 
concordemente.307
This explicit willingness to allow revision of the Concordat is contrary to the 
oft expressed demands of the Vatican that both the Treaty and the Concordat should 
form the spiritual bedrock of the new democracy and is more in keeping with De 
Gasperi’s personal dislike of the Concordat. In the subsequent document, La parola 
ai democratici cristiani published in Rome in January 1944, there is no mention of 
any such possibility -  indeed, it is implicitly excluded. The January 1944 document 
states:
L’efficacia delle riforme statali e vincolata al miglioramento del costume. Per 
questo lo Stato democratico, il quale contro ogni intolleranza di razza o di 
religione, si fonda sul piu riguardoso rispetto alia liberta delle coscienze, ha 
particolare interesse che le forze spirituali possano conservare e alimentare 
nel popolo la linfa vitale della civilta cristiana, che la voce del Romano 
Pontefice possa risuonare liberamente nel mondo e che la pace fra Stato e 
Chiesa, raggiunta e codificata nei Trattati del Laterano, costituisca una pietra 
basilare anche dell’Italia del domani.308
In fact, the Dc’s 1944 documents are much more focussed on defining religious
freedom in terms of the freedom of the Catholic Church, with the Lateran Pacts no
longer a peripheral item open to modification, but the immutable source of such 
freedom.309 All the evidence points to De Gasperi’s independence of mind, on 
matters relating to the Church’s immediate aims and interests, being step-by-step 
subjugated to the will of the Vatican.
306 Pollard, Italy, p. 85 and Damilano, Atti e Documenti della Dc, p. 9.
307 Damilano, Atti e documenti della Dc, p. 9.
308 Damilano, Atti e documenti della Dc, p. 25.
309 See Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 146.
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The next document (Feb. 1944, entitled Tradizione e ‘ideologia' della 
Democrazia Cristiana) covers a wide range of subjects and matters dealing with the 
background to Dc philosophies and brings the party even more in line with Catholic 
social teaching. Under the sub-heading Aspetti super at i, it states that a number of key 
issues from the past are no longer significant:
La questione dell’aconfessionalita, ad esempio, intesa come tendenza a non 
impegnare in rivendicazione di politica concreta l’autorita ecclesiastica, non 
ha piu risonanza dopo che i nuovi statuti di Pio XII circoscrivono esattamente 
la sfera di attivita dell’Azione cattolica e i Trattati Lateranensi, riconoscendo 
in pieno ITtalia unificata, hanno tolto per sempre ogni riserva richiesta in 
passato dal mancato accordo fra ITtalia e la Santa Sede. I Tratatti Lateranensi 
vanno difesi soprattutto perche rappresentano la pace fra la Chiesa e lo Stato; 
ma tra le felici conseguenze di essi non e la minore quella di assicurare alia 
ricostnizione nazionale il libero e ptezioso apporto delle coscienze 
religiose. 310
The document also criticises the Socialists and Communists for being totalitarian 
parties whose integralist ambition emanates from “un monismo materialistico che 
prescinde dallo spirito, surroga la religione e assume le funzioni dottrinali d ’una 
chiesa. ” 311 This is typical of the party political haranguing that accompanied the birth 
of the new Republic. The document goes on to refer extensively to the Pope’s 1942 
Christmas radio message, quoting from the conclusions made by the Pope on some 
of the points covered by the homily, including the dignity and rights of the persona 
umana, the defence of social unity and especially of the family, the dignity and 
prerogative of work, re-establishing the majesty of law “ancorandola al diritto 
naturale, riposante nel dominio di Dio, sottraendola all’arbitrio d’una persona, di un 
gruppo o di una classe” and the conception of the State according to Christianity:
II senso cristiano dello Stato e non che esso domini, ma serva: sia ricondotto 
cioe al pieno rispetto della persona umana. . .  Lo Stato dev’essere 
consapevole del vincolo eminentemente etico che lo lega alia vita individuale 
e sociale e dell’essenziale dipendenza che lo unisce alia volonta del 
Creatore,312
In the later documents edited by De Gasperi, there is also a bias towards the 
corporative system of government -  another idea of Pius XI carried forward by Pius
310 Damilano, Atti e documenti della Dc, p. 43. By ‘coscienze religiose’, the document is referring 
only to Catholic ‘coscienze religiose’.
311 Ibid., p. 45.
312 My italics. Damilano, Atti e documenti della Dc, pp. 46-47. Cf. p. 68 o f this section o f the thesis: in 
1946 the Church was putting out mixed messages as to whether it or the State was the dominant 
institution. What was clear was that the Church saw itself as the interpreter o f the volonta del 
Creatore, to which it considered both citizens and State to be subject.
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XII -  which does not appear in the Milan document. Ignoring De Gasperi’s 
willingness to revise the Concordat in the Milan document, Scoppola wonders if 
there is any significance in De Gasperi being keen not to reopen discussions on the 
Lateran Pacts after the fall of Fascism, since the latter had already expressed his 
doubts about the Concordat the day before the signing of the Lateran Pacts in 
1 9 2 9  3 13 pie aiSQ why the documents edited by him pay such close attention to 
Church social doctrine and in particular to the corporative system. Scoppola’s 
analysis tends to favour De Gasperi being pro-active in his proposals, keen to win the 
support of the Vatican. He considers that the choices made by De Gasperi
esprimevano reali e meditati convincimenti del futuro leader della 
Democrazia cristiana [which were] almeno in qualche misura, scelte tattiche 
destinate a raccogliere intomo al nuovo partito i consensi della Chiesa -  
certamente desiderosa di non vedere rimessi in discussione gli accordi del 
’29.314
Baget Bozzo thinks that De Gasperi saw himself in a more subservient role, and that 
he would have seen the Dc as the instrument of Christian social doctrine and thus in 
a position of dependence on the Church.315 Neither commentator suggests that at any 
stage was there likely to have been pressure from the Vatican to change the 
‘dangerous’ Milan document that allowed for revision of the Concordat. How else 
can one explain the dramatic changes made between the Milan document and the 
first Rome document of January 1944, only five months later? The Dc party was in 
no position to question the Church on religious matters and the fact that De Gasperi 
wanted to move the party away from its position of dependence on the Church, but 
was unable to, further suggests Vatican pressure.
So, in defining his new democracy, De Gasperi reluctantly accepted the need 
for Church support. But under Fascism the strength of the Church outside the 
Vatican was concentrated in the various Catholic Action organisations. Under their 
revised Statute of 1945, they came under the direct, centralised control of the Pope. 
To win over the grass roots, De Gasperi had to first win the support of the Pontiff. 
This was a difficult task for a man who believed deeply in the re-emergence of a 
political party with Catholic ideals but which was also endowed with a degree of
313 Cited in Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 76. Scoppola bases his question on 
incorrect facts here, since it has already been shown in the first Dc document in 1943 that De Gasperi 
was actually prepared to allow for the revision o f the Concordat, thus maintaining the opposition that 
he expressed to it in 1929.
314 Ibid.
315 G. Baget Bozzo, II partito cristiano alpotere. La Democrazia cristiana di De Gasperi e di 
Dossetti, 1945-1954, Firenze: Vallecchi, 1974, pp.59-63.
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autonomy. Such a party, acting, as De Gasperi envisaged, within a free political 
system, would mean that the guarantees required by the Church regarding religious 
policy would be much more difficult to achieve. Even less comprehensible to the 
Church would be the potential necessity to form alliances with the secular parties, 
many of which were hostile to the Church.316
So De Gasperi was forced to compromise and the effects on Dc policy, as 
shown above, were evident from 1944 onwards. At the end of July 1945 the 
Vatican’s position was strengthened when Dossetti was elected vice-secretary of the 
Dc: he was given the press and propaganda portfolio, with which his allies in the 
Catholic Action organisation Civitas humana collaborated closely; together the group 
would make a defining contribution to the party on a cultural and organisational 
level. 317 Having members of a satellite of Catholic Action in such a prominent 
position within the party meant that the Vatican was now able to bring enormous 
pressure to bear on the party policy makers. Scoppola points out that if one examines 
the votes obtained by the Dc party from 1946 onwards they clearly confirm the link 
between the party and the Catholic organisations; it is noteworthy, for example, that 
the electoral success of the party was almost everywhere proportional not only to the 
number of paid-up members of the party but also to the numbers belonging to 
Catholic Action.318
So from mid-1945 the influence of the dossettiani had been factored into the 
equation and the edges were becoming blurred between the party’s policy and the 
Vatican’s vision: the document IIprogramma della Dc per la nuova Costituzione, 
written for the 1st National Congress of the Dc on 24th -  27th April 1946,319 two 
months before the institutional elections, features strong elements of integralism; this 
is supported by the attitude and comments of Guido Gonella in reference to the 
document: “II partito e una coalizione di uomini che intendono affermare 
l’integralismo della loro fede”; and later: “dobbiamo fmalmente e coraggiosamente 
uscire da questa barbara notte dei tempi per marciare verso un nuovo evo cristiano”;
316 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, p. 119. Despite this alleged hostility, none o f the lay 
parties took the opportunity to question the D c’s claims to represent “99% of Italian Catholics” even 
though they only obtained 35% of the votes in the elections to the Constituent Assembly.
317 Ibid., p. 155. See also P. Pombeni, II dossettismo (1943-1951). Appuntiper una ricerca storica, in 
Nuova rivista storica, anno LVTII, fasc. I—II, gennaio-aprile 1974, pp.79-131.
318 Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, pp. 155-156. In fact, approximately seventy-five 
percent o f Dc deputies elected in 1946 were current or former members o f  Catholic Action.
19 Damilano, Atti e documenti della Dc, p. 231.
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and also “come pud volere uno Stato laico una democrazia che si chiama 
cristiana.” 320
However, the document sends out mixed signals and appears to have been 
less than thoroughly vetted. Under the section Liberta cristiana it states:
La Costituzione non deve essere una costituzione di partito o di confessione 
religiosa, ma la costituzione del popolo italiano che e un popolo cristiano e 
che percio non puo volere uno Stato laico o agnostico. D’altra parte, lo Stato 
conforme alFetica cristiana non e uno Stato confessionale.321
This appears to be a pro-active attempt at damage limitation, anticipating the furore 
that would accompany attempts to insert the Lateran Pacts into the new Constitution, 
though totally contradicting both article one of the Lateran Treaty and a later section 
of this Dc document entitled Liberta di credere, professare e propagandare la fede, 
which states that the new Constitution will recognise that TaReligione del popolo 
italiano nella realta della coscienza, della vita, della cultura, del costume e della 
tradizione e la Religione cattolica apostolica romana’ .322 Under the title Liberta delle 
coscienze the document makes a grudging acknowledgement of  the freedom of the 
individual to worship via whatever faith he or she chooses:
La liberta delle coscienze va intesa nel senso che la coscienza non puo essere 
costretta ad accettare suo malgrado la fede, nel senso che nessuno puo essere 
impedito di comportarsi secondo la sua personale coscienza, anche se errante 
in buona fede.32
A hardening of the Dc’s (and De Gasperi’s) approach to the question of the Lateran 
Pacts and, consequently, yet another measure of Vatican influence in the manifesto 
can be seen under the title Liberta della Chiesa: “La Questione Romana e risolta in 
modo defmitivo ed irrevocable con i Patti Lateranensi.” Under the same section it 
states plainly that state laicismo is unacceptable. 324 In the section entitled Liberta. 
della Scuola, it is clear that the Dc party considered the authority of the State -  in 
certain key functions, at least -  to be subordinate to that of the Church: under the 
sub-heading Diritti della Chiesa, it stated; “La Chiesa, per la sua maternity spirituale, 
ha il diritto di educazione religiosa. Questo diritto non puo essere limitato ne dalla
320 1 congressi nazionali della Democrazia cristiana, Roma, Ufficio documentazione SPES della 
Direzione della Dc, 1959, pp. 29ff.] cited in Scoppola, La proposta politica di De Gasperi, pp. 146-7.
321 Damilano, Atti e documenti della Dc, p. 233.
322 Ibid., p. 234.
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid., p. 235.
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famiglia ne dallo Stato.” 325 Further limitations to State power are found under Diritti 
dello Stato:
1) Lo Stato . . .  promuove le pubbliche scuole. La sua funzione e pero 
ausiliare o sussidiaria: lo Stato fa le veci della Famiglia; integra e supplisce 
la Famiglia, tutela il diritto del figlio alFeducazione.
3) La scuola neutra o laica e assurda ed irrealizzabile, poiche ogni 
educazione non puo non avere un contenuto spirituale e morale. La 
cosiddetta neutrality, e il cosiddetta laicismo, tradiscono la funzione 
educatrice della Scuola; tutelano gli increduli ed offendono i credenti; non 
rispettano la volonta dei genitori cattolici.
4) La Famiglia italiana e famiglia cristiana, ed esige che nella scuola la 
Religione sia veramente fondamento e coronamento di ogni forma di 
educazione.326
So with the Dc containing a large number of Catholic Action members, many 
with close links to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, influencing policy, and the support of 
the Vatican’s enormous organisational and electoral machine (without which the Dc 
would have been a much less attractive and effective party), one could argue that De 
Gasperi, the clear choice of both the Vatican and the USA, was something of a 
‘puppet’ leader. This, however, would not be a fair assessment of his undoubted 
leadership skills which would become evident in the ensuing years. But the party as a 
whole was seen by many of its opponents, at the time of the Constituent Assembly 
and arguably beyond, as little more than a satellite of the Vatican, acquiescing to its 
desire to create a country whose aims, morals and daily routines were guided by its 
own diktats: the extent to which such an influence inspired or even dictated the Dc’s 
work in the debating chamber of the Constituent Assembly will be examined in 
Section B.
c) The vision of Catholic Action
As little as two days after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, i.e. on the 4th 
June 1946, the representatives of the various branches of Catholic Action (Ac) met to 
discuss how they could promote and co-ordinate their efforts to guide and assist the 
work of Catholics in the Assembly. The Assistant Director General of Ac,
Monsignor Borghino, was careful to point out to those who had voted on the second, 
institutional, question put to the electorate
325 Ibid., p. 237. It should be bome in mind that what the Church understood by its right to exercise il 
diritto di educazione religiosa was its own control over religious education in state schools.
326 Ibid.
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il loro dovere, quello cioe di accettare, se monarchici, con spirito di disciplina 
e di serena collaborazione la nuova forma di govemo, rendendosi elemento di 
pacificazione e di fattiva ricostruzione del Paese.327
It was important that these Catholics who had voted for the monarchy should not 
allow their disappointment to hinder their efforts in promoting a Christian 
Constitution.
It is important to bear in mind the enormous, and to the outsider labyrinthine, 
complexity of attempting to impose order on both the religious and political world of 
political Catholicism, and this first meeting illustrates some of these difficulties. The 
Vaticanista Sandro Magister has pointed out that in relation to Rodano’s Partito 
communista cristiano “fino a tutto il 1942 e anche oltre, non c’e nulla che tradisca 
nella suprema gerarchia cattolica la determinazione di troncare sul nascere un 
movimento per molti versi inquietante, sia dal punto di vista politico che dottrinale”, 
and that subsequent events in 1943 provoked in the Vatican “una profonda incertezza 
di orientamento operativo, che spalanca di fatto inattesi spazi di tolleranza.” 328 The 
Dc leader De Gasperi could hardly be comforted by the fact that in the thinking of 
the new generation of his party, “il popolarismo scompare fin dalle memorie” ,329 
with its tradition of political independence from ecclesiastical control, and that rising 
stars in the party, such as the dossettiani, were able to misread Pius XII’s 1943 
Christmas message as a full endorsement of democracy and as an official 
pronouncement of Catholic social teaching. Yet the dossettiani, as we shall see, were 
among the stoutest defenders of provisions in the Lateran Pacts which raised the 
most serious questions about such democratic credentials.
Although by the time of the meeting of 4th June, De Gasperi had managed to 
gain the support of the Church for a single party of Catholics, there were many 
Catholics in other parties, thus not under the control of the Dc. Some of these, as we 
shall see, will later cause some embarrassment to the more moderate Dc Assembly 
members with their extreme integralism. And although by June 1946 Rodano’s 
Catholic communists no longer had a voice within political Catholicism, this was not 
the case, for example, with Gerardo Bruni’s left-wing cristiano-sociali. The 
perspectives of the ecclesiastical component (especially the leadership) of Ac,
327 Cited from the minutes o f the meeting in M. Casella, Cattolici e Costituente: orientamenti e 
iniziative del cattolicesimo organizzato (1945 -  1947), Perugia, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1987, 
p. 287.
28 S. Magister, La politica vaticana eL'Italia (1943-1978), Rome, Riuniti, 1979, p. 13.
329 Ibid., p. 16.
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moreover, were more likely to have their centre of gravity focussed on matters 
affecting the institutional status of the Church than could be assumed to be the case 
with the bulk of the laity, on whom the activities and effectiveness of the movement 
would depend.
The meeting in question consisted of representatives of the Presidency of the 
different components of the umbrella Ac, some clearly galvanised by the tasks for 
Catholics in the new Constituent Assembly, with the inevitable tensions over 
responsibilities and tasks. According to the minutes of the meeting, Monsignor 
Borghino states the importance of problems relating to the family, education etc. “in 
difesa ai patti lateranensi.” To this only too evident attempt on the part of the 
ecclesiastic to link all the concerns of lay Catholics to the Lateran Pacts, Francesco 
Murgia, who has just been elected Dc deputy to the Assembly, immediately replies 
that the principles governing such matters in the Constitution should be sought 
“prescindendo dalla difesa dei patti esistenti.” 330 At this stage of development, not 
only does Murgia separate the concerns of lay Catholics from the institutional 
question of Church/State relations, but his reference to “patti esistenti”, in 
contradistinction to Borghino’s “patti lateranensi”, indicates an openness to the 
possibility of revision which will have been noted. As indicated, further on in the 
minutes to the meeting, Luigi Gedda, at this stage President of Young Catholic 
Action, in a move which seems calculated to avoid Dc obstructions, proposes 
sending directly to the Assembly “contributi di studio e direttive per tutti i problemi 
che sono di interesse dei cattolici o particolarmente delFAc”, to which the lawyer 
Cassano responds that Ac should, even though maintaining its independence, make 
its contribution through the Dc .331 Mons. Rota supports Gedda but Mons. Guano, 
Cassano and Murgia, are all opposed and propose a more articulated and phased 
approach in line with discussions in the Assembly. 332
It is impossible, of course, to read the minds of the participants, but what 
seems to emerge from the minutes of this important initial meeting of Ac is that a 
series of manoeuvres aimed at placing the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts, at least as 
they stood at the time, at the top of the Dc agenda were not successful. This despite 
clear indications in Dc documents up to this point that the party had moved in this 
direction. At this stage, there would have been many Dc members (De Gasperi
330 Casella, Cattolici e Costituente, p. 288.
331 Ibid.
332 Ibid., p. 289.
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included) who still associated the Pacts with the previous regime, and had not 
perhaps reflected on arguments about separating the Pacts juridically from the regime 
with which they had been signed. The other major difference with the previous 
situation was that the Dc was now reinforced with elected Dc deputies, and the 
atmosphere within the party had been changed and galvanised, with its position at 
this early stage still uncertain.
The discussions at the meeting of the 4th June had clearly been thought about 
by the time of the consultative meeting of Ac on the 2 1st of the same month. In his 
report to the meeting, the General Secretary (soon to become President) of Ac 
Vittorio Veronese proposed proceeding on two fronts with the organisations relations 
with the Constituent Assembly. It would contact selected members of all parties (it 
did not specify Catholics, but may indeed intend this) but it would also delegate to 
ICAS (Istituto Cattolico di Attivita Sociale), its most suitable component for this 
task, the task of setting up commissions for providing guidelines and documentation 
to parliamentary commissions on matters relating to education, the family, trade 
unions and Church/State relations. 333
During the next few months ICAS worked on these projects, and eventually 
formulated its conclusions in the field of Church/State relations in a set of 
conclusioni cattoliche which it then sent to the President of Subcommission 1 
Umberto Tupini (and probably Giuseppe Dossetti) on 22nd November 1946 and to 
the Vatican Secretariat of State and Civilta Cattolica on 25th November 1946.334 The 
conclusioni were also sent to the President of the Assembly Giuseppe Saragat (Psli) 
and the President of the Commission of 75 Meuccio Ruini (Pdl) . 335 The ICAS 
objectives were thus openly declared, but could not thereby be assumed to be binding 
on Dc members of the subcommissions or the Assembly. And by being sent to 
Saragat, Ruini and Tupini they were being addressed also to the bodies they chaired.
The conclusioni were presented in four sections.336 Briefly, it requests an 
invocation of God’s name and adherence to the great principles of Christian morality 
-  the omission of which would be an offence to the common conscience of the 
nation. The Constitution should recognise that Catholicism is the religion of the 
Italian nation, and should reflect this in its legislation and administration. It must also
333 See the minute in Ibid., p. 289.
334 Ibid., pp. 296-7. It is reasonable to assume that both Tupini and the Vatican Secretariat o f State 
would have been kept abreast of, and consulted over, the work o f  ICAS while it was in progress.
335 With Ruini receiving a copy o f the conclusioni, it is likely that all three subcommissions would at 
least have been aware o f the document and its contents.
336 The text can be found in Appendix III o f this thesis and Casella, Cattolici e Costituente, pp. 297-8.
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guarantee freedom of religion, conscience and religious practice (‘culto’), of 
whatever faith or opinion; this is followed by a lengthy argument as to why this 
equality of freedom does not imply ‘equiparazione’ or levelling, or ‘uguaglianza di 
regolamento’ for all religions. Finally it asks for the Constitution to declare in favour 
of “la conservazione integrale dei Patti Lateranensi” and the impossibility of their 
alteration without the agreement of the Holy See.
This was a powerful document. Ac, of which ICAS was a component, could 
claim to be speaking for a membership of about 2.5 million outside parliament, and 
these would have claimed to be simply the front line of Catholics within the country. 
The document, moreover, was taking no chances in relation to the possibility of 
Catholic waverers in the Assembly. The Ac meeting on 4th June had indicated the 
possibility of Dc deputies backtracking on the important question of including the 
Lateran Pacts in the Constitution. Although emanating from ICAS, it must have been 
clear to all that the document expressed the wishes of the Italian Church and of the 
Vatican.
Despite all the evidence we have seen so far about Vatican desires for the 
future and the widespread support in Ac for these desires, which are even prevalent 
in the post-1944 Dc documents, methodologically we cannot simply assume as a 
point of departure that arguments on Church/State relations put forward by Dc 
members in Subcommission 1 and in the Assembly were a mirror reflection of the 
conclusioni cattoliche. The latter had no official status in the Assembly and were 
sent to it by a body independent of the Dc, indeed independently of all Catholic 
Assembly members in their function as deputies or members of subcommissions. 
Many members of Ac did not join the Dc, and vice versa, and there were Catholics in 
the Assembly who were members of neither. Notwithstanding the above, it would be 
useful to examine the overall numerical relationship between the Ac and the Dc in 
order to gain some kind of insight into the impact the conclusioni might have had on 
Catholic deputies. One must bear in mind that in the 1946 elections the Dc had no 
control over the hierarchy or over its electorate. The Vatican delivered the vote with 
its doctrine of Catholic unity. 75 per cent of Dc parliamentarians belonged to
337Catholic Action which, nationally, had 2.5 million members to the Dc’s 1 million.
Moreover, the Dc, although independent of other Catholic organisations in 
terms of status and function, was nevertheless part of a powerful network of 
collateral bodies which all aimed, in their respective fields, to promote Catholic
337 McCarthy, The Crisis o f the Italian State, p. 26.
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values. One would expect, therefore, particularly on the issue of Church/State 
relations, at least some Dc members to have had an input in discussions leading to 
the conclusioni cattoliche.
Our study will thus be concerned with the debates on Church/State relations, 
with particular reference to religious freedom and the minority religions, as 
conducted between the various parties and the members of the subcommissions 
(primarily Subcommission 1) and the Assembly. Although the ICAS demands will 
be seen to reflect constant features of the debates, our intent will be to see how, and 
to what extent, Catholic arguments either simply repeated, modulated, or modified 
these demands. We will also see whether there were Catholic arguments which 
rejected them. Of equal importance, we will examine the arguments of the laid  on 
religious freedom and discuss the variety of responses and exchanges between these 
and the Catholics on this important question. The importance to be attached to the 
conclusioni cattoliche will thus emerge as a result of our study rather than begin as a 
conditioning factor.
338 Given its apparently official Catholic origins, there would also have been a certain reluctance on 




THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON DRAFT ARTICLE 5
(i) How the Constituent Assembly was set up
The elections for the Constituent Assembly and the Institutional Referendum to 
decide whether Italy should be a Monarchy or a Republic were both held on 2nd and 
3rd June, 1946. For the Constituent Assembly elections, the votes for the parties 
were: Dc: 35.2%, Psi: 20.7%, Pci: 18.9%, Udn (liberals): 6 .8 %, Uq (‘qualunquisti’): 
5.3%, Pri: 4.4%, Bnl (monarchists): 2.8%, others: 5.9% . 339 It is important to make 
the point at this stage that in some of these formations, particularly in the case of the 
Udn and the Bnl, political positions and allegiances were fluid and constantly 
changing throughout the life of the Constituent Assembly. Particularly in the case of 
the Udn, with its strong liberal component, but not to be ignored in the case of the 
monarchist Bnl, views on religious liberty were not uniformly held. One cannot, 
therefore, think in terms of a “party line” for these formations, as one can with the 
Dc, the Pci and the Psi. A further difficulty for the reader of the debates is that 
members identified in the “Misto” group were drawn from the large number of 
smaller, often single-member, groupings (listed in Appendix II). During the period of 
the debates there were also parties that appeared and disappeared with a baffling 
regularity.
As far as the main political parties were concerned, one could expect the Dc 
to be favourably disposed to the protection of the Vatican’s (political and 
international) and the Holy See’s (spiritual and ecclesiastical) interests. At least at the 
start of the debates, one could also expect both the Pci and the Psi to support 
exclusion of the Pacts from the Constitution, which does not necessarily mean 
hostility to the Pacts as an independent agreement outside the Constitution. As we 
shall see, the Psi maintained this position throughout the debates, while the Pci, for 
various reasons discussed in this section of the thesis, eventually performed a 
“u-tum” and voted with the Dc for inclusion of the Pacts. With regard to the minority 
parties, the lay parties, such as the Udn and the Pda, remained strongly opposed to 
the Pacts, while right-wing minority parties such as the monarchist Bnl and the Uq 
were largely in favour of the inclusion of the Pacts. They remained consistently eager 
to do the bidding of Catholic Action and the Church, and at times presented 
integralist arguments which must have been embarrassing even to the latter.
339 These statistics are compiled from a number o f sources. For an explanation o f  these and other 
abbreviations o f party names, see glossary to Appendix II.
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In the Institutional Referendum 54.3% of the electorate voted in favour of a 
Republic. On 28th June, the independent Liberal Enrico De Nicola was elected 
provisional Head of State by the Constituent Assembly. It was clear to all parties that 
the new Republican Constitution would be both the foundation for future legislation, 
but in some ways even more importantly, the terrain which would provide the 
framework of legitimacy for all future political struggles. In this sense, the 
interlocutors were aware of the fact that they should not allow existing political 
differences or current political events to have too great an influence on the framing 
of a founding document able to accommodate future developments. The Pci leader 
Togliatti, in a speech on national unity in Naples, as far back as April 1944, had 
made observations looking forward to a Constituent Assembly, and its importance in 
precisely these terms.340 There is therefore a sense in which the debates are meant to 
be detached from current political events, and rightly so.
This is a position of principle which can be universally agreed. On the point 
which will be at issue in this study, however, the question will revolve around the 
protection of the interests of the Church. As the expert constitutionalist Calamandrei, 
and others, made clear, from a strictly juridical point of view there was no 
justification for including international agreements (such as the Pacts) in the debates. 
However, it also became clear in the debates that no political parties wished to 
threaten the position of the Church. Why, therefore, did the Christian Democrats, as 
we shall see, insist on the debate and even on the inclusion of the Pacts within the 
Constitution? Was this a point at which the objective position of principle was not 
maintained? It is, of course, possible to use the argument of Luigi Pestalozza that by 
the time of the constitutional debates, “andava affievolendosi il vento del N ord\ and 
that at the time of the vote on the issue “la primavera del 1947 segna indubbiamente 
il momento di una sistematica regressione della Dc rispetto alle posizioni piu 
avanzate precedentemente assunte” .341 As we shall see, many of the arguments 
during the debate revolved precisely around this question.
340 See P. Togliatti, “The Communist Policy o f National Unity (1944)”, translated by Derek Boothman 
in On Gramsci and Other Writings, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1979, pp. 29-65, esp. pp. 48-50 
and 58-59.
341 L. Pestalozza, La Costituzione e lo Stato, Roma, Riuniti, 1975, pp. 31 and 33. The ‘vento del nord’ 
refers to the strong leftist orientation o f the anti-Fascist alliance which by this time was weakening in 
response to emerging conservative pressures which had begun to find their way into policy 
discussions.
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With the Constituent Assembly consisting of 556 members, 342 it was 
considered necessary to nominate a smaller Commission to deal with the drafting of 
the Constitution, and so a Commission of 75 was proposed, to which all parties had 
the opportunity of nominating members. The Commission of 75 was split into three 
subcommissions, each with responsibility for drafting a specific area of the new 
Constitution, and an editing Committee. Subcommission 1 contained 18 members 
and dealt with the rights and duties of citizens, Subcommission 2 contained 38 
members, divided into two separate committees, and dealt with the constitutional 
organisation of the State, Subcommission 3 also contained 18 members and dealt 
with socio-economic affairs. The editing committee was initially made up of 18 
members taken from the three subcommissions. 343 For the purposes of this thesis, it 
is the work of Subcommission 1 on the inclusion of Lateran Pacts in the Constitution 
and its impact on the religious minorities that will form the focus of my analysis. 
However, it is worth discussing a few general points regarding the subcommissions 
before I embark on the analysis of the relevant debates.
Deciding who went into each subcommission was a very disorganised affair 
with no actual guidelines for the parties. President Ruini proposed that the parties 
themselves should choose their representatives on the three subcommissions. 344 The 
democristiano Ezio Vanoni observed that to the second Subcommission should go
quei colleghi che si sentiranno piu preparati sui i problemi di struttura dello 
Stato, mentre alia prima andranno quelli piu preparati spiritualmente e 
tecnicamente alia discussione dei grandi argomenti dei diritti fondamentali 
dell’uomo e della liberta.345
The imbalance in the party representation in the subcommissions, was not of great 
concern to the leader of the Bnl, Roberto Lucifero: “Se anche le Sottocommissioni 
non riprodurranno esattamente la proporzioni dei partiti politici nell’Assemblea, non
342 See Appendix I.
343 For details see Appendix II. There were at least two editing committees during the lifetime o f  the 
Assembly. The first, as mentioned above, had 18 members: Ruini -  President, Ambrosini (Dc), 
Calamandrei (Pda), Canevari (Psi), Cevolotto (Pdl), Dossetti (Dc), Fanfani (Dc), Fuschini (Dc), 
Ghidini (Psi), Grassi (Udn), Grieco (Pci), Marinaro (Bnl), Moro (Dc), Perassi (Pri), Rossi, Paolo (Psi), 
Terracini (Pci), Togliatti (Pci), Tupini (Dc). Comitato di Redazione: Source -  Archivio della Camera 
dei Deputati, Busta 80, Fascicolo 3, p.72. On 19th February, 1947, another Committee was nominated 
by Ruini, the President o f the Constituent Assembly, and contained only eleven members: Rubilli 
(Udn) - President, Natoli (Pri) - Vice-President, Bozzi (Udn) -  Secretary, Bencivenga (Bnl), Bertini 
(Dc), Calamandrei (Independente), D ’Aragona (Psli), Fabbri (Misto), Grieco (Pci), Pertini (Psi), 
Alessandro Scotti (Pdl). Taken from De Gasperi, De Gasperi Scrive, (vol. 2), p. 217.
344 Segretario Generate (Ed.) La Costituzione della Repubblica nei lavori preparati della Assemblea 
Costituente (CRAC), vol. 6, Roma, Camera dei Deputati, 1970, p. 22.
345 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 19.
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crede che sia il caso di preoccuparsene, appunto perche la decisione finale spettera 
poi alia Costituente.” 346
This lack of co-ordination in the setting up of the Assembly has not escaped 
criticism from political commentators. Furlong is scathing on the way the 
Constitutent Assembly was organised and on many aspects of the work of the 
subcommissions: although the members were intended to be technical experts, they 
also had party-political axes to grind with the result that their work became a 
complex amalgamation of legal technicalities and party compromise. He also 
criticises the length of time that passed in discussions over the election process and 
De Gasperi’s decision to hold the institutional referendum before the Assembly was 
set up, which the parties of the Left thought should have been decided in the 
Assembly. The Assembly was further constrained by “the difficulties in its 
relationship with the provisional governments, and by the generally low level of 
public interest in its proceedings. ” 347 All this contributed towards the Assembly 
establishing a pattern which Furlong claims was to be followed, to a considerable 
extent, by that of the ordinary Parliaments:
practical lack of accountability to public opinion, utter disrespect for 
deadlines, use of detailed legal technicalities to mask fundamental 
disagreements, the priority of seeking as wide an agreement as possible, and 
not least the vulnerability of Assembly debates to the wilfulness of backbench 
deputies.348
Another significant problem that manifested itself during the work of the 
subcommissions was the difference in approach of the major parties to their selection 
criteria for members of the Constituent Assembly: the Socialists and the 
Communists, although having eminent jurists in their ranks, chose not to send them 
into the Assembly, fearing that their formality would hinder the constitutional 
renewal they hoped for. The Dc party, on the other hand, was overflowing with 
judges, constitutional lawyers and experts in ecclesiastical law, all keen to make their 
mark on the new Constitution, principally by finding a way to guarantee the juridical 
security that the Vatican had gained for itself with the Lateran Pacts of 1929. In this 
way it could ensure that the Catholic Church regained the influence over Italian 
political life it had enjoyed prior to Italy’s unification and, most importantly, it would
346 Ibid., p. 22.
347 Furlong, M odem Italy, p. 63.
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guarantee that the new democratic Republic would be imbued at all levels -  social, 
economic, political and spiritual -  with Catholic values. 349
As mentioned above, the Dc was well-represented in the Assembly by 
experienced jurists, experts on ecclesiastical law, many of them Qx-popolari from 
pre-Fascist parliaments. But it was the younger generation of politicians from the 
ranks of Catholic Action, the so-called ‘professorini’ who would have the biggest 
impact on the work of Subcommission 1, although their work in the Assembly would 
not be as straightforward as their majority might indicate, as Giovagnoli points out:
II risultato del lavoro dei ‘professorini’ suscitava l’insoddisfazione della 
maggior parte degli ambienti ecclesiastici, che pure li avevano sostenuti, 
perche questi non videro accolto il disegno di uno ‘Stato cattolico’. Una 
profonda lontananza separava inoltre la massa dei cattolici dai loro 
rappresentanti in aula. 3 0
Giovagnoli, like Furlong, considers that the whole of the work of the Constituent 
Assembly was carried out amid a general lack of interest in the country, and the 
isolation of the costituenti from the population at large
rappresenta un dato rilevante: non a caso il loro progetto muoveva in gran 
parte dall’idea di una influenza dello Stato sulla societa, del centro sulla 
periferia. La situazione di separazione sociale e culturale dei costituenti 
cattolici, selezionati e sostenuti, prima ancora di ricevere la legittimazione del 
consenso popolare, dall’istituzione ecclesiastica, ha rappresentato una 
importante premessa dell’approccio da questi sviluppato nei confronti della 
realta del paese. 351
But the ‘realta del paese’ suggested by Giovagnoli was not the ‘realta* of the 
Catholic costituenti which emerged from their discussions and arguments. As we will 
see, they frequently claimed to be speaking in the name of a constituency that was 
much larger than represented by their electoral mandate. Along a strictly 
cattolici!laid divide, the Dc could with some justification claim to be speaking for 
about 35% of the voters. Those who had voted for the laid  (socialists, communists, 
republicans and liberals) were about 51%. Even if we assume all the remaining 
voters to have favoured Catholic opinion on the issues to be discussed in this thesis, 
which is far from clear even from the debates, this does not constitute a majority.
Looked at from this point of view, the Catholic arguments which, as we shall 
see, frequently claimed to be representing the ‘views of the nation’, ‘the vast
349 See Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 184.
350 Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiana, p. xvi.
351 Ibid.
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majority of the people’, ‘a country of 99% Catholics’, appear extravagant. In view of 
the unmistakeable presence of the laid  in both subcommissions and Assembly, the 
Catholics could hardly have been unaware of at least an element of implausibility 
and instrumentality in the claims for numerical preponderance for their arguments.
It is clear from the study of Catholic scholars like Giovagnoli and Scoppola 
that political Catholicism, after the demise of the popolari, had lost a great deal of 
the laidta which had inspired the founder of the Ppi; and under the pressure of 
fascist suspicion and hostility towards Catholic organisations, it drew closer to the 
institution of the Church, and became more ‘ecclesiastical’ in character. Thus De 
Gasperi found himself leading a party in which the new recruits, to use his own 
expression ‘erano tomati in sagrestia’. Many of these new recruits had come from the 
ranks of Catholic Action, for whom the defence of the Church and the privileges it 
had acquired in the Lateran Pacts was a priority. We shall give some indication in the 
pages that follow of how and why influence and pressure from this quarter may well 
provide important insights for our assessment of Catholic arguments.
(ii) Some preliminary observations
Despite intense rivalry and negative campaigning that pervaded the run-up to the 
institutional elections of May and June 1946, by the time the Constituent Assembly 
was inaugurated, the party political tensions had largely given way to an atmosphere 
of co-operation. In fact, Jemolo was convinced that
tutti gli uomini di parte cattolica, anche quelli che rivestirono poi eminenti 
posizioni politiche, e che dimostrarono tutto il possibile irrigidimento nella 
questione della inserzione degli Accordi lateranensi nella Costituzione, 
apparivano, a chi parlava loro in quel periodo, pieni di moderazione, di reale 
spirito conciliativo, di buona volonta. 52
Although there were indeed elements of conciliation and agreement between the 
deputies of all parties, it would be misleading to ignore strongly held divergences 
and disagreements -  particularly regarding how to deal with the thorny issue of 
relations between Church and State.
The Taico’ Mario Cevolotto (Pdl) advocated that the State should put itself
al di fuori -  non al di sopra -  della Chiesa e delle Chiese e proteggendole e 
garantendole tutto nello stesso modo e secondo un identico principio di
352 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato, p.285.
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liberta, lo Stato adotterebbe palesemente il metodo del laicismo in confronto 
a quello del confessionalismo. 353
He accepts that such a situation would be the cause of much debate in Italy:
La forma concreta . . .  che il regime assumerebbe da noi e diversa e potrebbe 
rapportarsi alia deflnizione e alia sistemazione che il Ruffini ha dato del 
giurisdizionalismo aconfessionale in una sua opera fondamentale.354
In his preliminary address to the Constituent Assembly on 25th June 1946, De 
Gasperi commented: “Operano nella Repubblica italiana le tenderize universalistiche 
del Cristianesimo, quelle umanitarie di Giuseppe Mazzini, quelle della solidarieta del 
lavoro, propugnate dalle organizzazioni operaie.” 355 One should note that whilst 
acknowledging the important part that different political and ideological traditions 
would play in drafting the Constitution, pride of place is given to the ‘tenderize 
universalistiche del Cristianesimo’, and these would be the driving force behind 
Catholic arguments in much of the debate on Church/State relations in the 
Constituent Assembly.
Indeed, the President of the 1st Subcommission, Umberto Tupini goes even 
further : he speaks of the Constitution in terms of it being a Christian Democrat 
Constitution based on the precepts of freedom, social justice and Christianity, the 
purpose of which was to bring about “una visione integrate della persona umana.” 
For Tupini, Christianity is the key element in the formation of the Constitution: “II 
Cristianesimo, cui guarda con speranza rinnovata l’attesa di milioni di uomini, pud 
veramente offrire il punto d’incontro, la base per questo forzo fecondo.” And quoting
333 Archivio della Camera dei Deputati (ACD) ‘Inventario dell’Assemblea Costituente’ (Quademi 
dell’Archivio storico: n. 6), Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, Commissioneper la Costituzione: 1° 
Sotiocommissione, Relazione del Deputato Mario Cevolotto sui ‘Rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa (Liberta 
religiosa)\ Roma: Camera dei Deputati, 1999, p.40. Note: Busta 74 contains the relazioni o f  
individual members o f  Subcommission 1 who had been appointed to examine individual issues within 
the Church State relations framework. There are no dates marked on the typed documents, but a note 
in the catalogue (Quademo no. 6) indicates that these relazioni were presented to the subcommission 
between 27th August, 1946 and 13th February, 1947.
354 Ibid. Cevolotto is here referring to F. Ruffini, Cor so di diritto ecclesiastico italiano; la liberta 
religiosa come diritto pubblico subiettivo, Torino, 1924. Giurisdizionalismo as a general term 
describes that current o f juridical thought which stands for a separation o f church and state but 
subordinates ecclesiastical to state legislation. There are further theoretical refinements: 
giurisdizionalismo confessionista, in which the confessional state affords protection to the Church in a 
relationship o f reciprocity; and giurisdizionalismo laico in which the state exercises control over 
ecclesiastical legislation. Francesco Ruffini, a Catholic jurist with liberal tendencies, Senator in 1914 
and Minister o f Education in 1916, theorized a giurisdizionalismo aconfessionale intended to 
guarantee both sovereignty o f the state, but also a genuine independence o f the Church. His two major 
works were La liberta religiosa (1901) and Cor so di diritto ecclesiastico (1924). Cited in Dizionario 
di storiografia, Milano, Mondadori, 1996, p. 911.
355 Segretario Generate (Ed.) La Costituzione della Repubblica nei lavori preparati della Assemblea 
Costituente (CRAC) (8 Volumes) Roma. Camera dei Deputati, 1970, vol. 1, p.3.
356 Ibid., p. 169.
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from Ozanam he says: “la democrazia o sara cristiana o non sara. ” 357 Tupini 
interprets Article 1 in a particularly Catholic way : the new Republic has work and 
the worker as its bedrock: it depends “sulTuomo socialmente attivo, sul cittadino che 
ha nel lavoro lo strumento della sua fatica e della sua redenzione. ” 358
In an article written for the Dc newspaper ‘II Popolo’ on 4th March 1947,
Aldo Moro claimed that two of the great achievements of the Dc deputies in the 
Constituent Assembly were the “affermazione delTindipendenza della Chiesa e della 
originarieta del suo ordinamento” and the “richiamo costituzionale dei Patti 
Lateranensi. ” 359 These issues, sincerely defended by Christian Democrat deputies, 
“costituiscono . . .  una concreta garanzia di quella democraticita del nuovo Stato, la 
quale sembra essere nei voti di tutti” .360 Moro makes no mention, however, of the 
effect of the successful inclusion of the Lateran Pacts into the Constitution on the 
broader question of religious freedom, particularly in relation to minority religions.
In Section B, therefore, I will examine how the Dc deputies succeeded in having the 
Lateran Pacts included in the Constitution, and the effects of this on the provisions 
concerning religious freedom and the religious minorities.
By far the greater share of the debates was devoted to the highly contentious 
issue of inclusion of the Pacts in the Constitution, initially covered by draft article 5. 
In the final version of the Constitution, the article referring to the Pacts became 
article 7, clauses 1 and 2 remaining identical to their draft versions. 361
Much of the debates concerning draft article 5 (i.e. not only clauses 1 and 2, 
but also other clauses, which found their way into other articles of the final version 
of the Constitution) raised questions concerning not only the Catholic Church and the 
Vatican, but issues relating to the freedom of other religions, which eventually led to 
provisions principally in articles 8  and 19 of the final version of the Constitution. 
Thus although the discussions leading directly to these articles in the final version 
may seem relatively brief, this is because much of the discussion relevant to the 
problems they dealt with had already been discussed in the all-important draft article
357 Ibid., p. 170.
358 Ibid.
359 Moro, A. L 'apporto democristiano alia  nuova Costituzione, in 11 Popolo, 4th March 1947, p. 1. In 
fact, the Pacts would not be voted into the Constitution until 25.03.1947. Moro is displaying in this 
statement one o f  the Dc characteristics throughout the period of the debates; namely a seemingly 
unwarranted assurance about the outcome o f  the debates on this article.
360 Ibid.
361 The draft version o f the New Constitution was presented to the President o f  the Constituent 
Assembly on 31 January 1947. It consisted o f  131 Articles and 9 Final and Transitory Provisions (See 
CRAC, vol. 1, pp. Ivii -  Ixxiii). By 22.12.47, the final version would contain 139 Articles and 18 Final 
and Transitory Provisions.
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5. Moreover, since the latter, in so far as it related to the inclusion of the Pacts in the 
Constitution, was given priority and voted upon earlier than the questions relating to 
the freedom of minority religions, what could be decided in relation to the latter was 
in many respects already decided in advance. The consequences of this procedure 
will become evident in our analysis.
Suggestions for each draft article were formulated by nominated relatori. 
They would then submit these suggestions to their subcommission for discussion, 
possible amendment and voting. This was the general rule, although some proposals 
for discussion were formulated within the subcommissions. With regard to my 
analysis of the discussions of the draft articles, each topic of discussion within the 
subsections of the thesis will be treated first in relation to debates in Subcommission 
1, and then in relation to the plenary session of the Constituent Assembly. In some 
cases the procedures that were followed, and the manner in which amendments were 
proposed, do not allow for such treatment, so that the entire discussion of some 
topics took place in the Assembly.
In the interests of clarity, I have had to present my narrative in thematic form, 
taking account of the chronological developments of the topics. Given that the 
debates were not organised on this basis, that the calendar was purely chronological 
and decided according to draft motions and articles, where deputies could speak 
freely and range from one aspect of a topic to another, with numerous digressions 
and/or repetitions, to base the present discussion on a form identical to the debates 
would have produced an equally confused narrative.
In this sense, I am aware of the fact that my presentation of the debates, quite 
apart from analysis and comments, is itself an interpretation. A broad and 
representative selection of contributions to the debates, which I have attempted to 
provide, is my attempt to ensure the fidelity of my study to the development and 
contents of the debates.
The international situation, by the time of the debates, while not having a 
direct, or at least an explicit impact, on the debates in the Constituent Assembly, was 
having an indirect effect. The strong impulse towards European integration, for 
example, initially promoted by individuals like Altiero Spinelli, and favoured by De 
Gasperi and the French Foreign Minister Schumann, was inspired by the idea that 
such integration would, in the future, be a powerful protection against national 
conflicts and escalation into war. The most dramatic evidence of this influence 
appears in the wording of article 11 of the Italian Republican Constitution:
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L'ltalia ripudia la guerra come strumento di offesa alia liberta degli altri 
popoli e come mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie intemazionali; 
consente, in condizioni di parita con gli altri Stati, alle limitazioni di sovranita 
necessarie ad un ordinamento che assicuri la pace e la giustizia fra le Nazioni; 
promuove e favorisce le organizzazioni intemazionali rivolte a tale scopo.362
Although European integration did not occur as soon as, or with the force 
desired by, early Federalists like Spinelli, by the time of the ratification of the 
Constitution it had had its effect.
In the area of religious freedom, we have already seen the confidence that 
Italian Protestants had in the ability of the United Nations to intervene at an 
international level on their behalf. We will see later in the thesis De Gasperi’s 
difficulties in responding to questions, on a visit to America, about the insertion of 
the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution. By the time of the debates, however, the 
beginning of the Cold War had strengthened the position of the Dc and the Vatican in 
Italy, and must have given substantial psychological support to the determination of 
the Catholics to include the Pacts in the Constitution. In relation to the Left, while it 
is not evident that these developments had much influence on the Socialists, nor on 
the Liberal opponents of insertion, it increased Togliatti’s determination not to 
inflame the situation by intensifying areas of potential conflict with the Dc and the 
Vatican. As we will see in the course of our analysis, this might go a long way 
towards explaining the Pci’s ‘u-tum’, a change of direction which would effectively 
win the day for the Catholics.
(iii) A Christian Democrat agenda
It will be clear from the ensuing discussion of the debates at the Constituent 
Assembly that the Christian Democrats were determined from the beginning to 
include the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution. What follows, therefore, will be an 
attempt to illustrate the various components of the Christian Democrat strategy in the 
arguments they used to persuade their opponents, skeptics, or any who remained 
uncommitted. In the process we will also be able to assess the extent to which 
arguments made by the Catholic members of the Assembly followed the proposals of 
the ICAS document discussed earlier.
As we shall see, their opponents attempted to meet their arguments, 
sometimes in a measured fashion, but also at times with degrees of exasperation.
This was largely the result of what seemed to a number of experienced
362 See Appendix IV for full Constitution.
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constitutionalists, the Catholic imperviousness, with one or two notable exceptions, 
to arguments about correct constitutional ideals. The Catholics were not limited to 
the Christian Democrat party, and frequently received strong support from members 
of minority parties. As we shall see, however, the main components of the Catholic 
arguments were guided by the dossettiani, namely Dossetti, Moro and La Pira, all 
members of Subcommission 1, responsible for drafting the relevant articles. It is very 
clear that this group of young Catholic militants, recruited from the ranks of Catholic 
Action, determined the agenda for discussions around the inclusion of the Pacts. And 
one of the first arguments they wished to establish was that the Church, as an 
‘ordinamento originario’, could not be subordinated to the State in its foundations or 
the free exercise of its spiritual function.
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B1 Draft article 5, clause 1
“Lo Stato e la Chiesa Cattolica sono, ciascuno nelproprio ordine, indipendenti e 
sovrani. ”
Clause 1 of Article 5 was important for the Church at a time when
era in piena auge il dogma della statalita del diritto, cioe il presupposto allora 
imperante che solo Forganismo statale fosse non solo la massima ma anche 
l’unica fonte di norme giuridiche e che quindi tutti gli altri organismi 
estrastatali, tra cui la Chiesa, non costituissero ordinamenti giuridici primari, 
cioe non fossero per natura loro independenti e sovrani sibbene dipendenti e 
derivati dalForganismo e dell’autorita dello Stato.363
Postwar the situation was more nuanced. The State was no longer the only 
institution capable of creating its own laws and of insisting on the right to have other 
principles enshrined in state legislation: there was also the Church “alia quale deve 
riconoscersi la natura di un tipico ordinamento giuridico originario e primario, cioe 
indipendente e sovrano. ” 364 This theory was at the heart of the Dc arguments for this 
clause and was in accordance with the theories expounded by Francesco Ruffini, 
Francesco Scaduto and Santi Romano during the early part of the 20th century and 
championed in the debates by Giuseppe Dossetti and his colleagues.
(i) The Church as an ‘ordinamento originario’
Subcommission 1
The arguments in this subcommission are based on proposals and counter-proposals 
presented to Subcommission 1 by Giuseppe Dossetti (Democrazia cristiana) and 
Mario Cevolotto (Partito democratico del lavoro). Dossetti opens his argument by 
emphasising the “realta sociale” of Catholic predominance in Italian society. 
However, the Dc party is quite prepared to accept the “pluralita della vita religiosa” 
and the “pluralismo delle varie religioni”, immediately stating the proviso that in its 
relations with the State, the Catholic Church in Italy is “molto diversa dai fenomeni 
religiosi che si concretano in altre confessioni e in altre associazioni religiosi”. In 
addition to using the argument that Catholicism is the majority religion in Italy, he 
also argues that it holds this special position because it has all the characteristics and 
basic functions of “un ordinamento giuridico autonomo”: this, he claims, is not only
363 P. A. D ’Avack, I  mpporti fra  Stato e Chiesa in P. Calamandrei, Commentario sistematico alia 
Costituzione italiana, Firenze: G.Barbera, 1950, p. 101.
364 Ibid.
365 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 719.
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a political fact but also a scientific fact. Thus, the Catholic Church in Italy operates 
within its own sphere, completely independently of the State. Church/State relations 
can therefore only operate at a bilateral level and cannot be dictated by one or other 
of the parties. Such an action, were it to occur, would nullify any distinction between 
the two systems and lead to either a theocracy, or what Dossetti terms 
giurisdizionalismo. One therefore has to recognise in both “il carattere di originarieta 
e la necessita di accordi bilaterali” However, the fact of a bilateral agreement 
between the State and the Catholic Church does not mean that the State cannot enter 
into bilateral agreements with other religions that have a similar “ordinamento 
giuridico autonomo”. As we shall see, however, there are more than sufficient 
reasons in the debates which follow to doubt whether, as far as Catholics are 
concerned, this is the fulsome acceptance of religious pluralism it seems at first sight.
The issue of originarieta is taken up by Giorgio La Pira (Dc). He is fully 
behind Dossetti’s arguments and reinforces the issue of the Church’s “ordinamento 
giuridico originario” by stating that if it exists (and being essential to the structure of 
the Church it must) the State, in regulating its relations constitutionally, cannot fail to 
recognise its existence. He claims that the first task of the Assembly is therefore to 
make a pronouncement on its existence.368
La Pira posits two interpretations (lenti) of religion: the “lente illuminista” 
views religion as separate from society, internal and private (a perspective which 
evolved as a consequence of the Protestant Reformation). The “lente anti- 
illuminista”, on the other hand, views religion as integral to society, with a strong 
historical basis and an associative purpose. He takes the latter view to strengthen his 
argument for the State’s recognition of the Church as an equal party in any 
negotiations. He believes the old “illuminista” attitude to religion will in future 
disappear and all States will have to constitutionally acknowledge the existence of 
the Church as intrinsic to the structure of society. The two key points he wants to see 
expressed in the clause are “liberta religiosa per tutti; rapporti bilaterale fra i due 
ordinamenti originari della Chiesa e dello Stato” .369
In response to a suggestion by Togliatti (Partito comunista italiano), Dossetti 
thinks that a bald statement of independence of each body is too reminiscent of the 
old liberal maxim ‘libera Chiesa in libero Stato’, and that the Dc would rather
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid., p. 720.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid., p. 721.
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approach the problem from the point of view of the “originarieta dei due 
ordinamenti” from which the independence of each entity is the natural conclusion. 
He says that if Togliatti considers that the independence of the two bodies should
370also be enunciated in the Constitution, the Dc party would agree.
According to Ottavio Mastrojanni (Uomo qualunque), there is no need to 
recognise the independence of another state (namely the Vatican) in a constitution. A 
state does not need recognition from another state in order to exist. Thus the Church, 
even if  it is not explicitly recognised as such, would still exist as an “ordinamento 
giuridico originario”. His difficulty with including an explicit statement recognising 
the Church’s sovereignty in the Constitution of the Italian Republic arises from the 
potential for the Church to use its rights as an independent state to impose its will 
and more importantly its laws on citizens whether they believe in it or not.371 
Dossetti continues to insist on recognition by the State of the originarieta of the 
organisation of the Church, by once again moving the discussion up a stage to the 
level of the international community, 372 to which Cevolotto responds, claiming that it 
is nonsense to make a general statement recognising all other States, whatever their 
make-up, simply in order to be able to include a recognition of the Church.373 
Dossetti develops his argument for State recognition of the Church by suggesting 
that the Church possesses a particular attribute which he calls “‘asseita’, cioe, di 
essere un ordinamento di se stante” saying that if a country enters into negotiations 
with another State possessing such a characteristic (a reference to Vatican City State 
and the Lateran Accords) “evidentemente all’ordinamento giuridico di tale Stato non 
si potni contestare il carattere di ordinamento originario. ” 374 Cevolotto thinks that 
one can recognise a State without necessarily having to make explicit statements 
about its originarieta, and criticises Dossetti for pressing this point on an 
international level, suggesting that he is doing so merely to obtain recognition of the 
alleged originarieta of the Church’s juridical structure. He points out that a state 
can be a member of the international community without necessarily having to 
recognise in its Constitution the originarieta of the legal systems of other states. He
370 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 721-2.
371 Ibid., p. 723.
372 x, ■ l372 Ibid., p. 752.
373 Ibid., p. 755.
374 Ibid., p. 756.
375 Ibid
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further suggests that there may well be states which do not recognise the originarieta 
of the Church’s juridical system. 376
The insertion of an additional article dealing with the rules of international 
law (in tandem with which the Dc members are pressing for recognition of the 
Church’s ‘ordinamento giuridico originario’) is suggested by President Tupini. 
However, Togliatti is not persuaded by it “poiche esso riconosce norme del diritto
'in n
mtemazionale che non esistono.” He clarifies the point by saying that while 
principles of international law are accepted, as yet there has been no codification of 
those principles.
Whether or not clause 1 should be introduced into the Constitution is a 
legitimate topic for discussion according to Carmelo Caristia (Dc), but argues that its 
content should not cause too much concern. He claims that the State already 
recognises the juridical systems of other states and of the Church. As for potential 
future conflicts between State and Church law, he thinks that this is a different matter 
entirely which should not be prejudiced by the recognition of the originarieta of the 
Church as an institution. In response, Togliatti points out that recognising the 
originarieta of institutions of state that are continually evolving, as in the case of the 
United Nations, is “eccesiva e fuori luogo” . 379 He has noticed a contradiction in 
Dossetti’s argument: if the originarieta of the Church is recognised by everyone, 
why does the Dc want it constitutionalised? Moreover, constitutional recognition 
would invalidate the Church’s claim, because if it were truly ‘original’, it would not
380need recognition. In Aldo Moro’s opinion, recognition of the originarieta of the 
Church is as important as recognising that of other nation states, in that it puts all 
parties who enter into negotiations on an equal juridical footing, expressed through 
the format of international treaties. Thus Church/State negotiations should proceed 
on a similar, common basis, bilaterally as is the case with the Concordat. He attempts 
to allay the fears of those opposed to the inclusion of the Pacts, by stating that they
376 Ibid., p. 759. That this was a weakness in the D c’s insistence on establishing international status for 
the Church in the debates is confirmed by Marottoli: quoting Piero Agostino D ’Avack, she says that 
“il fatto che la duplice personality dello Stato della Citta del Vaticano sia stata accettata dallo Stato 
Italiano che e uno stato membro della comunita intemazionale, non vuol dire che debba per forza 
essere accettata da tutti gli altri Stati membri.” Marottoli, S.M. La Santa Sede nel Diritto  
Intemazionale www.studiocelentano.it (Thesis published on the Internet) C hi.7. However in the 
context o f the constitutional debates, this wider recognition was not essential -  acceptance o f the dual 
personality o f the Vatican by the Italian State was enough to support the arguments for the next clause 
-  the inclusion o f  the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution.
377 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 778.
378 Ibid., p. 760.
379 Ibid.
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are open to revision by the terms of an article already included in them .381 He ends 
his argument with a thinly veiled warning: such recognition “contribuira a mantenere 
quella pace religiosa che oggi regna in Italia.” 382
In response to the Republican De Vita’s request for clarification of the 
juridical consequences of originarieta Dossetti says that there is parity between 
Church and State, since from both have emerged independent juridical systems. 
Acknowledging this equal status in the Constitution is the only thing which 
“garantisca che domani lo Stato non devii bruscamente dalla linea di fatto oggi 
esistente e non presuma di mettere la Chiesa alia stregua di qualsiasi societa
383privata”. Cevolotto calls Dossetti’s bluff in his response: if the only purpose of 
Dossetti’s article is to recognise the originarieta of a state’s juridical system, then it 
is merely theoretical and should not be included in a Constitution which should be 
predominantly practical. He points out that Moro’s argument for putting all parties 
on an equal footing would break down should there arise a subject on which 
agreement between Church and State cannot be reached, adding that the State must 
have the power to resolve such matters independently of the Church. He would be 
agreeable to discuss a formula which stated that relations are regulated by the 
Concordat and suggests a proposal by Jemolo: “Lo Stato regola i rapporti giuridici 
con la confessione cattolica cercando, per quanto possibile, di concludere concordati 
con la Santa Sede”. This would avoid the absurdity, noted also by other laid, of 
including the agreement itself as part of the Constitution. He is, moreover, against 
any formula that would jeopardise or weaken the sovereignty of the State and 
furthermore would like to see the freedoms afforded the Catholic Church also 
applied to other denominations. 384
The form of article 5 passed by the first Subcommission was opposed by 
Cevolotto and, even though he was one of the original proponents, he also opposes 
the amendment suggested by the Editing Committee which reads: “Lo Stato 
riconosce l’indipendenza della Chiesa cattolica nei suoi ordinamenti intemi. ” 385 
Cevolotto argues that putting the Church and State on an equal footing does not 
reflect the liberal democratic concept of a totally free Church within the structure of
381 He is refering to Article 44 o f the Concordat which states: “If, in the future, any difficulties should 
arise concerning the interpretation o f  the present Concordat, the Holy See and Italy will proceed by 
way o f mutual understanding to a friendly solution.” (Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 
214.) As far as the Treaty is concerned, there is no mention o f the possibility o f  revision.
382 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 761. See also section B2 c(i) o f this thesis,
383 CRAC, vol. 6, pp. 761-2.
384 Ibid., p. 762.
385 Ibid. p. 146.
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the State. 386 In fact, he says, the wording should be “free churches”, because 
whatever the difference in importance or in structure of the individual churches, the 
State’s position must be the same for all of them, respecting the independence and 
freedom of them all: “Libera Chiesa nello Stato sovrano.” Cevolotto did not, 
however, receive support in the final analysis from the Communists who, under 
Togliatti’s firm leadership, on religious questions were prepared to argue their 
Taicismo’ in the debates but drew back, for political reasons, from translating this 
into their voting practice if it risked creating too much hostility with the Catholics. 
The Communists were thus readier to compromise, which Moro notes when, in 
stating that he has been against Cevolotto’s proposal from the outset, adds that he is 
pleased that Togliatti and others are in agreement with his party’s formulation of the 
article, which he claims is a compromise formulation.
The Dc’s first request was not for recognition of the sovereignty of the 
Church, but for recognition of the originarieta of its organisation. Moro goes back 
over the arguments about the wording: State recognition of the “originarieta del suo 
ordinamento” was rejected as being too scientific and was replaced by “sovranita”. 
To Moro, this does not reflect the reality of the situation of the Church in relation to 
the State. Whereas Cevolotto has said that the independence of the Church must be 
recognised by the State, Moro considers it guaranteed by its very nature, but only 
when one recognises the originarieta of its organisation. He argues that such 
recognition by the State does not bring the individual norms of canon law into the 
realms of State law, 388 but allows the Church to exercise its legal system 
independently in the areas of social life that appertain to the Church. Bilateral 
agreements would instead come into play in the case of subjects that were of 
common interest to both Church and State. Moro continues:
il carattere originario .. . non e una innovazione dell’ultima ora che si 
prospetta, ma e un costante riconoscimento della dottrina e della filosofia del 
diritto, le quali unanimamente ormai riconoscono che il diritto non e soltanto 
il diritto dello Stato, ma e il diritto di tutti gli organismi che entro e fuori lo 
Stato hanno un’effettiva competenza per regolare in modo autonomo le 
materie di loro spettanza. 389
386 In fact, the wording, passed by Subcommissionn 1, would have had the effect o f subordinating the 
Church to the State.
387 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 146.
388 This would, however, be the case should the Pacts be included in the Constitution.
389 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 146.
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To this reassertion of the Church’s juridical position based on its originarieta, he 
adds what he calls a social and political consideration: if one refuses to acknowledge 
the Church’s originarieta, one is flying in the face of the widespread social 
conscience of the Italian people, which considers that the Church should not be 
treated like any other private association, as it has “tale una maest&, tale una larga 
competenza per quanto riguarda essenziali rapporti umani, ed ha una tale sfera di 
influenza che va al di fuori e al di la dello Stato singolo” . 390 To the laid  taking part 
in the debates, this is clearly a political consideration with serious ramifications: 
presenting the Catholic Church as an organisation that is larger and more influential 
than any single state and which thus, according to Moro, cannot be bound by the 
juridical system of any single state is, from the point of view of the sovereignty of 
those states, a dangerous argument. To give an organisation of such scope any 
political influence over such a relatively small country as Italy (compared to other 
countries that come under the ‘Catholic’ umbrella) could compromise the 
government on the world political stage.
It is the originarieta of the Church’s juridical system that Moro uses to argue 
for its relations with the State to be founded on a concordatory basis, and avoid the 
Catholic Church being treated as just another private body. He also says that he is 
willing to accept a proposal by Terracini to extend the regulation of State relations 
with the other religious groups on a broadly concordatory basis. 391 He closes by 
claiming that this article “e di straordinaria importanza per la coscienza cristiana del 
popolo italiano. ” 392 Moro’s position is supported by La Pira: not only is the State an 
“ordinamento giuridico originario”; there are other earlier forms of such 
‘ordinamenti’, the oldest being the Church. His closing argument on this point, 
however, is perhaps more distinctive for its manifestation of La Pira’s Catholic 
devotion and piety than for its political or juridical acumen, as he appeals to the 
Subcommission to vote in favour of the article because of the evident ability of the 
Church as an immense organism to gather together all human beings and guide them 
on the path to sanctity and peace. 393
390 Ibid., p. 147.
391 This appears to be an important concession by Moro, going against his image as an integralist; 
however, as Moro would have been only too aware, the minority religious groups were in no position 
structurally or juridically to establish concordatory relations with the State, and therefore one can only 
view this concession in the light o f this fact.
392 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 147.
393 Ibid.
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The Sardinian radical Emilio Lussu is not convinced by any of the Dc’s 
arguments thus far and has reservations over the text of the editing committee. He 
points out to the Catholics, who have based their arguments for the privileged 
position of the Church on the originarieta of its juridical standing, that if this is the 
case, Judaism should enjoy an equal status since its originarieta preceded that of the 
Catholic Church.394
Constituent Assembly
Following the discussions in the Subcomission, during the debates at the Constituent 
Assembly, Stefano Riccio (Dc) adds some detail both to the speech made by 
Meuccio Ruini, President of the Commission of 75 on 6 th February, 1947 and to the 
ensuing discussions on the originarieta of the Church’s juridical organisation: “E 
riconosciuta la sovranita, oltre l’indipendenza della Chiesa: e rinnegato cioe, sia un 
giurisdizionalismo separatista, sia un separatismo giusnaturalista, mentre e affermata 
la originarieta dell’ordinamento giuridico della Chiesa.” 395 He thinks it would be 
particularly useful to remind the Assembly of the thoughts of Santi Romano, for 
whom the originarieta of the Church’s juridical system, becomes the basis for the 
concept of the plurality of juridical systems.
Ed invero la differenza tra lo Stato e la Chiesa e che mentre il primo e una 
societa, giuridicamente e politicamente organizzata su base territoriale, la 
seconda e una societa giuridicamente e politicamente organizzata su base non 
territoriale. La originarieta dell’ordinamento giuridico della Chiesa significa 
che esso e a se, distinto ed indipendente. La Chiesa ha una potesta normativa, 
che non le deriva dallo Stato, ma che e ad essa propria ed originaria, in 
quanto essa si presenta come una istituzione organizzata e che ha conseguita 
una giuridica unita, la quale oltrepassa i confini dello Stato. I caratteri della 
indipendenza e sovrani t A, fissati cumulativamenie, indicano precisamente la 
originarieta di quest’ordinamento, cioe l’asseita, nel senso che essa e un 
ordinamento per se stante, il cui fondamento non deriva dal riconoscimento di 
un altro ordinamento. La sovranita della Chiesa, che non e legato al territorio, 
ma e un dominio spirituale, e, percio, supera ed abbraccia il territorio del 
singolo Stato, e una realta storico-sociale, ormai non piu disconoscibile.396
395 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 387. Riccio then quotes four important sources, Catholic and non-Catholic, on the 
subject: Leo XIII in his encyclical Immortale Dei in C. Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals (Vol. II: 1878- 
1903) Raleigh: The Pierian Press, 1990; S. Romano, L ’ordinamento giuridico, Sansoni, 1946; P. 
Gismondi, II nuovo giurisdizionalismo italiano, Milano: Giuffre, 1946 and L. De Luca,
Considerazioni sull ’autonomia e lapubblicita della Chiesa nel diritto italiano, Milano: Giuffre, 1946.
396 But it is only a spiritual sovereignty: not an economic, social or political one.
116
. . .  Stato e Chiesa agiscono in rapporto agli stessi soggetti e sullo stesso 
territorio; onde questa reciproca sovranita e opportuno riconoscere e stabilire, 
ad evitare equivoche interpretazioni della volonta costituzionale.397
Riccio’s account is a concise and clear statement of the theory of 
originarieta, and in some ways compelling. As we shall see, however, his argument 
that a clear understanding that the Church exercises its sovereignty in the spiritual 
domain would avoid conflict and ambiguity is, to say the least, optimistic. Spiritual 
sovereignty is not exercised in a vacuum, and ecclesiastical sanctions against 
Catholics (and priests in particular) who transgress its doctrinal or moral teachings 
inevitably raise issues in relation to civil rights, which are the proper domain of the 
state.
There were others, however, who also saw problems with the wording of 
clause 1, and specifically with the phrase “nel proprio ordine” Cevolotto, for 
example, took the opportunity to attempt to partially remedy his defeat in the 
Subcommission, arguing that the wording was imprecise to the point of being 
meaningless. A better wording would be “nel proprio ordinamento giuridico”. In 
Subcommission 1 he had debated this phrase at length with Dossetti: he says that 
Dossetti wanted to affirm that “Tordinamento giuridico della Chiesa e un 
ordinamento originario e primario.” He himself had refrained from using this phrase 
because he felt it would not be understood by the population at large and thus would 
not have been suitable for a constitution which must be both technically precise but 
also clear and accessible to everyone. Dossetti, however, wanted to state explicitly 
that the “ordinamento giuridico della Chiesa e un ordinamento giuridico primario e 
originario, cioe non subordinato e non derivante dalFordinamento statale.” 398 This, 
says Cevolotto, would be acceptable were it not for the wording which is not 
appropriate, and the fact that a constitution “non e chiamata a dire che cosa e e come 
e un determinato ordinamento giuridico, ma ad ammetterlo o non ammetterlo, e a 
trame le consequenze costituzionali. ” 399
Throughout the debates in both the Subcommission and in the Constituent 
Assembly, Dossetti put forward arguments of an extremely complex, technical and 
more often than not, theological and juridical nature. Such arguments had the effect 
of slowing down proceedings and, at times, causing confusion. The following 
intervention in the Assembly was typical: Dossetti says that Cevolotto and
397 CRAC, vol. 1, pp. 387-8.
398 Ibid., p. 538.
399 Ibid.
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Calamandrei have made the fundamental error of considering the first and second 
clauses of article 5 (draft) as a single entity, when they actually deal with two distinct 
principles:
II primo riguarda la qualificazione delle due societa, lo Stato e la Chiesa, 
ciascuna considerata in se stessa, cioe riguarda. . .  la considerazione, al di 
fuori di ogni contatto, statica; il secondo riguarda essenzialmente i loro 
rapporti e quindi la loro considerazione dinamica. ” 400
The first clause, he says, originated from an overtly technical proposal he had made 
in the course of the discussions at subcommission level (“Lo Stato riconosce . . .  
come originari Tordinamento giuridico intemazionale, gli ordinamenti degli altri stati 
e 1’ ordinamento della Chiesa”) which was subsequently amended by Togliatti into 
the current clause, which was more readily understandable and satisfied demands for 
a more politically-orientated wording. But Dossetti insists that any interpretation of 
the clause should, for reasons of clarity, be undertaken from the perspective of his 
original, purely technical, proposal. In fact, he claims, recognising the originarieta of 
the Catholic Church’s juridical system is tantamount to recognising its independence 
and sovereignty, and recognising its independence is likewise tantamount to 
recognising the originarieta of its system of canon law. He then highlights the 
difference between ordinamenti originari and ordinamenti derivati, arguing that 
none of the previous speakers have made the distinction between the two concepts 
with the necessary precision: an ordinamento originario is any institution which does 
not derive its own justification nor its own foundation from an other institution; 
whereas an ordinamento derivato -  as the name suggests -  is any institution whose 
juridical foundation is derived from a superior institution.
Dossetti insists that it is not enough to accept the plurality of juridical 
systems: one must also recognise that the Church’s juridical system is ‘originary’ and 
thus sovereign in its own sphere. Calamandrei’s objections are also nullified: he 
argued that the first clause was unsuitable for a Constitution which should be 
monologic in nature, and would be more aptly located in the dialogic context of a 
treaty. Dossetti argues that in a constitution the State cannot speak of other originary 
systems (of government and law) without acknowledging both its own and the 
other’s sovereignty and originary status. 401
400 Ibid., p. 547.
401 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 549. There is one obvious point not yet made in the debate: why was it necessary 
to even mention other institutions -  whether originary or not -  in a document which had the sole
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(ii) Sovereignty of Church and State
Subcommission 1
The issue of the sovereignty of Church and State revolved around the suitability and 
necessity of including a reference to such sovereignty in the Constitution. Indeed, the 
distinguished jurist Calamandrei thinks that such a serious issue as sovereignty 
should be debated in the full Constituent Assembly, not in the Subcommission. As 
we have seen, he considers that the article formulated by the First Subcommission is 
more suited to a treaty than to a Constitution, arguing that, in a constitution, the only 
sovereignty expressed should be the State’s, and indeed admitting another body into 
the constitutional framework is such a new and unusual juridical procedure that it 
would be inappropriate to deal with such a matter in the current Assembly. He 
doesn’t deny that the Church has an autonomous juridical structure with its own 
sovereignty, but says that there are many other such juridical structures, such as all 
other foreign states. He argues that it would be pointless to state in the Constitution, 
for example, that the Italian State and the USA are each in their own spheres 
independent and sovereign. For reasons of juridical correctness he thus states that he 
will not approve the clause.402 The socialist Lelio Basso considers that the 
independence and sovereignty of the state should be obvious in a constitution, 
although it is right to recognise the Church’s independence within the State.403 
Indeed, Togliatti claims that the Catholic Church, even if territorially contained 
within Italy, operates on a different level to a nation and the proposal is thus not 
juridically defective. He examines alternative scenarios: the State controlling 
ecclesiastical laws and the running of the Church; or what happened in France after 
the ‘Combes law’ when religious organisations had to satisfy certain criteria laid 
down by the State before they were given recognition. This cannot happen in Italy, 
he says, “perche significherebbe aprire in Italia una lacerazione religiosa, con una 
conseguente lotta che potrebbe sconvolgere tutta la societa italiana e mettere in serio 
peri col o la democrazia. ” 404
However, Gustavo Fabbri (Gruppo parlamentare misto) cannot accept the 
clause in its original form because he cannot accept the concept of the Church’s 
sovereignty. He says that precisely because it is Catholic it would seek to control the
purpose o f outlining the legal and moral duties of the State and the public duties o f the citizens living 
within that State? See also Section A3 (ii) o f this thesis.
402 CRAC, vol. 6, pp. 147-8.
403 Ibid., p. 148.
404 t u - .
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life of Italians thus conflicting with the sovereignty of the State inasmuch as such an 
invasion by the Church would conflict with the liberty of non-Catholics.405
It is noticeable in the debates in the Subcommission that the non-Communist 
la id , such as Calamandrei and Fabbri, although for different reasons, are less prone 
to compromise with the Catholics on the issue of expressing the independence and 
sovereignty of the Church in the Constitution. And whilst the socialists, led by 
Basso, are willing to accept such a declaration, it is clear that they are not doing so 
for quite the same reasons as Togliatti, who gives far greater weight to the Catholic 
argument throughout the debates of the need to maintain the pace religiosa. Whereas 
the socialists and the azionisti (Calamandrei was associated with the latter) regarded 
Catholic comments of this kind as little more than a veiled threat, and although 
Togliatti may well have also seen them in this light, he was far more anxious to 
quash the image of the Pci as an anti-Catholic party. Togliatti’s leadership of the 
Communists in the Subcommission and the Assembly must, moreover, be seen in the 
overall context of the Pci’s appeal to the masses in a Catholic country, and in the 
context of the long term hegemonizing strategy of the party’s forthcoming 
programme in the ‘Via italiana al socialismo’.
Constituent Assembly
Doubts were expressed by Pietro Mancini (Psi) as to the need for the State to 
explicitly refer to its own sovereign status. He pointed out that
Stato e Chiesa sono due ordinamenti giuridici sovrani ed indipendenti nella 
loro sfera giurisdizionale e territoriale. Libera Chiesa nello Stato sovrano.
. . .  Nella Costituzione lo Stato italiano non aveva bisogno di affermare la sua 
sovranita e la sua indipendenza. Lo Stato italiano e espressione diretta del 
potere sovrano del popolo. E lo stato di fatto che diventa stato di diritto. Onde 
la sua sovranita e la sua indipendenza sono attributi sacri ed inviolabili. Sono 
presupposti, che non debbono essere formulati, perche senza di essi, non si 
comprende la stessa Costituzione .. . Ma il richiamo e awenuto per ben altra 
ragione. Per rilevare la sovranita e Vindipendenza della Chiesa e metterla 
sullo stesso piano della sovranita e 1’indipendenza dello Stato. Orbene, lo 
Stato puo riconoscere 1’indipendenza della Chiesa; ma non pud riconoscere la 
sua sovranita quando si muove nella stessa giurisdizione territoriale. La 
Chiesa fuori del nostro territoriP e un PrdiriamPntP sovrano come Sono 
sovrani tutti gli Stati esteri ed essa e uno Stato estero; perche possiede il suo 
territorio, pur se ristretto e simbolico, ed i suoi ambasciatori, cioe i suoi 
‘Nunzi’.
CRAC, vol. 1, p. 474.
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Mancini, in the course of his speech, in referring to the ‘ben altra ragione’ for 
inserting references to the Church’s independence and sovereignty, was in effect 
voicing the sentiments of most of the laid. Very few were in principle opposed to 
granting this sovereignty and independence in its own sphere, but many insisted that 
declarations concerning the mutual recognition of sovereignty were better suited to 
an international treaty than to a national constitution. Calamandrei addresses the 
issue by clarifying a fundamental point regarding the wording of this first clause. He 
says the first thing that strikes the jurist is: who is speaking here? Is it the State or the 
Church? Is it one or two voices? He can understand the subject of the Constitution, 
the State, recognising the sovereignty of the Church, but for the Church to 
simultaneously recognise the sovereignty of the State, something which is assumed 
by the fact of it being a State Constitution, is, he says, incongruous to a jurist. Orazio 
Condorelli (Bnl), on the other hand, believes that the sovereignty and independence 
of the Church is non-negotiable and a fundamental aspect of its existence: “Qui la 
sovranita vuol dire . .. potesta originaria propria, connaturata, onde il diritto 
canonico non e diritto perche lo riconosce lo Stato, ma e diritto perche emana da un 
potere sovrano, che b la Chiesa. ” 407 In a subsequent debate, Calamandrei develops 
this argument adding weight to what others before him like Orlando, Croce, Nitti, 
Labriola and others have said ad infinitum, that such a clause belongs in an 
international treaty between two sovereign entities in order that they recognise each 
other’s sovereignty.
La Costituzione, quella che noi stiamo discutendo, e l’atto di una sola 
sovranita: del popolo italiano, della Repubblica italiana. Qui parla soltanto il 
popolo italiano, la Repubblica. La Chiesa qui, in questa sede, in questo 
momento, non ha aperitio oris. Non c’e nessuno che la rappresenti; ne credo 
che pensino di rappresentarla in questa sede gli amici democristiani, i quali 
sono stati mandati qui per rappresentare il popolo e non per rappresentare la 
Chiesa . . . E se pretendessero di poter parlare anche in nome della Chiesa, 
pretenderebbero in questo momento di compiere quello che giuridicamente e 
un assurdo ed un monstrum, cioe . .. un contratto con se stessi. Lo Stato e 
sovrano e non c’e bisogno che la Chiesa ne riconosca la sovranita. E vero .. . 
che ormai e comunamente ammessa la teoria della pluralita degli ordinamenti 
giuridici.408
Calamandrei adds that the old theory by which all laws emanate from the state has 
been superseded:
407 Ibid., p. 447.
408 Ibid., p. 514.
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Ma questa teoria della pluralita degli ordinamenti giuridici non ha niente a 
che vedere con questo articolo 5; perche, quando, come qui, ci si trova nel 
cuore di un ordinamento giuridico, cioe neirintemo di questa Assemblea 
Costituente, dalla quale deve scaturire la legge fondamentale 
dell’ordinamento giuridico di cui noi siamo i costruttori, allora noi dobbiamo 
darci cura soltanto di questo ordinamento giuridico, di cui siamo al centro, e 
soltanto in nome di esso possiamo creare le nostre leggi409
He puts a rhetorical question to the Assembly which produces ‘hilarity and lively 
comments fron the centre parties’: What would they think of an article stating:
“L’Italia e la Francia sono ciascuno, nel proprio ordine, indipendenti e sovrani”? 
Dossetti’s response is both dismissive and uncharacteristically concise:
Calamandrei’s point is “quasi piuttosto fiorentinamente scherzosa che obiezione 
seria” and, furthermore, no one doubts the authenticity of the independence and 
sovereignty of France, but in Italian political circles at least, there are those who 
doubt, or who pretend to doubt, that of the Church.410 Calamandrei points out that he 
put the same question to the Commission of 75, to which Togliatti, once more 
defending the Catholics, replied:
Un articolo di questa natura sarebbe inutile, sarebbe assurdo, perche questi 
due ordinamenti, 1’Italia e la Francia, sono entrambi ordinamenti dello stesso 
ordine e sarebbe superfluo e vano questa specie di scambio di cortesie, che 
consisterebbe nel riconoscere reciprocamente una sovranita inerente a 
diversita di ben distinti territori nazionali. Ma quando si tratta di Stato e 
Chiesa, si tratta di due ordinamenti che vivono in due diversi ordini, ed 
appunto perche sono due ordinamenti su piani diversi questo riconoscimento 
reciproco di sovranita diventa necessario 411
Calamandrei is not persuaded by Togliatti’s argument, but does accept that there is 
common ground between Church and State which must be negotiated on a political 
level. He repeats that clauses such as the first in article 5 are nonsensical
perche quando si arrivera su un terreno pratico in cui nascera il conflitto ed in 
cui si troveranno nei due ordinamenti norme divergenti e contrastanti, allora 
si trattera di stabilire se devono prevalere gli ordinamenti dello Stato, la cui 
sovranita e stata riconosciuta dalla Chiesa, o se devono prevalere gli 
ordinamenti della Chiesa, la cui sovranita e stata riconosciuta dallo Stato!412
He is totally against this clause which he claims has been put there to make it appear 
as if  the problem has been resolved, when in reality it remains unresolved.
411 Ibid.’ p. 514.
412 Ibid., p. 515.
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Carlo Bassano (Pdl) argues that the subject of the constitution is the state, and 
that in such a document the state is not authorised to speak on behalf of another 
institution such as the Church. He asks why the Church needs the Italian State to 
recognise its spiritual sovereignty, when it already achieves such recognition through 
international law? Moreover, this recognition is referred to specifically in article two 
of the Lateran Treaty. He also cites articles 1, 3, 6 , 7, 8 ,9 ,11  and 12 of the Law of 
Guarantees as proof that the Italian State has always respected the independence of 
the Pontiff and the sovereignty of the Holy See.413 He argues that if Catholic deputies 
want to make recognition of the spiritual sovereignty of the Church explicit, it should 
be done in accordance with the recognition given to the Italian State in the Lateran 
Treaty, that is, in terms laid down by international law.
Amendments
In an attempt to put all churches on an equal footing in the Constitution, the 
Republican, Ugo Della Seta, presented the following amendment to article 5:
Lo Stato e le singole Chiese sono, ciascuno nel proprio ordine intemo, 
indipendenti e sovrani.
I rapporti tra lo Stato e ogni singola Chiesa sono disciplinati per legge 414
He says that a people who are about to bestow on themselves their own republican 
Constitution should not feel the need to enshrine in that Constitution the sovereignty 
of the State; likewise, those with a higher moral and civil education and a higher 
level of political maturity should not be made to feel obliged to enshrine in that 
Constitution the independence and sovereignty of the Church.415
Edgardo Lami Stamuti (Psli) also presented the following amendment to draft 
article 5:
La Repubblica riconosce la Chiesa cattolica, nel suo ordine, indipendente e
416sovrana.
He acknowledges that article 5 was conceived with the best of intentions -  to avoid 
reopening religious conflict in Italy. However, he doubts whether this is, in fact, 
possible since the authors of the clause are attempting to resolve a political fracas,
413 Ibid., p. 535. See also see Legge 13 Maggio 1871 (Legge delle Guarentigie), No. 214 in Raccolta 
Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti del Regno d ’ltalia  (a cura del) Ministero per la Giustizia, Rome, pp. 
1015-1022.
414 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 614.
4,5 Ibid., pp. 614-5.
416 Ibid., p. 619.
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which he suggests is non-existent, and would in reality create religious turmoil in the 
country. His amendment reduces the duplicate affirmation of sovereignty and 
independence to a singular affirmation (the State recognising the Church as such), 
since it is the State that is the voice of the Constitution, and to declare its own 
independence in a document which by its very existence deems the State to be 
sovereign and independent seems to Lami Stamuti to be a nonsense. He makes the 
observation that all the parties have agreed to compromise over the delicate issue of 
religious freedom and not disturb the pace religiosa: “La prima parte del nostro 
emendamento risponde in certo senso a quella che e la sfida della Democrazia 
cristiana al pensiero laico e libero della democrazia italiana. ” 417 Clearly, Stamuti 
regards the badly defined notion of pace religiosa as an ill-conceived, unnecessary 
and provocative criticism of the civic and pluralist credentials of the laid.
(iii) Privilege of having the Vatican in Italy
Subcommission 1
More than most of the other Dc deputies, Giorgio La Pira was keen to promote the 
Church as a loyal and able supporter of the State, in a perfect position to work with 
the State in the government of Italy.418 He says,
quando la Chiesa vede uno spirito democratico di sincerita, di realta, di 
concretezza storica nei suoi confronti, essa allora viene incontro a tutte le 
legittime aspirazioni di questa democrazia: noi avremo in essa una preziosa 
collaboratrice. Perche devo ricordarvi una cosa che non possiamo 
dimenticare, che la Chiesa cattolica ha in Roma il centro mistico e giuridico 
di una comunita intemazionale che si estende da un polo all’altro: essa ha 
nell’Italia, in Roma, il suo centro propulsore, destinato ad imprimere il moto 
al corpo mistico della Chiesa. Perche non volete tener conto di questa 
condizione storica ed avere questa sensibility politica nei confronti della 
Chiesa cattolica? Credo ormai che una quantita di pregiudizi siano venuti 
meno. La Chiesa -  che nella sua struttura interiore e la comunione dei santi, e 
che nella sua struttura estema costituisce una magnifica e universale struttura 
giuridica -  puo fare e fa tanto bene, anche politicamente, pel nostro Paese 419
Stefano Jacini (Dc) uses the Roman Question to highlight the importance of the 
presence of the Catholic Church in Rome:
417 Ibid., p. 620.
418 This seems to be a generalised version o f De Gasperi’s ‘diarchy’ proposals which he proposed in 
his speech to the Assembly. See Section B2 b) (iv) o f this thesis.
419 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 324. La Pira closes his speech with a series o f biblical references and a final 
invocation calling for the blessing o f God and the Immaculate Virgin on their Constitution. To the 
annoyance, but occasionally indulgent amusement, and even affection, o f the parties o f the left, this is 
how he ends all o f his speeches to the Assembly.
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L’Italia, nei suo millenario processo di unificazione, si era sempre trovata 
davanti a questo ostacolo, di uno Stato, situato al centro della penisola e 
diverso da tutti gli altri, perche appannaggio temporale di una potenza 
spirituale, base nazionale di un potere intemazionale, il quale potere, a sua 
volta, aveva per altri aspetti, influenza su tutto il resto della penisola. Questo 
fatto . . .  la polemica anticlericale laicista ce lo ha dipinto sempre come una 
tremenda disgrazia per il nostro Paese. Noi cattolici pensiamo che invece ci 
fosse un grande privilegio ed onore quello di avere, in casa nostra, la sede del 
piu alto potere del mondo . . .  Ma, comunque lo si volesse discutere e 
giudicare, il fatto esisteva e rappresentava un ostacolo alia compiuta unita 
territoriale del Paese ..  420
These comments, by La Pira and Jacini, are important as an illustration of the 
sentiments shared by many Catholics, in relation to the sense of privilege enjoyed by 
the Italian peninsula at having what they regard as the centre of Christendom housed 
within their boundaries. This explains, to some extent, the inability of the more 
devout, like La Pira, to understand the doubts, reservations and even fears of the laid  
in relation to granting a position of privilege to the Church in their country. It can 
also help to explain the determination of other Catholic costituenti to ensure, despite 
the clear jurisprudential anomalies, that declarations concerning the sovereignty of 
the Church should be inserted into the Constitution. One must also bear in mind that 
despite the clear evidence of a willingness to collaborate and to compromise on the 
part of the Communists, many Catholics did not trust their motives.
(iv) Delineating the legislative powers of Church and State
Constituent Assembly
Taking a similar, juridical stance to Calamandrei, Ugo Della Seta (Pri) argues for 
greater clarity in the wording of the draft Constitution. He cites a number of 
examples including article 5 on Church/State relations. He argues that clause one 
needs more clarification: does ‘ciascuno nei proprio ordine’ refer to internal or 
external spheres? If it refers to their external spheres, then “porterebbe uno di questi 
poteri ad invadere illegitimamente la sfera dell’altro?”. He feels it needs a more 
precise construction, such as “ciascuni nei proprio ordine interno.”421
The overlap of the legislative powers of Church and State is addressed more 
fully by another republican Francesco De Vita. He believes that the first clause,
420 Ibid., p. 417.
421 Ibid., p. 178.
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cosi com’e formulato, anziche assicurare la tanto desiderata pace religiosa, 
potrebbe portare ad aperti contrasti. Con questo comma, infatti, non si vuole 
affermare il principio di separazione fra Stato e Chiesa. Lo scopo, 
evidentemente, e una altro: si vuole non soltanto affermare il principio del 
riconoscimento dei diritti e dei poteri temporali della Chiesa come Santa Sede 
-  e per cio ente con personality intemazionale perfetta -  ma anche dei diritti e 
poteri che si estendono oltre i limiti della Citta del Vaticano. Sorge allora 
spontanea la domanda: chi determina i limiti dell’ordinamento giuridico dello 
Stato e della Chiesa, se non lo Stato e la Chiesa medesimi, quali enti 
sovrani? 422
He points out that in some areas, such as matrimony, the Church claims sole 
jurisdiction for itself But, he asks, should the State benignly accept such a claim?
He thinks not, and moreover:
Possono Stato e Chiesa legiferare entrambi in questa e in altre materie senza 
il pericolo di conflitti? Si potrebbe obiettare che, ai sensi del successivo 
comma dello stesso articolo, il collegamento fra Stato e Chiesa deve essere 
concordatario. Ma, a mio awiso, l’obiezione non regge, perche col primo 
comma si riconosce la piena sovranita della Chiesa anche nei rapporti estemi 
e nei secondo comma e soltanto un impegno unilaterale dello Stato.423
By the time of the new Republic, ideas such as those of the laico Francesco 
Scaduto, who claimed that the Church’s juridical system was not compatible with 
that of the State, but was the statute of a mere association, had long been superseded. 
Indeed Cevolotto points out that Santi Romano’s theory of the plurality of juridical 
systems was now the accepted norm. He accepts that the originarietd and autonomy 
of the Church’s juridical system is a notion that has been unanimously and 
unconditionally accepted in Italian juridical circles. But he considers it necessary to 
add a proviso: “che agli ordinamenti statuali non possono appartenere norme che non 
derivano, almeno in modo mediato, dalla volonta dello Stato.” 424 He asks how it is 
possible that the Church’s legal system, albeit independent and ‘originary’, can 
acquire juridical relevance through the State’s legal system, when his party affirms 
the principle that the State is the only source of law? Like Calamandrei before him, 
he cites Mario Falco’s formula: “Le leggi canoniche hanno effetti civili solo in 
quanto le leggi dello Stato glieli attribuiscono e nei limiti di tale attribuzione.” 425 So 
having accepted the originarieta of the Church’s legal system, the next problem is to 
delineate to what extent that system can encroach on the State’s legal system. He
422 Ibid., p.361.
423 Ibid., pp. 361-2.
424 Ibid., p. 538.
425 Ibid.
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suggests that Church laws should only have force where State laws specifically allow 
this. This question is bound up with the issue of the sovereignty of each institution, 
an issue which arose with the creation of the Concordat. To illustrate the Church’s 
position on State laws that impinge on areas of legislature covered by the Concordat, 
Cevolotto cites the following section from an oft quoted letter sent by Pius XI to 
Cardinal Gasparri:
Nei Concordato sono in presenza, se non due Stati, certissimamente due 
sovranita pienamente tali, cioe pienamente perfette, ciascuna nei suo ordine, 
ordine necessariamente determinato dal rispettivo fine. Ove e appena d’uopo 
soggiungere che Foggettiva dignita dei fini determina non meno 
oggettivamente e necessariamente l’assoluta superiority della Chiesa. 426
Bearing in mind this claim by Pius XI, Cevolotto then succinctly outlines the 
problem: “Come risolvere il problema della sovranita dell’ordinamento giuridico 
della Chiesa, che incide e insiste sullo stesso territorio e sugli stessi soggetti della 
sovranita dello Stato? ” 427 He suggests that the jurists writing for Civilta Cattolica 
have found themselves in an embarassing position due to the difficulty of this issue, 
but have resolved it by claiming that the Church’s juridical system is external (i.e. 
independent) of the State’s system, and thus ‘any overlap or interferences’ (to use 
Cevolotto’s words) must be regulated by means of accords. In other words, he says, 
Italians would in practice be considered as having dual citizenship -  Vatican and 
Italian. Moreover, the complexity of each institution’s juridical system would, 
according to certain Civiltd, Cattolica jurists like Padre Salvatore Lener (SJ), 
necessitate both a different definition of the Church’s sovereignty and, due to the 
coexistence of the two sovereign juridical systems, and the Church’s claim to 
‘assoluta superiority’, inevitable limitations of State sovereignty. Far from being an 
external juridical system, it would then impinge on the same people and the same 
legal matters. This gives rise to the main issue: the overlapping areas of jurisdiction 
such as matrimony and education where even the Catholic jurists admit that a further 
diminution of the State’s powers is the only way the problem can be resolved to their 
satisfaction.
In fact, Cevolotto shows that Padre Lener’s interpretation of the Church’s 
juridical system as being external is a nonsense. Lener, he says, subscribes to the 
theory of the plurality of juridical systems (i.e. that they can co-exist). But the theory
426 Ibid., p. 539. See F. Pacelli, Diario della Conciliazione, App. XLII, pp. 549-557 for the full letter.
427 CRAC, vol. l ,p.  539.
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considers the Church’s juridical system as internal, and thus equivalent to the State’s 
system. Consequently, the Church’s claim to sovereignty suggests that it must have 
precedence over any areas of jurisdiction considered to be its own, even if they 
coincide with matters covered by the State’s juridical system. Any such diminution 
of the State’s sovereignty is dangerous and politically unacceptable to Cevolotto and 
his party. He is happy for the Church’s internal juridical system to remain valid, but 
only to the extent that it be recognised and accepted by the State. To this end he 
proposed an amendment to article 5 (draft): “Lo Stato riconosce l’indipendenza della 
Chiesa cattolica nei suo ordinamento giuridico intemo.” 428
In an attempt to show how the Church is autonomous, having no superior 
power to answer to, Dossetti contrasts its unique situation, at the spiritual level, to 
that of the regions and comunes of Italy whose powers all derive from the central 
authorities in Rome. Thus, the Church could be said to enjoy a primary autonomy, in 
other words, true independence and sovereignty. He argues that whereas the 
fundamental element of the sovereignty of the State is temporal, political and 
territorial, the sovereign status of the Church is essentially non-territorial, but rather 
spiritual and eternal. He points out that since the teachings of Francesco Ruffini at 
the University of Turin prior to the first World War, all of Italian public law has been 
constructed around the concept of the Church’s autonomy being primary and 
originary. He says that all the experts in ecclesiastical law, whether they be Catholic 
or non-Catholic, agree with this concept and that if their teaching were applied, then 
all the objections to the first clause of Article 5 would be more than adequately 
answered.429 Thus he claims that the objections of Orlando and Cevolotto -  from the 
moment that the principle of the plurality of juridical systems was accepted, the 
declaration of the Church’s sovereignty was superfluous -  are no longer valid.
Church and State, in their capacities as ordinamenti originari, should, 
according to Dossetti, negotiate any overlapping areas of law bilaterally. He 
considers that the subject should no longer be discussed within the old politico- 
philosophical parameters of laicismo and laicitd. or the confessional State. He thinks 
it is time to introduce a new framework for the discussion, that of precise juridical 
formulae and to use some of the more refined concepts of modem theory of law . 430 
The concept of the autonomia originaria of both the Church and the State is,
428 Ibid., p. 540.
429 Ibid., p. 548.
430 Ibid., p. 550.
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according to Dossetti, first of all, the essential pre-requisite for any discussion of 
relations between the two entities since it demarcates their juridical boundaries far 
better than any discussion based on State laicita. Secondly, it unequivocally creates 
parity between the two institutions: Dossetti uses this as an argument against 
Cevolotto’s claim that canon law assumes superiority over civil law. Dossetti claims 
that the very fact of the parity and independence of each institution as an originary 
entity negates the possibility of one interfering in the jurisdiction of the other.431 He 
argues that it makes absolutely necessary bilateral negotiations in areas where both 
institutions have the same interests. It also renders impossible any unilateral decision 
by one or other of the institutions on any such area. If such a decision were to be 
taken it would put the relationship between the two bodies immediately in jeopardy, 
and would mean that the body taking the decision would be effectively claiming 
juridical superiority over the other and denying or negating the originarieta of the 
other. Thus bilateral controls (ironically, he uses the word ‘concordataria’), Dossetti 
claims, would not result in confusion between the two institutions, in any limitation 
of the sovereignty of either one, nor in any interference of one in the affairs of the 
other.432 “Qui, onorevole colleghi, nei riconoscimento della necessity di una 
disciplina bilaterale delle materie di comune interesse, e la vera separazione tra 
Chiesa e Stato, la vera indipendenza reciproca, la vera laicita, la vera liberta di 
coscienza. ” 433 This ‘true’ freedom of conscience, he claims, can only emerge from 
such a system, where the State can neither impose its will in spiritual matters nor 
attempt to control the spiritual will of the individual, but must discuss any matters 
affecting the spiritual well-being of the nation in accordance with the bilateral 
framework established by the terms of article 5. As many of the laid  in the 
Assembly could see, Dossetti presented an over-optimistic picture of the possibility 
of reconciling potential conflict. In the sphere of state legislation, for example, does 
the Church regard such legislation permitting divorce or abortion as ‘imposing its 
[i.e. the state’s] will in spiritual matters’? It certainly did at the time, yet can the state 
accept being dictated to in such matters by the Church? The state is required to 
legislate for all its citizens, and not discriminate on religious grounds.
431 This was, o f course, in practice absolute nonsense since many o f the State laws on religious 
freedom had been directly influenced by Vatican pressure to reduce the operational scope o f the 
minority religions. And the laws, passed under the Fascist regime, remained on the Statute books well 
into the 20th century, with the post war Dc government making no attempt to update or modify them, 
and in some instances, actually increasing police powers o f enforcement o f the laws. See section 
C(v)a) o f this thesis.
432 CRAC, vol. l ,p.  551.
433 Ibid., p. 552
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(v) Separation of the powers of Church and State
Constituent Assembly
The issue of separation of Church and State was seen by Jacini (Dc) in terms of the 
Concordat: the question was whether a regime of concordatory relations was 
preferable “alia separazione amichevole tra Chiesa e Stato, alia neutrality assoluta 
dello Stato, alia religione considerata come cosa privata.” 434
His personal view on the issue is rather surprising, and does not reflect the 
view of his party at all, something he is keen to point out:
Posso arrivare a concedere, in linea teorica e dottrinale, la superiority d’una 
amichevole e rispettosa separazione dei poteri, di una liberta di coscienza non 
garantita ne vincolata da alcun accordo fra Chiesa e Stato; di una Chiesa 
inquadrata semplicemente nei diritto comune; posso ritenere che cio 
rappresenti qualche cosa di desiderabile, anche perche offrirebbe alia Chiesa 
stessa enormi possibility di sviluppo. Ricordo a questo proposito di avere 
conosciuto ai tempi della mia gioventu uno dei nostri piu illustri 
giurisdizionalisti, il senatore Carlo Piola Daverio; ottimo cattolico, ma 
giurisdizionalista feroce, egli temeva una cosa sola: che la Chiesa in Italia 
venisse trattata come cosa privata; perche, diceva, da quel momento, la 
Chiesa sara onnipotente e ci schiaccera tutti435
This, he says, is a perfectly valid opinion. However, in the Western world and in 
Italy in particular, it is not possible to present the problem in these terms:
Non vi e mai stata, non vi e, e presumibilmente non vi sara mai, la possibility 
di separazione assoluta tra i due poteri, in un Paese dell’occidente europeo e 
in Italia in modo speciale . . . perche Peuropeo non e divisibile. La Chiesa si 
puo combattere, la Chiesa si puo perseguitare; con la Chiesa si puo 
patteggiare; ma la Chiesa non si puo ignorare; e questo un dato di fatto che 
diciannove secoli di storia confermano 436
With regard to Church/State relations, and in response to arguments of the 
type proferred by Jacini, Condorelli says,
Noi abbiamo oggi dei casi di separazione sostanziale e di unione meramente 
formale; separazione sostanziale, perche lo Stato e un’entita laica; formale, 
perche si da forma giuridica, attraverso il Concordato, a certi rapporti 
intercorrenti fra Stato e Chiesa. Lo Stato italiano e veramente questo: e uno 
Stato sostanzialmente separato dalla Chiesa, formalmente coordinato per 
regolare le materie comuni.437
434 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 418.
435 Ibid.
436 Ibid., pp. 418-9.
437 Ibid., p. 449.
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Pietro Mancini (Psi) suggests that Condorelli was wrong when he said that
dal punto di vista sostanziale ‘lo Stato e separato dalla Chiesa, mentre dal 
punto di vista formale lo Stato concorda con la Chiesa’. Lo Stato e sovrano e 
indipendente nella sua giurisdizione territoriale e non puo concordare con 
nessuno; perche in politica la forma plasma la sostanza.438
In all probability, Condorelli and Mancini are working with slightly different 
conceptions of ‘formale’. It is clear from Condorelli’s use of the term that he 
interprets it as a formal (i.e. juridical) negotiated settlement of the terms of the 
relations. Mancini, on the other hand, clearly uses the term in the sense that the form 
shapes the substance, and seems to be using ‘concordare’ to mean coming to an 
agreement on matters which are the state’s prerogative alone. Otherwise, his 
statement that the state “non puo concordare con nessuno” would be absurd.
What is perhaps more interesting is Stefano Jacini’s comments on the Church 
as a reality “che diciannove secoli di storia confermano.” Whereas most Catholic 
references in the debates to the Church as a reality which cannot be ignored are in 
support of the idea that it is the religion of the majority of the people, and therefore 
deserves special consideration, Jacini, approaching it from the perspective of 
giurisdizionalismo, is anxious to guard against it as an overweening power which, in 
the absence of a concordatorial settlement, could well lead to a situation in which “la 
Chiesa sara onnipotente e ci schiaccera tutti.”
(vi) ‘Laicismo’, ‘laicita’ and the ‘stato laico’
Constituent Assembly
By the 1940’s many Catholics were beginning to accept the idea of laicita. Igino 
Giordani (Dc), attempting to explain this phenomenon quotes from
un documento che potrei chiamare ufficiale, un quademo intitolato La 
Chiesa, edito dall’istituto cattolico di attivita sociale, 1’I.C.A.S., dove e detto: 
‘Molti tuttavia sono tomati a richiedere lo Stato laico e nello stesso tempo 
assumono di volere assicurare il rispetto alia concordia. In questa concezione, 
lo Stato laico sarebbe quasi sinonimo che non subisce 1’influenza della 
Chiesa, e se i suoi sostenitori fossero in buona fede, anche i cattolici 
potrebbero sostenere tale nuova coniazione di concetti.439
Not all Dc deputies were as open to such controversial ideas as those harboured by 
Giordani. The integralist wing of the party (represented by the dossettiani among
438 Ibid., p. 474.
439 Ibid., p. 434.
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others), not to mention the right wing, argued vehemently against the emergence of 
such ideas. La Pira, for example, firmly believed that man is intrinsically religious 
and that society and the state must reflect this ‘truth’:
Stiamo sempre alia precisazione dei concetti. Stato laico? Perche, vedete, per 
quel famoso principio che esiste sempre una base teoretica di tutte le cose, 
anche inconsapevolmente (perche l’azione b sempre diretta dall’idea) non 
esiste uno Stato agnostico: come si concepisce la realta umana, come si 
concepisce la societa, cosi si costruisce la volta giuridica. Ora, se I’uomo ha 
questa orientazione intrinsecamente religiosa, senza una qualifica, ed allora, 
che significa Stato laico, se lo Stato e l’assetto giuridico della societa? Se 
l’uomo ha questa intrinseca orientazione religiosa, se necessariamente questa 
intrinseca orientazione si esprime in comunita religiose, non esiste uno Stato 
laico. Esiste uno Stato rispettoso di questa orientazione religiosa e di queste 
formazione religiose associate, in cui esso si esprime. II termine e 
contradittorio: non c’e Stato laico, non c’e Stato agnostico: non dobbiamo 
fat t  uriO State cbnfessionale, uno Stato, cioe, iiel quale i diritti civili, politici 
ed economici derivino da una certa professione di fede; dobbiamo solo 
costruire uno Stato che rispetti questa intrinseca orientazione religiosa del 
singolo e della collettivita e che ad essa conformi tutta la sua struttura 
giuridica e la sua struttura sociale 440
This last phrase begins promisingly with a call for the State to respect both individual 
and collective religious aspirations, but ends with the demand that the state should 
base all its legal and social structures on such aspirations.
At this point it is perhaps worth noting that the differences between Giordani 
and La Pira reflect the differences between two sides of a development in Catholic 
social thinking on the issue of the secular state {stato laico). Under the influence of 
thinkers like Jacques Maritain, Catholic intellectuals, mainly French at the time, had 
been developing the idea of a form of ‘secularisation’ as appropriate for Christian 
activists and politicians, in which there would be a clear separation, without any 
necessary hostility, between Church and State. Whereas laicismo remained the term 
to describe a militant secularism hostile to the state, laicita became the term to 
describe the correct separation of spheres without hostility.
Paradoxically, in the passages just quoted it is the socialist Rossi (also a 
Catholic) who came closest to describing a Catholic laicita:
Stato laico non vuol dire menomamente Stato ateo, e nemmeno, nei nostro 
modo di pensare, Stato areligioso. Essere laico . . . non significa limitare il 
pensiero umano all’orizzonte visibile, ne interdire all’uomo l’idea della 
perpetua ricerca di Dio; significa rivendicare per la vita presente tutto lo 
sforzo degli uomini. Per noi laicita significa soltanto posizione dei valori
440 Ibid., p. 323.
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religiosi nella loro sede naturale, senza la pericolosa e corrutrice 
contaminazione con i poteri dello Stato. Lasciatemi esprimere .. . il nostro 
esatto pensiero: noi non siamo atei e vogliamo professare pubblicamente la 
nostra fede in Dio; non siamo anarchici e vogliamo da onesti cittadini 
obbedire alle leggi dello Stato. Cio che non vogliamo e una legge che ci 
obblighi a credere in Dio con la minaccia dei carabinieri (o con la perdita 
della nostra cattedra, se siamo sacerdoti) e un Dio che ci obblighi ad obbedire 
alle leggi con la minaccia dell’inferno. Noi contiamo, nella nostra proposta 
per la revisione dell’articolo 5, sulla completa e naturale solidarieta di tutta la 
sinistra e di quei liberali che non vogliono rinnegare la loro eredita 441
(vii) Defining Church/State relations
Constituent Assembly
Defining the difference between Church and State is very difficult, according to 
Giordani “Questi rapporti si possono risolvere o nelFaccordo o nei disaccordo. 
L’accordo favorisce quella pace spirituale, quella pace interiore che ha formato la 
grandezza dell’Italia.5,442 He argues that Christianity was responsible for creating the 
distinction between Church and State; but was Christianity not responsible, from the 
time of Innocent III in the 13th century, for combining the two spheres and causing 
all subsequent problems of distinction?
Nei tempi piu felici l’ltalia aveva il popolo che godeva della pace religiosa e 
politica, cioe che non conosceva il contrasto fra le due attivita. II disaccordo 
invece danneggia tanto la Chiesa quanto lo Stato, perche se le due societa 
sono indipendenti, come e detto giustamente nell’articolo 5 del progetto, pero 
i loro rapporti vanno regolati tenendo presente che cosa significhi Chiesa e 
che cosa significhi Stato 443
He then introduces an element of confusion into the debate by saying that the Church 
is not the Vatican, the Curia or the bishops, important though they may be as the 
leaders of the Church. The Church is in fact, he says, the people. “Ciascuno di noi e 
cittadino ed e credente; in quanto cittadino, potremmo dire, e Stato; in quanto 
credente, e Chiesa, sicche siamo la stessa persona su cui si esercitano le due 
attivita. ” 444 He goes on to examine various scenarios, such as the State ignoring 
religions, persecuting religions and making religions subordinate to the State.
In Italy, Giordani sees the problem as simultaneously extremely simple and 
extremely difficult.
441 Ibid., pp. 415-6.
442 Ibid., p. 434.
443 Ibid., pp. 434-5.
444 Ibid., p. 435.
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E estremamente facile . . .  perche la grande maggioranza del popolo italiano e 
cattolica. Guardate i censimenti, anche anteriori al fascismo, e voi trovate il 
97 per cento circa di cattolici. In democrazia la maggioranza significa 
qualcosa; cioe il popolo cattolico, che ha la maggioranza, vuole una sua pace 
religiosa, ha bisogno di una sua pace religiosa. Non concederla, non 
realizzarla, significa fare il danno di questa grande maggioranza.445
It is difficult and delicate because of the presence on the Italian peninsula of a city 
that is not only the political capital of Italy, but also the spiritual capital of the 
Catholic world. The presence of the mini-State of Vatican City within the political 
capital only compounds the problems of relations between the two States. The Pope, 
as head of this mini-State, is, says Giordani, considered by some as a foreign leader. 
But his position as Bishop of Rome and Primate of Italy along with the fact that most 
of the Popes prior to Pius XII have been Italian, and most indeed Roman, clearly 
makes him also an Italian national.
The events of 1870 opened up the divide between Church and State and, 
according to Giordani, caused a feeling of uneasiness among Catholics in Italy and 
worldwide. He recognises that the Law of Guarantees was an attempt to overcome 
this ‘uneasiness’, but as a unilateral document it could never really do this. 
Subsequent attempts by various governments to intervene in the affairs of the 
Vatican were not welcomed by the residing Pontiffs, “perche la Santa Sede voleva la 
risoluzione del problema dalla coscienza liberate del popolo italiano e tanto aspetto 
fino a che questo non awenne e fu il popolo italiano che risolse la questione 
romana. 5,446
The lack of direction and indecisiveness of the arguments expounded by 
Giordani was not lost on the parties of the right. Gennaro Patricolo (Udn), was one of 
their number who was particularly irritated by them. He put forward the following 
amendment to clause 1 :
“La Religione cattolica e la religione ufficiale della Repubblica italiana.5,447
Patricolo is concerned about the way the Assembly is having to compromise on 
many of the articles of the Constitution and so his amendment, he says, is a true and 
honest reflection of the beliefs and wishes of his party “senza infingimenti e senza
445 Ibid., pp. 435-6.
446 Ibid., p. 436.
447 Ibid., p. 623.
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ricorrere a vie tortuose.” 448 The first clause of draft article 5, as it stands, is 
unacceptable because it could not prevent the conflicts between the State and the 
Catholic Church. He believes the amendment is essential in that it honestly reflects 
the religious situation in Italy and the feelings of the vast majority of Italians. To his 
satisfaction it has the effect of imposing the will of the Catholic majority on Church/ 
State relations and simultaneously declaring Italy to be a confessional State.
(viii) Was clause 1 constitutionally sound?
Subcommission 1
From the outset of the debates, the cross-party consensus was that under no 
circumstances should there be religious confrontations in the Constituent Assembly. 
However, this did not preclude a great deal of concern felt by many parties of the 
Left with the tenor of clause 1 in its original form. Tommaso Perassi (Pri) agreed 
with some of Calamandrei’s observations on the unconstitutionality of such a clause, 
but particularly noted that the first clause has a juridical sense, suggesting there may 
exist a juridical level higher than both Church and State, which delineates their 
operational parameters. However, he makes it clear that such a norm exists neither 
here nor between other States. He adds that a formula such as that contained in the 
first clause can only be understood as a declaration between two equal bodies and as 
such should not appear in a State constitution.449 Lucifero (Bnl) cuts straight to the 
heart of the question (which Togliatti brought up in Sub commission 1): “che si tratta 
di una materia che stricto jure non e costituzionale. ” 450 Despite the weight of these 
arguments, however, Communist concessions to the much-vaunted pace religiosa 
ensured that it went through to the Constituent Assembly.
Constituent Assembly
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (Udn) accepted the first clause of Article 5 (draft) from 
the legal perspective, but doubted the efficacy of including such a statement in the 
Constitution: “perche metterla nella Costituzione, dando luogo ad equivoci, ad 
interpretazioni, che potrebbero essere false ed erronee per chi non si e, direi,
448 Ibid.
449 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 148.
450 Ibid., p. 152. Togliatti only said that there was no need to mention the Church’s originarieta in the 
constitution.
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specializzato in questo genere di studi? ” 451 No new arguments on the topic were 
forthcoming in the Assembly.
The last word on the juridical appropriateness of this troublesome first clause 
should go to the political commentator Piero Agostino D’Avack who considers that
sotto qualunque aspetto si consideri, l’enunciazone contenuta in questa prima 
comma delFarticolo 7, o costituisce addirittura una formula priva di senso 
giuridico quale norma di una Carta costituzionale, o rappresenta quanto meno 
una direttiva generica astratta dello Stato priva di ogni giuridica rilevanza, o 
si risolve tutt’al piii in una sostanziale ripetizione di un’altra norma 
costituzionale e quindi in una disposizione superflua ed inutile 452
Despite the huge body of arguments against this clause, both inside and 
outside the debating chamber, draft article 5, clause 1, was approved by 
Subcommission 1 and, with all amendments rejected by the Constituent Assembly, 
remained unaltered and became article 7 of the Italian Constitution in the following 
form: “Lo Stato e la Chiesa cattolica sono, ciascuno nei proprio ordine, indipendenti 
e sovrani.”
451 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 299.
452 D ’Avack, 1 rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa, p. 106.
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B2 Draft article 5,453 clauses 2 and 3
‘7 loro rapporti sono regolati dai Patti Lateranensi.
Qualsiasi modificazione dei Patti, bilateralmente accettata, non richiede 
procedimento di revisione costituzionale. "
a) THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LATERAN PACTS
(i) The origins of the debate
There can be no doubt that for the Catholic Church, the Christian Democrat party and 
other political parties with large Catholic numbers, clause two of article 5 of the draft 
Constitution of the Italian Republic was the apotheosis of Catholic political activity. 
Jemolo assessed the importance thus: “per i democristiani, che erano in buona parte 
superstiti del Partito popolare o provenienti dalle file dell’Azione cattolica, infine, 
Tarticolo era veramente quello sostanziale della Costituzione, quello per cui 
avrebbero ceduto tutti gli altri.” 454 Scoppola agrees with Jemolo’s assessment of this 
feeling among Catholics:
cultura e mentalita cattolica erano state tuttavia profondamente segnate dalla 
esperienza delle ‘compromissioni’, come si diceva allora, con il regime:
Pidea che lo Stato dovesse assicurare alia Chiesa una condizione di privilegio 
legale era radicata nell’episcopato e nei clero. La difesa del Concordato del 
’29 diventera percio uno dei cardini delle rivendicazioni cattoliche nella fase 
costituente 455
It had been a dearly held ideal of Pius XI to see Italy governed through Catholic 
social principles. Catholic Action had been the training ground for the new breed of 
Catholic politicians who emerged during the postwar period to guide Italy’s new 
democracy towards this dream. By far the most important weapon in their armoury 
were the Lateran Pacts. The Church had pushed for the Pacts to be signed during the 
reign of the Fascist government knowing that the concessions they demanded would 
have been far more difficult to obtain under a democratically elected government.456 
And the Church’s position on the Pacts in 1946 was very clear, even if it was calling 
the politicians’ bluff: the Treaty and the Concordat remain untouched, or they both 
collapse -  ‘simul stabant, simul cadent ’. This was a risky stance to take because to
453 Because there was confusion even among the costituenti as to whether to refer to this article as 
article 5 (i.e. its draft number) or article 7 (i.e. its number in the final version o f the constitution), for 
simplicity’s sake, I will refer to it primarily as article 5.
454 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, p. 308.
455 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p.99.
456 See section A l (vi) o f this thesis.
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lose the Pacts would have taken Church/State relations back to a similar situation to 
that prevailing at the time of Unification. However, retaining the Pacts as the basis of 
relations between Church and State would have huge benefits for the Vatican: it 
would guarantee an unprecedented level of influence in key areas of the social and 
political life of the country; it would keep the financial stability the Vatican had 
achieved via the massive cash remuneration (for the loss of the Papal States), the 
portfolio of Italian Consols bearer bonds -  these two items alone worth 1.75 billion 
lire,457 and it would continue to enjoy many other concessions, such as the 
maintenance of the railway station built under the 1929 agreements with connections 
to the Italian State rail network, connection to the Italian telegraphic, telephonic, 
wireless broadcasting and postal services 458 But for the parties of the left, and 
especially the non-Catholic jurists in the Assembly such as Cevolotto and 
Calamandrei, insertion of the Lateran Pacts into the Constitution was to be avoided at 
all costs, otherwise it would be the death-knell for their dream of a truly lay, truly 
democratic republic.
So the battle lines were drawn. Political opinion was, on the whole, poles 
apart on the issue. It was up to the Dc’s young blood to win the day. But they were 
not alone -  supporting them was the immense power of the Church, its press and a 
phalanx of cardinals and other ecclesiastics providing moral, political, spiritual, 
logistical and propaganda support. And yet the outcome was still not certain. Mario 
Casella points to Communist threats to vote against insertion of the Pacts as the 
probable origins of the debate in the Constituent Assembly.
Dopo il 2 giugno, specie durante e dopo la campagna anticlericale 
dell’autunno 1946 . . . crebbero tra i cattolici le incertezze sull’atteggiamento 
che i partiti Iaici e marxisti avrebbero tenuto nella Costituente di fronte al 
problema dei rapporti tra Stato e Chiesa in generale e dei Patti lateranensi in 
particolare. Nelle settimane che precedettero e accompagnarono la 
discussione in Aula delPart. 5 si accentuarono in Italia tensione e
459nervosismo.
This was most keenly felt among the ecclesiastical hierarchy, who repeatedly insisted 
that the future political stability of the Vatican rested on the insertion of the Lateran 
Pacts into the Constitution.
457 Which equated to approximately £20 million in 1985; see Pollard The Vatican and Italian 
Fascism: 1929-32, Appendix II, p. 215.
458 Article 6 o f  the original Treaty also states: “All these works will be executed at the expense o f  the 
Italian State within one year o f the coming into effect o f the present Treaty.” Pollard, The Vatican and 
Italian Fascism: 1929-32t Appendix II, p. 198.
459 Casella, Cattolici e Costituente, pp. 308-9.
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(ii) The evolution of Article 5, clauses 2 and 3
An important and significant reference to the Lateran Pacts came on 25th July 1943 in 
the Dc party’s Programma di Milano. This document bears witness to De Gasperi’s 
(and the party’s) initially relaxed attitude to amendments to the Concordat, however 
by January 1944, for a number of reasons already discussed, his position changed to 
one of absolute intransigence which would remain throughout all subsequent Dc 
policy documents.460 Then, in 1945, the Settimana sociale dei cattolici italiani took 
as its theme for discussion Costituzione e Costituente. The proposals that emerged 
from these discussions, included a specific request for the reconfirmation of the 
Lateran Concordat, along with an uncompromising demand for a ‘Costituzione 
d’impronta cristiana’ .461 This theme of a ‘Costituzione d’impronta cristiana’ is taken 
up by the dossettiani regularly throughout the debates. But, as Jemolo points out, “la 
difesa dell’inclusione dei Patti lateranensi non e propria soltanto dei democratici 
cristiani; sono in questo senso i ‘qualunquisti’ che hanno raccolto tutti i voti dei 
superstiti fascisti. Parlano anche i superstiti della Camera prefascista. ” 462
Authoritative calls for the reconfirmation of the Lateran Pacts (and especially 
the Concordat) from an ecclesiastical source came from a Catholic Action document, 
published nationwide during Easter 1946. The primary purpose of the document was 
to deny accusations that a section of the clergy were mobilising behind the 
monarchy. However, the document’s call for neutrality among the clergy in the 
elections was accompanied by a request that following the institutional elections, the 
Pacts be reconfirmed to allow the status quo of Church/State relations to prevail.463
Subcommission 1
During the period of the Subcommission debates, proposals and amendments were 
constantly being presented as the arguments progressed. However, Cevolotto was left 
in a rather isolated position during the preparatory stage of the Subcommission’s 
work because his Dc collaborator, Giuseppe Dossetti, was largely absent from the 
sessions. Cevolotto has to admit to the Subcommission that he has thus had no 
opportunity for any preparatory discussions with Dossetti. As a result, Cevolotto’s
460 Some possible reasons for this change of attitude are posited in section A3 (vii) b), pp. 87-93 of 
this thesis; see also Damilano, Atti e documenti della Dc, pp. 9-25 and Scoppola, Lapropostapolitica, 
pp. 76-105.
461 A. Prandi, Chiesa e politica  Bologna: II Mulino, 1968, pp.27 & 45.
462 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato, p. 302.
463 S. Magister, La politica vaticana e Vltalia (1943-1978% Roma, Riuniti: 1979, p. 58. Magister 
seems to be referring to a document different from the ICAS document discussed earlier, sent to the 
Assembly.
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proposals are rather general in tone and substance, dealing principally with religious 
freedom as a liberty, and equality for the minority religious groups. I will therefore 
discuss the bulk of his preliminary proposals in Section B3 of this thesis.
However, he did make some observations on the Lateran Pacts which are 
worth discussing at this point. He thinks that relations between the State and the 
Catholic Church should be included within the framework of religious freedom and 
relations with churches of all faiths, whereas formal agreements currently in force, 
such as the Lateran Pacts, should not be included in the Constitution but should be 
dealt with by special legislation, which should in turn be guided rigidly by the 
Constitution. He also considers that, given the changes to the Constitution still in 
force (i.e. the Albertine Statute from which had been removed all references to the 
King and the monarchy), he thinks it would be necessary to amend article 21 of the 
Treaty and articles 12,20 and 42 of the Concordat which contain explicit references 
to the King, the monarchy and the nobility.464
In order to get the debates underway, both Palmiro Togliatti (Pci) and 
Umberto Tupini (Dc, President of Subcommission 1) presented interim proposals. 
Togliatti’s proposals for discussion on Church/State relations were:
a) Lo Stato e indipendente e sovrano nei confronti di ogni 
organizzazione religiosa od ecclesiastica.
b) Lo Stato riconosce la sovranita della Chiesa cattolica nei limiti 
delTordinamento della Chiesa stessa.
c) I rapporti tra Stato e Chiesa cattolica sono regolati in termini 
concordatari.465
President Tupini presented the following proposals:
a) Le norme di diritto intemazionale fanno parte delTordinamento della 
Repubblica. Le leggi della Repubblica non possono contradirvi.
b) La Repubblica riconosce la sovranita della Chiesa cattolica nella sfera 
delTordinamento giuridico di essa.
c) I Patti Lateranensi, Trattato e Concordato, attualmente in vigore, sono 
riconosciuti come base dei rapporti tra la Chiesa cattolico e lo 
Stato.466
There is an important distinction to be made here: Togliatti’s proposal is an attempt 
to ensure that Church/State relations are negotiated outside the boundaries of the
464 ACD, Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, “Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° Sottocommissione. Relazione 
del Deputato Mario Cevolotto sui 'Rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa (Liberta religiosa)n, Roma: Camera 
dei Deputati, 1999, pp. 37-42.
465 CRAC, vol.6, p. 768
466 Ibid.
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Constitution; whereas Tupini’s proposal assumes that the Pacts are an integral part of 
the Constitution and as such, form the basis of Church/State relations. Clauses 2 and 
3, after the deliberations of the Subcommission, read as follows:
I loro rapporti sono regolati dai Patti Lateranensi.
Qualunque modifica di essi bilateralmente accettata, non richiedera un 
procedimento di revisione costituzionale, ma sara sottoposta a normale 
procedura di ratifica 467
There follows another session of voting on each individual clause and any 
new amendments 468 Togliatti then proposed a slightly amended version of the third 
clause of his initial proposal as an amendment to the second clause: “I rapporti fra 
Stato e Chiesa sono regolati in termini concordatari.” 469 There are three points to be 
made about this amendment: firstly, with 27 votes in favour and 32 against, it was 
remarkably close for such a controversial amendment (as far as the Dc and the Right 
were concerned); secondly, Umberto Nobile, a high-ranking member of the 
Communist Party, voted with the Dc against the amendment; thirdly, of the people 
that voted in the ballot for the amendment, eight did not vote in the next ballot for the 
original clause 470 The eight included Togliatti himself, even though he insisted in a 
speech to the full Constituent Assembly that he did in fact vote for what became the 
final clause.471 Whether this can be attributed to a lapse of memory or a desire to 
appear more accommodating, there is a detectable shift in Togliatti’s position in the 
whole area of Church/State relations, from initial opposition to Catholic demands 
towards conciliation as Catholic intransigence on the inclusion of the Pacts seemed 
to him to risk creating a serious rift between the Dc and the Pci over the pace 
religiosa.
I will now examine the arguments that surfaced around the inclusion of the 
Lateran Pacts in the Constitution. As in Section B l, under each argument heading I
467 Ibid, p. 787.
468 For details see CRAC, vol. 6, pp. 149-158 and pp. 768-787.
469 Ibid., p. 158. See section B2 b) (vii) o f this thesis for a more detailed analysis o f this proposal.
470 Ibid. They were: Alessandro Bocconi (Psiup); Giovanni Conti (Pri); Giuseppe Di Vittorio (Pci); 
Concetto Marchesi (Pci); Umberto Nobile (Pci -  who had also voted against Togliatti’s amendment); 
Teresa Noce (Pci); Ferdinando Targetti (Psiup) and Palmiro Togliatti (Pci). The names o f voting 
members, and the nature o f their votes are included in CRAC at the points in the debates where votes 
are taken.
471 CRAC, vol. 1, pp. 331-2. Why would Togliatti have abstained on such an important issue? 
Martinelli offers a possible explanation: Grieco, Togliatti and others at the head o f the Communist 
Party were keen to play down their opposition to the insertion o f the Lateran Pacts into the 
Constitution preferring to come to a compromise with the Dc on this and other sensitive matters like 
the family, indissolubility o f marriage, private schools and the setting up o f  the regions. R. Martinelli, 
Storia delpartito  communista italiano, Torino, Einaudi, 1995, p. 265.
141
will discuss the arguments as they were presented first in Subcommission 1 (unless 
no such discussion took place) and then in the Constituent Assembly.
b) POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
(i) The legacy of the Albertine Statute: a confessional State?
In the new post-war situation, following the anti-Fascist alliance and cross-party 
collaboration, it was important to avoid the impression that the Catholics were 
attempting to establish a confessional state. This was essential to their debating 
strategy.
One of the major issues raised by the proposals to include the Lateran Pacts 
in the Constitution related to the fact that article 1 of the Treaty (and not the 
Concordat) ‘recognised and reaffirmed’ the reference in article 1 of the Albertine 
Statute that Catholicism was the only religion of the Italian State, thus creating a 
problem for the laid. Consequently, in response to speeches by Pietro Nenni (Psi) 
and Piero Calamandrei (Autonomista) and other proponents of the ‘lay state’ in the 
Constituent Assembly, Catholic costituenti and especially Catholic newspapers felt 
the need to send reassuring signals in the direction of left-wing and lay politicians. 
These took the form of speeches and articles not only denying the existence of a 
confessional state in Italy, but claiming that such a state was an impossibility. 
Replying to interventions on the subject by Calamandrei in the Assembly and by 
Crisafulli in Rinascita, Federico Alessandrini, editor of ‘II Quotidiano’ (the main 
Catholic Action newspaper) wrote:
Lo Stato confessionale, a rigor di termini, dovrebbe attuare le esigenze di una 
‘confessione’ religiosa. Ora se e vero, come e vero, che il cattolicesimo e una 
disciplina di vita spirituale e morale fondata su la liberta umana, e altrettanto 
vero che esso non puo costringere nessuno a pensieri e ad opere che non 
siano libeii . . .  Uno Stato confessionale nei senso che oggi si vuol attribuire 
alia parola non e da temere. Quando noi cattolici difendiamo i Patti 
lateranensi, quando approviamo che se ne faccia esplicito ricordo nella nuova 
Costituzione dell’Italia, noi non meditiamo di asservire nessuno: vogliamo 
soltanto che a tutti i credenti -  che sono la maggioranza del Paese -  sia 
consentito di vivere secondo le loro personali convinzioni.472
However, Nenni and the Socialists rejected article 1 of the 1929 Treaty because as a 
result, “lo Stato italiano e abbassato al livello di Stato confessionale e chiesastico.” 473 
Arguments in the Assembly, as we shall see, suggested that such a situation already
472 F. Alessandrini, Stato democratico o stato confessionale? in ‘II Quotidiano’ 7th March 1947, p.l.
473 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 633.
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existed in Italy. But Alessandrini, in another article entitled, ‘Stato democratico o 
Stato confessionale?’ emphatically denied this:
Lo Stato confessionale cattolico . .. non esiste e non e possibile: la Chiesa 
non puo costringere nessuno a santificarsi suo malgrado e gli uomini 
aderiscono alle verita della fede e alia morale che ne deriva spontaneamente, 
per un atto di volonta che deve essere libero. Una sola cosa puo domandare la 
Chiesa alio Stato: che lasci ai cittadini l ’intera liberta di santificarsi, di vivere 
in armonia con la fede che professano, di vivere cioe secondo le loro 
personali convinzioni. . .  Quando i cattolici italiani insistono perche il 
Concordato sia inserito nella nuova Carta dello Stato italiano, non chiedono 
nulla che sia in contrasto con lo spirito e la lettera di un reggimento 
democratico. Ed e inutile citare articoli concordatari che sarebbero in antitesi 
con la coscienza ‘laica’, quasi che lo Stato potesse avere un coscienza diversa 
da quella dei cittadini che lo compongono, un contenuto ‘morale’ autonomo 
ed autosufficiente 474
That is what the Catholic press had to say, but what of the costituentil 
Subcommission 1
As we have seen, from the start of the opening debate, Cevolotto (Pdl) raised the 
question of whether an international treaty such as the Lateran Pacts should be 
inserted into a republican constitution. He highlights the problem of Article 1 of the 
Treaty which states that the Catholic religion is the only religion of state in Italy, 
pointing out that since the Albertine Statute, the Italian State had passed laws which 
had nullified the effects of Article 1, and that prior to the Treaty, Italy was moving 
towards being an aconfessional state. Any reference to the Pacts would automatically 
recreate a confessional state, which he is against. But neither is he in favour of 
creating a ‘lay state’ which, he claims, would encourage anticlerical feelings. 475 
Article 1 of the Treaty should not be included in the constitution and he says that on 
this point there is no possibility of agreement between himself and Dossetti.
Umberto Merlin (Dc) points out to Cevolotto that Article 1 of the Albertine 
Statute has never been considered non-existent and neither has there been any law 
passed in Italy that has had “il coraggio di abrogarlo”. He makes it quite clear that he 
is against re-establishing a confessional state, but draws attention to the ‘reality’ of 
the position of the Catholic Church in Italy. He considers the proposals put forward
475
F. Alessandrini, Art. 5 e democrazia in ‘II Quotidiano’, 22nd March 1947, p.l. 
CRAC, vol. 6, p. 718.
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on freedom of religion and conscience to be ample for even the harshest of 
opponents 476
Togliatti presents a doctrinal argument: the State cannot have a religion, 
religion belongs to individuals. Consequently, he says that the Communists disagree 
with Article 1 of the Treaty, which came from Article 1 of the old Albertine Statute. 
How they intend to keep the Pacts in force and reject Article 1 is a valid question.
The Communists consider the article to have had an historical value, which they 
don’t want to argue about, but they will oppose its insertion into the new Constitution 
as it could in future cause legal problems for the State at international level. He says 
that the differences between Communists and Dc members are not insoluble at a 
political level: when the Constitution is voted on, the Communists are prepared to 
admit, in a separate act of the Assembly, that the Pacts are still in force.477 This 
position held by Togliatti would, over the course of the debates, undergo several 
mutations.
Constituent Assembly
In relation to the familiarity of the costituenti with the contents of the Pacts, Della 
Seta (Pri) makes quite a remarkable statement: ‘To conosco tanti, anche fra gli 
onorevoli colleghi, ed anche fra gli uomini di legge, che sono venuti a dirmi: hai letto 
i Patti Lateranensi? Io non li conosco. ” 478 This general lack of knowledge of the 
contents of the Pacts has, he claims, allowed the Dc party to win support for their 
inclusion. But he says that if they want the new State to be confessional, to have its 
own religion and for that religion to be Catholicism, then they should have the 
courage to say so explicitly in an article of the Constitution. He criticises the 
overzealous attempts at compromise which have resulted in a fudged document 
which in certain respects moves Italy towards a democracy, in others it returns the 
country, by means of the reference to the Albertine Statute and confessionalism, to 
the position it was in under fascism; and in its continued moral and juridical 
oppression of the religious minorities it jars against the modern conscience of post­
war Italians.
During the course of his speech, Alfonso Rubilli (Udn) warns that the Statute
476 Ibid., p. 724.
477 Ibid., p. 784-5.
478 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 181.
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non era per i tempi nostri, ed era di gia invecchiato prima del fascismo, tanto 
che si sentiva da ogni parte il bisogno ed il desiderio di modificarlo. Ma 
anche se fosse stato modificato ai tempi nostri, bisognava abolirlo come un 
documento che non aveva avuto grande fortuna dopo quello che si e 
verificato. Si capisce, quindi, colleghi, che non ho proprio alcuna voglia di 
richiamare in vigore lo Statuto Albertino.479
In response to claims by Orlando, Togliatti insists that he did not say he was in 
favour of inserting the Pacts,
Ho votato contro questo richiamo e anche qui, sino a che il problema sara 
posto nei modo come adesso e posto, voteremo contro.480 Attraverso quel 
richiamo cosi esplicito, infatti, ritomiamo all’articolo primo dello Statuto. Ora 
non dimentichiamo che l’articolo primo dello Statuto, in tutte le discussioni 
che ebbero luogo prima nei Parlamento subalpino, dal 1849 in poi, e quindi 
nei successivi Parlamenti italiani, venne sempre considerato come qualche 
cosa di decaduto. Basti ricordare in proposito il discorso di Marco Minghetti 
nei dibattito sulla legge delle Guarantigie, dove egli dice la cosa apertamente, 
e aggiunge che l’articolo primo viene lasciato nello Statuto unicamente per 
non aprire un procedimento di revisione costituzionale. E soltanto nei Trattato 
lateranense che questo articolo viene riesumato e rimesso in circolazione, ed 
e principalmente per questo che l’inserimento dei Patti lateranensi nella 
nuova Costituzione non e da noi approvato. Quando volete farci tomare alia 
religione di Stato, ci volete fare tomare a qualche cosa che la nostra coscienza
•> 481non puo accettare.
The republican Francesco De Vita warns of the grave consequences for the state and 
its people of imposing a religion of state:
Quando alio Stato si da una religione, esso deve difenderla. Questo mi 
sembra owio; e in questa difesa esercita una inammissibile pressione sulla 
coscienza dell’individuo, violando una delle fondamentali liberta della 
persona umana. Nell’attuale stato di sviluppa della nostra civilta, il rispetto 
delle opinioni dei singoli professanti religioni differenti deve assurgere a 
maggiore pubblica considerazione. I cittadini devono essere effetivamente 
eguali di fronte alia legge, indipendentemente dalla religione professata. 482
In direct contrast to such sentiments, Stefano Riccio goes where no Cristian 
Democrat has gone before in public, launching headlong into a defence of the 
Confessional State:
Per aversi uno Stato confessionale e necessario: a) un giudizio di valore, per 
cui lo Stato dichiari di aderire ad una determinata confessione, riconosciuta 
come la sola, vera religione; b) conseguentemente un regime di particolare
479 Ibid., p. 220.
480 In fact, Togliatti did not vote.
481 Ibid., p. 331-2.
482 Ibid., p. 361.
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favore per siffatta confessione. Ad aversi percio uno Stato confessionale non 
basta il semplice riconoscimento estemo di una data religione come 
fenomeno storico, ne quello dell’eventuale prevalente importanza da essa 
conquistata nella storia di un popolo. Ne un regime giuridico speciale per il 
culto prevalente contraddice al principio delFuguaglianza dei culti. 
Uguaglianza giuridica non significa trattamento uguale di problemi disuguali, 
ma applicazione dei principi di giustizia alle situazioni concrete. ‘A ciascuno 
il suo: non a tutti lo stesso’, e il principio di giustizia. L’eguaglianza non e 
parita aritmetica ne quantitativa; come la giustizia e proporzione.
Sostenere principi diversi significa non gia soltanto non riconoscere alcuni 
privilegi alia Chiesa cattolica, ma anzi combattere e negare quella importanza 
che storicamente essa ha assunto di ffonte al nostro popolo; significa negare 
una realty socialc attuale, cui deve ispirarsi una Costituzione la quale quella 
realta deve pur garantire ed organizzare.483
State laicismo, if it manifests itself as agnosticism in relation to the dogmas of 
individual religions, cannot also manifest itself as disinterest in the social facets and 
structural formation of a given religious confession, according to Riccio. Treating the 
Church as a societa privata, which would result in the rights of Catholics to publicly 
demonstrate their religious beliefs being ignored, and the Church being put in a 
subordinate position to the state,
sarebbe intollerabile dovunque, e soprattutto in Italia. Noi cattolici italiani 
abbiamo il diritto di chiedere alia legge fondamentale del nostro Paese che 
ITtalia non diventi la longa manus delFanticattoIicesimo e 
delFanticlericalesimo mondiale nella parvificazione della Santa Sede, del 
Papato e della Chiesa cattolica.484 Tutti uguali di fronte alio Stato; ma 
ciascuno deve essere libero di credere e di esprimere estemamente il proprio 
culto.485 Sarebbe altrimenti un uguaglianza estrinseca, uniformista, imposta, 
non quella di uomini liberi che vivono nella loro liberta e realizzano il loro 
ideale e che in liberta si uniscono e si associano per gli scopi della vita e 
trasmettono a queste associazioni la loro stessa liberta, per cui anche queste 
vanno rispettate dallo Stato; onde la concezione pluralista di cui parlava 
Tonorevole La Pira. La Chiesa e la societa dei credenti, i quali vivono nello 
Stato. E se Stato e Chiesa si riferiscono alio stesso soggetto umano, cioe 
necessariamente interferiscono ai soggetti destinatari dell’esercizio delle loro 
funzioni, 6 evidente che non si possono ignorare reciprocamente. Distinzione 
si, ma non contrasto; laicismo dello Stato e ugualglianza dei cittadini di fronte 
alio Stato, ma non livellamento di tutti i cittadini e di tutte le fedi.486
483 Ibid., p. 383.
484 Here Riccio is exaggerating the consequences o f a lay state for political effect.
485 This clearly did not happen.
486 Ibid., p. 383-4. There are different uses o f the term ‘pluralist’: the parties o f the left, for example, 
tend to use the term to refer to equality across all religious denominations; however, La Pira’s 
dossettian pluralism is conceived within Catholic integralist parameters. For a more detailed 
discussion o f  how the Catholic conception o f  pluralism differed from that o f a liberal conception, see 
G. Bedani, Pluralism, integralism and the framing o f  the republican constitution in Italy: the role o f  
the Catholic left, in G. Bedani et alia (Eds.) Sguardi sull'Italia, Leeds, Society for Italian Studies, 
1997, pp. 158-170.
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One of the main themes he keeps coming back to in his defence of the Pacts is Italy’s 
own special history and of the Catholic Church being an intrinsic part of that history; 
of what he terms, “la realta sociale attualissima. Non si fa e non si puo fare una 
Costituzione rinnegando la storia di un Paese e la realta sociale che e base e
A Q H
coronamento insieme della Costituzione.’
Having glossed over Article 1 of the Treaty, he further denies that the 
wording means the recognition of a single religion as the only religion of State,
anche se significa riconoscimento di una situazione di rilievo particolare alia 
religione della maggioranza degli italiani, come del resto e voluto dalle stesse 
norme sostanzialmente democratiche, le quali devono garantire i diritti della 
minoranza, ma non disconoscere quelli della maggioranza, ne evitame in 
pieno la realizzazione. Ed in verita, in nome della maggioranza dei cattolici, 
organizzati in tutti i partiti, in quanto tutti i partiti hanno dichiarato di 
prescindere dalla religione per la iscrizione, noi avremmo il diritto di pome 
nella Costituzione una dichiarazione espressa che la religione degli italiani e 
la religione cattolica.488
So having initially denied that acceptance of the Pacts means the return to a 
confessional State, his closing argument seems to be calling for precisely that.
Although he accepted that the Treaty, with its reference to the Albertine 
Statute may well have resulted in a confessional state according to its official 
declaration, Orazio Condorelli (Bnl) questions whether the reality of the situation 
amounted to such a state of affairs:
Malgrado quella dichiarazione, lo Stato piemontese prima e lo Stato italiano 
poi non furono mai degli Stati confessionali. Era una dichiarazione che aveva 
soltanto questo significato: ove lo Stato avesse avuto bisogno di 
accompagnare dei suoi atti con riti propiziatori o di ringraziamento, avrebbe 
dovuto ricorrere al rito cattolico e ai sacerdoti cattolici. Non ebbe mai altro 
significato, e non ne ha acquistato nuovo, auando e stato trascritto nei 
Trattato. II significato e rimasto identico 48
Condorelli4s speech, along with that of others, illustrates the problems 
inherent in a discussion around a concept (in this case the confessional state) where 
there is no universally accepted definition of its meaning. It could denote a variety of 
meanings ranging from a purely formal declaration with little practical purchase on 
the historical reality of the situation (the ‘dead letter’ argument), to a full realisation 
of Catholic principles in the social and juridical framework of the country’s
487 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 384. The phrase ‘base e coronamento’ is borrowed by Riccio from Article 36 o f  
the Concordat dealing with Church control over education.
488 Ibid., p.390.
489 Ibid., p. 449.
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institutions. It is important to keep this in mind when reading the debates. On this 
occasion Condorelli is employing a ‘dead letter’ argument which, however, takes 
little account of the logistical, financial and educational privileges enjoyed by the 
Catholic Church after 1929. He refers to the purely formal Catholic liturgical 
accompaniments on state occasions. As we shall see, however, the performance of 
the Catholic liturgy enjoyed an exclusive liberty at the expense of the Protestants, for 
example during the fascist period. It is also interesting to note that Condorelli goes 
on to minimise the risk of a confessional state, “perche lo Stato modemo e 
spersonalizzato. 5,490 Condorelli’s argument at this point pursues his pragmatic 
approach in suggesting that in the modem world the state has an ‘impersonal’ 
character, which makes the idea of a confessional state in Italy impracticable. The 
pragmatism of his approach is clear from his choice of the term ‘spersonalizzato’ in 
relation to the more ideologically resonant ‘laico’; he wished to avoid a Catholic 
reaction to his argument. Others, however, were not prepared to accept either 
Condorelli’s ‘dead letter’ argument, or his compromising pragmatism. In an attempt 
to clarify the definition of the confessional state, Arturo Labriola (Udn) cites the first 
article of the Albertine Statute (la “religione cattolica, apostolica e romana e la sola 
religione dello Stato”) and puts particular emphasis on the word ‘sola’ saying that 
with this word there is no room for equivocation.
Con quelle parole si affermano due cose: 1) che lo Stato deve avere - e quindi 
ha -  una religione; 2) che questa religione e appunto la cattolica. A mio 
awiso, nessuna delle due tesi puo reggere, in genere, per uno Stato modemo; 
non puo reggere, ad ogni modo, per una Repubblica democratica, come 
quella che pretendiamo di aver fondata. Si resta sorpresi sentendo da qualche 
parte affermare che la dichiarazione che lo Stato proclama la sua 
appartenenza alia religione cattolica non implica il suo confessionalismo.
Non capisco che cosa da certi parti si voglia per riconoscere il carattere 
confessionale dello Stato; quindi da parte sua un obbligo di difesa di essa e di 
offesa, implicita, verso gli altri culti491
He says that the declaration found in Article 1 of the Treaty can only mean a 
confessional state, something he must vote against if  it were to be included in the 
Constitution. But he emphasises that opposing its insertion in the Constitution does 
not mean not respecting it as a special treaty.
Lo Stato e un complesso di uffici e di organi. Esso non e un individuo 
senziente, e quindi i problemi della coscienza religiosa non lo riguardano.
490 Ibid.
491 Ibid., p. 482.
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Esso non e ne cattolico, ne buddista, ne confuciano, ne ateo. Esso e un 
complesso amministrativo fomito di coazione; ecco tutto. Quando s’imbatte 
in organi del culto, prende con essi accordi particolari, da cui i Concordati o 
le leggi riguardanti gli altri complessi del culto.492
A monarchy can declare itself to have a specific religion, but, he says, this is not the 
case with a democratic republic.
Calamandrei asks the members of the Assembly whether they realise that the 
first article of the Treaty contradicts all religious liberties with its reference to a 
religion of State and hence a confessional State. He suggests that confirmation of 
whether a confessional State exists in Italy can be found in any standard reference 
book, such as the ‘Nuovo Digesto Italiano’ (which all lawyers have on their 
bookshelves) and in the entry on ‘Confessionismo’ edited by an advisor to the Court 
of Cassation, Piacentini 493 Even there, the Italian State, following the Lateran 
Accords, is defined as a ‘confessional state’.
Se questo e esatto, ne deriva una seconda proposizione: che lo Stato 
confessionale e inconciliabile colla tutela della liberta di coscienza; perche, 
nel dare riconoscimento giuridico ad una religione di Stato, e col far passare 
cosi questa religione dal piano spirituale al piano temporale, inevitabilmente 
pone coloro che professano la religione dello Stato in condizione di favore e 
di privilegio giuridico, e in condizione di inferiority e di menomazione 
giuridica gli appartenenti alle altre religioni retrocesse al grado di religioni 
tollerate.4 4
Calamandrei then cites an extract from a letter sent by Pius XI to his Cardinal 
Secretary of State Gasparri just after the Pacts were signed in 1929. He believes that 
there can be no more authoritative voice than that of the Pope himself to show how a 
confessional State and freedom of conscience are irreconcilable:
Anche meno ammissibile sembra che si sia voluto assicurare incolume ed 
intatta l’assoluta liberta di coscienza. Tanto varrebbe dire allora che la 
creatura non e soggetto al Creatore, tanto varrebbe legittimare ogni 
formazione, o piuttosto deformazione, delle coscienze anche piu criminose e 
socialmente disastrose. Se si vuol dire che la coscienza sfugge ai poteri dello 
Stato, se si intende riconoscere, come si riconosce, che, in fatto di coscienza 
competente e la Chiesa ed essa sola, in forza del mandato divino, viene con 
cio stesso riconosciuto che, in uno Stato cattolico, liberta di coscienza e di 




494 Ibid., p. 517.
495 Ibid. See F. Pacelli, Diario della Conciliazione, App. XLII, pp. 549-557 for the full letter.
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From this we can see that Pope Pius XI clearly thought that a confessional State 
should exist in Italy.
Calamandrei quotes La Pira as saying that the Dc party does not want a 
confessional state, only a religious state. However, Calamandrei says, ‘a religious 
State’ is not a juridical concept; in such a state the practise of a religion, even if by 
the majority of citizens, is not imposed or guaranteed by law, unlike in a confessional 
state. He says that if the Dc party wants a democratic state with rights of liberty then 
they must remove Article 5 from the draft Constitution.
Expanding on the point he made in the subcommission regarding article 1 of 
the Albertine Statute being juridically defunct, Cevolotto, with a variant of the ‘dead 
letter’ argument, claims that many eminent lawyers have agreed that article 1 of the 
Statute had lost its significance over the decades, as a result of the various laws 
dealing with the permitted religions,496 while the basic premise of it (that Catholicism 
is the only religion of the State) was no longer relevant and thus had no influence on 
positive legislation.497 However, Cevolotto considers the article in terms of principles 
not actual laws, expanding on Jemolo’s point that article 1 of the Statute “non 
conteneva una vera e propria norma giuridica, e quindi non era possibile parlare ne di 
abrogazione, ne di desuetudine.”498 Under the post-unification Liberal governments 
the principle was modified and transformed to such an extent that jurists were forced 
to reasses the spiritual character of the Italian state which, according to some, was no 
longer a ‘confessional’ State. It was only with the signing of the Lateran Pacts that 
the confessional State was reborn. Despite Mussolini’s later attempts to undermine 
the Catholic Church’s great achievement in recreating for itself a confessional State 
within which to operate, closer examination of the letter sent by Pope Pius XI to 
Cardinal Gasparri (quoted above) reveals references that corroborate the view that a 
new Catholic confessional State did indeed, in the eyes of the Church, actually exist. 
Thus, inserting the Pacts would inevitably consolidate the confessional state and 
would necessitate alterations to Italian legislature to accommodate i t 499 Cevolotto
496 See section A2 o f  this thesis.
497 However, it could be argued that the opposite was also true: the Vatican enjoyed a considerable 
risorgimento o f  its power and influence under the Fascist regime, to the point where one could argue 
that the principle behind article 1 o f the Albertine Statute, far from being irrelevant and outdated, was 
instrumental in creating the huge raft o f legislation against the minority religions -  legislation which, 
it must be remembered, remained in force and unamended throughout the period of the Constituent 
Assembly and beyond.
498 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 541
499 In fact, such alterations had already been allowed for in clause 1 o f article 29 o f the Concordat: 
“The Italian State will revise its legislation, in so far as it refers to ecclesiastical matters, so as to
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considers it imperative that the State should not be put in a position where it finds 
itself unable to act unilaterally if it believes it is in its own interest to do so.
In order to mollify the concern felt by the left-wing parties that article 1 of the 
Treaty would result in the regeneration of a confessional, subordinate State and the 
subordination of all non-Catholic religious groups, Dossetti refers to Mario Falco’s 
Corso di diritto ecclesiastico: if concerns had been raised regarding the reaffirmation 
of a confessional State, and the subordination of the non-Catholic minorities, then 
those doubts would have been settled by the debates subsequent to the 11th February, 
1929 (presumably a reference to the culti ammessi laws) and by the juridical 
framework put in place by the executive laws dealing with the Accords.500 
Furthermore, Dossetti insists that article 1 of the Lateran Treaty only impacts on 
Italian citizens in so far as it is the religion practised by the ‘great majority’ of them 
(a favourite phrase of the Dc party), and on the State when the latter has recourse to 
religious ceremonies, since it looks, by default, to Roman Catholicism. He also 
strongly defends the tone of the letter sent by Pope Pius XI to Cardinal Gasparri, 
written in response to a typically bullish and decidedly undiplomatic speech made by 
Mussolini in the Camera dei Deputati celebrating his ‘great achievement’ in signing 
the Pacts. Dossetti suggests that the only response to such a speech was to be equally 
bullish and biased in favour of the Church.501
In response to the arguments against insertion of the Pacts, Gennaro Patricolo 
(Udn) puts forward the following amendment to article 5, clauses 1 and 2, which can 
only be described as driving a steamroller through this delicately balanced debate:
La Religione cattolica e la religione ufficiale della Repubblica italiana.
I rapporti tra la Chiesa cattolica e lo Stato sono regolati dal Concordato 
Iateranense.502
The first clause of the proposed article is unacceptable because it could not prevent 
the conflicts between the State and the Catholic Church; the second clause is not 
specific enough and, as such, does not offer any guarantees for the longevity of the
reform and complete it, putting it into harmony with the principles o f the Treaty stipulated with the 
Holy See and this Concordat.” Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism: 1929-32, Appendix II, p.
209 and cited in CRAC, vol. 1, p. 546.
500 Ibid., p. 555. Although the culti ammessi laws did, on paper at least, improve the situation o f  the 
minority religious groups in Italy -  something freely admitted by some o f the groups at the time -  in 
practice, the application of the laws dramatically impinged on the freedom within which the groups 
were able to operate, as will be shown in Section C.
501 Ibid. That Pius XI was so disparaging o f the minority religions in the letter shows just how fearful 
the Church was about the perceived threat to its magisterium from these tiny and, frankly, at the time, 
inconsequential religious groups.
502 Ibid., p. 623.
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Concordat. He believes the first clause of the amendment is essential in that it 
honestly reflects the religious situation in Italy and the feelings of the vast majority 
of Italians. The second clause emanates from the dual juridical personality of the 
Catholic Church with its spiritual jurisdiction and the Vatican with its (albeit reduced 
since unification) temporal status. Patricolo accepts that a diarchy headed by the 
Italian State and Vatican City State would be a nonsense,503 but the proposed 
wording of article 5 as it stands is confusing: whereas the first clause refers 
(correctly) only to the Catholic Church, the second clause suggests that relations 
between Church and State are regulated by the Pacts. However, a distinction must be 
made between the Treaty (which governs relations between the Vatican and the 
State) and the Concordat (which governs relations between the Church and the 
State). Hence the wording of the second clause.504 Surprisingly, although he is 
against the inclusion in the Constitution of the first article of the Albertine Statute 
and its declaration of a confessional State, Patricolo closes his argument with a call 
for the Constitution to explicitly recognise Catholicism as the religion of State.
(ii) Italy’s Catholic majority
One of the arguments that Catholics had repeated recourse to in their determination 
to have the Pacts included in the Constitution was that the Catholic faith was the 
religion of the vast majority of the population. This was, in effect, a defence of 
section 2 of the ICAS proposals.505
Having realised early on in the debates that there were attempts to impose a 
Catholic flavour on the new Constitution, in September 1946, Togliatti affirmed that:
Noi crediamo che a cio occorre risolutamente opporsi ma non con 
un’affermazione di carattere anticlericale contro la chiesa cattolica in 
particolare e contro Io spirito cattolico che e un realta di fatto in quanto e Io 
spirito della grande maggioranza del popolo italiano, ma nel difendere 
tenacemente la piena liberta di coscienza e di culto ed affermando 
implicitamente ed esplicitamente la piena uguaglianza di tutte le religioni 
indipendentemente dal seguito maggiore o minore che esse possano avere.506
503 See section B2 b(iv) o f  this thesis.
504 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 624-6.
505 See Appendix III. As will be clear from a comparison between the arguments presented by the 
Catholics and the text o f section 2, the former are simply an elaboration, sometimes word-for-word of  
the latter.
506 APC, Verbali del CC, 18-21 settembre 1946, p. 26; cited in Martinelli, Sioria del Partito 
Comunista italiano, p. 263.
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This clear stance was taken against the possibility of accepting the Concordat -  one 
of the more delicate discussions undertaken by the Communist leadership at that time 
(Togliatti had already displayed a much more flexible position on the matter at the 
fifth congress of the Communist party earlier that year.)507
Subcommission 1
Early in the subcommission debates, Cevolotto appears to be keen to acquiesce to Dc 
demands:
Non si pud prescindere dal fatto che, per quanto le minoranze siano degne di 
ogni protezione nella loro assoluta liberta, in Italia la religione cattolica e la 
religione della grande maggioranza dei cittadini. Percio io non riterrei 
inopportuno che nel preambolo della Costitutione, in linea storico e di fatto, 
fosse inserito una dichiarazione in questo senso.508
Togliatti is also already yielding towards the Dc. He says that he would not be 
against an article that stated that the Catholic Church, as the representative of the 
faith of the majority of Italians, regulates its relations with the State by means of the 
Concordat.509
In answer to Dossetti’s claim that his party’s call for the Lateran Concordat to 
be included wholesale into the Constitution represents the wishes of the great 
majority of Italian Catholics, Marchesi points out that there are a great many Italian 
Catholics who belong to other parties. He questions whether they want to have the 
current Concordat inserted into the Constitution or whether they simply ask for a 
Catholic Church that is free and respected, but that does not have powers attributed 
to it that ought to belong to the Italian State.510
Constituent Assembly
Umberto Tupini (Dc), President of Subcommission 1, advises the Assembly that if 
the Lateran Pacts are inserted in the Constitution a big step forward will be made in 
consolidating the pace religiosa in Italy. He says,
Sara questo un atto opportuno e giusto, perche riconsacrera nel piano 
democratico la fine del dannoso divorzio tra la coscienza cattolica e la 
coscienza nazionale del nostro popolo, che nella sua quasi totalita rimane
Martinelli, Storia delPartito Comunista italiano, p. 263.
508 ACD, Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° Sotiocommissione. Relazione del 
Deputato Mario Cevolotto sui ‘Rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa (Liberta religiosa), p. 40.
509 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 721.
510 Ibid., p. 782.
153
fedele alia religione dei Padri. E appunto l’appartenenza della grande 
maggioranza dell’Italia alia religione cattolica che giustifica appieno la nuova 
posizione di natura costituzionale che si dovrebbe fare, e che, io spero, si fara 
ai Patti del Laterano.511
Tupini comments on Togliatti’s assessment of Church/State relations as “un grave 
problema” and uses this to highlight the vast difference between the other parties, 
which, he claims, want to ignore the issue, and the Dc party which wants to confront 
and address it. He says, “I Patti firmati dal fascismo non sono nati come funghi sotto 
la pioggia della dittatura, ma furono preparati nell’attesa ansiosa di tutto il popolo e 
dall’opera lenta e lungimirante di statisti egregi.”512 Optimistically, and rather 
condescendingly, Tupini says that inclusion of the Pacts will not constitute a 
crystallisation of the position of the Church in state affairs:
la Chiesa cattolica e sempre talmente saggia che, intransigente nella difesa 
del suo patrimonio spirituale e religioso, mostra, come ha sempre dimostrato, 
di tenere esatto conto della varieta successiva o progressiva delle condizioni 
storiche dei vari Paesi, con un spirito di adeguamento che desta sorpresa e 
meraviglia nei profani e, comunque, negli estranei alia dinamica della sua 
perenne vitalita.513
He says there will be no constitutional problems with the inclusion as a result of the 
third clause of article 5 (draft) allowing for modification without recourse to 
constitutional revision procedures.514 He goes on to make a quite remarkable claim : 
“Si attua cosi sul terreno costituzionale quello che Jacques Maritain ha definito un 
puralismo anche nel campo religioso.”515
In response to Palmiro Foresi (Dc), who points out that Italian Catholics 
make up the absolute majority of the population, Francesco De Vita (Pri) insists that,
Anche se in Italia ci fosse un solo uomo che la pensasse diversamente dalla 
maggioranza, noi, in omaggio alia liberta dell’individuo, dovremmo 
assicurargli la piena liberta di coscienza e di pensiero.516
511CRAC, vol. 1, p. 170.
512 Ibid., p. 171. He takes for granted the impact o f the Lateran Pacts on the general population o f  Italy 
-  a tactic adopted by many Dc deputies.
513 Ibid.
514 Ibid.
515 Ibid., pp. 171-2. From a Dc perspective, they believed they were creating a pluralism, but as 
Bedani has shown, this was at the very least a highly problematic claim. In addition to the article 
referred to earlier by Bedani, other aspects o f the problem are also discussed in his T he Dossettiani 
and the concept o f the secular state in the constitutional debates: 1946-1947’, M odem  Italy, volume 1, 
Autumn 1996, pp. 3-22.
516 CRAC, vol. 1, pp. 361-2.
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The democristiano Stefano Riccio argues against the criticism of Article 1 of 
the Albertine Statute falling into disuse and thus not being valid: “la desuetudine non 
puo invalidare una legge costituzionale; ma il cattolicesimo, in applicazione di quella 
norma, e stato sempre ritenuto come la religione della maggioranza del popolo 
italiano.”517 On behalf of the Christian Democrat Party he applauds Togliatti for 
saying that (religious) unity, having been achieved, must now be maintained and 
defended. But he then warns Togliatti and the Left:
Vi e un bene che appartiene alia maggioranza degli italiani; questo e il 
cattolicesimo. In esso e la base della unita etica. Non lo attaccate; creereste la 
rottura e sareste i responsabili di questa frattura. L’unico mezzo per 
mantenere Tequilibrio e la riconferma dei Patti; e data la grande importanza 
di essi, nel momento della rinnovazione sostanziale della vita giuridica 
italiana, il loro richiamo nella Costituzione costituisce una necessita assoluta 
ed inderogabile. Questo richiamo e di garanzia che lo Stato domani non si 
allontani dalla volonta popolare e consideri la Chiesa come una qualunque 
societa privata, invadendone il campo e perseguitandola. Noi, costruttori di 
un domani democratico d’ltalia (e crediamo che tali siano anche Tonorevole 
Marchesi e Tonorevole Nenni), non possiamo non volere la garanzia 
costituzionale delle liberta religiose con il richiamo al Concordato, che e 
fonte sicura di pace religiosa. La politica religiosa dello Stato Italiano dovra 
essere ispirata alia leale realizzazione della Costituzione.518
Riccio’s argument is almost a paradigmatic illustration of how the Catholic position 
would have persuaded Togliatti in the final analysis, to drop his objections and vote 
in favour of the inclusion of the Pacts in the Constitution. To the communist leader, 
the threat “creereste la rottura e sareste i responsabili di questa frattura” was the 
signal of a future Dc attempt to present the left in an anti-clerical and divisive light if 
he did not vote in favour of inclusion. This was a battle Togliatti was anxious to 
avoid at all costs, aware of the susceptibility of the unpoliticised Catholic masses to 
anti-leftist propaganda. But what was perhaps equally seductive was Riccio’s 
admission that Marchesi (the Communist) and Nenni (the Socialist) represented 
political forces which shared with the democristiani the title of “costruttori di un 
domani democratico d’ltalia”. This was one of Togliatti’s principle aims: that the 
creation of the Italian republic should be seen as the work of the Italian Communists 
with equal recognition alongside other popular political forces. At the time the appeal
517 Ibid., p. 387.
518 Ibid.
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to Togliatti of such public recognition from the Catholic side is difficult to 
exaggerate.519
To return to the ‘majority’ argument, De Gasperi quotes figures from the 
1931 census (no figures were available for 1942): out of 45,526,770 inhabitants, 
45,349,221 declared themselves to be Catholics; there were 2 Protestants per 1000 of 
the population; 30,000 Jews (reduced from 54,000 due to Fascist and Nazi 
persecution) and 18,000 non-believers. In response, Nenni, less prone to compromise 
than Togliatti, says that of all arguments put forward by the Dc in relation to 
inclusion of the Pacts in the Constitution, this is the weakest: “Appunto perche le 
statistiche sono quello che sono, appunto perche la religione cattolica abbraccia la 
quasi totality dei nostro popolo, voi non avete bisogno di particolari garanzie 
giuridiche a sostegno della garanzia di liberta per la Chiesa.”520
The final word on the Catholic majority issue should go to the qualunquista, 
Mario Rodino. He is mainly concerned about the need for democracy and considers 
that Togliatti’s view (that the Constitution should not only be democratic but 
specifically anti-fascist) means that it must necessarily be also anti-communist. His 
right-wing, though refreshingly honest, Catholic credentials are obvious from his 
proposed amendment to article 5 which, similar in tone to that put forward by 
Gennaro Patricolo above, according to him should begin with the phrase: “La 
religione cattolica e la religione professata dalla enorme maggioranza del popolo 
italiano.” He goes on:
Un emendamento del genere dovrebbe essere accettato, se si pensa che, in 
luogo della semplice affermazione storica proposta, lo Statuto Albertino, 
compilato in periodo di intense correnti ed attivita anticlericali, e quando 
ancora le masse cattoliche non partecipavano ufficialmente nella vita 
pubblica italiana, riconosceva tale verita con una asserzione molto piuS91esplicita e molto piu impegnativa.
This should also be done in gratitude to the Church for the succour and 
protection it has given to people of all faiths and parties in times of conflict He 
claims that the amendment should also be included in gratitude to the Italian people 
for their vote on June 2nd 1946, when they demonstrated clearly and democratically
519 We need to bear in mind that the full force o f Catholic anti-communist feeling which later emerged 
with the national elections o f 1948 was fuelled by external factors, and was precisely what Togliatti 
wished to avoid.
520 Ibid., p. 633.
521 Ibid., p. 532.
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“di desiderare in grandissima maggioranza una Costituzione ispirata ai principi 
cattolici e di carattere liberistico: certamente, non comunista.5,522
(iii) Sovereignty
The issue of sovereignty, in relation to the Lateran Pacts, revolved around the 
problem of whether insertion of the Pacts in the Constitution would cause any loss of 
sovereignty to the State in carrying out the terms of the Concordat and in any future 
renegotiation of the Pacts.
Subcommission I
The Lateran Pacts as a means of regulating relations between Church and State are 
perfectly acceptable to Ottavio Mastrojanni (Uq), but he is against Dossetti5 s 
proposal to insert them into the Constitution, claiming that it will result in the 
renunciation of Italy's state autonomy.523 Dossetti argues that the Lateran Pacts are 
an external agreement between two states and therefore necessarily operate on an 
‘international5 level, and so in accepting them one must also accept Italy’s position 
as an active member of the international community. He says that one must accept 
the need to operate at an international as well as national level. In doing so, 
recognition of the organisation of the Church is a specific application of that 
principle.524 However, the natural progression of this argument is that, as an 
international agreement, as repeatedly pointed out by Calamandrei and other juridical 
experts from among the la id , the Pacts have no place in a national constitution.
Lelio Basso (Psi) questions the content of Article 1 of the Treaty 
(Catholicism as the only religion of State) and article 5 of the Concordat (limitations 
on apostate priests in the workplace) and its effect on State independence. He puts 
forward a technical argument: the State may have been sovereign when it accepted 
the limitations imposed by the Pacts, but once both sides agreed to them (ie. in
522 Ibid., p. 530. Rodind’s reference to the vote on June 2nd as expressing a desire for Catholic 
principles to be incorporated into the Constitution refers, not to the vote in favour of the Republic 
(which can have no essential reference to Catholicism), but to the other vote the population were 
asked to cast, i.e. for members to the Constituent Assembly. The Dc obtained 35.18% of the votes, 
ahead o f  both the Pci (18.96%) and the Psi (20.72%). D. Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, London 
Longmans, 1986, Table 8.1, p. 167. Rodino makes his argument, o f course, from a ‘relative majority’ 
position. It becomes implausible and in effect almost impossible to decipher if  we attempt to guess the 
positions o f the votes for other political forces.
*23 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 722.
524 Ibid., p. 723.
525 Ibid., p. 725.
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1929), then such limitations instantly diminish the sovereignty of the one party (ie. 
the State).526
Constituent Assembly
Calamandrei’s principle concern is with the third clause: “Qualunque modificazione 
di essi bilateralmente accettata non richiedera un procedimento di revisione 
costituzionale.” This clause, if the wording remains intact, means that the State 
cannot unilaterally amend a certain part of its own Constitution, having to obtain the 
permission of the other contracting party, the Church. This, says Calamandrei,
c*y n
“sarebbe una vera e propria rinuncia ad una parte della nostra sovranita.”
Complimenting the Sub commission on the wording of the third clause, 
Ferdinando Targetti (Psi) then asks a very pertinent question: what if a bilateral 
agreement between the two contracting parties cannot be reached? Does it come 
under normal constitutional revision rules as laid down by the Assembly? In which 
case a revision would have to be given two readings at least three months apart and 
passed by both houses; and on the second reading by an absolute majority in both 
houses. Even then if  one fifth of each house requests it, the article could be put to a 
public referendum for resolution. But this cannot happen simply because the Dc 
party insisted on including the word ‘bilateral’.528
Politically, Vittorio Orlando (Udn) has no qualms about including the Lateran 
Pacts in the Constitution, but on a technical level he says: “i’includere qui una 
renuncia al diritto sovrano di denunziare un trattato, mi sembra che constituisca un 
limite della sovranita (ie for the State).”529 So technically he accepts that inclusion of 
the Pacts would mean limiting State sovereignty, but politically he is quite prepared 
to allow it.
Rossi (Psli) admits to a somewhat anodyne ambition -  he hopes to be witness 
to the creation of a free Catholic Church and a lay state in Italy:
con il vostro concorso, onorevoli colleghi democristiani, e nel supremo 
interesse dei piu veri ed alti valori religiosi, facciamo in modo che quella 
vasta ombra protegga e conforti il cuore dei cattolici italiani, ma Iasci 
indipendente e al sole, nella pienezza della sua vitale, sovrana, liberta e 
dignita, lo Stato italiano.530
526 Ibid.
527 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 161.
528 Ibid., p. 432-3.
529 Ibid., pp. 299-300.
530 Ibid., p. 416.
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This is perhaps the most eloquent expression of those laid  who, not prepared to 
pursue the question of sovereignty according to a strict juridical logic, for reasons of 
political compromise were prepared to ‘hope for the best’.
(iv) The diarchy theory
A consequence of the sovereignty debates, the diarchy theory has its roots in the idea 
of Church and State being two independent, sovereign entities with equal status and 
jurisdiction over the same territory: Italy. The arguments for it developed in isolation 
throughout the course of the debates, but were only collated as a coherent theory by 
De Gasperi in a quite remarkable speech he made to the Assembly towards the end of 
its deliberations on Church/State relations. To put the theory properly into context, I 
will begin by looking, in brief, at some of the ideas behind De Gasperi’s theory.
Constituent Assembly
Amerigo Crispo (Udn) examines the significance of the Lateran Treaty and the 
independence it gives the Church. The creation of Vatican City State allowed the 
Church to operate at an international level as a recognised international body, with 
powers to regulate its relations with other States by means of concordats. Having 
established in Article 5 (draft) of the Constitution that the State and the Catholic 
Church are independent sovereign bodies, Crispo asks how then can what amounts to 
a foreign State have an influence over the Constitution of another State? He claims 
that, “si pongono nella Costituzione due sovranita che evidentemente non possono 
coesistere.”531 However, Riccio (Dc) argues that they can and must co-exist and 
relations between them must remain governed by the Lateran Pacts. He maintains 
that the equal status of the two bodies is a necessary pre-requisite for the new 
Republican State and one that he claims has been approved by the Communist Party 
in their V Congress, and in the Assembly, by Togliatti himself and so
non parliamo percio di spirito laico o agnostico -  come I’ha definito 
Tonorevole Nenni -  che, portato nella Costituzione, sarebbe la rinnegazione 
della volonta della maggioranza ed il misconoscimento della liberta dei 
cattolici d’ltalia. II laicismo dello Stato e un postulato essenziale ed originate 
del Cristianesimo, giacche se gli uomini piu non debbono dare a Dio quel che 
e di Cesare, piu non debbono dare a Cesare quel che e di Dio; onde il 
dualismo dei supremi reggitori dell’umanita risulta ineliminabile. V’e la 
duplice sudditanza dei credenti. E vi e la duplice sovranita: quella della 
Chiesa e quella dello Stato. II Cristianesimo ha iniziato subito il processo di
531 Ibid,, p. 367,
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unione nella distinzione. Noi la distinzione la vogliamo; non vogliamo la
contrapposizione e, tanto meno, Feliminazione.5 2
Thus, by the time De Gasperi made his speech to the Assembly, the idea of 
two sovereign states (originally posited by Dossetti in the subcommission debates 
and cristallised in clause 1 of draft article 5), one with spiritual jurisdiction and one 
with temporal jurisdiction over the peninsula had become, if not wholly accepted by 
the costituenti, at least familiar to them. But De Gasperi does not start his argument 
at this point. He begins by examining the nature and significance of concordats, 
which, he says, have been the main tool used by the Vatican for negotiations with 
states for 900 years. Between 1080 and 1914, 74 concordats were signed, and from 
1914 -1947 a further 25. Concordats have evolved over the centuries, but have 
recently lost much of their temporal content and have concentrated more on the 
spiritual. In this evolution towards the spiritual, they have become less antagonistic 
to the organisation of the State, instead taking on a more complementary role -  a role 
that De Gasperi sees as essential to the well-being of the citizens of the State. The 
natural progression of this, according to De Gasperi, is a diarchy of the Vatican and 
the Italian State working in partnership to govern the spiritual and material needs of 
the Italian population: “e innegabile che vi e in questa evoluzione un progresso verso 
una piu chiara distinzione della sfera d’influenza della Chiesa nei confronti dello 
Stato, verso il riconoscimento di una diarchia che garantisca la volonta delle due 
parti.”533
He suggests that this evolution of governance toward a diarchy is a 
continuing process, he questions the right of the Assembly to stop this process (i.e. 
by including neither the Pacts nor a mention of them in the Constitution) and 
declares his personal aim to fulfil his duty, in the task to which he has been 
appointed, “di consolidare, di universalizzare, di vivificare il regime 
repubblicano.”534 This speech was made by Prime Minister De Gasperi, not in some 
isolated context as a theoretical ideal, but in the Constituent Assembly, as the debates 
around final article 7 were drawing to a close, and in defence of the inclusion in the 
Constitution of the Lateran Pacts.
This intervention by De Gasperi is something of a historical conundrum, 
coming as it does from one who has enjoyed the reputation of being on the ‘liberal’
532 Ibid., p. 385.
533 Ibid., p. 630.
534 Ibid.
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wing of political Catholicism. Indeed he became leader of the Ppi with the ‘removal’ 
of Luigi Sturzo as leader, owing to the latter’s embarassment to the Vatican in its 
relations with the Fascist regime. The Vatican had profound reservations vis-a-vis the 
Ppi’s policy on strict separation of Church and State, one which did not change under 
De Gasperi’s leadership. De Gasperi was, however, as a devout Catholic, given 
refuge by the Vatican during the fascist era, and this may provide some partial 
explanations for these statements on the ‘diarchy’, for which I have been unable to 
find any references by eminent Catholic commentators such as Scoppola and 
Giovagnoli. One possibility is that De Gasperi was trying to give renewed currency 
to a modem version of the ‘two swords’ (temporal and spiritual) theory. First devised 
by Pope Gelasius I (492-496), and revised in the so-called theocratic claims by 
Innocent III (1198-1216) and Boniface VIII (1294-1303), its historical demise was 
not matched by a parallel erasure in the Vatican’s historical memory. Thus De 
Gasperi’s reference to “un progresso verso un piu chiara distinzione della sfera 
d’influenza della Chiesa nei confronti dello Stato” would be an attempt to bring the 
‘diarchia’ more into line with the perspectives he supported during his years as a 
popolare.
This idea of a serious theoretical elaboration of the notion of ‘diarchy’ is, 
however, unlikely to persuade those scholars who have emphasised De Gasperi’s 
difficulties with the Vatican, who are more likely to stress the uncertainty of the Holy 
See’s continued support for the Dc, and De Gasperi’s constant fear of the creation of 
a right-wing ‘partito romano’ supported by the Vatican.535 To such commentators 
De Gasperi’s comments would be more likely to be seen as attempting to 
demonstrate his Catholic credentials to the Vatican.
However this may be, in response to De Gasperi’s call to vote for article 7 to 
consolidate the Republic, Nenni calls for a vote against for the same reason, because 
“per consolidare la Repubblica, bisogna fondare lo Stato e lo Stato non si fonda sul 
principio di una diarchia di poteri e di sovranita.”536
Indeed, according to even the Catholic jurist Ruffini, the idea of Church and 
State being two entities with equal status, identical powers and similar degrees of 
independence, with one looking after the body while the other looks after the soul is, 
in practice, a flawed notion. He says: “La teorica della coordinazione presuppone una 
divisione che non esiste se non alio stadio speculativo: gli individui sono
535 For an in-depth treatment o f this, see A.Riccardi, IIpartito romano, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1984.
536 Ibid., p. 634.
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naturalmente integri ed entrano integri nel rapporto sociale.”537 Ruffini takes the 
creation of the Papacy and the Empire as described by Dante in his De Monarchia as 
the starting point for the concept of Church and State as equal partners. But he says 
they are truly independent entities, one with temporal responsibilities, the other 
spiritual. He goes on to say that the Church has never received, neither from God nor 
from man, “Tautorita di mescolarsi nei negozi temporali e di dare autorita al 
principato civile [Rome]. Non l’ha avuta da Dio, perche le Sacre Scritture, l’Antico e 
il Nuovo Testamento, nulla dicono in proposito.” Any unification of the two powers 
(Church and State) would constitute a “fonte di pericoli e di danni, perche favorisce 
quella confusione tra il potere civile e il potere religioso, la quale, essendo contraria 
alia volonta divina, produce soltanto tristi conseguenze.”538
(v) Church and Dc pressure on the Assembly
The insertion of the Lateran Pacts was, as we have seen, the key issue for the Holy 
See, which “esigeva soddisfazione ‘costituzionale’ e delegava il conseguimento di 
questa vittoria di principio ai cattolici ed al loro partito.”539 However, in calling the 
insertion of the Pacts merely a ‘vittoria di principio’, Melloni is understating the 
importance somewhat: it was very much the substance of the Pacts that were needed 
in the Constitution to guarantee -  as the Church saw it -  its future stability. To this 
end, both during the period of Giuseppe Dossetti’s position as vice-secretary of the 
Dc party (from August 1945 until February 1946), and following the formation, with 
Fanfani, Lazzati and La Pira of Civitas Humana in September 1947, he held regular 
meetings with his old friend Mons. G.B. Montini in the Vatican. During these 
meetings they discussed both the party’s activities and events at the heart of 
government.540 Moreover, Italy’s interim government had been liaising with the 
Vatican from as early as August 1944 when Meuccio Ruini, later President of the 
Commission of 75, made representations to Montini via Cardinal Ronca offering his 
assistance. Ruini was keen to be made aware of “i desideri della Santa Sede per poter 
-  nei limiti del possibile -  essere utile.”541
537 Ruffini, Relazioni tra Stato e Chiesa, p. 181.
538 Ibid., pp. 183-4.
539 A. Melloni, (Ed ), Giuseppe Dossetti: La ricerca costituente (1945-1952) Bologna, II Mulino: 
1994, pp.39-40.
540 Magister, La politico vaticana, p. 83.
541 A. Riccardi, Roma 'citta sacra'?Dalla conciliazione alia operazione Sturzo Milano: 1979, p. 301.
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Subcommission 1
In the subcommission, Church and Dc pressure was not as evident as in the full 
Constituent Assembly debates. There are, however, two examples: the first appeared 
to have been a faux pas by the young and eager Aldo Moro, keen to fulfil his party’s 
duty with regard to the insertion of the Pacts. Having been irritated by a speech by 
Terracini, he accuses the latter of being deliberately provocative by suggesting that 
he (Moro) was questioning the validity of parts of the Concordat. He insists that they 
cannot allow details to get in the way of including the Concordat in the 
Constitution.542 His unfortunate choice of words clearly suggests that the Dc was 
under pressure from the Church to ensure insertion of the Pacts. Secondly, Concetto 
Marchesi (Pci) claims that an article in the Constitution would not be sufficient to 
avoid an eventual wave of anti-clericalism, which the Communists would be the first 
to denounce. To avoid such an occurrence he suggests that nothing would be more 
beneficial than a reduction of the number of Vatican-inspired demands put forward 
by the Christian Democrats.543 Christian Democrats are obviously flexing their 
muscles, to the annoyance of the non-Catholic parties.
Constituent Assembly
Reiterating his objections to article 5 (draft) and its creation of a confessional State, 
Mario Cevolotto then attacks the Dc members of the Subcommissions for over- 
zealously imposing their ideas on the other parties, “sicche molte volte non sono 
aderenti alia via intermedia ed hanno troppo voluto tirare la corda.”544 As we shall 
see, many such accusations were made during the course of the debates, although 
they had little or no influence on the Dc’s determination to have its own way on the 
issues linked to Church/State relations.
Concetto Marchesi (Pci) says that clause 2 of article 5 has been considered by 
some to be an intrusion. The Communists think that the arguments can be resolved if 
they and the Dc party can reach an agreement:
I colleghi della prima Sottocommissione sanno che nessuno di noi ha mai 
pensato, ha mai sognato di chiedere la denunzia dei Patti lateranensi. Nostro 
proposito era ed e che la Costituzione . . . non sia impegnata fin da principio 
da norme, le quali continueranno a vivere fino a che le circostanze e la 
saggezza delle parti insieme lo permetteranno. Ma i colleghi democristiani
542 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 155.
543 Ibid., p. 782.
544 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 210.
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hanno voluto che questi Patti entrassero nel tessuto organico e vitale della 
Costituzione della prima Repubblica italiana.545
Scoppola compares Togliatti’s declarations with those which the aide to the 
American ambassador to the Holy See, Myron Taylor, attributed to Monsignor 
Tardini in one of his memoranda destined for Secretary of State Marshall:
Mons. Tardini. . .  mi ha detto oggi (20.03.1947) che egli crede fermamente 
che la nuova costituzione italiana attualmente in discussione, allorche sara 
approvato nella sua forma definitiva, comprendera un riferimento ai Patti del 
Laterano e confermera la loro validita. . .  Tardini ha aggiunto che non 
sarebbe sorpreso se i communisti votassero a favore del proposto riferimento 
ai Patti del Laterano nella nuova costituzione poiche essi sono ansiosi di non 
compromettere i veri sentimenti del popolo italiano che e grandemente 
attaccato al Papa e alia fede cattolica.” 46
The report is dated the day before Togliatti pledges his party’s vote to the Dc. Is this 
evidence of Church pressure on the Communists? Compare this with the following 
assertion by Togliatti who claims that his amenable attitude towards the insertion of 
the Lateran Pacts was a position he was ‘forced’ to display during the debates of the 
Constituent Assembly. In a discussion at Rovigo a few days after the vote on Article 
7, he said:
Ci hanno accusato .. . che noi questo voto l’abbiamo dato dopo essere venuti 
a path col partito democristiano, e che non sta bene fare la Costituzione sulla 
base di questo compromesso ..  . Qui devo dire esattamente Ie cose come 
stanno. Nel Partito della Dc vi erano dei deputati piu o meno autorevoli i 
quali sinceramente mi hanno manifestato il desiderio che noi votassimo per 
l’articolo 7. Essi dicevano: voi comunisti votando per questo articolo darete 
un contribute alia pacificazione del Paese, all’unita della classe lavoratrice, 
unita che sta a cuore tanto a noi che a voi. Ma questo non era l’atteggiamento 
della direzione del partito democristiano. Abbiamo avuto T impress! one, ed io 
non voglio essere maligno, che essi avessero il desiderio che noi 
respingessimo l’articolo. Abbiamo avuto l’impressione che molti avessero il 
desiderio di trovare il motivo per accusare il Partito Comunista di essere il 
netnico della religione. Non vi era quindi possibility di venire a compromessi 
col partito democristiano.547
This statement, suggesting that the Pci wished to avoid falling into a Dc trap, may 
also help to explain the Communists’ shift in attitude to the insertion of the Lateran 
Pacts from intransigence to acceptance.
345 Ibid., p. 410.
546 Cited in Scoppola, La Republica dei partiti, p. 146.
547 Interview with Togliatti: 7  comunisti hanno sventalo i tentativi di guerra religiosa ’, in L’Unita, 
01.04.1947; cited in Martinelli, Storia del Partito Comunista italiano, p. 277.
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Even after all the argument and attempted persuasion of the centre-right 
parties, Ferdinando Targetti (Psi) still does not understand why the Lateran Pacts 
have to be included in the Constitution.
Che questi Patti esistano e una realta. Se la democrazia cristiana si 
accontentasse, pertanto, della constatazione della sussistenza attuale di questi 
Patti, credo non troverebbe nella sua pretesa alcun ostacolo. Sarebbe la 
constatazione di un fatto storico. Ma qui si tratta di ben altro. Parlo - ripeto - 
col linguaggio di chi non abbia troppa confidenza ne con la storia ne col 
diritto, e mi domando: perche questa insistenza della democrazia cristiana ad 
includere nella Carta costituzionale il richiamo dei Patti lateranensi? Quando 
si tiene presente che l’autore, il creatore di questa formula e stato Tonorevole 
Tupini, si capisce che la ragione ci deve essere, anche se non si vede da parte 
di un osservatore superficiale ed ingenuo; la ragione ci deve essere e deve 
avere un grande significato.”548
Targetti clearly believes that Tupini’s contacts with the upper echelons of the 
Vatican hierarchy suggest a hidden agenda underlying the Dc’s determination to 
have the pacts included.
Moro (Dc) recalls Togliatti’s wish that the Constitution should not be merely 
an ideological document. He says: “Preoccupati, come siamo stati e come siamo, di 
realizzare attraverso la nuova Costituzione italiana uno strumento efficace di 
convivenza democratica, noi non abbiamo mai cercato e neppure adesso cerchiamo 
di dare alia Costituzione un carattere ideologico.”549 This was patently not believed 
by the laid  and Francesco Saverio Nitti (Udn) is keen to highlight the religious 
idealism embarked on by the Dc party and rebukes them for attempts at subliminal 
proselytism:
In questi giomi vi e stato in quest'Aula un risveglio strano ed inatteso di ideali 
religiosi. Realmente sincero? O prevalentamente politico? Io non posso dire. 
Abituato alle antiche Assemblee, essendo vissuto all’estero ed avendo 
frequentato assemblee politiche di diverse natura, non ho mai veduto, come in 
quest’Aula nei giomi passati scoppi di religione, al punto che Tonorevole La 
Pira, con fluidita di parola e con abbondanza di sentimento, ha finito il suo 
discorso con un inno alia Vergine e una preghiera, cosa largamente 
apprezzabile, ma che non era mai stata fatta in nessun’Assemblea politica del
548 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 432. A member o f Catholic Action from his youth, Umberto Tupini was a 
member o f the Movimenio cristiano sociale in Rome and a founder member o f the Ppi. He stayed out 
o f politics for most o f the Fascist period and then worked with Giuseppe Spataro and Alcide De 
Gasperi to form the Dc in 1943. Between 1947 and 1950, he was the Ministro dei lavori pubblici. See 
F. Tranielloand G. Campanini, Dizionario storico del movimenlo catlolico in Italia: ]860-1980, 
Torino: Marietti, 1981, pp. 865-6.
549 Ibid., p. 369.
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nostro Paese e che non risponde al carattere politico della nostra 
istituzione.550
Piero Calamandrei feels the need to make his party’s position clear: they are 
against article 5 and for this reason they will vote accordingly. He says this because 
he wants to distinguish himself and his party from those who are against article 5 and 
for this reason will vote for it!551 He strongly criticises comments made by La Pira 
who “si lamento che questa discussione che si svolge qui sui Patti lateranensi fosse 
quasi una irreverenza verso la Chiesa, e disse: ‘Date il voto favorevole a questo 
articolo per una ragione di delicatezza verso la Chiesa, che ha tante 
benemerenze’.”552 There is no room in Calamandrei’s sense of juridical correctness 
for undermining its requirements through mystificatory appeals to the labyrinthine 
fog of delicate sentiments.
Calamandrei then discusses Togliatti’s quotation from a Gregorian teaching 
manual that, where possible, the Church prefers to deal with governments who do not 
have to seek approval from a representative body. He recognises that it cannot be 
pleasant for the Church to have such matters discussed in public,
ma non siamo stati noi che T abbiamo provocata. Chi puo aver mancato di 
delicatezza verso la Chiesa provocando questa discussione che non era ne 
necessaria ne utile, non siamo stati noi, amici democristiani; ma dal momento 
che questa discussione si deve fare, noi abbiamo il dovere di dire in 
proposito, con tutto il rispetto ma con tutta l’energia, il nostro pensiero.554
All the pressure exerted on the Assembly to include the Lateran Pacts reaches 
its apogee in a speech by Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi (Dc) on 21st March 
1947. When De Gasperi addressed the Constituent Assembly, many deputies were 
expecting his themes to encompass the new Republic, the assembly members’ duty 
towards it and the honour and responsibility of their contribution to it. However, he 
actually spoke at length in defence of the proposed article 7. This, despite the 
position of formal impartiality he might have been expected to display, shows how 
important the article was to the Dc party and indeed the Catholic Church.
Whatever the reasons, whether it is out of conviction or Vatican pressure, it is 
clear that at what he sees as a crucial point in the debate, De Gasperi puts to one side 
the traditional clear separation of Church and State of the popolare tradition in a
550 Ibid., p. 486.
551 A sarcastic dig at the Communists.
552 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 513.
553 See section B2 (viii) o f this thesis.
554 CRAC, vol. l ,p . 513.
highly partisan defence of Vatican claims. He argues that it is due to the instrumental 
part played by Christianity through the ages that necessitates a close liaison between 
the State and the Church and thus no-one can suspect or lack confidence in a 
collaboration with the Church.555 De Gasperi cites the oath sworn by bishops at their 
inauguration, pledging allegiance to the Italian State (recently amended by the 
Vatican following the declaration of the new Republic) and suggests that the State 
owes the Church a similar vow of allegiance by accepting the Lateran Pacts as part of 
the Constitution. He claims that the issue at stake is greater than squabbles over 
individual articles of the Concordat not aligning with the Constitution: “Si tratta della 
questione fondamentale: se la Repubblica. . .  accetta l’apporto della pace religiosa 
che questo Concordato offfe; badate bene, Concordato che nella premessa e 
dichiarato necessario complemento del Trattato che chiude la Questione romana.”556
The rhetoric becomes more inflammatory when he warns that it will not be 
the Dc party that reopens the political battle over the Pacts if the Assembly voted 
against their inclusion, “ma l’aprite voi, o meglio, aprite in questo corpo dilaniato
c c n
d’ltalia una nuove ferita che io non so quando rimarginera.” He suggests that 
Basso’s amendment would have been acceptable if the present discussion had not 
taken place and the original Dc proposal for the article had been accepted at the end 
of deliberations in the subcommission. However, he claims that since the other 
parties have insisted on pushing for a discussion of the merits of the proposed article, 
then the Dc has been forced to take this strong stance, a claim which annoys Tonello 
(Psi) who shouts that it was the Dc who wanted to continue the debate.
What pressures were behind De Gasperi to make this unprecedented 
intervention? Perhaps Nenni has some answers in his equally bullish response. An 
element of De Gasperi’s speech that worried Nenni was his suggestion that Basso’s 
amendment could have been accepted: it could have and should have according to 
Nenni. On the same point, Togliatti is scathingly critical: “cio che ella ha detto e una 
svalutazione diretta dell’Assemblea. I dibattiti che precedono preparono i dibattiti 
nell’Assemblea; ma qui si decide ogni questione, qui ogni formula deve essere 
pesata, valutata, accettata o respinta. In questo sta la sovranita della nostra 
Assemblea.”558 Moreover, De Gasperi’s appeal to uphold the pace religiosa has done 
nothing to change Nenni’s mind about voting against article 7: “Siamo
555 Ibid., p. 629.
356 Ibid., p. 631.
557 Ibid.
558 Ibid., pp. 637.
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profondamente convinti che la pace religiosa e un bene altamente apprezzabile, ma 
per noi, la garanzia della pace religiosa e nello Stato laico, nella separazione delle 
responsabilita e dei poteri.”559 He considers the intransigence of the Dc party to be an 
explicit invitation to battle over the Pacts, which he says the Psi neither seeks nor 
accepts.
Nenni is also concerned about the root of the Dc’s reticence to reach a 
compromise over the Pacts: he is convinced that their intransigence stems from the 
pressure exerted on the Assembly by Catholic Action and by the Vatican’s official 
newspaper, L ’Osservatore Romano, which has published articles threatening that if 
the Socialists and the other parties of the Left voted against article 7, then they would 
risk undermining the pace religiosa and even reopening the Roman Question.
E L’Osservatore Romano che, ricollegandosi all’interpretazione data daPio 
XI al nesso fra Trattato e Concordato (considerati in funzione l’uno dell’altro) 
e all’interpretazione fanaticamente confessionale che del contenuto del 
Concordato fu data nelle discussioni del 1929, ha smisuratamente allargato il 
campo del dibattito e riproposto il problema della questione romana che 
l’immensa maggioranza degli italiani considera chiuso e che restera chiuso 
qualunque sia il voto che stiamo per dare.560
This, he sayS, is why his party must vote against article 7.
As for Communist reaction to De Gasperi’s speech to the Assembly, it is both 
the tone and substance of it that Togliatti is most critical of:
avremmo voluto che Tonorevole De Gasperi non parlasse qui, come ha 
parlato, quale esponente del Partito democristiano o, ancora di meno, come 
esponente della coscienza cattolica, la quale non si estrinseca ne si puo 
estrinsecare in un solo partito; ma che, per tramite suo, tutto il nostro dibattito 
fosse guidato da un rappresentante autorizzato di tutta la Nazione, cioe dal 
nostro govemo, democratico e repubblicano.561
De Gasperi makes a statement in his speech which must have strained the credulity 
of the Assembly: while a large part of the clergy worry about the rise of 
anticlericlism in Italy, and while a great deal of pressure is being exerted (on the
55y Ibid., p. 632.
560 Ibid., p. 634.
561 Ibid., p. 638. This is an important point to make regarding De Gasperi’s only appearance in the 
Assembly: it could have been a point o f reference for the work o f the Assembly in general, an 
indication o f  the support and encouragement o f the government for the work they were undertaking on 
behalf o f  the Nation at the head o f which was De Gasperi himself. But this international statesman, as 
undoubtedly he already was, seemed to have succumbed to party political and Vatican pressures to 
defend at all costs the insertion o f an international treaty, which all parties agreed was under no threat 
at all, into their Republican Constitution, the principal beneficiary o f which was effectively a foreign, 
sovereign state.
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Assembly), “la Chiesa in Roma, il Pontificato rimase neutrale, seguendo una linea di 
saggezza che non sempre in altri paesi fu mantenuta dai rappresentati ecclesiastici 
locali.”562 That this was not the case is evident, and is of grave concern to Togliatti, 
who seeks the reasons for it in the pages of the official voice of the Vatican,
L ’Osservatore Romano.563 However, he does not doubt that such articles constitute 
the Church wealding its considerable influence over the future political shape of the 
Italian democratic republic, nor that the threat of non-insertion of the Pacts resulting 
in losing the pace religiosa is a fabrication of the Vatican keen to secure for itself a 
key role at the helm of that democracy, nor that such interference undermines the 
very essence of that democracy. Instead the Pci, eager not to be the cause of a rupture 
of the pace religiosa, accepts the threats of the Church at face value and declares its 
intention to vote with the Dc.564 Togliatti belies the alleged ‘doppiezza’ for which he 
has become (in)famous. He knows that he will be reviled by other forces of the left. 
But he declares frankly that he does not believe in the arguments of the Catholics, 
and that he is fully aware of the Vatican’s tactics. He perceives clearly, however, that 
it has a hegemony over the Catholic population which could take the nation into a 
totally unnecessary and destructive battle, in which he refuses to engage. His 
opponents on the left may well have disagreed with his decision, but his reasons are 
clear.
Enrico Mol& (Pdl) is one such opponent. He starts, however, with a critique 
of De Gasperi’s party-political contribution to the debate. He claims that the Dc 
leader brought the argument down to its lowest and, from the point of view of a risk 
to the pace religiosa, most provocative level. Mole paraphrases De Gasperi’s 
approach to the problem:
562 Ibid., p. 630.
563 Ibid., p. 638. The articles are taken from the editions o f  13th March, 1947: “Simile omissione (the 
failure to refer to the Pacts in the Constitution) significherebbe nella realta . . . non un silenzio, non 
una lacuna, ma una minaccia, un pericolo. La minaccia alia pace religiosa, il pericolo di vederla 
turbata per la possibility che lo sia. ” 19th March, 1947: “Questo eventuale diniego (again a  reference 
to the lack o f an explicit mention o f the Pacts), il sostenerlo necessario, il presagirlo possibile, turba 
gia la pace e l’unita spirituale del popolo, il quale puo ben pensare fin d’ora che tale pace, tale unita e 
minacciata per l ’awenire, se al suo unico fondamento si v u o l. . . togliere la sicurta costituzionale.” 
20th and 21st March, 1947: “Per quanto si protesti fin d’ora di non voler cadere nelPanticlericalismo di 
maniera, ne in una loita contro la religione, tuttavia (se si esclude dalTarticolo 5 il richiamo 
costituzionale ai Patti lateranensi), pace religiosa . . . certissimamente non sara, purtroppo.” 22nd 
March, 1947: “Se realmente si vuole che nessun lotta a carattere religiosa turbi il faticoso 
rinnovamento della Patria, perche mai cosi manifesto timore di riaffermare, in un momento e in un 
documento solenne, l’efficacia di Patti sottoscritti non soltanto tra un govemo ed altro govemo, tra 
uno Stato ed altro Stato, bensi tra il popolo italiano e la sua fede e la sua Chiesa?”
564 Ibid., p. 640.
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Siete religiosi o atei? Riconoscete o disconoscete la validita del messaggio 
cristiano? Intendete o non intendete la importanza del problema religioso? Vi 
ponete o non vi ponete in opposizione col Pontefice? . .. Volete riaprire la 
questione romana? Volete iniziare di nuova la lotta religiosa? Votando contro 
I’articolo 7, voi accendete Ie fiamme malefiche di una guerra di religione.565
But the danger does not end with De Gasperi: Mole considers Togliatti’s 
response to this speech to be even more harmful, “perche ha dato riconoscimento a 
questa impostazione pericolosa.”566 He strongly denies that a guerra religiosa would 
be the outcome of a vote against the insertion of the Pacts. Thus, he says, his party’s 
vote should not be taken as an insult to the Catholic faith, nor does it mean that they 
want to ignite a religious war “esiziale pel nostro Paese; ne voi avreste, pel nostro 
voto contrario, il diritto di dichiararcela ”567
There were many such criticisms of De Gasperi’s speech, and of Togliatti’s 
reaction to it. Alberto Cianca (Autonomista) is also critical of De Gasperi:
Respingere l’inserzione dei Patti lateranensi nella Costituzione equivarebbe 
per lui a compiere un atto di ostilita contro la fede cattolica. E facile replicare 
che quella fede e la morale evangelica non sono in giuoco. Un buon cattolico 
rimane tale anche se postula Tesigenza che i Patti concordatari siano messi in 
armonia con la Costituzione.568
However, Umberto Calosso (Psi) is slightly less circumspect in his view of what he 
claims is Togliatti’s purely tactical voting with the Dc. “II discorso di Togliatti e 
un’umiliazione per tutti i cattolici italiani,”569 in not offering them at least the dignity 
of honest opposition. Randolfo Pacciardi (Pri) in declaring his party’s intention to 
vote against the Pacts, takes another position on behalf of the citizens of Italy when 
he questions the appropriateness of such a debate when the country is faced by 
massive social and economic problems following the war. He asks why the Dc are 
insisting on the inclusion of the Pacts in the Constitution.
Questa pretesa non Taveste fatta nemmeno col fascismo che era disposto a 
concedere tutto. La Chiesa non ha preteso che i Patti del Laterano fossero 
inclusi nello Statuto del regno di allora. (Commenti). Non c’e stata mai questa 
pretesa, per nessuno Stato del mondo, nemmeno per la cattolicissima Irlanda. 
Perche con la forza del numero avete imposto questa pretesa alia nascente 
Repubblica italiana? . .. Io spero che la risposta non sia sottintesa nelle 
dichiarazioni che abbiamo teste ascoltato dall’onorevole De Gasperi, che in
565 Ibid., p. 647.
566 Ibid., p. 642.
567 Ibid., p. 648.
568 Ibid., p. 649.
569 Ibid., p. 652.
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forma molto velata e molto serena . . . associava stranamente questo voto, con 
la sicurezza e la stabilita della Repubblica.570
(vi) Public interest in the Pacts
Constituent Assembly
Ottavio Mastrojanni (Uq) says that if it was a government that we must now detest 
that brought about the historic-spiritual event that was the Lateran Pacts, then the 
paternity of such an event which brought about the pace religiosa must now be 
bestowed on the Italian people who clearly aspire to see the inclusion of this 
fundamental pact between Church and State in the Constitution. He is at this point 
making the same questionable historical assumption as many others in the Assembly, 
namely that the Italian public was well-informed on the significance of the Pacts, and 
that it was as central an issue in their minds as it was in that of many of the Catholic 
deputies in the Assembly. As regards the contradictions between the Pacts and the 
Constitution, he reiterates that they can be easily eliminated so that ‘Tinserzione 
della esistenza di questa pace religiosa tra il popolo italiano e la Chiesa Cattolica 
Apostolica Romana rappresenta una conquista spirituale del nostro popolo.”571
Pietro Mancini (Psi) clearly believes that the Dc is overplaying the ‘coscienza 
popolare’ card. He speaks robustly on behalf of the people of Italy who are enduring 
hardships and deprivations in the aftermath of the war:
Che volete che il popolo si interessi dei Patti lateranensi, che non conosce e 
che dovrebbe tenere soltanto in gran dispetto, perche firmati da Mussolini! Io 
li ho letti soltanto quando si discusse la questione dinanzi alia prima 
Sottocommissione. Pensate sul serio che nel momento in cui tante doglianze e 
tante necessita rendono difficile la vita, possa il popolo affamato e 
disoccupato interessarsi dei Patti lateranensi?572
He says that the Pacts “servono soltanto ad imprimere alia Costituzione il crisma di 
un partito. Comunque io non saprei, ne potrei spiegarmi come possa conciliarsi il 
principio dell’eguaglianza del cittadino e della sovranita popolare con il contenuto
c n ' j
politico, etico, giuridico dei Patti lateranensi.”
The Dc could have countered this important point if it had been able to 
provide some evidence of its repeated claim about expressing the wishes of the vast
570 Ibid., p. 653.
571 Ibid., p. 187.
572 Ibid., p. 474
573 Ibid.
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majority of the Italian people. On this score, however, it was in some difficulty, 
knowing that more than half of the population had not voted for the Dc, and that 
many baptised Catholics were not practising their faith. What is surprising, perhaps, 
is the lack of even anecdotal evidence coming from the Catholics. It is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion, given the clear importance of the issue to the Catholics in the 
Assembly, that they themselves suspected that the issue was not in reality at the 
forefront of the minds of the vast majority of the population, and that simple 
assertion was the best approach in debate.
(vii) The ‘termini concordatari’ issue
This issue stems from a compromise proposal to clause 2 proposed by Togliatti 
which suggested that Church State relations be governed by ‘termini concordatari’. 
This was in order not to incorporate the Pacts, as such, into the Constitution.
Subcommission 1
As mentioned above, during the subcommission debates, the Pci were still espousing 
hard-line tactics in relation to the Pacts. Concetto Marchesi illustrates their position 
very clearly: Togliatti’s proposal (‘i rapporti tra lo Stato e la Chiesa cattolica sono 
regolati in termini concordatari’) “rappresenta il limite estremo di ogni concessione 
che puo essere fatta in materia ai Commissari di parte comunista.”574
However, Giuseppe Grassi (Udn) points out that Togliatti’s proposal has not 
mentioned the Lateran Treaty, which he claims is essential and cannot be omitted 
from the article. However, Cevolotto recognises that the Concordat includes 
material of a more constitutional nature, but considers that any mention of it should 
be limited to the terms of the proposal by Togliatti (ie “in termini concordatari”) so 
that the State remain free to amend clauses as it deems necessary, either by means of 
bilateral agreement or even unilaterally where no such agreement can be reached. He 
mentions the Buonaiuti case which caused “una vera indignazione in tutte le 
coscienze libere.”
Umberto Merlin tries to defend the Church by saying that the Buonaiuti case 
was the only one in which Article 5 of the Concordat was applied. (At which point 
Togliatti recalls a second case.) However, as Cevolotto points out the number of
574 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 782.
575 Ibid.
576 Ibid., p. 783. This was the case o f a dismissed priest, Ernesto Buonaiuti, deprived o f civil rights by 
the Church’s insistence on the priority o f Canon Law in the case o f clerics.
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cases is irrelevant: “quando la liberta e ferita in una persona, tutta la liberta e ferita.” 
He thinks the Vatican should, sooner or later, modify this article, and if it doesn’t, 
then the State should be free to do so. He feels that other articles should also be 
revised, such as the question of jurisdiction in matrimonial cases “che e una vera e 
propria rinuncia da parte dello Stato alia sovranita nella piu gelosa delle sue 
funzioni”577
Terracini (Pci) is interested by Mortati’s proposal, that the second clause 
should be completely suppressed. The fact that the Church and State are independent 
and sovereign necessarily means that relations must be governed by a concordat. He 
questions Mortati’s view of the consequence of Togliatti’s proposal as being the 
abrogation of the Pacts. He and his party do not want that. He recognises that it is 
necessary to speak of relations conducted on a concordatory basis, but not, as Moro 
said, because the Italian people want to know that relations are based on the 
concordat currently in force. He says that what is important to Italians is that
f*70
relations between Church and State are run on a basis of harmony and reciprocity.
It is therefore better to talk of concordatory pacts (i.e. in general) and not specifically 
about the Lateran Pacts. The Constitution contains norms, it does not make concrete 
statements of fact, as has been done in the first clause. The new Italian democracy 
enshrines the same rights and position as other states. He argues that it is evident that 
one cannot refer to a territorial treaty in the new Constitution, and that there is no 
need to mention Vatican City State or the Concordat.579
Giuseppe Grassi (Udn) comments that Togliatti’s proposal “in termini 
concordatari” only takes the Concordat, and not the Treaty, into account. He claims it 
would be more logical to exclude the Pacts completely from the Constitution, but the 
moment one accepts as constitutional the principle that Church/State relations be 
regulated “in termini concordatari” then he cannot see why the Lateran Pacts, being 
still in force, should not govern those relations. The agreement to modify the Pacts in 
future should remove every other concern about their inclusion.580 Clearly, however, 
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Bassano (Pdl) concedes that he is not against a reference to Church/State relations 
being governed by ‘patti concordatari’, as in Togliatti’s proposal. This would allow 
the State to continue relations with the Church without creating any disparity which 
might in time harm such relations.581
Quoting the eminent Dc lawyer Costantino Mortati, Cevolotto points out that, 
in spite of a spirited argument in favour of the insertion of the Pacts into the 
Constitution, Mortati also accepted that a proposal such as that put forward by 
Togliatti would offer sufficient guarantees for the longevity of the Pacts as an 
agreement in its own right. He emphasises that none of the left-wing parties consider 
it necessary to embark on a process of amending the Pacts -  a process which they 
consider would have been politically inopportune at that time -  but neither do they 
consider it prudent to rule out any future amendments to the Pacts, nor would they
C O 'l
even consider attempting this without the consent of both interested parties.
Ugo Della Seta (Pri) presents the following two clauses as an amendment to 
article 5, clause 2:
I rapporti tra lo Stato e ogni singola Chiesa sono disciplinati per legge.
Per i rapporti tra lo Stato e la Chiesa cattolica potranno essere mantenute, in 
termini di concordato, quelle norme dei Patti Iateranensi che, nello spirito e 
nella lettera, non contrastino con le norme fondamentali della Costituzione 
repubblicana.583
Here Della Seta brings the idea of Church/State relations into the realm of concrete 
legislation: continuous contact between institutions operating within the same 
territory is essential, but any relations must be regulated. Since such regulation is not 
appropriate for inclusion in a Constitution, the only option is for it to be governed by 
law.
The situation with the Catholic Church does, he admits, need particular 
attention. The key to this third clause is his interpretation of ‘in termini di 
concordato’. To the word ‘concordato’ he gives not only juridical and political 
significance, but also psychological and moral significance: “Un concordato non si 
riduce all’incontro di due volonta; queste volonta debbono essere animate da verace
581 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 536. The Dc party was not happy with any other wording, such as ‘Patti 
concordats or ‘principio concordatari’ simply because those options would not specifically require the 
Pacts to be part of the Constitution -  a matter which, as has been shown, was fundamental to their 
vision for the new Italy.
582 Ibid., p. 545.
583 Ibid., p. 617.
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spirito di concordia.” The failure of Togliatti’s proposal, even in amended form, to 
find acceptance was once again a demonstration of the Dc’s doggedness and 
determination, rather than of persuasive juridical argument.
(viii) Fascist origins
Subcommission 1
One of Togliatti’s initial arguments against inclusion of the Pacts was that they were 
signed by a fascist government and have come to be considered as one of the greatest 
remnants of the fascist regime. However, Corsanego (Dc) claims that this is a 
dangerous statement because if the Pacts correspond to the wishes of the majority of 
Italians, then the type of government of the day is irrelevant.585 Corsanego ignores 
the fact that the Pacts were signed in secret without the knowledge of the Italian 
people.
Dossetti criticises Togliatti’s attempts to reduce the significance of the Pacts, 
as Togliatti said he would try to in his speech on 21st November 1946. As for 
Togliatti’s ‘fascist document’ remark, Dossetti agrees with Corsanego, and adds that 
there are many examples of pacts that take on a different aspect when they appear to 
contrast with a specific political line, stating that the Italian people have warmed to 
the Pacts, particularly considering their unsuccessful historical precedents.
Emilio Lussu (Psa) would prefer to see relations between Church and State 
mentioned briefly in a preamble to the Constitution, since Catholicism is the religion 
of the vast majority of Italians and the political action of the State is inspired by this 
reality. He thinks the Pacts should not be included in the Constitution because they 
were generated by a Fascist government without being discussed and approved by 
the Italian people.586
According to Giuseppe Grassi (Udn), it is not correct that the conclusion of 
the Pacts was reached only as a consequence of fascism: true the event had been 
concluded during this period, but the desire among Italian politicians greatly 
preceded fascism. Grassi claims that since unification attempts had been made by 
successive governments to find a solution, attempts which encountered resistence 
especially from within the hierarchy of the Church, which had its own claims on 
Rome and on the old pontifical State.
584 Ibid.
585 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 785.
586 Ibid., p. 155.
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Ottavio Mastrojanni (Uq) cannot see why the fact that the Roman Question 
was solved during Fascist times should diminish its significance. What his party 
wants to emphasise is that the spirituality of the Italian people found a tangible 
satisfaction in the signing of the Pacts. As trustees of that spirituality, he says they 
have a duty not to reject something that the Italian people have unanimously 
approved and on no occasion have demonstrated that they do not want to observe.587
Mastrojanni rejects Lussu’s argument, saying that its natural conclusion 
would be to throw out all legislation passed during Fascism because it has no 
juridical or moral value. As victim of either disinformation or of a staggering 
optimism, he claims that the government is looking at all the old laws and abrogating 
any that do not correspond to the current governmental structure. In the same way, he 
says that they have the possibility of re-examining the Lateran Pacts and updating
588them. He also criticises the republican Perassi’s argument: if it is true that Treaties 
continue to maintain their validity and force above and beyond any Constitution and 
must be regulated by the agreements laid out in them, it is also true that we cannot 
consider Vatican City State and the Catholic Church as being on a par with any other 
State.589
Constituent Assembly
In response to Mastrojanni’s claim that it would be ridiculous to throw out all Fascist 
legislation, Cevolotto says, in the Constituent Assembly, “Non dobbiamo 
dimenticare che noi viviamo in un momento di trasformazione dello Stato in cui e 
necessario rinnovare tutta la legislazione precedente.”590
Mastrojanni continues his arguments in the Constituent Assembly. He 
considers it to be essential to have the relationship between Church and State clearly 
outlined in the Constitution. As regards the remarks of those who consider it to be 
incongruous and the work of the Fascists, “sarebbe grave errore attribuire al Govemo 
fascista tanta grandiosa concezione negli eventi storici e nello comprensione dello 
spirito nazionale.”591 He seems to be questioning to what extent, if  any, Mussolini’s 
government had any say in the process leading to the signing of the Pacts. The
587 There are three points to be made here: Italians had no idea that the Pacts were being negotiated 
until after they were signed; secondly, apart from the principle exponents and a tiny circle of  
negotiators no-one knew what was contained within the Pacts; and thirdly, at no time did either the 
Church or government put the Pacts to a popular referendum.
588 Ibid., p. 156.
589 The implication here is that they are juridically superior to other states.
590 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 213.
591 Ibid, p. 186.
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spiritual divide between the Italian people and the Catholic Church was, he says:
“una situazione matura che era impellente nella coscienza collettiva del popolo 
italiano, il quale da tempo si dibatteva.”592
Indeed Stefano Riccio goes further: he responds to an accusation by Tonello 
(Psi) regarding the Fascist origins of the Pacts by claiming that because many of the 
articles in the Treaty and Concordat begin with the word ‘Italia’ they have nothing 
whatsoever to do with Fascism: “I Patti lateranensi non sono una imposizione, ne una 
espressione del fascismo; sono la libera conquista di una coscienza popolare, che 
voile ricomporre un dissidio intimo, eliminando contrasti che venivano sfruttati da 
speculatori politici, awelenatori della liberta.”593 In fact, Orlando (Udn) takes the 
responsibility for concluding the Pacts himself:
sono stato io l’autore o, dico meglio, colui che consent! al patto centrale 
dell’accordo e della pacificazione. Questo ormai e storico: quella che e la 
base degli Accordi lateranensi era stata defmitivamente conclusa con me. II 
mio non fu un tentativo, come tanto ne registra la storia: effettivamente a 
Parigi, nel giugno 1919, tra la fine di maggio e i primi di giugno, quegli 
accordi poterono dirsi conclusi.594
Thus, his argument for inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution is that the 
basis of the negotiations was agreed, though unpublished by mutual consent, between 
himself and Mons. Cerretti, at Paris in June 1919 under the Liberal Government. 
Having said that, the Pacts as they emerged in 1929, with their massive concessions 
to the Church, would have borne little resemblance overall to the agreement made in 
1919 and so Orlando’s claim must be treated with scepticism.
Nenni points out that, under Mussolini, both the fascist Regime and the 
Church needed the Treaty and Concordat: the former to make use of the Church as an 
‘instrumentum regni’ and the latter to protect itself from Fascist aggression. The 
reasons for such action on both sides was understandable at the time, “ma oggi, 
credete dawero, onorevole colleghi, che per assicurare il prestigio della religione e 
del Vaticano sia necessario che il Sommo Pontefice sia sovrano sui 44 ettari di 
territorio che costituiscono lo Stato del Vaticano?”595 This appears to be a thinly 
veiled threat by Nenni to the Vatican’s territorial possessions. If  this is the case, it 
would have been very unhelpful to his cause.
593 Ibid., p. 384. In fact, even a cursory reading o f the Pacts will show that they were not ‘an 
imposition nor an expression o f fascism,’ but a powerful demonstration o f Vatican influence.
594 Ibid., p. 299.
595 Ibid., p. 306.
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Togliatti addresses the issue of the origins of the Pacts in a very wide-ranging 
speech. He makes one point early on which, although made in the context of the 
political nature of the Constitution, is also relevant to the debate on the Lateran 
Pacts, and indeed to the Catholic hegemony of post-war politics in Italy He says:
II compito che dobbiamo assolvere oggi . . .  si tratta di distruggere fino 
all’ultimo ogni residuo di cio che e stato il regime della tirannide fascista; si 
tratta di assicurare che la tirannide fascista non possa mai piu rinascere; si 
tratta di assicurare l’awento di una classe dirigente nuova, democratica,
596nnnovatrice, progressiva.
Yet another question wonying the Communists was one that Togliatti himself 
raised in a previous speech to the Assembly when he spoke of an eventual renewal of 
the Pacts to remove the signature of fascism and to introduce some essential 
amendments. He says he would not have proposed such changes if the Dc party had 
not proposed inserting the Pacts into the Constitution.
E qui si inserisce una questione abbastanza grave e profonda, quella dei 
rapporti della Chiesa cattolica col regime democratico repubblicano. II nuovo 
giuramento dei vescovi sta bene; ma Concordato e Trattato sono qualche cosa 
di piu del giuramento, sono un impegno e un grande impegno. Ora, in cerca 
di una documentazione sopra questo tema, mi e accaduto di sfogliare un testo 
autorevolissimo di Diritto delle Decretali, manuale d’insegnamento nella 
Pontificia Universtia Gregoriana in Roma, e a proposito dei concordati, delle 
condizioni e del momento in cui la Santa Sede li conclude ho trovato 
un* affermazione assai sintomatica che mi permetterete di citare: 4Sedes 
Apostolica, ne evidenti ludibrio exponatur, conventiones in forma solemni 
inire non solet, nisi gubernium civile necessitate petendi consensus 
comitiorum publicorum non sit adstrictum. *597
Much to the delight of the costituenti someone asks if he would translate the 
statement. He does so: 444La Sede Apostolica, per non correre il rischio di gravi 
delusioni, di solito non stipula convenzioni solenni, se non con quei govemi i quali
CQQ
non sono costretti a chiedere l’approvazione di un corpo rappresentativo’.” He 
suggests to Orlando that possibily in such a statement can be found the reasons for 
the inability of the government of 1919 to conclude the negotiations.599
Dismissing Togliatti’s attempts to undermine the Church’s democratic 
credentials, Stefano Riccio (Dc) argues that one cannot make such a judgement based 
on a single source. Moreover, he suggests that the instruction, which was written
596 Ibid., p. 327.
597 Ibid., p. 332.
598 Ibid.
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possibly by Wermez - a professor of the Gregorian University, pre-dates the 
collocation of the Code of Canon Law (by Eugenio Pacelli -  published in 1917) and 
cannot therefore be used as an argument against the Church’s support for 
democracy.600
Riccio further points out that the Church has made corrections to official 
documents following the installation of the Republic, which now read ‘Repubblico’ 
not ‘regno’. This, he claims, is not only a question of form but also of substance: 
“Questo significa che la Chiesa ha riconosciuto l’awento della repubblica; questo 
significa che la Chiesa e sensibile alia democrazia; questo significa che la Chiesa 
gradisce trattare con la rinata democrazia italiana.”601
Rossi adds his own input into the debate on the origins of the Lateran
Pacts:
non Orlando Parigi 1919; non Roma Nitti 1917, ma Vienna 1914-15, 
Francesco Giuseppe e la Cancelleria austriaca! Si esaltano i Patti Lateranensi 
come una magnifica conquista dello Stato italiano. Ebbene diciamo qui quello 
che durante la dittatura fascista era pericoloso dire pubblicamente: fra gli 
scopi di Guerra degli imperi centrali vi era appunto la ricostruzione di un 
piccolo stato teocratico temporale in Roma. E Francesco Ruffini, esaminando 
i Trattati Lateranensi e paragonandoli articolo per articolo, virgola per 
virgola, col progetto austro-germanico, trovo che il Concordato del 1929 non 
e diverso da quello che sarebbe stato imposto ailTtalia sconfitta, per sua 
umiliazione, dai due Kaiser.602
Cevolotto calls on the Assembly not to accept the Pacts which, he argues, 
were agreed in particular circumstances with a government that did not represent 
Italy and cared little for the long-term best interests of the Italian State.603 Della Seta 
(Pri) is more direct: he calls for a complete revision of the Lateran Pacts:
Questi Patti. . .  sono stati firmati dal dittatore e non dal popolo nel pieno 
esercizio della sua sovranita. Questi Patti portano, esplicito, il riconoscimento 
dell’istituto monarchico e la loro inserzione nella Costituzione repubblicana 
non e una garanzia sufficiente per l’atteggiamento della Chiesa. Questi Patti 
sono indissolubilmente legati al periodo piu tragico e ignominoso della nostra 
storia. Non e interesse della Chiesa che un tale ricordo rimanga 604
600 Ibid., p. 382. However, the fact that the rule was clearly applied in relation to the negotiation, 
formulation and signing o f  the Lateran Pacts did not help Riccio’s case.
601 Ibid.
602 Ibid., p. 415.
603 Ibid., p. 546.
604 Ibid., p. 617.
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The last word on the Fascist origins of the Pacts must go to Zuccharini (Pri). 
He warns of the possibility of another dictatorship taking hold in Italy due to the fact 
that the new Constitution has been created without updating the old legal system and 
dismantling the old apparatus of state 605
As we can see by reading clauses 2 and 3 of draft article 5, and comparing it 
to the eventual article 7 of the Constitution, the vast array of mainly political 
arguments analysed thus far presented by the Christian Democrat’s opponents had 
little effect on the final outcome of the debates. If the same will be true of the more 
religious and legal aspects of the debates, it is nevertheless important to examine 
these discussions in order to come to a better understanding of the nature of the Dc 
victory on this issue and how it was achieved.
c) RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
It had become patently clear to costituenti from right across the political spectrum 
that the Catholic Church, revelling in its post-war popularity, was flexing its muscles 
via Catholic Action and the Catholic press over the issue of the Lateran Pacts. And 
Dc intervention in the Assembly was the key to insertion of the Lateran Pacts in the 
Constitution -  a crucial factor in protecting the Church’s interests.
As discussed earlier, one of the key reasons for the need to keep the Lateran 
Pacts alive, and, moreover, to guarantee their future by including them in the 
Constitution, was to ensure that relations between the Catholic Church and the Italian 
State would continue to be governed by them. This, in the view of the Catholic 
hierarchy, was the best and most secure way of guaranteeing its spiritual and 
juridical sovereignty and financial independence, while maintaining the privileged 
position it had enjoyed almost continually for 1600 years at the heart of the Citta 
Eterna. As this theme of the privileged position of the Vatican has already been 
discussed in relation to article 5, clause l,606 1 will not repeat those discussions here, 
even though they were used by the costituenti to argue for both clause 1 and clause 2 
of this article.
605 Ibid., p. 235.
606 See section B1 (iii) o f this thesis.
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(i) The ‘pace religiosa’ and the ‘coscienza religiosa degli italiani’ issues
Sub commission 1
These themes appear throughout the debates and are frequently interwoven with 
other arguments so it is quite difficult to look at them as separate arguments. The 
exchanges regarding the pace religiosa issue are very interesting from the point of 
view of the attitudes of the various groups to the subject. Given that the Church had 
acquired a position of considerable strength by this time, it was clearly an advantage 
for the Catholics to combat those arguments of their opponents which threatened the 
pace religiosa, a concept which was also introduced into section 3 of the ICAS 
proposals. Within the debates, however, the Catholic parties tend to use it in an 
aggressive, threatening manner constantly warning the others that they may upset the 
pace religiosa with their demands not to include the Pacts in the Constitution, 
whereas the Communists and Socialists in particular tend to use it as a tool for 
conciliation: they constantly repeat that they have no intention of disturbing the pace 
religiosa.
As far as the origins of the phrase are concerned (at least with regard to the 
arguments around the Constitution and the Lateran Pacts) one must go back to 1944 
when Arturo Carlo Jemolo attempted to initiate a discussion on ecclesiastical law, its 
position in the new Italy and the effect of the Lateran Pacts, which, according to 
Jemolo, had put ecclesiastical law into the realms of the rami morti of Italian law. 
Jemolo’s position was outlined in his famous pamphlet T er la pace religiosa 
dTtalia’. The pamphlet partially succeeded in resuscitating discussion on the subject, 
but more in the political sphere than the juridical one. But it was the title of the work 
-  or more specifically the phrase ‘pace religiosa’ -  that was almost as significant as 
the content. As Long puts it: “E singolare che il titolo utilizzi 1’espressione che nella 
primavera del 1947 diventera quasi monopolio della Chiesa e di coloro (dai liberali ai 
comunisti) che accettano la sua impostazione dei rapporti Stato/Chiesa.’ In other 
words, the concept of pace religiosa moved from the realms of pluralism (that is, 
absolute freedom of conscience as a basis for the whole debate, as in Jemolo’s 
interpretation of it) into the realms of integralism, where the Church and the 
Christian Democrats used it to make thinly veiled threats regarding national unity 
and to cajole parties from across the whole political spectrum into supporting its 
own, integralist proposals. In fact, Jemolo is unequivocal in his view on the use of 
the term by the Catholic Church with regard to the insertion of the Pacts into the
607 Long, A lie origini delpluralismo confessionale, p. 317.
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Constitution:
Se fosse stato al potere un govemo non democristiano, il govemo sarebbe 
stato il naturale mediatore perche questi ritocchi fossero concordati con la 
Santa Sede; il govemo come tale e stato purtroppo assente. Comunque la 
situazione e questa: la Santa Sede pone come condizione di pace religiosa la 
canonizzazione constituzionale degli Accordi lateranensi608
And it is not only the Catholic Jemolo who is taking these threats seriously: he also 
quotes Togliatti as saying in the debates: “II contrario del termine pace e guerra. E' 
vero che per fare la guerra bisogna essere in due e che una delle parti pud sempre 
dichiarare -  come fai tu, compagno Nenni -  no la guerra non la vogliamo; ma per 
dichiararla, la guerra, basta uno solo.”609 In the context in which Jemolo puts this 
speech, this ‘uno solo’ appears to be a clear reference by Togliatti to the Catholic 
Church. As mentioned above, the term, as used by Jemolo, was based on pluralist 
principles. In Jemolo’s own words:
Non e possibile rinunciare al postulato della liberta di coscienza, intesa come 
liberta non pur di praticare, ma di difendere e diffondere, la propria fede 
religiosa, quale essa sia. Negli ultimi quindici anni vedemmo un govemo 
scettico e una magistratura che era gettata per opportunismo a soddisfare tutto 
cio che credeva desiderio della Chiesa, foggiare regolamenti e interpretarli, 
anche contro la loro lettera, in modo da far rivivere odiosita che si credeva 
sparita per sempre dal suolo europeo. arresti e condanne di distrubutori di 
bibbie protestanti, adunanze di sparuti gruppi di evangelici in case private per 
cantare inni e salmi, disperse dalla polizia e condannate dalla magistratura; e 
nel codice penale fu punito il solo vilipendio del culto cattolico e stabilita una 
diversa protezione per i ministri e i tempii cattolici e per quelli degli altri 
culti. Tutto questo offende a tal punto quei principi di liberta religiosa in cui 
credo si trovino d’accordo quanti sperano in una nuova Italia, che non puo 
neppure discutersi sulla opportunity di una mantenimento o di una 
abrogazione.610
Acknowledging the agreement between himself and Togliatti on the subject 
of the recognition of the independence of Church and State, Dossetti adds that having 
admitted that their relations should be governed by concordatory negotiations, one 
cannot then fail to recognise in the Constitution the concordatory agreements already 
in existence -  the Lateran Pacts. He points out that Togliatti accepted the principle of 
recognition of the Lateran Pacts in a speech made on 21st November, 1946 and 
considers it natural that he should now accept the inclusion of a reference to the
608 Jemolo, Chiesa e Stato in Italia, p.307.
609 Ibid.
610 A C . Jemolo, Per la pace religiosa d ’ltalia, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1944, p.33.
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Lateran Pacts in the Constitution. He accepts that amendments to the Pacts might be 
necessary on a technical level but that “e invece necessario vedere realisticamente 
cio che vi e al fondo della questione,”611 in other words, what is at stake if the 
Church fails to achieve its aim of constitutionalisation of the Pacts. Dossetti says that 
if the declarations made by Togliatti in the Constituent Assembly are sincere, then 
“la sola conseguenza logica che se ne puo trarre e che si deve arrivare ad introdurre 
nella Costituzione quell’unica effettiva garanzia che oggi puo tranquillizzare la 
coscienza dei cattolici, senza recar pregiudizio alle coscienze non cattoliche.’
Dossetti’s demand that the Pacts as they exist should be included is not, of 
course, the logical conclusion of Togliatti’s declaration. As Togliatti, and many 
others, had repeatedly stressed, all that was necessary, and juridically more correct in 
a constitution, was a statement to the effect that Church/State relations were 
regulated ‘in termini concordatari’. The dogged insistence of the Catholics on having 
the existing Pacts inserted in the Constitution was almost certainly in support of the 
Vatican’s desire not to have to re-negotiate them, which might have followed if the 
Constitution had simply referred to Church/State relations being governed ‘in termini 
concordatari’. Although Togliatti himself, along with Calamandrei, Cevolotto and 
others insisted that not specifically referring to the Pacts in the Constitution did not 
mean that they would not still be valid, the Dc did not want to risk a subsequent 
juridical debate, with the Pacts in what they would perceive as the much weaker 
position as a stand-alone document.
In the debates, Togliatti takes issue with Merlin over his references to the 
Communists and the pace religiosa. He states that the Communist Party in Italy, 
even before it had been able to openly resume its political activity, had defended the 
pace religiosa in Italy. Not one of their policies aimed to impair the religious peace 
of the Italian people. He says that they understand the difficulties of this period of 
reconstruction for their country and do not believe that this process should be 
complicated by religious conflict. He says that Christian Democrats cannot possibly 
suspect the intentions of the Communists, having acceded to the Dc’s request for 
recognition of the sovereignty of the Church. He goes on to complain that while the 
Communists have made such efforts towards a rapprochement, the Dc have turned 
away, presenting ever more peremptory formulas on other aspects of the Pacts 613
611 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 777.
612 Ibid.
613 Ibid., p. 784.
183
Aldo Moro declares that he will vote in favour of the Pacts and will thus be 
interpreting the Catholic conscience of the Italian people, and of Catholics in other 
parties. Moreover, he says that with this vote the members of the Dc party do not 
intend to impose the affirmation of a temporary majority,
ma vogliono awiare tutta la vita politica italiana verso la pace religiosa, nella 
certezza che, anche per mezzo del loro contribute, saranno operati nel 
Concordato quei ritocchi che valgano a rendere i termini della pace religiosa 
perfettamente aderenti alio spirito liberale e democratico della nostra 
Costituzione614
This was the key moment of the debate, just prior to voting and Moro succeeds in 
getting in two final references to the pace religiosa in order to hammer home the 
importance of voting for this article and the consequences of not voting for it. The 
major ‘ritocco’ would, of course, have the elimination from the Pacts of the reference 
to the Albertine Statute in which Catholicism is the religion of State. It is difficult to 
believe that Moro in all sincerity thought the Vatican would agree to this.
Regarding the inadmissability of the Lateran Pacts due to the era in which 
they were signed, Moro considers the important point to be not the type of 
government with which the Catholic Church made the agreement, but the fact that 
the Pacts settled an age old problem (the Roman Question) which had matured in the 
consciences of the Italian people.615 Moro thus argues that they cannot reject the 
Lateran Pacts which have “una straordinaria importanza per aver realizzato la pace 
religiosa neH’ambito del popolo italiano.”616
In response to Cevolotto’s points regarding crystallising Church/State 
relations by means of the Lateran Pacts and the alleged problems this may cause, 
Moro plainly states that there is absolutely no question of rejecting the Lateran Pacts 
on any point of detail contained therein, neither is it possible to “trascurare la 
questione di principio alia quale tutti quanti dobbiamo essere estremamente 
sensibili.”617 He claims that if they reject the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the 
Constitution the Italian people will react in a much stronger way than Cevolotto and 
others have reacted. They will see it not as a problem with Article 5 of the
614 Ibid., p. 787.
615 Ibid., p. 151. To what extent this was true is open to debate. He was certainly placing a lot o f
emphasis on what the average Italian thought of an upheaval which had occurred nearly eighty years 
and almost four generations before. As Jemolo points out: “Negli italiani e ormai cosi radicata l’idea 
di un papa chiuso nel Vaticano, corazzato in una protesta, che tutti sanno sterile.” Jemolo, Chiesa e
Stato in Italia, p. 229.
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Concordat, but as if the new Italian democratic system wants to distance itself from 
the Pacts which represents to the Italian people the regaining of the pace religiosa in 
which they want to remain “come garanzia di costruttivita nello sviluppo
r i o
democratico della vita italiana.’ He states his intention to vote against Togliatti’s 
‘termini concordatari’ proposal which he thinks is too vague, and does not reflect the 
disciplinary nature of the Concordat which has, in its years of application, satisfied 
the vast majority of the Italian people. There is an important point to raise here: if, as 
has already been established, a large proportion of the costituenti knew little or 
nothing about the Pacts, then how many ordinary Italians would have been aware of 
their contents? I believe Moro is putting far too much emphasis on the Italian general 
public’s knowledge of its contents. If Jemolo was right about the public reaction to 
the Roman Question by 1929, how could the situation have changed by 1946? Would 
not the hardships of Fascism and the war years have sent the Pacts even further from 
the minds of ordinary Italians who would have been concerned primarily with self- 
preservation?
In an extraordinary piece of mystificatory sophistry, Ottavio Mastrojanni 
(Uq) argues that relations between Church and State have a particularly spiritual 
nature which transcend any juridical conceptions. The content of such relations 
cannot be manipulated by any artificial juridical construction. If we make an 
abstraction of this concept, we put ourselves on a level which denaturalises the very 
essence of the content of the Treaty and Concordat. For these reasons, he says, we 
must ignore sophisticated juridical considerations and include the Pacts unaltered in 
the new Constitution, in accordance with the collective conscience of the Italian 
people, which itself remains unaltered in time.619
Thus, impervious to the technical requirement of juridical correctness, and 
claiming to speak in the name of the religious sensibilities of the nation, the 
Catholics were able to gain a majority in favour of taking forward to the Assembly 
the proposal to insert the Lateran Pacts, as they existed, into the Constitution.
618 Ibid., p. 152.
619 Ibid., pp. 156-7.
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Constituent Assembly
Emilio Lussu (Psa) warns that if they agree to include the Lateran Pacts in the 
Constitution “le realizzazioni sociali sarebbero ancora da venire.”620 He says the 
situation is already bad and cites a message read out to pupils in a scuola media in 
Rome instructing them to attend three afternoons of spiritual exercise in preparation 
for the Easter celebrations. The message says that a roll-call will be taken and anyone 
absent will be called before the head the following morning and will be expected to 
provide letters from their parents explaining their absence. After some personal 
attacks between Lussu and President Terracini, Lussu reads out the conclusion of the 
notice during which comments and interruptions abound:
Per le spese della cerimdnia -  e questione di coscienza non di borsa -  gli 
alunni dovranno versare liberamente 20 lire. Questa e la pace religiosa, 
onorevole Tupinif Noi che ci sentiamo, in parte, continuatori della tradizione 
del Risorgimento nazionale, non accettiamo che il Patto lateranense rientri 
nella Costituzione.621
Nenni turns the Dc argument on its head, claiming that it is only in a stato laico that 
they will find a true pace religiosa.
Che ci fosse infine un’aspirazione laica nel sentimento e nella volonta dei 
dodici milioni elettori repubblicani del 2 giugno, io lo deduco dalla 
convinzione profonda che il fondamento della pace religiosa e nella laicita 
dello Stato e nella laicita della scuola. Di cio abbiamo avuto la prova negli 
anni piu difficile per la vita politica e sociale del nostro paese, quelli che per 
l’appunto vanno dal 1943 al 1945, e che non hanno visto affiorare nessun 
dissidio di carattere religioso.
Nenni5s pace religiosa differs from the Dc5s in that he bases it on equality for all, not 
on special arrangements for Catholics. He insists that in the Psi “non vogliamo ..  . 
promuovere una lotta di carattere religioso e di mettere in pericolo quella che 
l’onorevole Tupini ha chiamato la pace religiosa.55 ‘ However, they have been 
forced into opposing insertion of the Pacts purely as a result of Dc intransigence:
E la Democrazia cristiana che chiede di introdurre nella Costituzione del 
Paese, con una specie di sotterfugio, i Patti Lateranensi. Siete voi, quindi, che 
ci obbligate a discutere la natura di questi patti, cio che hanno significato 
nella storia del nostra Paese, la portata che avrebbe la loro inserzione nella 
Costituzione. Ora, come dico che non abbiamo I’intenzione di sollevare la
620 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 245.
621 Ibid., pp. 245-6.
622 Ibid., p. 302.
623 Ibid., p. 305.
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questione dei Patti Lateranensi, cosi aggiungo che non possiamo accettare 
che, in aperta violazione con lo spirito laico, i Patti Lateranensi siano inseriti 
nella Costituzione 624
He believes that the Dc, even more than the Liberals, would be committing a 
historical and political error if they underestimated the two main principles of the 
Risorgimento which have done so much to bring about the pace religiosa. Thus, he 
says, it is wrong to assume that it was the Lateran Pacts that brought about the pace 
religiosa:
la pace religiosa esisteva in Italia da molto tempo; la pace religiosa si puo 
dire che esisteva fino dal 1905, quando la Chiesa rinuncio al ‘non expedit’, e 
quando, via via, si formarono i partiti cattolici che si posero sul piano del 
riconoscimento dello Stato. La pace religiosa e stata opera della vecchia 
borghesia liberale, da Cavour a Giolitti, e poggia su due principi ancora 
interamente validi: il principio di liberta applicato ai rapporti fra la Chiesa e 
lo Stato, ed invocato da Cavour nel suo discorso del marzo 1861, ed il 
principio dell’agnosticismo del Govemo costituzionale in tutti i problemi 
dello spirito e, specialmente, nel problema della fede.625
In other words, a very specific set of historical developments have in reality 
produced a real pace religiosa, and it was these which produced the very grounds of 
possibility for the Lateran Pacts. The latter were the consequence, not the cause, of 
the pace religiosa.
There can be little doubt that the Catholic insistence on inclusion of the Pacts 
risked raising the temperature of the debate to unpredictable levels, and Togliatti, in 
response to Nenni’s evident willingness to do so, attempts a moderating mediation:
Non condivido Topinione . . . che la questione del mantenimento della pace 
religiosa non esiste. Tutti coloro che hanno fatto la campagna elettorale 
precedente al 2 giugno lo hanno sentito. E meglio dunque riconoscerlo e 
sapere che la pace religiosa del nostro Paese si mantiene attraverso Tazione 
meditata dei Govemi e di quei partiti che hanno una responsibility di Govemo 
o, se non altro, una funzione di direzione della vita nazionale, in quanto 
partiti di massa.626
Togliatti insists that they must
riconoscere che la pace religiosa e fondata su due colonne: il Trattato 
lateranense e il Concordato . . . Nessuno di noi aveva chiesto che venisse 
aperto il problema del Trattato e del Concordato; nessuno del nostro partito in 
particolare. Fin dall’anno scorso, in occasione del nostro V Congresso, noi
626 Ibid., p. 331.
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facemmo un’affermazione precisa in questo senso. Ma quando voi ci avete 
chiesto Tinserimento del Trattato e del Concordato nella Costituzione, 
attraverso il richiamo del articolo 5, allora il problema si pone e siamo 
costretti a discutere 627
Togliatti repeats that the problem exists and that therefore they have a duty to carry
qualche cosa di comune accordo in questa Assemblea e fuori di questa 
Assemblea per guarantime la soluzione, cioe per dare alia pace religiosa del 
popolo italiano un carattere solido e permanente. Noi vogliamo una 
Costituzione la quale guardi verso Tawenire. I problemi gia risolti nel 
passato non ci interessano piu: cerchiamo perd che quelle posizioni di liberta, 
che hanno conquistato i nostri padri e i nostri avi attraverso lotte memorabili, 
non vadano perdute. E voi, colleghi della Democrazia cristiana, credo che 
farete opera buona, favorevole al consolidamento dell’unita politica e morale 
della Nazione, se non porrete noi e altre parti important! dell’assemblea di 
fronte ad altemativi troppo gravi e invece cercherete insieme con noi la forma 
o la formula migliore per risolvere questa questione col sodisfacimento di 
tutti e con la piu larga maggioranza possibile 628
Stefano Riccio (Dc) attacks the non-Catholic parties for what he claims is 
their lack of consistency in promises made regarding the pace religiosa and the 
insertion of the Lateran Pacts into the Constitution. Prior to the election of June 2nd 
1946, he says “altri grandi partiti hanno detto solennemente che essi intendevano non 
denunziare i Patti lateranensi” and therefore, “il popolo italiano, di fronte a questa 
affermazione, ha dovuto interpretare l’orientamento di questi partiti nel senso che i 
Patti lateranensi andavano pienamente rispettati; e vedremo se rispettarli significhi 
che debbono entrare nella Costituzione.’ Riccio criticises the other parties for not 
saying what they mean and warns them that they cannot have religious peace without 
recognition of the sovereignty of the Church and without recognition of the Lateran 
Pacts. He reserves his most vitriolic attack for Nenni:
Non siamo noi a turbare la pace esistente, perche non poniamo condizioni 
nuove: siete voi che questa pace intendete turbare. E, in verita, Tonorevole 
Nenni l’ha turbata questa pace, e non ha turbato soltanto la pace, ma ha 
turbato l’equilibrio umano della coscienza italiana, quando ha detto che al suo 
gruppo non interessano i problemi dello spirito.630
627 Ibid.
628 Ibid., p. 332
629 Ibid., p. 382.
630 Ibid.
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Riccio claims that within the State the pace religiosa “era sentita come un bisogno 
assoluto e si poneva come la base potenziatrice della rinascita libera del popolo 
stesso.”631 He goes on to construct a history of the Italian people’s struggle to recover 
the pace religiosa, warning against “fare giuochi politici su questo punto. La pace 
religiosa in Italia e garantita dai Patti lateranensi. Ogni attacco contro di essi e 
turbamento di questa pace ed e sopraffazione della realta sociale.”632
In an incisive attack on the Dc’s intransigence over the issue, Paolo Rossi 
(Psli) warns of the consequences of it:
Sara certo deplorevole per voi, colleghi democristiani, ma sembra anche a me 
deplorevole il pullulare di libelli antireligiosi per tutta la penisola. Se con 
debole maggioranza, ne potrebbe essere altrimenti, 1’Assemblea votasse 
quegli articoli che danno tono confessionale al documento e che sono, in 
buona sostanza, i medesimi che lasciarono morire lontano dalla sua cattedra 
Ernesto Buonaiuti e avrebbero messo in un tremendo imbarazzo il vostro 
stesso antesignano don Romolo Murri, allora 1’Assemblea creerebbe in Italia 
un decennio di lotta religiosa, inutile, demoralizzante, capace da sola di 
stremare il Paese.633
The reference to dissident Catholics in Rossi’s speech, and the problems which 
insertion of the Pacts as they stand into the Constitution could cause, refers directly 
to the provision within the Pacts for the application of sanctions to clerics who are 
dismissed from their ministry. The application of Canon Law to such individuals, 
with its insistence that they should not be given employment, even by the state, 
which directly involves dealings with the public, would be in conflict with the civil 
rights all citizens of the Republic should enjoy in connection with the employment 
they are qualified to discharge.634
Igino Giordani (Dc) argues for the Treaty and Concordat to be inseparable 
and proceeds to the constitutional problem: should they be included in the new 
Constitution? “O meglio ancora: avendoli la Sottocommissione e la Commissione dei 
Settantacinque inseriti gia nel progetto di Costituzione, dobbiamo oggi noi
C ' l  C
toglierli?’ ‘ To Giordani the pace religiosa is one of the greatest elements of 
strength in the new Republic from which will emanate all the energy to drive Italy’s
631 Ibid., p. 384.
632 Ibid., p. 385.
633 Ibid., p. 415.
634 For more information on the Buonaiuti case see section B2 d) o f this thesis.
635 Ibid., p. 437. Giordani, at this point, is employing a well-worn political tactic in attempting to 
manipulate the Assembly’s procedures by assuming that the draft document cannot be amended: the 
whole purpose o f a draft document is to propose articles for discussion, to be then accepted, amended 
or removed.
189
reconstruction. For this reason he advocates not touching anything in the Pacts so as 
not to disturb this pace religiosa. He then gets to the heart of the matter.
Perche noi vogliamo inserire i Patti Lateranensi nella Costituzione? Perche 
vogliamo affermare la loro enorme ed unica importanza di Patti 
intemazionali? Non si tratta del solito Trattato fra due potenze, fra due 
sovrani. . . .  Qui il Trattato e concluso con il Capo spirituale della nostra 
religione, che e il fondamento del nostra Chiesa, e nel quale s’impemia tutta 
l’autorita e il prestigio della nostra fede. E dunque qualcosa di unico. Non si 
tratta qui di interessi economici pattuiti fra due Stati, ma dei piu alti interessi 
spirituali che hanno trovato la loro sistemazione; sistemazione che non 
riguarda soltanto noi in Italia, ma i cattolici di tutto il mondo.636 Ecco perche 
noi vogliamo che questi Patti siano consacrati in un documento che ne 
affermi la solennitd, Tunicitd e la stability.637
He warns that taking the Pacts out of the Constitution will weaken them and the 
Italian public cannot be given this impression. He further suggests that all the doubts, 
concerns and even the technical objections to the inclusion of the Pacts in the 
Constitution must be ignored as they have “una importanza subordinate’
Giordani argues that even the Law of Guarantees had the weight of a basic State law 
and this, being a unilateral law, was far inferior to the Lateran Pacts. He is concerned 
about what other countries with large Catholic populations will think if Italy does not 
do everything in its power to deal effectively with the relationship between Church 
and State and to protect the Papacy in the exercise of its duties. He refers to recent 
developments in Protestant ecclesiology as giving more importance to the Church as 
a constructive element in society, of which Italy is a prime example:
Oggi c’e anche nei settori protestanti un risveglio di quello che si chiama 
Sensus ecclesiae'. il senso della Chiesa, come popolo che agisce nel campo 
dello spirito. Orbene, questo awiene in Italia; e il popolo agisce nella 
concordia e nell’unita, con enormi frutti e benefici nella politica stessa.639
Giordani claims that the Pacts have consolidated the political unity in Italy which 
Togliatti holds dear, and asks what better basis is there for this national unity than a 
religious one?
636 This is not wholly accurate: spiritual freedom was obviously a major consideration in the 
negotiations for the Concordat; however, the Financial Convention reimbursed the Church very 
handsomely indeed for its loss o f the Papal States, allowing it to become a major player in global 
financial markets, while imposing huge financial commitments on the Fascist government and all 
future governments. Giordani is here omitting to mention an important element o f the agreements.
637 Ibid., pp. 437-8.
638 Ibid., p. 438.
639 Ibid., p. 438.
190
Specialmente in questo momento che stiamo attraversando di enorme crisi, 
noi abbiamo bisogno di cio per creare gli istituti della nuova repubblica, per 
creare e per operare quelle riforme sociali, che saranno possibili soltanto in 
uno stato di euforica concordia. Questo si fara, se noi considereremo 
definitivamente chiusa questa partita con i Patti lateranensi del 1929, 
conferendo ad essi quella consacrazione che la coscienza cattolica detta 640
He advises against wasting the sense of agreement and co-operation that is pervading 
the country, claiming that it is not just a matter of the Dc party benefitting from it, 
but that it is something that lies at the heart of Catholics throughout Italy. Moreover, 
“si direbbe veramente che questo riawicinarsi al tema religioso abbia irradiato su di 
noi un senso di fratemita dal quale molto c’e da sperare.”641 He closes with a vision 
of Rome as the political and religious motor for the creation of a new peaceful 
Europe, and as the place where they will write “il primo atto della fondazione di 
quella che e stata vaticinata come la nuova cristianita giuridica deH’awenire.”642
Like other Catholic politicians, Condorelli slants the issue: if the Pacts are not 
included in the Constitution “non vi accorgete che, legiferando cosi, voi venite a 
denunziare il Concordato, cioe a distruggere quella pace religiosa che tutti quanti dite 
di volere conservare?”643
Pietro Mancini (Psi) categorises the arguments against the socialist viewpoint 
into two sections: not disturbing the pace religiosa which was won by the Italian 
people; and regaining the unity of the Italian people. Regarding the first point he 
amicably criticises his friend Umberto Tupini, who as President of the First 
Subcommission had shown wisdom, tolerance and objectivity, but here in his speech 
to the Constituent Assembly
ha mutato voce, atteggiamento, volto. Mi e sembrato un uomo che voleva 
imporre il crisma pontificio alia Costituzione. Siamo noi dunque che abbiamo 






643 Ibid., p. 450. Again, by suggesting that non-inclusion equals denunciation o f the Pacts he is 
exaggerating the consequences for effect, the Pacts had lasted 18 years without forming part o f an 
Italian constitution and the benefits to the Church, even under Fascism, as has been shown, had been 
substantial. Not to include the Pacts in the new Constitution would not have in any way lessened their 
importance. Nor would it indicate a denunciation o f them other than in the eyes o f a few extreme right 
wing Catholic factions. However, there is a valid reason why the Vatican hierarchy was so keen for 
the Pacts to be inserted , inclusion would mean that the Church had a foot-hold on the political 
rockface o f the emerging democratic republic, an opportunity that had eluded it since the loss o f the 
Papal States at the time o f Unification, and which had proved as impossible to regain under the 
ensuing liberal governments as it had under Mussolini.
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amico Tupini, che sei andato oltre. Hai predicate) bene, ma hai razzolato male, 
perche hai sommosso le acque immote di questa tolleranza reciproca 644
Mancini goes on to warn Tupini and the Dc party that it is not the Left who 
are threatening to disturb the pace religiosa, but the Centre and the Right, inflaming 
the issue and creating tensions where there are not, and have never been, tensions.
C’era qualche increspatura sulle acque trasparenti e niente piu. II popolo 
italiano ha saputo dare al suo sentimento religioso la saggezza luminosa della 
sua tradizione e della sua coscienza democratica. La pace religiosa potrebbe 
turbarsi con queste vostre intolleranze e queste lunghe discussioni. 
Fortunatamente il popolo non vi presta orecchio; perche ha una volonta 
orientata verso altre mete . ..  Allarmava l’onorevole Giordani l’altro ieri: 
l ’unita del popolo italiano corre pericolo. Ma 1’unita del popolo italiano e 
rappresentata forse da questi ignorati Patti lateranensi? Rispondo subito con 
lo stesso argomento delFonorevole Giordani. Egli si rivolse alF Assemblea 
dicendo: ‘Voi vi sbagliate quando credete che la Chiesa siano i cardinali, i 
vescovi, i preti: niente di tutti questi. La Chiesa e la coscienza del credente, e 
Tio del credente.’ Ne pigliamo atto e gli osserviamo: tutto cio e vero nel 
campo della spirituality, che nessuno vi tocca, perche vi abbiamo date prove 
indubbie di rispettarlo. Ma se dal campo spirituale si passa al campo 
dell’azione cattolica la Chiesa si trasforma in strumento di politica e la 
religione diventa tirannia spirituale piu pericolosa di quella politica. La 
democrazia e contro tutte le dittature: dalla spirituale e religiosa alia 
politica.645
Speaking directly to the Catholic deputies of all parties, he says: “Voi avete il 
vostro martirologio; noi abbiamo il nostro. Voi avete una fede, onorevole Tupini, che 
ha l’ardire di squarciare i misteri delFal di la; noi abbiamo una fede che ci da la forza 
di vincere le ingiustizie e le miserie dell’al di qua.”646 He closes by trying to bring 
the two sides together, saying that each faith has its own important part to play in the 
new democratic republic.
In an attempt to focus the discussion, Arturo Labriola (Udn) raises once again 
the question of whether it is proper to include the Pacts in the Constitution. “La 
questione preliminare che il problema presenta e se sia fondata la tesi che essi 
abbiano dato all’Italia la pace religiosa.”647 He says the test as to whether the pace 
religiosa has been disturbed is in the ability of the masses to participate in the rites 
and ceremonies of the Catholic faith. Neither under Fascism, nor under any of the 
various Liberal regimes, has this right been taken from them.
644 Ibid., pp. 474-5.
645 Ibid., p. 475.
646 Ibid.
647 Ibid., p. 481.
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Qui noi non discutiamo del Concordato o del trattato fondamentale fra la 
Santa Sede e lo Stato italiano. Toglieme la menzione dalla Costituzione 
fondamentale della Repubblica non significa sopprimerli o annullarli.
Almeno per il momento rimangono validi, e son da rispettare, come tutti gli 
altri trattati conclusi dallo Stato italiano. Che cosa accadra appresso, non lo 
sappiamo. Non so se, con tanto furore di partiti proletari, marxistici e 
progressivi sia da prevedere una maggioranza laicistica -  io non dico 
anticlericale -  nella futura Camera dei Deputati.648
The whole point of a constitution is to provide direction and be a framework 
for a country’s legal system, and which can be revised as necessary. As Labriola 
points out:
allora la stessa clausola della non rivedibilita dei Patti Lateranensi e . . .  
rivedibile, purche, naturalmente, ci sia una maggioranza parlamentare 
disposta ad ammetterlo. II che e confermato da un’altra clausola dello stesso 
progetto di Costituzione. Infatti Tarticolo 131 esclude dalla rivedibilita 
unicamente la forma repubblicana.649
Francesco Saverio Nitti (Udn) does not consider it opportune to alter the Pacts at the 
moment, but for reasons different from those of the Dc.
La mia tesi e questa: noi non dovremo fare alcun cosa che turbi le relazioni 
esistenti fra l’ltalia e il Vaticano. Le condizioni quali furono stabilite da 
quell’accordo dobbiamo accettarle quali esse sono. In questo momento ogni 
discussione e vana e odiosa. L’ltalia ha tali difficolta di vita, tali turbamenti 
intemi che, aggiungere nuove cause di turbamento sarebbe opera non 
benefica650
He claims that discussions as sensitive as those regarding amendments to the Lateran 
Pacts are best left until such time as stability and order have returned to Italy and 
relations with the Vatican are on a firmer footing.651
Non cerchiamo ora di risolvere queste difficolta, ma neanche di nutrirci di 
vane illusioni. L’articolo 5 e una realta; ma sarebbe vano illudersi che 
difficolta reali piu grandi non esistano e che non siano tali da rendere difficile 
in awenire un Govemo che non abbia largo spirito di serenita e di 
temperanza.652
Attacking the Dc idea that the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts is necessary to 
bring about the pace religiosa in Italy, Calamandrei admits that they solved the
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid.




Roman Question (i.e. the territorial dispute following the annexation of the Papal 
States in 1870), but argues that the pace religiosa already exists, and has done so 
since priests and other ecclesiastics helped protect everyone affected by the race laws 
and supported and provided shelter and hiding for partisans of every political and 
religious creed during the war. It is obvious that it exists from events in this very 
chamber, he says, such as shouts of ‘Viva il Papa’ and Giorgio La Pira ending his 
speech with an invocation to God and the Most Holy Virgin, accompanied by the 
sign of the cross, which are greeted by the non-Catholic parties with neither a single 
protest nor any hint of laughter.653
He then relates the story of fra’ Michele minorita, burned at the end of the 
13th century for arguing that the Gospels do not recognise private property. Fra’ 
Michele refused to give up his beliefs right to the end. The story goes that when 
asked why, he said: “This is a truth which I have always held dear to me, a fact 
which can only be proven by my death.” Calamandrei concludes his point by saying:
La morte per la propria idea, la morte per la propria fede, Lesser pronti a farsi 
uccidere per testimoniare una verita . . . anche nel periodo della lotta 
clandestina si sono avuti a migliaia questi esempi: e proprio quando si e visto 
che ci sono ancora ffaticelli e religiosi disposti a dare la vita per una fede di 
fratellanza umana, proprio allora e tomata la pace religiosa in Italia!654
Following Togliatti’s view of the wording of clause 2, Giancarlo Pajetta (Pci) 
talks in very general terms about the need for the State to maintain ‘concordatory’ 
relations with the Church. And, what is more:
Noi non parliamo delle chiese, o delle comunita religiose soltanto, ma 
parliamo esplicitamente della Chiesa cattolica. Perche della Chiesa cattolica 
in Italia nessuno potrebbe negare quello che rappresenta oggi e che ha 
rappresentato per secoli per il Paese. La realta storica e la Chiesa, non un 
fatto, un accordo che rimane pur sempre un fatto politico contingente. La 
nostra volonta e di fare che sia la pace piena tra questa Chiesa e il nostro 
Stato. Non si tratta gia di etemare quel trattato piuttosto che un altro; non gia 
quel trattato con quelle particolari forme. Perche, amici, quello che ci pare 
essenziale, e che ognuno di noi faccia uno sforzo per dare dawero la pace 
religiosa al nostro Paese.655
What is clear from Pajetta’s speech is that the Communist position was by 
this time moving away from that of the Socialists and other left-wing parties with 
regard to Church/State relations, and was becoming, at least in discussions around
653 Ibid., p. 519.
654 Ibid.
655 Ibid., p. 522.
194
Article 5, almost indistinguishable from that of the Dc party. He even yields to the 
Christian Democrat argument of emphasising the public’s concern for Concordats: 
“Se pensassimo che i concordati non sono altro che pezzi di carta, certo non ci 
batteremmo ne per questo ne per altri articoli. Ma noi pensiamo che i concordati 
duraturi e le costituzioni vive sono quelli che vivono veramente nella coscienza 
popolare.”656 Such arguments were exactly what the Dc deputies wanted to hear.
Carlo Bassano (Pdl) thinks there has been too much talk of pace religiosa in 
the subcommissions. Pace religiosa suggests a preceding guerra religiosa which he 
says has never occurred: the Roman Question was political in nature, not religious. 
Bassano sees the Lateran Pacts as “la sanzione di uno stato giuridico e di fatto, che lo 
Stato italiano aveva inteso mettere in essere sin dal 1871, con quel monumento di 
sapienza giuridica e politica che fu la legge delle guarentigie.7,657
Following a similar line of argument, Cevolotto claims that there are some 
who consider him to represent the old spirit of anticlericalism. But he claims that 
such a movement is long dead and, moreover, has no reason to exist any more. 
Nevertheless, the only thing that could possibly re-ignite such feelings is draft article 
5 of the Constitution. He warns that, perhaps, the Christian Democrats and the 
Church do not realise that by speaking of a pace religiosa they have laid the
v r r o
foundations for a renewal of this old conflict. He agrees with Bassano that if the 
Pacts are inserted into the Constitution, it will not re-ignite a religious war because a 
religious war never existed; however, it will, he believes, give rise to clericalism, 
followed closely by the incumbent anti-clerical backlash which, he warns, will be the 
sole responsibility of the members of the Constituent Assembly. Mussolini accepted 
the Concordat simply because he wanted a conciliation at any cost; when Vittorio 
Emanuele Orlando met with Cardinal Cerretti in 1919, the former accepted the 
creation of Vatican City State, but the Church knew that any mention of a Concordat 
would be rejected and did not dare ask for it.659
Edgardo Lami Stamuti (Psli) proposes the following amendment to draft 
article 5, clause 2:
La condizione giuridica della religione cattolica e disciplinata mediante 
concordati con la Chiesa.660
The reason for the amendment is that the Psli agree with Togliatti’s assessment of the 
Pacts -  that they offend the civic conscience of Italians. Lami Stamuti warns the Dc 
directly that if they use their majority to force through the article as it stands, then in 
a few months they will force the Psli to begin proceedings to revise the Constitution 
to remove the Pacts.
Lelio Basso (Psi) also puts forward an amendment to clause 2:
I rapporti tra lo Stato e la Chiesa cattolica sono regolati in termini
concordatari.661
This wording, he argues, is more than adequate to guarantee the Catholic Church that 
the State will not intervene unilaterally in their relations. He goes on to make a 
radical, if not contentious, statement: religious peace in Italy cannot be disturbed by 
his amendment, simply because the Lateran Pacts did not bring about that peace. It 
came about as a result of the modernisation of Italian democracy, over a period of 
decades since its darkest period at the time of the suppression of the Church’s 
temporal power in 1870. Basso’s main concern is to avoid the Constitution being 
exploited by any particular party for its own agenda. He considers that the popular 
conscience of the majority of Italians is best expressed by the wish that the religious 
peace that exists in Italy is not disturbed. In response to Dossetti claiming that he did 
not want the Pacts in the Constitution, merely a guarantee of the future independence 
of the Church, Basso argues that his amendment accommodates such an aim.663 He 
tries to flatter the Catholic Church in his closing remarks by saying that he hopes for 
a unanimous vote for his amendment to show that, on the one hand, Italian 
democracy has overcome the old curse of anticlericalism and that, on the other, the 
Church has learned from its own experiences that religion cannot be defended or 
bolstered by creating favourable laws or by making concessions with dictatorial 
regimes, but by supporting regimes eager to promote freedom and respect for the 
individual.664
661 Ibid., p. 621.
662 Ibid.
663 Ibid., p. 622.
664 Ibid., pp. 622-3.
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(ii) Church interference in State affairs
Constituent Assembly
Francesco De Vita (Pri) is concerned that article 5 uses religion as a means to 
manipulate the character and morals of the nation.
Per me un’ingerenza di tale natura, in qualunque modo esercitata dallo Stato, 
e dannosa, perche incatena la liberta dell’individuo. A mio awiso, non puo 
sussistere alcuna ingerenza dello Stato in materia religiosa, senza che questa 
ingerenza significhi maggiore o minore favore per determinate professioni 
religiose. Si potrebbe obiettare che l’incoraggiamento della religione per 
mezzo delle leggi e delle istituzioni dello Stato e reclamato per la difesa 
dell’ordine intemo, per la moralita. Io sono fermamente convinto che la 
religione puo produrre buone azioni, ma debbo anche dire che la religione e 
un mezzo d’azione il cui punto d’appoggio e estrinseco alio Stato.665
He acknowledges the role of religion in giving man hope of reaching spiritual 
perfection, but
si debba attribuire alio Stato soltanto il compito di rimuovere gli ostacoli che 
menomano la fiducia nel sentimento religioso, e di agevolare lo spirito del 
Iibero esame. Se Io Stato va oltre, se Io Stato tenta direttamente di dominare il 
sentimento religioso o di orientarlo, anziche determinare la vera convinzione 
religiosa, determinera una coscienza religiosa che poggia sopra l’autorita666
Reading through draft article 5, Russo Perez (Uq) says he found himself in a 
conflict between his roles as jurist and lawmaker and that of Catholic: how can the 
statute of the Italian Republic contain a reference to an international treaty? He then 
clearly ranks the spiritual consideration higher than the constitutional one, saying
C\C\7that when the time comes he will vote with the current wording. He says that the 
substance of the article has been accepted by all including Togliatti and his party. But 
he is not sure whether Meuccio Ruini (Udn and President of the Commission of 75) 
was correct when he said that the acceptance of article 5 does not mean the insertion 
of the Lateran Pacts into the Constitution, but only gives them a special 
constitutional position. He argues that the Pacts represent much more than just an 
agreement between two sovereign states, they are “i rapporti fra uno Stato sovrano e
665 Ibid., p. 361.
666 Ibid.
667 This incites a sarcastic comment from Giancarlo Pajetta (Pci) who says: “Allora ha chiesto 
consiglio al confessore, non ai giuristi!” to which Russo Perez replies, much to the delight o f the 
Right: “Se il confessore fosse piu intelligente e, soprattutto, spiritualmente piu elevato di voi, il che e 
facile, avrei fatto bene a chiedere consiglio a lui!” Ibid., p. 399. It is clear from this exchange that 
there was no love lost between the right and left at this time -  only two months before the Socialists 
and Communists were expelled from government.
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la Chiesa Cattolica Apostolica Romana, che e cosa ben diversa.’ Perez goes on to 
describe how the Catholic Church in Italy has its representatives at every level of 
society and in all parts of the Italian peninsula:
Orbene, di questo fatto assolutamente peculiare, ineguagliabile, che 
rappresenta tanta parte della vita della nazione, e possibile che lo Stato, nella 
sua Carta fondamentale, non debba tener conto, chiarendo in che modo 
devono essere regolati i suoi rapporti con questo ente spirituale e sovrano che 
siede e vive nel suo stesso territorio?. . .  No i . . .  consentiamo agli amici 
dell’altra sponda di professare liberamente la religione che vogliono, e anche 
di non professame alcuna; ma consentano essi senza rammarico a noi cattolici 
che, nell’orbita dello Stato sovrano, attraverso il riferimento costituzionale 
alPinviolabilita dei Patti Lateranensi, possiamo vedere riaffermato il nostro 
filiale ossequio alia Chiesa Cattolica Apostolica Romana 669
Once again, the idea of the Catholic Church as a unique institution, and the fact that 
the majority of Italians are Catholic by birth, is made to override all considerations of 
juridical correctness, even in the case of an individual who displays evident pride in 
his profession as a jurist.
(iii) Catholic liberty
Subcommission 1
Although Catholic liberty was generally taken for granted in the debates at the 
drafting subcommission, the issue was much more widely debated in the Assembly.
A very important point was raised, however, by Concetto Marchesi (Pci) in 
Subcommission 1, who argued that although the Lateran Pacts had brought Church 
and State closer together, he had reservations over the future stability of the 
settlement due to the increased influence the Church was clearly destined to have in 
postwar Italy. The Church requires freedom, not a fragile conciliation:
Non sappiamo con il flusso degli awenimenti, che porteranno nuove regole 
alia vita umana, quali e quanti impulsi essa avra ad occupare piu alto e piu 
largo spazio nelle coscienze degli uomini; ma pensiamo che questo awerra 
tanto piu facilmente e ampiamente quanto piu la Chiesa si asterra dal chiedere 
agli Stati altra garanzia che non sia quella della liberta.570
668 Ibid., pp. 399-400.
669 Ibid., p. 400.
670 ACD, Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° Sottocommissione. Relazione del 
Deputato Marchesi sui ‘Principii costituzionali riguardanti la cultura e la scuola ’, pp.61-2.
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Constituent Assembly
A partial response to this, in terms of the Church’s anxiety to have the Pacts included 
in the Constitution, was given by the qualunquista Ottavio Mastrojanni, who argued 
that the oppression of the Catholics under liberalism was a major factor determining 
the Church’s desire for the guarantees it would receive through insertion of the Pacts.
II cittadino cattolico, il credente, specie se di elevata cultura, specie se 
investito di pubblici poteri, si trovava costantemente di fronte al dilemma fra 
l’esaudimento di quello che era l’imperativo categorico della sua coscienza, 
per manifestare anche pubblicamente la sua fede religiosa, e gli ordinamenti 
agnostici e legalitari dello Stato che impedivano queste manifestazioni; 
impedivano, preciso, non legalmente, ma impedivano in una ipocrite 
consuetudine protocollare e formale671
Togliatti denies, however, that non-inelusion of the Pacts in the Constitution would, 
at this point in history, result in any threat to Catholic liberty:
Voi dite: si tratta della nostra liberta, cioe della liberta della Chiesa. No, 
nessuno offende la vostra liberta; nessuno ha proposta e nessuno propone di 
ritomare a un regime giurisdizionalista, nessuno sogna in questa Assemblea 
di proporre una costituzione civile del clero: quindi la vostra liberta e salva. 
Ma voi dovete riconoscere che nel Trattato e nel Concordato vi e qualche 
cosa che urta la nostra coscienza civile e che sarebbe bene -  lo stesso 
onorevole La Pira accennava a questa possibility -  che venisse al momento 
opportuno eliminata. Perche dunque inserirli in modo cosi solenne nella Carta 
costituzionale?672
Turning the argument for Catholic freedom on its head, Stefano Riccio states that 
Catholics already have freedom, but this fact must be recognised by the State:
Si e parlato in quest’aula di liberta sociale, cioe della liberta individuale 
protetta e potenziata socialmente; ebbene, questo e un aspetto della 
democrazia nuova, per cui, anche nel campo in cui oggi ci occupiamo, 
occorre costituzionalmente stabilire e regolare non soltanto la liberta 
religiosa dei singoli, nei singoli e in rapporto alio Stato, ma anche delle e 
nelle organizzazioni religiosi, che uniscono e trascendono i singoli, dal 
momento in cui divengono organismi viventi nello Stato e nella piu grande 
societa673
671 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 187
672 Ibid., p. 332.
673 Ibid., p.385. (My italics). The reference to religious organisations that ‘unite and transcend the 
individual’ is clearly a reference only to Catholic groups; this is confirmed when he talks o f the new 
democracy establishing and regulating such organisations from the moment when they become 
‘organismi viventi’, in other words ‘sanctioned’ by the state in the form o f  an explicit reference to 
them in the Constitution. No similar argument is made by Catholics (aside from one notable exception 
when Jacini spoke independently o f his Dc colleagues), for a similar provision for other faiths.
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He says that religion, whether internal or external, has become an essential structural 
component of democratic life:
Nei popoli ora si ha la organizzazione non soltanto giuridica, ma anche etica 
e religiosa; onde il problema religioso non e piu ai margini o negli interstizi 
del diritto, ma si pone e s’impone come un problema centrale del diritto 
regolatore della vita associata. Una Costituzione non puo ignorarlo: deve 
risolverlo 674
Later in the debates, in response to criticisms of his party’s attitude to 
Catholic freedom of conscience, Togliatti says:
Rivendichiamo e vogliamo che nella Costituzione italiana vengano sancite le 
liberta di coscienza, di fede, di culto, di propaganda religiosa e di 
organizzazione religiosa. Consideriamo queste liberta come Ie liberta 
democratiche fondamentali, che devono essere restaurate e difese contro 
qualunque attentato da qualunque parte venga.675
The Constitution, he says, satisfies their demands in this respect. What Catholics 
failed to realise was that the Constitution would be rendered completely ineffectual 
in the practical application of these norms by dint of the raft of oppressive Fascist 
laws dealing with the minority religions that would remain on the statute book for the 
next forty years. Togliatti reserves strong criticism for the Dc party and the way it 
presents itself as the sole defender of the freedom of conscience of the Catholic 
masses: “E vero, noi difendiamo questa liberty come partito democratico, modemo, 
progressivo, comunista, se volete; ma, ad ogni modo, la difendiamo. Non lasciamo a 
voi la esclusivita di questa funzione.”676
Giancarlo Pajetta (Pci) is annoyed by Catholic claims about the guarantees 
that insertion of the Pacts would give to the Church:
Si e parlato di garanzie, ma, a questo punto, potremmo dire: E le garanzie nei 
confronti degli altri, le garanzie nei confronti dello Stato, nei confronti dei 
Iaici, nei confronti degli acattolici? Abbiamo inserito, mi pare, nella Iegge 
elettorale una clausola che vieta agli ecclesiastici di fare determinati atti che 
porterebbero la Chiesa ad interferire nella vita politica; ma nessuno di noi ha 
chiesto che queste norme siano precisate nella Costituzione. Voi, onorevoli 
colleghi, parlate di delicatezza: forse vi sentite offesi da qualche 
manifestazione anticlericale; ma, che direste se noi vi chiedessimo delle 
garanzie contro certa intolleranza formalistica che si e manifestata anche qui? 
Mi pare che un collega della Democrazia cristiana abbia chiesto che i 
musulmani non abbiano diritto di essere sepolti in Roma. Badate che il
674 Ibid.
675 Ibid., p. 636.
676 Ibid., p. 637.
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collega Di Fausto non si riferiva a quei Saraceni che venivano nei secoli 
lontani a fare le loro scorrerie fin sotto le mura dell’Urbe, intendeva parlare 
dei soldati di colore di una Nazione alleata, morti perche anche Roma fosse 
liberata dal giogo nazista. Noi non pensiamo certo a chiedere garanzie 
costituzionali contro le aberrazioni del collega Di Fausto, il quale vorrebbe 
farci tomare piu in dietro del 1861, quando i Ministri italiani dovettero 
battersi per far si che un valdese trovasse degna sepoltura in un cimitero 677
a) A view from the Catholic 1left ’
The deputy Gerardo Bruni led a minority party of Catholics, the Partito cristiano 
sociale. As spokesman for this party he presented a view of Church/State relations 
which, although not representative of the majority of Catholics on the issue in 
question, is nevertheless important to register; not least because of the fact that it 
would live on in the collective memory of Catholics and be revived, for example, in 
the later history of the Republic in the perspectives of the ‘cattolici del no’ at the 
divorce referendum of 1974, and in those of numerous Catholics of the Independent 
Left electoral alliances with the Pci.
In a momentous speech to the Assembly, Bruni laments the lack of a 
preambolo to the Constitution citing the main reason for this as
la incapacity nei Settantacinque [i.e. the total number of members of the three 
subcommissions] di interpretare l’anima unitaria, e cioe, quel minimo 
denominatore comune spirituale che, al di sopra di tutte le particolari 
ideologic, pur esiste nel popolo italiano. II non averlo saputo mettere 
convenientemente in luce, questo commune denominatore, il non essersi 
impegnati piu esplicitamente su di esso, non solo rappresenta un grave difetto 
formale del progetto -  (il che sarebbe il meno) -  ma un grave difetto di 
sostanza che non depone favorevolmente per l’awenire della nostra 
democrazia. Infatti, sulla democrazia esistono ancora in Italia delle gravi
678nserve.
Bruni then argues for a religious sensitivity in both the Constitution and in the day- 
to-day running of the State:
La democrazia crea una situazione spirituale per tutti. E un regime di 
comunione tra gli uomini, che posseggono convinzioni diverse verso 1’ultimo 
destino dell’uomo, ma che nella Citta temporale vogliono compiere un’opera 
comune, che non pregiudichi questo destino, che, anzi, lo favorisca. . . 
Pretendere di far adottare dallo Stato nella sua totalita l’ideologia cattolica o 
marxista, significherebbe introdurre nella vita politica degli elementi di 
turbamento, che la politica, di sua natura, non pud sopportare. Esistono delle
677 Ibid., p. 523.
678 Ibid., p. 401.
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verita e dei valori che tutti gli uomini non possono non riconoscere e che lo 
Stato, organo del bene comune, deve, percid riconoscere. Di fronte a questi 
valori lo Stato non pud essere agnostico; una Costituzione non pud chiudersi 
nell’agnosticismo 6 9
These arguments bring him onto an analysis of the basic ethical problem that 
underlies the democratic weakness in Article 5 (draft):
Onorevoli colleghi, le garanzie, atte ad assicurare la liberta di coscienza, di 
culto e di religione, non potranno essere stimate giammai eccessive da coloro 
che, come voi, sanno apprezzare il valore della spontaneita dello spirito nella 
ricerca della verita e l’importanza che assume il rispetto dei diritti naturali 
dell’uomo in ogni conquista spirituale politica ed economico-sociale .. ,680
He advises the Assembly that they must, above all, be unanimous in their duty to 
nurture the political and spiritual well-being of all Italians. However, he 
acknowledges that defining this political and spiritual well-being is far from 
straightforward. Neither in Italy nor elsewhere does there any longer exist spiritual 
unity.
Esiste una pluralita di famiglie religiose e filosofiche. Non e piu possible, 
dato che fosse consigliabile, unificare politicamente gli italiani alfombra di 
un determinato credo religioso. E invece possible unificarli sulla base del 
rispetto delle regole della morale naturale e dei diritti naturali dell’uomo, 
sulla base . . .  di un credo civico pratico, morale e politico, su precise 
disposizioni costituzionale e legislative che prescindono da qualsiasi 
giustificazione teologica e filosofica. Si tratta . .. di identificare un principio 
e di tracciare una linea di condotta politica da valere in tutti i tempi ed in tutte 
le situazione, che sono tenute a rispettare tanto le maggioranze quanto le 
minoranze religiose.681
The stability in the new Constitution must, says Bruni, come from man, not from 
God:
E bene che Tunita politica non si tenti di cementare dall’alto di un sistema di 
verita rivelate, e cioe con un movimento discendente, ma sibbene con un 
movimento ascendente, che parta dalla chiarezza delle verita naturali come il 
processo piu educativo e piu formative dello spirito umano. L’unita politica 
non puo avere per base che la chiarezza di queste verita naturali, che 
costituiscono come Fideologia di tutti, l’ideologia comune a tutta la Nazione. 
Ma questo patrimonio comune non deve essere misconosciuto da gli italiani, e 
deve essere positivamente e rigorosamente difeso dalla legge.682
679 Ibid.




This is an unusual viewpoint, possibly not shared by many Catholics, but one 
which successfully gets to the heart of the issues in question. Bruni talks of the need 
to give society a “positivo e vitale orientamento religioso” which he says is already 
evident in the draft Constitution in its defence of the freedom of the individual and of 
social justice. ' But, he warns
c’e una religiosita, e, vorrei dire, un cristianesimo apocrifo, che e quello dei 
govemi clericali, patemalistici, assoluti, che lasciano sussistere 
tranquillamente le piu grosse ingiustizie sociali; e c’e una religiosita ed un 
cristianesimo autentico, che e quello dello sforzo costante ed eroico verso la 
libera ricerca della verita e della giustizia. ft pertanto su questa base 
spirituale, che puo chiamarsi bensi laica, ma non laicista,84 che potra trovare 
la sua piena applicazione il principio dell’unita e del pluralismo spirituale in 
campo politico, che solo e in condizione di garantire il pieno rispetto della 
liberty di coscienza, di culto e di religione ad ogni cittadino. Evidentemente 
non si puo parlare di queste liberta dove esiste una ‘religione di Stato’ e dove 
esiste Tateismo di Stato’. Qui, evidentemente, non si tratta di affermarsi sul 
principio della ‘tolleranza religiosa’ e della ‘tolleranza filosofica’, che per me 
equivarrebbe a professare l’indifferentismo religioso e filosofico; qui si tratta 
dell’adozione -  in via di principio -  del metodo della ‘tolleranza civica’ 685
As regards the relationship between Catholicism and politics, Bruni says:
Senza compiere un tentativo di sowertire I’ordine politico, che anch’esso e 
una parte dell’ordine divino, non ci e lecito, diro usando una terminologia 
teologica, comportarci come cattolici quando ci troviamo sul terreno politico; 
siamo, invece, tenuti a comportarci sempre da cattolici, distinguendo in tal 
modo, senza separarlo, l ’ordine politico dall’ordine religioso. Quando ci 
troviamo sul terreno politico, l’unico modo di salvare l’essenza del 
cristianesimo, e cioe la carita e lo spirito di fratellanza, non e quello di 
instaurare una legislazione d’eccezione e di privilegio nei riguardi della 
propria Chiesa; e invece di instaurare un regime fondato su base di 
eguaglianza.686
Bruni emphasises the part the Christian spirit of Italians will play in the new 
democracy:
La maggioranza cattolica del nostro Paese accettera questa disciplina civica, 
se fosse illuminata, sapendo di ubbidire alio spirito stesso del Vangelo, e, 
conscia di contribuire efficaciamente all’unita nazionale, all’amicizia politica 
di tutti gli italiani, sempre necessaria, ma nelle attuali circostanze 
necessarissima, essendo in corso Tardua opera della ricostruzione. 
Naturalmente la societa italiana, in quanto composta in maggioranza di 
cattolici, conservera la sua fisionomia spirituale, ma non in virtu di una
683 Ibid.
684 For an explanation o f these terms, see Section B 1 (vi) o f this thesis.
685 CRAC, Vol. 1, pp. 402=3.
686 Ibid., p. 403.
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giurisdizione confessionale dello Stato, ma in virtu del numero e dello spirito 
della maggioranza dei suoi membri e delle forme democratiche che 
permettono e garantiscono pienamente Fespressione pubblica dei sentimenti 
religiosi.687
Bruni is thus agreeing with the analysis of the parties of the left, that, from a Catholic 
point of view, whether there is a confessional state or not, it will have little effect on 
Catholics’ ability to worship freely as they are already guaranteed such freedom by 
law, by the Concordat and by their sheer numbers. He then cites the articles that have 
been specifically created with this Catholic spirit in mind: draft articles 5,14 and 15.
Sono delFopinione che sono questi articoli a fissare la linea fondamentale 
della politica religiosa dello Stato italiano, e percio non posso giustificare le 
ragioni che hanno indotto i Settantacinque a posporli all’articolo 5, che 
invece si riferisce ad un determinato problema di questa politica 688
Bruni strongly believes in the need to defend the Church’s liberty on a firmly 
democratic footing.
Bisogna abbandonare i vecchi metodi di difesa, buoni, forse, e giusti per altri 
tempi, ma che nel nostro tempo si sono mostrati dappertutto inefficaci, e 
rischiano di offendere la giustizia. Soltanto sopra una base, chiaramente 
espressa, che non ammetta politiche discriminanti, neanche formali, tra 
maggioranza cattolica e minoranze acattoliche, la religione della maggioranza 
potra ricevere le migliori e piu concrete garanzie di liberta 689
He claims that what the countiy needs is a new, open, amicable approach to 
resolving old issues. He asks the Dc members what they are afraid of in applying this 
new approach to Church/State relations. Why are they reticent? Is it for ideological, 
political or religious reasons?
Gia l’onorevole De Gasperi nel ricevere, durante il suo viaggio negli Stati 
Uniti d’America, una Commissione del ‘Consiglio federale della Chiesa di 
Cristo’, pote saggiare gli umori di quelle potenti comunita che esplicitamente 
lo interrogarono attomo all’introduzione del Concordato nella Costituzione. 
Stando a cio che riferi in data 21 gennaio 1’‘Associated Press’, l’onorevole De 
Gasperi rispose all’interpellate reverendo Anthony che ‘non credeva che i 
termini del Concordato sarebbero stati inclusi nella Costituzione’.690
As Bruni points out, the terms of the Concordat were not to be included -  the whole 
document was in the clause De Gasperi was urging the Assembly to accept. He goes
687 Ibid.
688 Ibid.
689 Ibid., p. 407.
690 Ibid.
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on: “Queste parole di ‘colore oscuro’ dell’onorevole De Gasperi dimostrano .. . il 
suo imbarrazzo di fronte a cosi precisa richiesta del reverendo Anthony, ed anch’esse 
vengono a giustificare pienamente le mie richieste.”691 No explanation was 
forthcoming.
b) The mainstream Catholic view
In conjunction with the precise juridical, moral and spiritual arguments for the 
inclusion of the Pacts proposed by the Dossettiani and others, Stefano Riccio (Dc) 
provides perhaps the best summary of the Catholic arguments from the point of view 
of the defence of Catholic freedom. He makes clear the proviso that even though any 
modification of the Pacts is in theory possible with bilateral agreement, the territorial 
issue is non-negotiable. This stated, he moves on to give his argument for the 
legality and constitutionality of the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in Article 5 (draft).
10 appartengo alio Stato ed alia Chiesa. E desidero che lo Stato e la Chiesa 
siano d’accordo nel regolare la mia condotta, nel rispetto della mia liberta. Ho
11 diritto di conoscere, a mezzo della Iegge costituzionale, se la mia liberta 
religiosa di culto e garantita e se la mia attivita religiosa, con l’accordo dello 
Stato, avra a conseguire anche rilevanza giuridica nello Stato. Io come 
cattolico ho il diritto ed il dovere a contrarre matrimonio religioso, che per 
me e Tunica forma ammissibile. Che fara lo Stato di fronte a questo che io 
ritengo un diritto ed un dovere? Lo riconosce o lo nega? Ho il diritto di 
saperlo. Questa e tutela effettiva della mia liberta; e se e cosi, siamo nel 
campo strettamente costituzionale, quando viene riaffermata la sovranita della 
Chiesa e vengono richiamati i Patti lateranensi. II riconoscimento della 
duplice sovranita e la base per il coordinamento delle azioni dei soggetti 
destinatari delle norme e per la precisazione dei limiti dei diritti dei cittadini 
credenti. II riconoscimento e necessario, in quanto, a differenza dei trattati 
intemazionali propriamente detti, che sono stipulati tra due organisazioni 
statali, le quali agiscono su territoriali diversi e per lo piu in rapporto ai 
cittadini diversi; qui invece il territorio e lo stesso e i soggetti sono gli stessi. 
Non e fra la Citta del Vaticano, come Stato, e lo Stato italiano che vennero 
stretti i Patti lateranensi; ma e tra la Chiesa e lo Stato. Pero il Concordato, 
pur non essendo un rapporto intemazionale in senso stretto, e un rapporto tra 
due diversi ordinamenti giuridici. Cioe, non siamo nel campo del diritto 
pubblico intemo, ma invece sul terreno dei rapporti e del diritto estemo. E il 
rapporto, insomma, tra due societa di ordine diverso, ma che in un certo senso
691 Ibid. For further elaboration on these words ‘di colore oscuro’ uttered by De Gasperi on the matter, 
see his speech to the Assembly on p. 632 o f volume 1 o f the Debates.
692 Stefano Riccio appears to be speaking with some authority here, although I have been unable to 
establish exactly what authority he had. He belonged to the ‘Gruppo cattolico napoletano’ who 
adhered closely to De Gasperi1 s vision o f  the new democracy -  including his diarchy theory. See 
www.carovanoperlacostituzione.it. (This website also contains the full Constitution as published on 1st 
January, 1948.)
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rappresentano due cerchi concentrici, che hanno lo stesso volume: l’uomo; e 
la stessa superficie: il territorio 693
Riccio argues that creating a working relationship between Church and State is 
necessary not only for those who live within the confines of both entities, but 
necessary also to avoid a repetition of the conflict of recent years where one became 
stronger than the other.
Questo sarebbe un altro aspetto di un’assolutismo statale che noi, per la tutela 
della nostra liberta, non possiamo volere. Forse poteva anche sostemersi 
Fagnosticismo dello Stato ai tempi del Iiberalismo, quando effettivamente Io 
Stato non intendeva entrare nei rapporti delle singole liberta; ma oggi, invece, 
quando lo Stato si pone anche come regolatore delle liberta economiche e 
sociali, questo agnosticismo sul terreno etico e religioso e incomprensibile. E 
strano dawero che in una teoria, la quale pone lo Stato come il creatore unico 
anche delle liberta individuali, le quali non sarebbero naturali ma 
troverebbero la loro origine nella concessione dello Stato, si possa sostenere 
uno Stato agnostico. E che sotto il concetto dell’agnosticismo e della laicita vi 
e un’altra tendenza e un’altra realta: ridurre la Chiesa e la religione a 
strumenti di govemo; affermare la superiority assoluta dello Stato. Noi questo 
non possiamo volerlo ed ecco perche ancora una volta diciamo che questi 
rapporti devono essere costituzionalmente garantiti. In sostanza vogliamo 
evitare ancora una volta che lo Stato abbia a ritenersi come valore assoluto ed 
abbia a porsi come negatore delle liberta dell’individuo, guardato non 
soltanto in se come singolo, ma proiettato anche sul terreno sociale, e cioe sul 
terreno delle organizzazioni sociali, in cui egli entra, dalla famiglia alia 
Chiesa. E giacche la norma concordataria, preesiste per la volonta dello Stato 
e della Chiesa, lo Stato, nel momento solenne in cui si da una struttura 
costituzionale, non puo che riconfermare questi Patti, ponendoli, come ha 
bene osservato l’onorevole Ruini, in un particolare e speciale rilievo.694
There is little doubt that the religious dimension of the debates on draft article 
5 were the determining factor in explaining the Catholic intransigence over the issue 
of inserting the Lateran Pacts into the Constitution. This despite the fact that the 
Togliattian formula, or any one of a number of alternative formulations, would have 
guaranteed that the State would be required to either accept the existing Pacts, or 
agree new ones. This would also have avoided the juridical anomaly of having the 
details of an agreement with a foreign body enshrined in the Constitution.
It is also difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was more than a little 
‘instrumentality’ in Catholic arguments, excepting the case of the small minority. Dc 
costituenti constantly made claims about speaking for the vast majority of the 
Catholic population, without explaining why many millions had voted for ‘lay’
693 Ibid., pp. 388-9.
694 Ibid., p. 390.
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parties, and despite the fact that the Dc was a long way from achieving even a simple 
majority in the Assembly. The juridically unexceptionable arguments of experts such 
as Calamandrei were either ignored, responded to with ad hoc juridical speculations 
or, as in the disarmingly frank case of the Catholic jurist Perez, overridden by 
religious considerations. To most of the laid  Catholic arguments seemed deliberately 
obtuse, manipulative and sometimes provocative. What lay behind Catholic 
intransigence?
One cannot explain it with reference to the troubled history of political 
Catholicism, with its inability to form a party until 1919, or the exile of Ppi leaders 
under Fascism, because the historical circumstances underlying these problems had 
been swept away, and the Togliattian formula, moreover, was sufficient guarantee 
against their return. There was, however, one factor of overriding importance which 
should not be overlooked. If a Togliattian formulation had been accepted, this would 
indeed have bound a future government to regulating Church/State affairs ‘in termini 
concordatari’, and a future government could even have agreed to retain the existing 
Pacts. But at the time, a Dc victory at the first Republican elections was by no means 
a foregone conclusion. A government of laid  would at the very best have eliminated 
any reference to Catholicism as the religion of state, been expected at least to 
question the Church’s monopoly of religious education, and possibly revisit its fiscal 
and financial privileges.
Whilst there were probably, in reality, Catholics in the Assembly who would 
have accepted such an eventuality with equanimity, the Vatican was not prepared to 
do so. Nor should we underrate a substantial element of Catholic mistrust of the 
Communists, which Togliatti’s proclamations of good will could do little to dispel. 
Given the Pci’s ties to the Soviet Union with its atheism of State, such reservations 
would have seemed, to most Catholics, not entirely unreasonable. His awareness of 
Catholic fears and suspicions goes a long way to explaining the softening of 
Togliatti’s opposition to Catholic demands, and his eventual willingness to yield. 
Added to the factors already mentioned, there is the not insignificant (though 
constitutionally unofficial) impact of the conclusioni cattoliche which must have 
weighed heavily on Catholic moderates. Along with the genuine integralists who 
require no pressure from such external sources to press for a privileged position for 
the Church, the combined effect of all these elements produced a determination 
which was not going to be swayed by reasoned argument.
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d) LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
When dealing with the issue of the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution 
on a juridical plane, it became clear that the Dc’s arguments became rather thin when 
compared with those of the constitutional lawyers of the lay parties. However, 
protection of the Church’s interests remained paramount, and there was no 
diminution of their determination carry through their arguments.
(i) Problems with the Treaty and the Concordat
The eminent lawyer, Piero Agostino D’Avack, suggested that the duration of the 
Constituent Assembly would have been the opportune time for a re-evaluation and 
revision of the Lateran Pacts in the light of Italy’s new republican identity. He 
considered that special attention should have been given to Articles 8, 21 and 26 of 
the Treaty and Articles 12,15, 20, 37,41 and 42 of the Concordat, inclusion of such 
articles unrevised in the Constitution being, for him, a technico-juridical error.695 It is 
surprising that D’Avack did not include in his list article 1 of the Treaty, referring to 
the confessional state, nor article 5 of the Concordat, which dealt with the civil rights 
of apostate priests, the legal complications of which were illustrated by the case of 
Ernesto Buonaiuti 696 As the confessional state has already been dealt with in the 
sub-section entitled ‘Political Considerations’ of this section, I will not repeat it here. 
However, article 5 of the Concordat will be discussed in what follows.
Subcommission 1
The democristiani Giuseppe Dossetti and Giorgio La Pira agree that if  ‘the family’ is 
important enough an issue to warrant a mention in the Constitution, then surely the 
‘fenomeno ecclesiastico’ should also be included as it has been in almost all previous 
constitutions. This Constitution should therefore take a position on it and the best 
solution, Dossetti thinks, is to include the Lateran Pacts. With regard to Basso’s
695 D ’Avack, I rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa, p. 112. Articles 8 o f the Treaty and 12, 15 and 20 o f the 
Concordat referred to the King; articles 21 o f the Treaty and 41 and 42 o f the Concordat deal with 
‘titoli nobiliari’; article 26 o f the Treaty refers to the Kingdom o f Italy and the abrogation of the Law 
of Guarantees o f 1871; article 37 o f the Concordat refers to religious education o f Fascist youth 
groups. For a detailed account o f the discrepancies between Constitution and Concordat, see Crispo’s 
speech in CRAC, vol. 1, pp. 367-8.
6 6 Ernesto Buonaiuti was a Roman priest who, even after he had been removed from his position as a 
university professor by the Fascist government in collusion with the Vatican, remained passionate 
about the role o f the Roman Church. When Italy was liberated he tried to return to his former post but 
the Ministro della Pubblica Istruzione refused him his old position on the basis o f  the constraints 
created by article 5 o f the Concordat. During the debates his case became, for the Left and lay 
costituenti, symbolic o f  the problems that insertion of the Pacts would create in the Constitution.
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preoccupations over Article 5 of the Concordat, he uses the argument that anyone 
taking holy orders “si pongono volontariamente su una posizione di differenziamento 
dagli altri cittadini” by accepting that they are under the jurisdiction of the Church 
and must abide by its rules. For this reason, he claims that inclusion of Article 5 of 
the Concordat does not impinge on citizens’ liberty in general.697 The difficulty with 
this argument is that once a priest has become an apostate, not only can he not 
practice his vocation within the Church, but he is also deprived of his right to any 
form of employment which brings him into contact with the public within the State. 
To the laid  this is a punitive and monstrous form of discrimination against a citizen, 
with which the State should have nothing to do.
Lelio Basso (Psi) summarises the arguments against this provision in stating 
that Article 5 of the Concordat harms the independence of the State, (and, in fact, 
subordinates the State to the Church) by obliging the State to remove or ban from its 
employ those persons whom the Church intends to punish under its own laws. 
Preventing people from working for the State for religious reasons contravenes the
/T Q Q
principle of equality of citizens of the State. He is also concerned about the article 
on religious education for the same reason: state schools must include Catholic 
religious education, a right not afforded to other religions. He mentions that even 
schools in the Waldensian region must teach Catholicism, whereas the religion 
widely practised in that area is not allowed to be taught in its schools.699
Cappi (Psi) breaks ranks with the la id , and makes some unusual points. He 
observes that to deny that Church/State relations are currently dealt with by the 
Lateran Pacts, effectively means that the Concordat should be considered abrogated. 
Furthermore, if the Concordat were to be kept, what would be the point of stating 
that relations are governed by concordatory pacts? He admits that Article 1 of the 
Treaty causes him some concern, although, remarkably, Moro’s arguments and the 
formula “I loro rapporti sono regolati dai Patti Lateranensi” appear to be enough to 
convince him that the possibility of consequences harmful to the freedom of other 
religions are nullified. 700
Constituent Assembly
In the Constituent assembly, Ugo Della Seta (Pri) praises the way in which various 
articles of the Constitution have raised the status of women and have dealt in general 
with the equality of Italian citizens, but asks how such articles can be reconciled with 
those found in the Pacts. He mentions article 5 of the Concordat dealing with 
apostate priests in the workplace and the permanent ban imposed on them, “quella 
pena che il Codice penale contempla come appendice alia pena dell’ergastolo, per i 
piu gravi reati infamanti.” 701 He says that Article 36 of the Concordat contradicts the 
freedom of education article in the Constitution (draft 27) to the extent that children 
of non-Catholic families have two choices: either be educated against their religious 
beliefs or leave school. He also points out the discrepancies with the raft of laws in 
the Penal Code that ‘complement’ the confessional nature of the State as stipulated in 
the Pacts. He also questions the morality of two different sets of laws, depending on 
whether a crime is committed against the Catholic religion or any other religion. He 
says that the Constitution cannot talk of equality among citizens when such 
discrepancies exist in laws still in force. He advocates removing such discrepancies 
from the Concordat and from the Penal Code if the Constitution is to mean 
anything. 702
Lelio Basso (Psi) criticises the Constitution on several fronts at this draft 
stage, but his most trenchant attack is reserved for article 5 of the Concordat.
Noi siamo fermamente decisi, ad accettare il principio concordatario e ad 
adoperarci per il mantenimento della pace religiosa. Ma .. . devo dichiarare 
che includere nella Costituzione l’articolo 5 del Concordato rappresenta per 
la nostra coscienza civile una grave offesa al principio di liberta. Non mi si 
dica, come ha affermato l ’onorevole Tupini ieri, che la Chiesa cattolica, nella 
sua sconfinata saggezza, correggera anche questi errori. Noi siamo chiamati 
oggi a votare questa Constituzione in cui si vuole inserire questo Concordato 
e questo articolo 5; e noi siamo chiamati a dare il nostro voto a quell’articolo 
che ha permesso, che ha servito a far tacere nelFAteneo romano la libera 
voce di Ernesto Buonaiuti.703
Stefano Riccio (Dc) responds to a number of objections to the inclusion of the 
Pacts beginning with the fact that Article 1 of the Lateran Treaty “recognises and re­
affirms” Article 1 of the Albertine Statute of 1848 which States that “the Holy 
Catholic Apostolic and Roman Religion is the only religion of State” .704 Such an
701 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 180.
702 Ibid., p. 181.
703 Ibid., p. 205.
704 See Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 197.
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article would, responds Crispo (Udn), recreate a confessional state in Italy. In 
defence of this, Riccio quotes the first clause of Article 1 of the Concordat, which 
states: “Italy, as per Article 1 of the Treaty, guarantees to the Catholic Church the 
free exercise of its spiritual power, the free and public exercise of worship, and also 
of its jurisdiction on religious matters in conformity with the rules of this Concordat; 
when necessary, it guarantees to all ecclesiastics, for the acts of their spiritual
70Sministry, the support of its authorities.” This, he claims, proves that Italy will not 
become a confessional State, but simply one that recognises the important role the 
Church has to play in ministering to Italians, the majority of whom are Catholics. He 
suggests that “la semplice lettura della norma da la risposta alle osservazioni. ” 706 Not 
only does this argument fall short of answering the charge by Crispo, but it fails to 
mention the second clause of Article 1 of the Concordat which reads: “In 
consideration of the sacred character of the Eternal City, episcopal See of the 
Supreme Pontiff, centre of the Catholic world and goal of pilgrimages, the Italian 
government will take care to prevent in Rome anything that might clash with that
7 0 7character.” This is a clear indication that, according to the terms of the Concordat, 
the government should not only prevent any kind of open challenge to the Catholic 
Church, but also seems to suggest that the other religions should not be allowed to 
enjoy too high a profile, at least in the capital.
Gerardo Bruni (Partito sociale cristiano) raises, once more, a vigorously 
dissenting Catholic voice. He is not impressed with the second clause of article 5 of 
the Constitution which, he argues, is concealing both article 1 of the Treaty and 
article 1 of the Albertine Statute, and bombards the Chamber with questions . Why 
the subterfuge? Why the lack of clarity? Why treat such important politico-spiritual 
problems so insensitively? “La Chiesa cattolica, onorevoli colleghi democristiani. . . 
non puo passare dalla finestra! Deve passare dalla porta. E non dalla porta del 
confessionalismo, divenuta ormai porta di servizio, ma dalla porta, ch’e padronale 
per tutti, della democrazia. ” 708 Bruni talks at length about the defence of the 
Church’s freedom: argued from a democratic position, it would have everyone’s 
support,
mentre, se posta al di fuori di questi termini, getta Tamarezza anche nel cuore 
di molti cattolici, ai quali se il comma passera tale e quale in questa
705 Ibid., p. 204.
706 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 390.
707 See Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, p. 204.
708 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 406.
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Assemblea, com’e passato nella Commissione dei 75, non resterebbe dawero 
che augurarsi una cosa: che sia la Santa Sede stessa. . .  a prendere l’iniziativa 
della necessaria ed improrogabile revisione, per non mettere il Govemo 
italiano in gravi difficolta 70
However, he says, it is up to them to avoid such a situation. He then gives a stem if 
not surprising warning: “La permanenza dei Patti lateranensi nella Costituzione, 
rilevo gia l’onorevole Basso, provochera purtroppo un appello all’O.N.U., appello le 
cui ripercussioni, morali e politici, potranno non essere simpatiche per il nostro 
Paese” 710
In a speech not easily reconciled with another in which, declaring himself not 
to be speaking for his party, he was critical of an arrangement which did not give 
equal rights to Protestants, Stefano Jacini (Dc) joins forces with those Catholic 
costituenti who display a cavalier disregard for the numerous arguments mounted by 
the opponents of the wholesale insertion of the Pacts into the Constitution. He 
considers the Lateran Treaty and creation of Vatican City State to be something 
which Italians should cherish and of which they should be proud. He cannot see how 
any future government could even think of jeopardising this position of prestige that 
Italy enjoys in Europe and indeed the world: “Quelle difficolta che sono state 
affacciate da alcuni come incongruenze derivanti dalla incorporazione di questo 
trattato in seno alia costituzione Repubblicana mi sembrano . .. di scarsa 
importanza.” 711 As regards the official recognition of the Italian Republic by the 
Holy See, Jacini quotes from the 28.01.1947 edition of the Acta apostolicae sedis 
which reports the decree of 26.11.1946 of the Sacred Congregation of Rites which 
substituted in all cases the prayer pro-repubblica for the prayer pro-rege prescribed 
by the Concordat; he considers this to be “il piu ampio e completo riconoscimento 
del nuovo stato di cose da parte della Suprema autorita ecclesiastica. ” 712 This rather 
optimistic view is somewhat undermined by the fact that the prayer pro-rege 
remained unaltered in the Concordat.
Orazio Condorelli (Bnl) groups the costituenti who are against the Pacts into 
two, rather simplistic, categories: those who, he claims, have nothing against the 
Pacts per se, but who regard their inclusion in the Constitution as juridically and 
constitutionally unsound; and those who consider that the Concordat contains articles 
which contradict the principles of a democratic State. Condorelli doesn’t accept
709 Ibid.
710 Ibid., pp. 406-7.
711 Ibid., p. 418.
713 Ibid.
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either of these arguments. As regards the former, he says that the main concern of his 
opponents is that inclusion would constitute a limitation on the sovereignty of the 
Italian State. This, he claims, is nonsense because Article 3 of the draft Constitution 
already subjects the Italian State to the norms of international law. But in his 
argument he concentrates on the Treaty, with a number of scatter-gun polemical 
comments: Are we going to argue over the loss of 44 hectares of national territory? 
How can we be creating a new Italy from scratch when it already exists? How do we 
have the right to denounce the Pacts when they have created Vatican City State? 
Once a State has been created by means of a Treaty it cannot be uncreated, so what is
7 1 q
there to denounce?
Regarding article 5 of the Concordat, Condorelli (Bnl) argues that when a 
person becomes a priest, he is well aware of the contract he is entering into. So how 
can he then claim that the penalties imposed are a restriction on his freedom when he 
falls foul of his contract? Furthermore, he claims that the article is necessary to 
protect the needs of the vast majority of Catholics in the country. Who, for example, 
would want to send their children to a school that employed a priest who had 
incurred the wrath of the Church? 714
Condorelli then examines the criticisms against imposing religious education 
in State schools. He claims that if there was one child in ten thousand whose parents 
did not want him to have religious instruction, their choice would be respected. He 
adds that no-one would teach a child religion against his or her wishes.
With regard to Article 5 of the Concordat and the Buonaiuti case, Stefano 
Riccio (Dc) quotes from an article in ‘Rinascita’ by Professor Vezio Crisafulli.715 
Crisafulli suggests that the concordat with Italy is more burdensome than the one 
with Bavaria, in that in the latter, only the withdrawal of the right to give religious 
instruction is provided for, and not the withdrawal of all state employment rights of 
the cleric. In his response, Riccio deflects the argument away from the issue of the 
withdrawal of the basic rights of the cleric, which he admits is exactly what the 
Italian Concordat does, by saying: “Ma, dunque che insegnava il Buonaiuti, se non la 
Storia del cristianesimo? Ed allora perche scandalizzarsi tanto, quando anche nel
713 A common ploy used by the parties opposed to the Left was to misrepresent the issue by claiming 
that not agreeing to the insertion o f the Pacts, was tantamount to ‘denouncing’ them -  a point hotly 
denied on numerous occasions by the Left wing parties.
7,4 Ibid., p. 450.
715 Jan-Feb Edition 1947, p. 15ff
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n\£\concordato con la Baviera. .. questo principio e riconfermato?” Here he is 
perhaps admitting more than he intends to, but his attempts to justify it (by saying 
that because such an article appears in a concordat with another country, then it must 
be acceptable to Italy) are not hugely convincing.
Riccio’s next argument in favour of Article 5 of the Concordat is factually 
flawed: “In esso non si parla di qualunque ufficio ed impiego; ne e detto che i diritti 
del funzionario apostato o irretito da censura non vadano conservati. Si parla soltanto 
deU’impiego e dell’ufficio a contatto immediato con il pubblico.” 717 Here he has 
already contradicted himself with his remarks about ‘the withdrawal of rights of the 
cleric5 in the Italian concordat. But let us take a close look at Article 5 of the 
Concordat. It states: “No ecclesiastic can be appointed to, or remain in any post or 
office of the Italian State or of any public body under its jurisdiction, without the 
nihil obstat (permission) of the Ordinary of the diocese. The withdrawal of the nihil 
obstat deprives the ecclesiastic of the capacity to continue to hold the appointment or 
position previously assumed. In any case no apostate or censored clergy can be 
appointed or kept in any teaching position, office or employment in which they 
would be in direct contact with the public.55718 This is a very wide ranging article, in 
which the second clause plainly states that the ‘ecclesiastic5 is banned from ‘any5 
post previously held. Moreover, the article encroaches on the jurisdiction of the State 
and also contradicts Articles 1 ,6 , 7, 8  and 16 of the draft Constitution. The third 
clause removes the rights of priests who worked with the public, in whatever 
capacity, to work in similar posts again, thus once more contradicting all of the 
above articles.
The reason for this third clause is interesting: in Riccio5 s own words, 
“significa che si vuole evitare quella strana situazione di curiosita, che nasce nel 
popolo intomo al prete spretato, e si vuol evitare quel nocumento alia psicologia ed 
alia morale popolare, che fatalmente deriva dal contatto col prete apostato. 557 1 9 He 
says that the priest is subject to ecclesiastical laws as well as State laws when 
employed on the Church’s behalf and freely accepts to work according to both sets of 
guidelines. For this reason his position is a special one and cannot be considered in
720relation to constitutional articles on freedom of choice and personal liberty.
716 CRAC vol. 1, pp. 390-1.
717 Ibid., p. 391.
718 See Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, Appendix II, p. 205.
719 CRAC, vol. l ,p . 391.
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Dossetti later adds to his argument in the subcommission, supporting Riccio’s 
argument: the ruling does not apply to the Catholic population as a whole, but simply 
to ecclesiastics, who would have taken up their positions with the full knowledge of 
their responsibilities and the conditions and limitations attached thereto, and 
continues: “Quindi, possiamo dire che non siamo in presenza di una discriminazione 
legale della capacita, ma di una discriminazione consensuale, fondato sul consenso
791del singolo.” Furthermore, he points out, this article is not the only one to apply 
such a principle: he cites article 43 of the Concordat, forbidding ecclesiastics from 
participating in party politics; articles 7 and 14 of the administrative electoral law at 
the time, rendering them ineligible for the position of Mayor; the laws of 1913 and 
1933 also exclude them from acting as notaries and from becoming lawyers.
But Cevolotto complains that he is not telling the whole story: the last clause 
of the article also says that they are ‘prohibited from being members of, or taking 
part in, any political party’. The phrase ‘taking part in’ is vague and imprecise, and 
whether it covers supporting or canvassing for a political party is open to 
interpretation. What is clear is that during the institutional elections in 1946 not only 
Catholics priests, prelates, bishops and cardinals, but even the Pope himself 
‘supported’ and ‘canvassed for’ the Dc .722
Dossetti stresses once again that the Dc’s interpretation of article 1 of the 
Treaty is based on the spiritual and moral functions of the Church, and has nothing to 
do with the politically-motivated and fabricated incompatibilities between the Treaty, 
the Concordat and the Constitution highlighted by Cevolotto and Calamandrei. He 
points out that there is a textual argument in defence of article 1 of the Treaty as it 
appears in the Pacts: the phrase ‘gli altri culti sono tollerati’ (from the Albertine 
Statute) has been omitted, thus he says “non implica nessuna qualificazione 
deteriore, nessuna inferiority giuridica di principio per gli appartenenti alle altre 
confessioni.” 723 In fact, Dossetti appears to trump Calamandrei, who has already 
used Mario Falco as an authority on the matter, by citing Falco to further his own 
case: “II principio generale della irrilevanza della appartenenza alia Chiesa cattolica 
per la capacita giuridica dei cittadini e . . .  riaffermato anche dopo 1’articolo 1 del
721 Ibid., p. 557.
722 Pius XII gave a radio address to both Italy and France on the eve o f the institutional and 
Constituent Assembly elections in June 1946 calling for Italian (and French) people to vote for 
Catholic candidates.
723 Ibid., p. 556. Both pre- and post-war, the treatment o f Protestants by the authorities conflicts with 
this principle.
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79 4Trattato del laterano.” Thus, the scope of article 1 of the Treaty should not be 
artificially inflated; above all, he says, it should be realised that it does not have any 
rigid or predetermined juridical weight, but achieves its positive juridical 
significance from the body of law into which it is inserted. In conclusion, he sees no 
inconsistencies in article 5 (draft) of the Constitution, and claims that the explicit 
wording he insisted on for draft articles 14 and 15 (dealing with one’s freedom to 
worship in any faith one chooses) offers ‘decisive proof of the sincerity of his 
convictions on the subject.725
Dossetti categorically denies that the simple mention of the Pacts in article 5 
of the draft Constitution is tantamount to the wholesale insertion of the Pacts into the 
Constitution. To support this, he re-emphasises the distinction between material and 
instrumental norms: material norms regulate facts or (political) relationships; 
instrumental norms simply define the method {iter) in which other juridical norms 
should be produced. The latter could eventually become the regulatory material 
norms defining a fact or a relationship. He argues that the third clause of article five 
is just such an instrumental norm. It does not have anything to do with the specific 
articles of the Treaty and the Concordat, but is intended purely for one purpose: “cioe 
che le eventuali norme dirette a modificare le norme contenute nel Trattato e nel 
Concordato debbono essere prodotte . .. attraverso un determinate iter, cioe
726I’accordo bilaterale.” Thus, according to this interpretation, he argues, all members 
of the Constituent Assembly have already given their support to the article, by dint of 
their declarations that relations between the Italian State and the Catholic Church 
should be governed by the concordatory system (again Dossetti is close to the 
wording of Togliatti’s proposal) and that unilateral modifications by the State of the 
existing regulatory system can only be achieved by means of a process of 
constitutional revision.727 Cevolotto picks up on Dossetti’s use of the phrase ‘sistema 
concordatario’ and asks why he cannot then accept Togliatti’s proposal. The
724 Ibid.
725 Ibid.
726 Ibid., p. 554.
727 Ibid. Dossetti is referring to a principle, used subsequently by the Court o f Cassation in Italy, 
which distinguishes between those Constitutional provisions which take immediate effect, and those 
which have been referred to as ‘di natura programmatica’, which take time to implement or encase in 
legislation. The legitimacy o f  such a distinction has been questioned by jurists. (See Pestalozza, La 
Costituzione e lo Stato, pp. 52-3.) Dossetti’s use o f the distinction is at least open to suspicion of  
manipulation on two counts. A wording such as Togliatti’s ‘in termini concordatari’ would have fitted 
Dossetti’s argument by avoiding both problems: in the first place, reference is made to specific Pacts 
and not to a kind o f agreement required; secondly, the Pacts are in existence and their mention in the 
Constitution, without any reference to a specific need for revision many o f the costituenti were calling 
for, clearly refers to them as already in existence and accepted.
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response is given later in the debates by De Gasperi, that it would have been quite 
satisfactory if Togliatti and others had not made so many allegations of 
incompatibility between certain individual dispositions of the Concordat and some 
articles of the Constitution.
De Gasperi’s response should not be seen as the inept lapse in logic it appears 
at first sight. Togliatti’s proposal was formulated precisely to avoid the 
incompatibilities that were raised by the Catholics opponents. Indeed, it would have 
done so, and De Gasperi is perfectly aware of this. Nor should it be assumed that he 
is suggesting that his opponents did not have every right to raise such objections. 
What, in fact, he seems to be doing is placing the blame for a rise in tension and 
hostility over the question squarely on the shoulders of his opponents. The Catholics 
might have responded more favourably, as he claims, if they had not met with a 
barrage of objections which inevitably came across as anti-Catholic. De Gasperi’s 
response provides a useful insight into the highly-charged atmosphere of what was, 
by common consent later attested to by all the participants, the most contentious part 
of the debates on the Constitution.
For reasons of formality and substance, Edgardo Lami Stamuti (Psli) is not 
happy with the inclusion of the Pacts. The formal reason is that nowhere in the 
Constitution does the Italian State have recourse to mentioning treaties with any 
other juridical entities within international law. The substantial reason is that he 
considers the Lateran Treaty not to require any such acknowledgement: “Sta a se e 
vivra, nel senso che nella sua essenza non e piu discusso o minacciato da alcuno. II 
Trattato, in quella parte che risolve la questione romana, lo consideriamo anche noi
n<y q
definitivo.” He declares his party morally unable to accept both articles 1 of the 
Treaty and 5 of the Concordat. Moreover he claims that he has yet to hear a 
convincing argument for the incluson of the Concordat in the Constitution. The Dc 
argue that it must be included because it regulates relations between the State and the 
Catholic Church. But as Lami Stamuti points out, the Concordat, like the Treaty, will 
survive non-inclusion in the Constitution just as it has survived up until that point in 
time as a stand-alone document. Although the Psli would be in favour of maintaining 
Church/State relations by means of a concordat,
il richiamo al Concordato nella Costituzione avrebbe come conseguenza che
nessuna modifica sarebbe possibile portare al Concordato medesimo senza la
728 Ibid.
729 Ibid., p. 620
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revisione della Carta costituzionale e che questa necessita costituirebbe una 
intollerabile limitazione della liberta e della sovranita dello Stato italiano.730
The principle of the equality of all citizens is, for Republicans, non- 
negotiable. It is, however, undermined by several of the articles of the Concordat 
mentioned earlier. Della Seta places particular emphasis on draft article 28, dealing 
with state education, and its incompatibility with article 36 of the Concordat. How, 
he asks, can the Catholic Church, not content with having its own private, 
confessional schools and not content with having inserted an element of religious 
education into the state school system, demand, through article 36 of the Concordat, 
that all state education at infant and primary level should have “come fondamento e 
come coronamento Pinsegnamento della dottrina cristiana secondo la forma ricevuta
'T '3  1
dalla tradizione cattolica”? Such a demand, he says, is an outrage and violates the 
freedom of all non-Catholic children and their parents who wish to avail themselves 
of a secular state education. He also strongly criticises the law that stipulates a 
harsher penalty for crimes committed against Catholicism than those committed 
against the minority religions: “tutto questo, non solo a rispetto delle minoranze, ma
H 'i'y
a difesa del buon nome della patria, deve essere dalla legge abolito.”
Amerigo Crispo (Udn) makes a very interesting point regarding the Pacts and 
their insertion in the Constitution: Vatican City State still had recourse to the death
tVipenalty for certain crimes under article 4 of the legge vaticana of 7 June 1929. The 
Lateran Pacts, referring in a number of instances to Vatican law, once inserted into 
the Constitution with its array of articles dealing with all aspects of Italian State law, 
had forced a connection between the two juridical systems, and thus created yet
H ' l ' l
another very serious point of contention between the two legislatures. This 
comprised a grey area, especially in the field of Church/State relations, where both 
legislatures at certain points contradicted or contravened the legislation of the other. 
This phenomenon had been largely ignored under the liberal governments and under 
Fascism. But the nascent republican Constitution, and the Holy See’s insistence on 
the Lateran Pacts forming the basis of Church/State relations under that constitution, 
brought the issue back into focus, and the lay jurists in the Assembly had become 
uneasy. Some Dc deputies, like Igino Giordani, tried to reassure them with recourse 
to a formula about the Church’s widely-known generosity which gave the appearance
730 Ibid., p. 621.
731 Cited in CRAC, vol. 1, p. 618.
732 Ibid.
733 Ibid., p. 679.
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of being rehearsed: “c’e la valvola di revisione o di ‘qualsiasi modificazione 
bilateralmente accettata’. E noi conosciamo dall’esperienza quanto generosa e 
indulgente sia la Chiesa nell’accedere ad istanze ragionevoli. ” 734 Others, like 
Francesco Saverio Nitti (Udn) tried reasoning with the Dc for changes to be made: 
although the Pacts have to be reconfirmed by the Assembly (having been accepted at 
subcommission level, but not yet ratified by the full Assembly), they contain 
controversial elements which in future might need changes “volute consenzialmente 
e imposte dalle necessita. ” 735
(ii) Overlap of ecclesiastical and state legislature
Subcommission 1
As we have seen, incorporating the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution was, for the Dc 
and the Catholic Right, non-negotiable. The implications their inclusion would have 
for Italian State law, however, needed a great deal of clarification. As mentioned in 
Section A2, prior to the Lateran Pacts, the Law of Guarantees regulated any 
discrepancies or overlap between ecclesiastical and state legislation. According to 
article 17, appeals against decisions made by the ecclesiastical authorities had to be 
made through the civil courts and in matters where ecclesiastical law overlapped or 
contravened civil law, the latter took precedence over the former. Hence, on a legal 
level, the Church was subordinate to the State. This situation was changed by the 
Lateran Pacts and thus it became a key reason for the inclusion of the Pacts in the 
Constitution so that the independence (some might even argue ‘supremacy’) of 
ecclesiastical legislation could be maintained In Subcommission 1, Dossetti 
immediately tries to diffuse the issue by saying that “la legislazione ecclesiastica ha 
vigore in Italia appunto in quanto nella legislazione italiana vi e un esplicita rinvio ad 
essa. E questo il principio del rinvio che non menoma affatto la sovranita dello 
Stato.” This is, however, highly unsatisfactory to the laid  since such referral to 
ecclesiastical law can also be seen as a case of subordination in the Italian legal 
system.
Moro rather clumsily asks whether article 5 refers to international treaties (ie. 
which would include the Lateran Treaty), or to international rules in general. He 
says: “Deve essere chiarito cioe se i trattati, una volta stipulati, facciano parte di
734 Ibid., p. 438.
735 Ibid., p. 485.
736 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 725.
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diritto, senza bisogno di una legge applicativa, delPordinamento dello Stato
n'ln
italiano.” This seems like an attempt to clarify how much legal tampering will be 
required to insert the Lateran Treaty into the Italian legal system. Moro appears to 
have somewhat upset proceedings and almost created problems for his own side by 
bringing in this question before the general discussions on the relationship between 
treaties and the new constitution have been completed. Dossetti intervenes to deflect 
the discussion from Moro’s question by making observations on categories of 
international rules of law: “bisogna distinguere: norme di diritto intemazionale 
generale; norme di diritto intemazionale positivo (i trattati); accordi tra Stato e 
Chiesa. ” 738 These observations seem to be a deliberate attempt to put some distance, 
for the meantime, between discussions on treaties and discussions on Church/State 
relations which, in the case of the Pacts, were inextricably linked.
Francesco De Vita (Pri) observes that problems of Church/State relations, 
soluble on political terrain, have slipped quite insidiously onto a juridical level. He 
uses the Church’s control over matrimony to highlight the problem of sovereignty. 
“Riconoscendo, quindi, la sovranita della Chiesa, si vengono a porre gravi limiti alia 
sovranita e ai poteri dello Stato.” 739
Basso (Psi) says that his only concern is that one must affirm in the 
Constitution the principle that the State should not return to a situation where the 
doctrine of natural law is dominant, in other words, that the Church is not allowed to 
legislate on a matter that is strictly the State’s responsibility, nor in matters where 
both sides have responsibility. Spiritual matters are in the hands of the Church; an 
amendment he proposes allows relations with the State to be governed on a 
concordatory basis. He says that no serious argument can be put forward to such a 
provision which, he says, gives the maximum guarantees to the Catholic Church. 
There is no doubt, he says, that on a juridical level, the arguments adopted 
demonstrate that the details of the existing Pacts are not to be included in the 
Constitution and thus considers the proposal by Subcommission 1 to be unacceptable 
to the Socialists’ juridical consciences.740
737 Ibid., p. 779.
738 Ibid.
739 Ibid., p. 782.
740 Ibid., p. 157.
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Subcommission 2(H)
The issue of overlap of State and ecclesiastical legislature was also dealt with briefly 
in Subcommission 2(ii). Like De Vita in Subcommission 1, Calamandrei’s original 
proposal was quite unequivocal:
II potere giudiziario appartiene esclusivamente alio Stato che lo esercita per 
mezzo di giudici indipendenti, isituiti e ordinati secondo le norme della 
presente Costituzione e della legge sull’ordinamento giudiziario. Le sentenze 
e gli altri provedimenti dei giudici sono resi in nome della Repubblica.741
Calamandrei argues that ‘Taffermazione della statualita della giurisdizione esisteva 
gia nello Statuto Albertino, che diceva: ‘La giustizia emana dal Re ’ . ” 742 He goes on 
to point out that there could be problems with sentences passed by ecclesiastical 
tribunals but since these are recorded by the Court of Appeal they come under the 
jurisdiction of the State anyway. 743
Pietro Castiglia (Udn) attempts to resolve the concerns over non-State 
jurisdictional provisions with the second clause of his alternative proposal: “le 
sentenze e gli altri provedimenti giurisdizionali degli Stati stranieri, dei Tribunali 
ecclesiastici per gli effetti civili.. . possono nello Stato avere efficacia nei casi, nei 
limiti e nei modi stabiliti dalle sue leggi. ” 744 He claims that recognising the 
effectiveness of these sentences will not have an adverse effect on the principle of 
State jurisdiction, according to the wording of his proposal.
Calamandrei does not consider it opportune to include in the Constitution any 
questions which could be considered exceptions to the fundamental principle of the 
statality of judicial power. He says that if the Concordat were to remain in force, then 
the recognition of the executive nature of sentences passed by ecclesiastical tribunals 
in matrimonial matters would be on a par with the principle of the statality of judicial 
power. To debate such matters would be beyond the remit of the Subcommission.745 
Aldo Bozzi (Udn) emphasises that the
riconoscimento dell’esecutivita delle sentenze ecclesiastiche in materia 
matrimoniale . . .  non intacca affatto il principio della statualita del potere 
giudiziario, perche in tanto le sentenze dei Tribunali ecclesiastici hanno
741 CRAC, vol. 8, p. 1910.
742 Ibid.
743 Ibid., pp. 1910-11.
744 Ibid., p. 1913.
745 Ibid., pp. 1913-14.
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vigore in Italia, in quanto lo Stato lo ha consentito, proprio nell’esercizio 
della sua sovranita. 46
So as we can see, Subcommission 2(ii) had a much greater awareness of the 
importance of the State maintaining its independence and sovereignty in juridical 
affairs than Subcommission 1. One of the reasons for this could have been its 
formation: the Dc had put most of its experienced jurists and highly politicised young 
politicians (in other words, the ‘big guns’) into Subcommission 1 where they realised 
that Church/State relations would be the key area of debate. The lay parties tended to 
concentrate their legal specialists in the other subcommissions.747
Constituent Assembly
Having dedicated some of his studies to a Tuscan reformer of the 19th century, Piero 
Guicciardini, and had this work published simultaneously by I 'Osservatore Romano 
and Rivista valdese, Stefano Jacini (Dc) hopes that his brothers in the other religious 
denominations do not find any hint of intolerance in his speech. He fears that his 
objectivity in this instance will not endear him to his own group and so he will speak 
independently of them. He considers that the distinction between the four aspects of 
Church/State relations has not been adequately delineated. The first point is that 
some Deputies have talked as if Church/State relations were governed by the Lateran 
Treaty:
II che non e: il Trattato del Laterano e un Trattato diplomatico che si informa 
direttamente al diritto intemazionale e si riferisce alle relazioni fra lo Stato 
italiano e la Santa Sede. Vi e poi il Concordato, che riguarda i rapporti fra 
Stato e Chiesa in Italia, rapporti di carattere pubblico estemo, ma non di 
carattere intemazionale. In terzo luogo deve considerarsi la posizione dei culti 
acattolici, che sono regolati da una legge interna dello Stato italiano [i.e. the 
culti ammessi laws]. E vi sono infine i bisogni, i desideri, le aspirazioni, le 
tenderize, i diritti dei cittadini italiani, in quanto cattolici, i quali costituiscono 
materia di legislazione interna, in cui la Santa Sede non interviene, se non 
come spettatrice benevola, non certo come parte in causa.748
Orazio Condorelli (Bnl) ties himself in a knot when he acknowledges that it is 
only at the point where Church matters and State matters overlap, with potential 
conflict, that there is need for concordatory negotiations, but then sees the problem, 
and locus of this conflict for the la id , also as the solution: “era ben logico che nella
746 Ibid., p. 1916.
747 See Appendix II.
748 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 417.
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formulazione della norma costituzionale si uscisse dall’astratto, e si venisse al 
concrete, dicendo: i rapporti sono regolati dai Patti lateranensi.” 749
None of the parties have suggested nullifying the Lateran Pacts, according to 
Carlo Bassano (Pdl), even though it is generally accepted that in many instances they 
contradict the terms of the new Constitution. He also points out that it would be 
highly unusual for a Treaty to become an integral part of a Constitution. Ruini has 
called for the Pacts to be added to the Italian legislature, but as Bassano rightly 
points out, they have been part of it since the law of 27th May 1929, no. 810.750 
Consequently, he says, there is no need to refer to the Pacts in the Constitution, 
particularly since this would result in the Italian State finding itself in a position of 
inferiority in relation to the Church; a position which, as Calamandrei has already 
pointed out, would be consolidated and aggravated by the second part of the clause 
which states that “qualsiasi modificazione dei Patti, bilateralmente accettata, non 
richiede procedimento di revisione costituzionale.” 751
Indeed, D’Avack confirms Calamandrei’s argument: by including the Lateran 
Pacts not only does the State accept the independence and sovreignty of the Church, 
but in negotiations on matters ecclesiastical the Church will not only have an equal 
footing with the State but will, in any matters covered by articles in the Treaty or the 
Concordat, be the dominant party (with the same rights as any nation-state) . 752
(iii) Amendments to the Pacts
Both of the above issues -  problems with the Treaty and Concordat and the overlap 
of Church/State legislation -  bring us on to the next point, which is a natural 
progression: whether it is opportune, possible and, more importantly, acceptable to 
the Church to amend the Pacts prior to their insertion in the Constitution.
Subcommission 1
Cevolotto thinks that relations between the State and the Catholic Church should be 
included within the framework of religious freedom and relations with churches of 
all faiths. As for formal agreements currently in force, such as the Lateran Accords, 
they should not be mentioned in the Constitution but should be dealt with by special 
legislation, which should in turn be guided strictly by the Constitution. However, he
749 Ibid., p. 447.
750 Ibid., pp. 535-6.
751 Ibid., p. 536.
752 D ’Avack, I  rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa, pp. 101-4.
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does say that given the changes to the Constitution (i.e. the Statuto Albertino which 
until 1st January, 1948 was still in force) he thinks it would be necessary to amend 
article 21 of the Treaty and articles 12, 20 and 42 of the Concordat.753 Cevolotto 
dismisses Dossetti’s concerns regarding prior modification of the Lateran Pacts, 
which he deems absolutely necessary if they are to be inserted in the Constitution. 
Like Luigi Einaudi (Udn) he is concerned in particular with Article 5 of the 
Concordat in relation to apostate priests, article 34 which includes the implicit 
abdication of the State’s right to control matrimony, and article 36 dealing with 
religious education.754
The battle lines are immediately drawn when Dossetti warns that if the 
Constituent Assembly attempts to make amendments to this bilateral agreement it 
risks destroying the distinction between the two parties and “annullando quel
7SSprincipio di liberta che si vuole affermare”. In what appears to be an attempt to test 
the nerve of the revisionists in the Subcommission, Dossetti says that nothing is 
preventing the State from asking the Church to modify certain clauses of the 
Concordat. He says this safe in the knowledge that the Church would object so 
vociferously that it would cause serious embarassment for the Assembly and the 
government.756 In another attempt by Dossetti to put the Subcommission to the test, 
and in response to grave concerns about Article 5 of the Concordat, he says that if it 
is so unacceptable to the other parties, then the only legitimate course of action 
would be “che lo Stato italiano facesse presente alia Chiesa Tintolleranza di una 
vaste parte dell’opinione pubblica nei riguardi del suddetto articolo e ne chiedesse la
7S7soppressione o la modificazione.”
Togliatti (Pci), who by this time has modified his position, recognises the 
difficulty of the situation: the reality of the existing Pacts, the principle of the 
independence of the State from the Church and the complete liberty of conscience 
and cult. He states that none of the parties want to demand modification of the Pacts 
at the price of nullifying those in existence, but points out the discrepancy between 
the Pacts as regards the religion of state and the constitutional aim of equality of 
rights for all religions. He proposes a solution to this problem, different from his 
original ‘termini concordatari’ proposal, by suggesting that the Church “regola i suoi
753 ACD, Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° Sottocommissione. Relazione 
del Deputato Mario Cevolotto sui ‘Rapporti fra Stato e Chiesa (Liberta religiosa)’, pp.37-42.
754 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 719.
755 Ibid., p. 720.
756 Ibid.
757 Ibid., p. 759.
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rapporti con lo Stato per mezzo dell’esistente Concordato. ” 758 He declares himself 
against the insertion in the Constitution of a reference to the independence of the 
Church from the State which is more suited to a treaty of public law or of
7SQphilosophy.
It gives Umberto Merlin (Dc) a great deal of satisfaction to know that 
Togliatti both accepts the indissolubility of the Pacts and that he does not want to 
disturb the pace religioso that exists in Italy. He disagrees with Cevolotto who, he 
claims, wants the destruction of the Concordat inasmuch as he attacked the Church’s 
right to sole jurisdiction in the fundamental areas of marriage and the competence of 
ecclesiastical tribunals in matrimonial matters, on which Merlin later affirms that “la 
Santa Sede si dimostrera assolutamente intransigente. ” 760 Merlin assures the 
Assembly that “la Chiesa. . .  ha gia cominciato essa stessa a modificare alcune 
disposizioni del Concordato, come quelle relative al giuramento dei Vescovi e alle 
preghiere per il Capo dello Stato. ” 761 Merlin says that only when Cevolotto accepts 
that the Treaty and the Concordat must not be touched can they find agreement.762
Marchesi states that the Communists have never and would never deny the 
international juridical nature of the Holy See nor call for any changes to the Pacts.
He only requires that the Constitution should not be bound by the Concordat’s rules 
which he hopes will survive until circumstances and the wisdom of the two
763contracting parties move with the juridical and political conscience of the times.
Cevolotto launches into a detailed argument against the inclusion of the Pacts 
in the Constitution. His first point is that there is no need for the Pacts to be included: 
“i Patti Lateranensi sono ormai una realta indistruttibile” and no-one wants to destroy 
Vatican State, but exactly because they continue to exist there is no need to mention 
the Pacts nor any other treaty. 764 Moreover within the Pacts there are transitory 
sections which can be modified in the future thus avoiding the need to crystallise the 
Treaty with the Holy See in the Constitution. He argues that international treaties are
Ibid., p. 721.
760 Ibid., pp. 723-4.
761 Ibid., p. 724.
762 Ibid.
763 Ibid., p. 759.
764 D ’Avack agrees with this assessment o f the situation: “anche senza questo espresso e formale 
richiamo della norma costituzionale, i Patti Lateranensi avrebbero continuato a conservare pieno 
valore ed inalterata efficacia sia nell’ordine intemazionale, sia in quello intemo italiano.” D ’Avack, /  
rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa, p. 107.
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continually being modified and including the Treaty in the Constitution would 
impede the process of any future modifications of i t
Merlin (Dc) pronounces himself in favour of Togliatti’s proposal as one 
which will not disturb the religious peace in Italy. He says that both Togliatti and 
Marchesi are substantially in agreement with the Christian Democrat members as 
regards relations being conducted “in termini concordatari” and not tampering too 
much with the Pacts 766
What follows after Merlin’s accommodating response to Togliatti is perhaps 
the perfect illustration of De Gasperi’s comments mentioned earlier, in relation to the 
opposition’s provoking hostility. Merlin had just suggested that the Dc might accept 
Togliatti’s ‘in termini concordatari’. He even goes so far as to say that in relation to 
the problematic article 5 of the Concordat, Dc members of the Subcommission, 
“anche essi sono contrari al famoso articolo 5”, and then ends on the defensive note 
“che pero, ha avuto una sola applicazione nel caso Buonaiuti.” But instead of 
letting this defensive comment pass, not even the supreme conciliator Togliatti can 
stop himself from replying that “quell’articolo e stato applicato anche in un altro 
caso, riguardante un prefetto. ” 768 Instead of consolidating a movement towards 
harmony, a momentary lapse is transformed at least in terms of the atmosphere of the 
exchange, into an irredeemable blunder. In the few seconds it must have taken for 
Togliatti to undulge his corrective instinct, Merlin’s own attitude is itself transformed 
into one of barely concealed implacable opposition. He responds as if speaking on 
behalf of the Holy See:
la Santa Sede non sarebbe forse aliena dal consentire ad una modifica di 
quell’articolo, quando le si facesse presente che esso non corrisponde piu al 
nuova clima del Paese, dopo aver preso la solenne deliberazione di inserire i 
Patti Lateranensi nella Costituzione.769
The article [5 of the Concordat] towards which the Dc members were themselves 
opposed has now become one which the Church might be willing to modify once it 
has been demonstrated that it no longer corresponds to the new climate in the nation. 
But even this, Merlin now makes clear, after the “solenne deliberazione” to include 
the Pacts in the Constitution. He now claims that if they were to vote for Togliatti’s
765 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 783.
766 See ibid.
767 Ibid.
768 Ibid., p. 784.
769 Ibid.
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proposal, the Holy See might suspect that they are actually calling for a new 
Concordat -  something which the Dc party must vote against. Merlin invites them to 
support the President’s proposal with the proviso that the articles such as the one in
*770question, might be reviewed by both parties when appropriate to do so. It is very 
clear that beneath the juridical, and other, arguments on this issue there lay 
sensitivities ready to erupt.
All Togliatti can do now in response is to claim that the Communists have no 
intention of even bringing up the problem of a revision of the Pacts, although they 
consider that the arguments presented so far have not succeeded in justifying the
771inclusion of the Pacts in the Constitution.
Basso doesn’t understand the reason for including the Lateran Pacts in the 
new Constitution since Catholics have never called for them to be inserted into the 
Albertine Statute. He says that in order to secure the future of the pace religiosa, it 
would be useful for Italy to have a Concordat approved by a government which is a 
legitimate expression of the people’s wishes.772 He says that the concept of the 
accords with the Holy See complies with the wishes of the Italian people, but the 
individual decrees do not, and some need to be modified or updated. He states that 
no-one, including the Socialist party, wants to disturb the pace religiosa. However, 
the Socialists do want this peace to rest on a solid base, not a Concordat which 
contains decrees contrary to their juridical and civil consciences. He declares that the 
modification of some of the articles is necessary and that moreover one cannot at the 
same time declare that the Concordat should be inserted wholesale into the 
Constitution. He then points out some of the discrepancies: article 5 offends two 
demands of the Constitution -  the independence of the State and equal status of 
citizens; article 36 talks of religious education as based on the principles of the 
Catholic Church and thus offends the equal status of citizens belonging to different 
faiths; and article 20 relating to bishops being sworn in by the king. He adds that his 
party sees no problem in affirming the independence of the Church and other 
principles of a constitutional nature; but they do not want the wholesale insertion of 
the Concordat. He recognises that the Concordat brought the pace religiosa to Italy, 
but considers it perfectly acceptable not to recognise that the specific form given at 
that time to the document is compatible with current circumstances.773
770 Ibid.
7771 Ibid.
7772 Ibid., p. 785.
7773 Ibid., p. 786.
227
The second clause as it was proposed by the first Subcommission does not 
cause Mortati (Dc) concern: juridically and politically, he thinks it is the natural 
progression of the first and has the added benefit of preventing the State from acting 
unilaterally in an area which clearly needs bilateral agreement. He thinks Togliatti’s 
amendment is absurd as it would stipulate relations negotiated on a concordatory 
basis while ignoring the Concordat currently in force. He says another absurd 
scenario would follow if the Church were to dig its heels in on matters of State 
sovereignty, since there would always be the possibility of a revision of the 
Concordat.774
Giua (Psi) brings a vigorous, if not juridically precise argument back to the 
Fascist question. By accepting in full the Pacts, the Dc party is creating links, 
whether it wants to or not, with the work of Fascism (which, he says, was not the 
choice of the Italian people). If they are arguing that the Lateran Pacts are the direct 
manifestation of the wishes of the Italian people, then why can they not accept that 
Church/State relations are regulated on a concordatory basis? Plainly, if the Italian 
people have already demonstrated their wishes then there is no need to go backwards 
(i.e. and throw out the Lateran Pacts). But why, he asks, close the door on future 
pacts that might arise between the Vatican and the Italian State which might even 
improve on existing ones. He says the Dc’s position -  that the Lateran Pacts are non- 
negotiable -  is a principle he cannot accept. The Pacts are synonymous with Fascist 
politics, and when the Italian people consider that the time is right to discuss those
775politics more seriously, they have the right to review the Pacts.
Terracini (Pci) admits that although the annulment of the Treaty and 
Concordat is not possible, neither can they be cast in stone. Due to the sense of 
continuity that the Constitution must have, every contractual arrangement (including 
the Lateran Pacts) must be subject to amendment. He points out that Moro himself 
has recognised that several articles in the Concordat can already be considered 
invalidated, which raises the question of whether they can insert into the Constitution 
a pact which does not exist in its entirety. 776
774 Ibid., p. 153.
775 Ibid., pp. 153-4.
776 Ibid., p. 155.
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Constituent Assembly
Calamandrei announces his (albeit extremely hypothetical) willingness to co-operate 
with Dc demands: in future debates on this article he could be agreeable to the 
Constitution expressly including all the articles of the Lateran Pacts; he would also 
agree to the Italian Republic openly proclaiming itself to be a confessional state. But 
if this is to be the case, he says, it must be stated clearly and not furtively slipped in 
with a whispered reference to it so that anyone without knowledge of the Pacts 
would not realise that many of its articles contrast with the articles of the 
Constitution. Calamandrei mentions that while in America, De Gasperi met 
representatives of 25 protestant religious groups who asked him if the Lateran 
Concordat would be included in the Constitution. De Gasperi replied that he didn’t 
believe the ‘terms of the Concordat’ would be included. Calamandrei says this was 
the truth -  they have not been expressly included, they are only there by implication. 
But he says the Constitution must be read in the light of their inclusion. So that to 
article 5 (draft) of the Constitution stating that Church and State are independent and 
sovereign, one must add article 1 of the Treaty stating that Catholicism is the religion 
of State. He goes on to cite other examples: article 7 (draft) and article 5 
(Concordat); article 27 (draft) and article 36 (Concordat); article 94 (draft) and article 
34 (Concordat) 777
In yet another example of Stefano Riccio (Dc) either talking with some 
authority, making a big assumption, or attempting to appease the Left with rhetoric, 
he suggests that “se qualche modifica sara ritenuta necessaria, lo Stato potra proporla 
e l’accordo certamente sara raggiunto con la Chiesa.” 778 Riccio also addresses 
amendments by Bruni and Crispo to the wording of Article 5 (draft) in relation to the 
discrepancies between various articles of the Concordat and of the Constitution: 
Bruni’s amendment brought in a reference to the aconfessionality of the State and the 
equality of rights laid out in articles 5, 14 and 15 (all draft) and contradicting Article 
5 of the Concordat. Crispo suggested the following amendment to Article 5 of the 
Constitution: “sono regolati dai Patti lateranensi, in quanto non siano contrari alia 
presente Costituzione.” 779 He points out discrepancies between Article 36 of the 
Concordat on religious education and Article 27 (draft) of the Constitution on
777 Although he uses these examples, as he says, only to highlight the need for clarity in the 
methodology o f constructing the new Constitution, it is clearly an opportunity for him to question the 
merit o f  including the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution and reinforce his case for amendments to the 
Pacts. CRAC, vol. 1, p. 161-2.
778 Ibid., p. 385.
779 Ibid., p. 390.
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freedom of art and science and between Article 34 of the Concordat on ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction and Article 94 (draft) of the Constitution which declares the sole 
jurisdiction of the State on Italian territory.780
Riccio makes a rather bullish and, in the light of the numerous points raised 
in the debates, extravagant assertion: “Diciamo subito che non vi e nei patti 
lateranensi nulla che contrasti con i principi di liberta e di eguaglianza dei 
cittadini.” 781 He mentions article 6  (draft) as laying out the foundations of man’s 
social and economic dignity, but then says ‘how much more important it is for man 
to seek ethical and religious dignity’. He argues that if Catholics believe that this is 
where their true salvation lies then no-one can deny them this. Riccio appeals to the 
costituenti to leave the Pacts untouched by referring to the wishes of many in the 
Assembly, including Togliatti, that
I problemi gia risolti nel passato non ci interessano piu, ma cerchiamo che 
quelle posizioni che hanno conquistato i nostri padri, i nostri avi, attraverso 
lotte memorabili, e che hanno un valore permanente, in quanto rappresentano 
conquista della nostra coscienza, non vadano perdute 782
Gerardo Bruni (Partito sociale cristiano) sees the issue of amending the Pacts 
as a clear choice:
O fare lo Stato confessionale, con tutte le sue logiche conseguenze, come 
esplicitamente lo vogliono i Patti lateranensi, e, in tal caso, bisognerebbe 
modificare sensibilmente gli articoli 7 e 14, o fare lo Stato aconfessionale, 
come lo vogliono gli articoli 7 e 14, ed allora bisogna sopprimere o 
modificare il secondo comma dell ’articolo 5 . . . Qui non e soltanto questione 
di logica, ma di elementare onesta. . .  La legislazione italiana sui rapporti tra 
Stato e Chiesa non pud continuare a dibattersi. . .  in una continua 
contraddizione, in un continuo compromesso tra vecchio e nuovo, che turba 
la pace della Nazione.783
This is the clearest analysis of the problem thus far by a costituente. Bruni describes 
the Pacts as a foreign body which, if included in the Constitution, would strike a fatal 
blow to ‘our young, emerging Republic’. He suggests the following amendment to
780 Article 94 (draft) states, “La funzione giurisdizionale, espressione della sovranita della Repubblica, 
e esercitata in nome del popolo.”
781 Ibid.
782 Ibid., p. 391.
783 Ibid., p. 406. All the articles referred to by Brum in all extracts of this speech are articles o f the 
Constitution, except where indicated otherwise. However, he is confusing the issue by referring to 
final article 7 and draft articles 14 and 15 at the same time. Draft article 5 (final article 7) had by this 
time undergone a series o f voting, with some deputies referring to its new final article number and 
others still referring to the original draft number, hence the confusion.
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the second clause of article 5 (draft): “I loro rapporti sono regolati dai Patti 
lateranensi, in quanto non entrino in conflitto con il carattere aconfessionale dello 
Stato e con il principio di uguaglianza dei diritti di cui agli articoli 7, 14 e 15 della
7 8  Apresente Costituzione.” This would, he says, avoid any conflict between both the 
aconfessionale nature of the State, as he envisages it, and articles 7 and 14 (draft). In 
this way the revision, but, he emphasises, only the revision, of the Pacts remains 
constitutionally possible. Future legislation could result directly from the application 
of these articles without embarrassment for the legislators. In this way the Italian 
State could approach any future bilateral negotiations for the revision of the Pacts 
from a position of strength, using the aconfessional character of the State to ensure 
equality of rights for all citizens whatever their religious beliefs.785 
Bruni then attempts to reason with his opponents:
Questa mi pare essere la sola via della sincerita, dell’onore, della saggezza 
politica. Gli onorevoli colleghi democristiani non possono negare 
ragionevolmente il loro appoggio al mio emendamento senza farci sorgere il 
sospetto che si voglia giocare colTarticolo 5 [i.e. of the Concordat] per 
eludere, almeno in parte, cio che si dice negli articoli 7, 14 e 15. (Commenti 
al centro). Io Tho presentato nella supposizione che si voglia mantenere in 
piedi l’impalcatura delTarticolo 5 [Concordat], mentre dichiaro che sarei 
pronto a ritirarlo qualora si giudicasse preferibile includere la menzione dei 
Patti, per esempio, tra le ‘disposizioni transitori e fma\i\ in attesa della loro 
revisione, o qualora, in altra parte qualsiasi del testo, fosse comunque fatta 
con quelle cautele che sono nello spirito del mio emendamento.786
Comparing the problems faced by the Church when it secured the Lateran 
Pacts for itself, to the post-war atmosphere of liberty and co-operation, Concetto 
Marchesi (Pci) says,
Di fronte al fascismo violatore di ogni coscienza e di ogni liberta, la Chiesa 
cattolica affermava la proprio supremazia morale e sopra i deliii di una 
scomposta tirannia, poneva la stabilita e I’altezza del suo insegnamento 
religioso. Ma . .. oggi e la stessa cosa? Interpretando il primo articolo del 
Trattato . . .  giungereste alle medesime conclusioni di allora, del 1929? Oggi, 
in cui Tonorevole La Pira, ferventissima anima cattolica, nel quattordicesimo 
articolo della sua relazione, propone che ogni cittadini abbia la liberta di 
esprimere con ogni mezzo le proprie opinioni e i propri pensieri, oggi noi 
stiamo certamente in una diversa situazione . . .  Gia la modificabilita dei Patti 
lateranensi era affermata nelTarticolo 44 del Concordato, il quale diceva: ‘Se 
in awenire sorgesse qualche difficolta sulla interpretazione del presente 
Concordato, la Santa Sede e Tltalia procederanno di commune intelligenza ad
784 Ibid., p. 409.
785 Ibid.
786 Ibid., p. 409.
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una amichevole soluzione. ’ Si parla di interpretazione, ma noi sappiamo, e la 
Chiesa sa, e voi sapete, che interpretare significa spesso creare, e l’interprete
% • 787e spesso ncreatore.
He then mentions that the Pope himself has indicated that there may be the 
possibility of revising certain sections if the need arose. Marchesi argues that if this 
did not happen and the whole Concordat was inserted, then the Constituent Assembly 
would be giving the Holy See the right not to negotiate on such inconsistencies. 
Marchesi goes on:
L’onorevole La Pira . .. osservava in quel discorso che abbiamo ascoltato con 
vivo interesse, che i Patti esistono, sono una realta concreta, e bisogna 
pertanto riconoscerli. Ma, onorevoli colleghi, non tutto quello che esiste si 
pud e si deve riconoscere. La Costituzione deve contenere quelle norme che 
hanno validita oggi e piu ne avranno domani; non quelle che sono gia 
bisognose di cancellatura e di correzione, come voi stessi avete riconosciuto. 
Noi vogliamo che questi Patti lateranensi non entrino nell’ossatura e non 
divengano parte del nuovo Stato; vogliamo che essi abbiano vigore come gli 
altri trattati, con quel senso di speciale osservanza che devono avere per noi 
italiani. Questa discussione non l’abbiamo voluta noi. Voi l’avete voluta: 
nessuno di voi poteva immaginare che sarebbe rimasto awolto nel silenzio il 
tentative di inserire quei Patti nella Costituzione repubblicana d’Italia. Con 
quei Patti, certamente una nuova storia e incominciata nei rapporti fra la 
Chiesa e lo Stato italiano. Noi vogliamo che quella Storia non si arresti; noi 
vogliamo che quei Patti siano mantenuti, anzi, siano resi piu validi in un’aria 
piu limpida di liberta e di sincerita.788
Jacini (Dc) claims there are as many clauses in the Concordat which would 
jar on a Catholic conscience as there are that would displease a democratic 
conscience and so revision would not be such a grave problem as some costituenti 
have made out:
non e con uno spirito di intolleranza e di clericalismo che noi chiediamo la 
conservazione dei Patti del Laterano; la chiediamo da un punto di vista 
storico, perche riteniamo che solo in questo modo si possa garantire la pace 
religiosa. Dal testo dell’articolo 5 emerge che noi facciamo riferimento ai 
Patti lateranensi, soprattutto come ad una fonte della norma giuridica sancita 
dalla Costituzione. Se le norme in parola facessero singolarmente parte 
integrante della Costituzione, non basterebbe un accordo bilaterale per 
modificarle, ne tanto meno si potrebbe dire che possono eventualmente 
modificarsi senza richiedere un procedimento di revisione costituzionale; 
rimane quindi aperta la porta ad una revisione per via di semplici accordi 
bilateralmente concordati, mentre il principio di una separazione amichevole,
787 Ibid., p. 411.
788 Ibid., pp. 411-12.
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onesta, rispettosa, come e nel desiderio di tutti, e proprio sancita dal primo 
comma dell’articolo 5.789
Condorelli (Bnl) typifies the intransigence of the Catholic Right and their 
assumption that not accepting the Concordat as it stands equates to denouncing it: “la 
Costituzione in cui e recepito ci obbliga a considerarlo come una legge 
costituzionale, e per modificarlo unilateralmente, cioe denunciarlo, dobbiamo 
raggiungere quelle determinate maggioranze necessarie per il processo di 
revisione.”790 He emphasises the formula put out by the Church in relation to both 
documents (‘simul stabant simul cadenf) and says that many lay jurists agree with it. 
He also points out that Article 44 of the Concordat allows for joint reinterpretation of 
the document and that any conflict should not lead to denunciation but renewed
7Q1negotiations to find such an interpretation. If on the other hand the Assembly sees 
fit to modify the Concordat unilaterally, he says all they have to do is adjust the 
wording in draft articles 76 and 83 (which provide for parliamentary authorisation 
for revision of treaties) to include Concordats and the problem is resolved. Although 
the problem might well have been overcome in this way, such a move would 
certainly have antagonised the Church and would potentially have caused a rift in 
Church/State relations: for the majority of the Assembly, this was something to be 
avoided at all costs.
Arturo Labriola (Udn) puts on the agenda the following item for discussion:
L’Assemblea, convinta dell’opportunity di modificare o togliere dalle parti in 
esame del progetto di Costituzione le formali proposte che appaiono 
superflue o giuridicamente inesatte; convinta altresi che i principl fissati 
all’articolo 5 del progetto in esame non rispondono alio spirito laico delle 
istituzioni repubblicane; passa all’ordine del giomo.792
He begins by delineating the component parts of the Pacts.
I Patti Lateranensi consistono: in un Trattato che costituisce lo Stato della 
Citta del Vaticano; in un Concordato riguardante la materia ecclesiastica ed i 
rapporti fra lo Stato italiano e le autorita ecclesiastiche; in un insieme di 
accordi finanziari, riguardanti rapporti di dare e avere fra i due poteri 
(peraltro di dare da parte dello Stato italiano, di avere da parte della Chiesa: 
come al solito!) Ho distinto fra atto costitutivo dello Stato della Citta del
789 Ibid., pp. 420-21.
790 Ibid., p. 448.
791 Ibid.
792 Ibid., p. 479.
233
Vaticano (trattato politico) e Concordato, pur non ignorando che il 
Concordato e un trattato.7 3
He reduces the problem to its simplest terms: a treaty cannot become part of a 
constitution because treaties are temporary documents, able to be modified and 
annulled, while constitutions, in theory at least, contain conditions which have a 
juridical stability.
Ma, se nella costituzione si considera la sua mutabilita, questa e un’altra 
ragione, opposta e non meno fondata per non includervi trattati. II principio 
pacta sunt servanda implica che un trattato non puo essere modificato 
unilateralmente, puo solo essere annullato unilateralmente; mentre una 
Costituzione si puo sviluppare e modificare. C’e tuttavia una ragione 
fondamentale, dipendente dalla natura dei due istituti (Costituzione e trattato), 
che esclude la trasfusione e il trapiantamento del trattato nella Costituzione.
L’indole di una Costituzione e un rapporto fra cittadini e Stato, o fra cittadini 
e cittadini. L'indole di un trattato e un rapporto fra Stato e Stato. La diversita 
dei due istituti spiega la loro necessaria separazione pratica. . .  
Sull’impossibilita d ’includere un trattato in una Costituzione, vale la 
considerazione riguardante l’estinzione dei trattati. La teoria e la pratica 
ammettono che ‘vi sono casi in cui la volonta unilaterale puo abolire il 
trattato. ’ {Nuovo Digesto Italiano). Vi e contraddizione nel fatto che il 
Progetto di Costituzione prevede la revisione della Costituzione (articoli 130- 
131), e poi vuole inserire un trattato nella Costituzione. Se pacta sunt 
servanda, come si possono esporre i Patti stessi ad una revisione? La 
prospettiva di revisione della Costituzione ci richiama al sistema 
dell’annullamento dei trattati. Essi possono essere annullati per volonta di una 
delle parti. E un diritto che compete ad ogni Stato ‘quando siano mutate le 
eircostanze di fatto che avevano influito sulla conclusione del trattato [Nuovo 
Digesto Italiano] ’ ,794
He cites a number of examples of states annulling treaties and continues:
Del resto, e pratica ammessa che la guerra produce Pannullamento dei trattati. 
Ora, se il Vaticano puo unilateralmente abolire i Patti Lateranensi (per 
esempio il Concordato, che per ammissione univoca e un trattato); e se i Patti 
Lateranensi siano inclusi nella Costituzione, potremmo riconoscere a uno 
Stato straniero il diritto di modificare la nostra Costituzione?795
Dossetti argues that having already applied the concept o f originarieta to 
both Church and State, and having established that each institution is, therefore, 
distinct but equal and thus prohibited from legislating unilaterally on any shared
794 Ibid., p. 480.
795 Ibid.
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interest, consequently the principle of bilaterality must also be applied to
796Church/State relations as delineated by the Lateran Pacts of 1929.
Even though articles in the Concordat impinge on state jurisdiction in the new 
Republic, their amendment is impossible and unconstitutional without the agreement 
of the Church. As a result the State would find itself in a subordinate position to the 
Church in ecclesiastical matters and would be faced with the choice of either 
acceding to Church demands without the possibility of a veto, or else renouncing all 
amendment of such material and prohibiting any constitutional regulations being 
drawn up:
il che praticamente significa uno Stato completamente ligio e sottoposto 
all’autorita della Chiesa, senza alcuna possibility di sottrarsi ad essa, cioe uno 
Stato subordinato alia Chiesa in guisa tale, quale non fu mai nell’epoca del 
piu acceso e fervente confessionalismo.797
(iv) Constitutionalisation of the Pacts
Whether the Pacts, once inserted in the Constitution, could be modified or annulled, 
and, if so, whether individual parties or both parties had the right to do so, was 
pivotal to the issue of the constitutionalisation of the Pacts. A key point of debate 
was whether the inclusion of the Pacts in the Constitution meant that they were 
‘norme puramente di legge’ or ‘norme costituzionali’. D’Avack believed that Vatican 
intransigence was at the heart of the problem for the Assembly:
in base alFultima parte del secondo coma delFart. 7 (i.e. in the final version), 
la Chiesa puo, in questo caso, rifiutando ogni riesame della questione, e in 
particolare ogni riesame dei casi di contrasto concretatasi per la nuova 
situazione, rendere impossibile ogni revisione bilaterale e corazzare quindi le 
norme lateranensi con quella fittizia rigidita di norme costituzionale, che 
anche per riconoscimento dei costituenti cattolici esse in realta non 
possiedono. Ma cio sarebbe, oltre tutto, anche un abuso giuridico, perche nel 
momento stesso in cui (almeno per bocca dei propri ideali rappresentanti) si 
afferma il principio che il regolamento dei rapporti tra Stato e Chiesa 
dev’essere bilaterale e concordatario, e che proprio questo e il piu vero 
significato dell’art. 7, non si puo frustrare questo spirito e questa regola di 
accordo opponendosi a priori a qualunque ipotesi di revisione.798
796 Ibid., p. 552.
797 D ’Avack, I  rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa, pp. 109-10.
798 Ibid., p. 322.
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Subcommission 1
Marchesi (Pci) forcefully objects to the constitutionalisation of Article 5 of the 
Concordat which
deve considerarsi una grossa spina confitta nel cuore della pace religiosa che 
si e creata, sul cui solco non comprendo perche si sia voluto gettare il germe 
di una lotta religiosa che i comunisti intendono scongiurare e che, qualunque 
parte prevalga, non potra dare buoni frutti.799
Perassi (Pri) says he will vote for Togliatti’s ‘termini concordatari’ 
amendment and believes that this is not the time for any discussion of the Treaty and 
Concordat. He limits his argument to juridical and constitutional matters. In fact, he 
makes a personal attack on Moro who, although “sia persona di molta autorita, 
questo e indubbiamente un problema che supera la sua competenza.”800 This is quite 
a put-down for one of the Dc’s brightest young politicians. Perassi is against 
constitutionalising the Lateran Pacts because, he argues, there is no reason to make a 
special case of them and not do the same for other international treaties. He says it is 
proper that Togliatti’s amendment (not making reference to the Pacts currently in 
force) by using a more general terminology (“termini concordatari”) means not 
touching the Pacts at all. It is a principle of international law bound by solemn 
declarations that not even a Constitution can touch existing conventions, as they 
remain in force until such time as they are modified or revoked, according to the 
principles by which they are governed. The essential reason for not including an 
explicit reference to the Pacts is that treating them in this way would set a legal 
precedent where the juridical regulation and control of them would differ from that 
of other treaties. He will vote for the amendment as it represents a major concession 
according to many costituentim
Constituent Assembly
Calamandrei talks extensively on the need for clarity in the Constitution and how the 
Draft does not meet up to such a basic requirement, both from the point of view of
homogeneity of language and articles, however well crafted, that do not reflect the
802economic and social difficulties faced by post-war Italy. He is particularly 
concerned that by the end of the draft phase of discussions many Dc politicians are
799 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 758.
800 Ibid., p. 154.
801 Ibid.
802 CRAC, vol. l,pp . 154-166.
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already talking about the Lateran Pacts as if their insertion in the Constitution is 
guaranteed, when there is still, in theory, the possibility that the Assembly will reject 
their inclusion.803
Citing the incongruous situation of a treaty finding its way into a constitution, 
Benedetto Croce (Pli) speaks plainly against the Pacts:
e come mai a questo trattato in sede di Costituzione si puo aggiungere 
Lirrevocability, cioe l’obbligo di non mai denunciarlo o (che vale lo stesso) di 
modificarlo solo con l’accordo dell’altra parte, mentre l’una delle due, cioe 
Paltro Stato, non interviene e non puo intervenire come contraente in questo 
atto intemo e quell’obbligo resta unilaterale, ossia appartiene a uno di quei 
monologhi che, come argutamente e stato osservato, nel testo presente si 
altemano coi dialoghi. Parlai io solo in Senato, nel 1929, contro i Patti 
lateranensi; ma anche allora dichiarai nettamente che non combattevo l’idea 
delle conciliazioni tra Stato e Chiesa, desiderata e piu volte tentata dai nostri 
uomini di Stato liberali, perche la mia ripugnanza e opposizione si riferiva a 
quel caso particolare di conciliazione effetuato non con una Italia libera, ma 
con una Italia serva e per mezzo delPuomo che Paveva asservita, e che, fuori 
di ogni spirito di religione come di pace, compieva quell’atto per trame 
nuovo prestigio e rafforzare la sua tirannia . . .  Si dira che la strana inclusione 
nella Costituzione vuol essere una assicurazione verso Pawenire; ma quando 
mai parole come quelle legano Pawenire? . . .  Se quella inclusione, che e uno 
stridente errore logico e uno scandalo giuridico, e troppo fragile o illusorio 
riparo verso Pawenire, perche ofFende il senso giuridico che e stato sempre 
cosi alto in Italia e che solo il fascismo ha osato calpestare?804
Meuccio Ruini (Udn), President of the Commission for the Constitution, 
compares three proposals for the wording of the draft article 5 (Final article 7).
Delle tre formule che sono state discusse: -1) i rapporti fra Stato e Chiesa 
sono regolati da patti concordati; 2) dai patti concordati; 3) dai Patti 
lateranensi -  anche la prima (da patti concordati) implica gia un 
riconoscimento tacito dei Patti lateranensi che sono i patti concordati in 
vigore. Le altre due aggiungono di piu. Lasciando stare la parola 
‘lateranensi’, dove stride il ricordo mussoliniano, ambedue, pur non 
inserendo veramente quei Patti nella Costituzione (ed e affermazione inesatta) 
danno ai patti stessi. . . uno speciale valore costituzionale.805
Behind the technical questions lie the ideological differences between the 
proponents of the lay democracy and the Catholic democracy, according to Ruini. 
Furthermore, each ideology has its own traditions and definitions: but agreement 
between them is essential for the development of the Italian Republic:
803 Ibid., p. 160.
804 Ibid., p. 338.
805 Ibid., p. 349.
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Tutti gli oratori dell’estrema sinistra hanno qui dichiarato che non pensano a 
denunziare i Patti lateranensi: ma a perfezionarli e migliorarli, d’accordo con 
la Chiesa, al momento opportuno. E chiaro che, se noi ridestiamo il contrasto 
religioso, non sono solo in pericolo, amico Nenni, le riforme sociali: v’e 
qualcosa di piu in pericolo, lo stesso awenire del Paese. E allora? E possibile 
un accordo, una formula che consente alia Santa Sede un riconoscimento dei 
patti dalla Repubblica, ed alio Stato di non vincolare la propria posizione 
costituzionale? Lasciate che io mi unisca al voto ed all’appello delFonorevole 
Orlando, che e stata ripetuta da Togliatti ed altri; si trovi la formula 
conciliatrice, che senza ferire il punto fondamentale delle due parti, eviti di 
riaccendere una guerra religiosa, esiziale per il nostro Paese.80
Amerigo Crispo (Udn) analyses the significance of incorporating the Pacts in 
the Constitution:
Significa questo: immobilizzarli, cristallizzarli. . .  non essendo ammessa 
revisione costituzionale. Ne occorreva dirlo, perche si tratta di patti bilaterali, 
ed e evidente che lo Stato, cioe una delle parti, non potra riesaminarli e 
modificarli per conto proprio.807
Indeed any modification would, he claims, undermine the rigid nature of the 
Constitution. Furthermore, if the Pacts are inserted into the Constitution, then both 
documents would become one entity, so that the Pacts could not then be modified 
anyway. He quotes Pius XII’s intransigent remark ‘simul stabant, simul cadenf and 
controversially states his belief that the discrepancies between the Constitution and 
the Concordat must necessarily signal the downfall of the Treaty, thus reigniting the 
Roman Question. To this end, he proposes a substitute first clause for article 5 
(draft): “Lo Stato riconosce I’indipendenza della Chiesa cattolica, con la quale 
continuera a regolare i suoi rapporti per mezzo di Patti concordatari.”808 He allows 
for the possibility of this proposal being thrown out by suggesting an additional 
phrase to be added to the second clause: after the wording: “i loro rapporti sono 
regolati dai Patti lateranensi”, he suggests the following: “in quanto non siano 
contrari alia presente Costituzione”,809 a suggestion to which there are the inevitable 
6 comment? . He closes by sternly criticising the members of the Constituent 
Assembly and particularly the Commission of 75 for wanting to reunite the 
Constitution of 1849, which proclaimed the fall of the Church’s temporal powers, 
with the current one, which is effectively reinstating them via the renewed political 








situation has the effect of “retrocedendo nel tempo, e rinnegando i maggiori valori 
ideali del nostro Risorgimento. Ed e dawero strano che proprio io debbo ricordare 
questo ai soci fondatori della Repubblica italiana.” 810
Francesco Saverio Nitti (Udn) is saddened by the inclusion in the 
Constitution of article 5 (draft) in its current form.
E cosa che non avrei preveduta e che ora non mi spiego. I Patti del Laterano 
non riguardano in nulla la materia della Costituzione. E, perche si pensa di 
fame materia di un articolo speciale della Costituzione? Si crede forse di 
garantime non solo l’esistenza, ma la durata? La Costituzione che noi 
prepariamo non e tale che possa con la sua durata garantire patti solenni e di 
durata indefinita. La verita e dunque che i Patti Lateranensi non danno 
maggiore garanzia, ne maggiore sicurezza di durata, se messi nella 
Costituzione.811
According to Calamandrei, the second clause of article 5 is problematical.
The Dc representatives consider it to have the value of an historical fact which 
cannot be ignored by the Constitution. Calamandrei admits that he would not be 
averse to mentioning the Pacts in the Constitution and for this reason he has been in 
favour of a preamble to the document. But the moment such a reference forms part of 
an article, and thus becomes legally binding (in other words: ‘constitutionalised’), the 
consequences are very grave. The first consequence is that, the Lateran Pacts, once 
they form part of the Constitution, are not able to be modified without the consent of 
another power. He questions whether the mandate they have been given by the 
people of Italy to form the new Constitution includes renouncing Italian sovereignty 
which, he says, “e nostro dovere affermare, difendere e tener alta ed intatta nella 
nostra Costituzione. ” 812 The second consequence of constitutionalisation of the Pacts 
is even worse: the surreptitious introduction of articles and clauses within the Pacts 
that contradict bona fide articles of the Constitution. Calamandrei identifies in 
general terms some of the contradictions:
II principio della uguaglianza dei cittadini di fronte alia legge, della liberta di 
coscienza, della liberta di insegnamento, il principio della attribuzione 
esclusiva alio Stato della funzione giurisdizionale, tutti questi principi 
costituzionali sono menomati e smentiti da norme contenute nei Patti 
lateranensi, le quali vengono tacitamente ricevute nel nostro ordinamento col
Q 1  1
secondo comma dell’articolo 5.
8,0 Ibid.
811 Ibid., p. 485.
812 Ibid., p. 515.
813 Ibid.
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He quotes article 1 of the Treaty and puts his question to the many respected jurists 
in the Christian Democrat Party, men like himself, steeped in the pure and precise 
logic of their trade:
non vi awedete delle incongruenze, delle contradizioni, delle assurdita 
giuridiche, che si annidano in questo articolo 5? E vi chiedo: dobbiamo o no 
fare una Costituzione democratica, che abbia alia sua base i diritti di liberta? 
Tra questi c’e il diritto di uguaglianza di tutti i cittadini, la liberta di religione, 
la liberta di coscienza. 814
Regarding the Lateran Pacts, at first Mario Rodino (Uq) does not mention 
their ‘inclusion’ in the Constitution, but rather presumptuously refers to them being 
‘guaranteed’ by the Constitution. However, in response to the main arguments 
against inclusion, he says:
L’inclusione dei Patti nella Costituzione . . .  significa solo e unicamente che il 
nuovo Stato italiano . . .  deve, di fronte al popolo, che desidera dare al 
Trattato la massima stabilita e garantirlo da ogni improwisa iniziativa di 
sconsiderati, impegnarsi a mai denunziarlo di propria iniziativa; rimanendo 
ogni eventuale decisione del genere subordinata alle procedure ed
Q I C
approvazioni richieste per le variazioni delle norme costituzionali.
He says inclusion of the Pacts does not and cannot have any juridical repercussions 
since the Pacts are the
rappresentante legale di una famiglia che assume, nei riguardi dei componenti 
della famiglia stessa, impegno ufficiale di non denunciare, senza prima 
consultarli, la continuity di un contratto, che la famiglia, parte contraente, 
considera utile e gradito per i suoi interessi ed i suoi sentimenti. Perche . . . 
rifiutarsi di ratificare un accordo intento a garantire uno dei maggiori beni 
dell’uomo: la tranquillita famigliare? Un accordo che puo portare e che 
portera un essenziale contributo a quella pace e quella tranquillita di cui la 
grande famiglia italiana ha tanto bisogno. 816
Bassano singles out Jacini as one of a number of Christian Democrats who 
recognise that there are elements in the Concordat that need amending, and yet at the 
same time, as a party, they are seeking, by means of this article of the Constitution,
O I T
to make the Pacts immutable. Cevolotto agrees that insertion of the Pacts under the 
current wording would crystallise them, making future amendments very difficult.
He says that Costantino Mortati (Dc) has vociferously objected to this idea and
814 Ibid., p. 516.
815 Ibid., pp. 532-3.
816 Ibid., p. 533.
817 Ibid., p. 536.
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proceeds to quote extensively from an article written by Mortati for the newspaper II 
Popolo that morning (21.03.1947), In the article Mortati denies that the wording of 
the article suggests that the Pacts would be received in every detail into the 
Constitution: “Quello che invece e assunto nella Costituzione e solo il principio 
concordatario, non i singoli Patti in cui questo e attuato e svolto.” 818 Cevolotto argues 
that the third clause of article 5 (“Le modificazioni dei Patti, accettate dalle due parti, 
non richiedono procedimento di revisione costituzionale”) suggests that any 
unilateral attempts at modifying the Pacts is not allowed and, from that, one must 
deduce that the Pacts would indeed form part of the Constitution.
Not only would they form part of the Constitution: according to D’Avack
l’essere venuti oggi a vincolare ora e per l’awenire lo Stato al rispetto e alia 
conservazione immutata di tali Accordi addirittura come uno dei fondamenti 
costituzionali dei suo ordinamento sia stato, a mio sommesso awiso, anche se 
opportuno ed utile politicamente, non meno erroneo e di un’estrema gravita 
giuridicamente.819
Some costituenti, including Mortati, put forward the opinion that the second 
clause of article 5 was merely a general reference to the nature of Church/State 
relations, being based as it was on the Concordat’s external (ie. non-constitutional) 
laws. The fact that these ‘external laws’, once Article 5 had become final Article 7 of 
the Constitution, would have full constitutional weight was played down. In fact, 
being included in the Constitution guaranteed the Lateran Pacts “una speciale 
posizione di natura costituzionale” . 820 However, the ferocity with which the Dc 
politicians in particular defended the inclusion of the Pacts up until the very last 
moment suggests that they feared the consequences of their not being included.
Again D ’Avack goes a long way to delegitimising those fears: “anche senza questo 
espresso e formale richiamo della norma costituzionale, i Patti Lateranensi avrebbero 
continuato a conservare pieno valore ed inalterata efficacia sia nell’ordine
89 1intemazionale, sia in quello intemo italiano.”
It is very clear from the debates, both in the subcommission and in the 
Constituent Assembly, that the arguments, once again from the juridical as from the 
political and religious standpoints, were divided along very clear lines in terms of 
choice: either for or against inclusion of the Lateran pacts within the Constitution.
818 Cited in ibid., p. 541.
819 D ’Avack, I  rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa, pp. 111-2.
820 Ibid., pp. 110-11.
821 Ibid., p. 107.
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It is also difficult to avoid the conclusion that from the purely juridical point 
of view, their inclusion within the Constitution represented an anomaly. From this 
point of view, it is not surprising that Catholic arguments frequently seemed to be 
tactical, rather than technical, in nature, despite the large number of Catholic jurists 
in the Assembly and particularly in Subcommission 1.
The laid  were able to demonstrate a certain straightforwardness and 
assurance in their arguments, but frequently showed irritation, and sometimes 
hostility and suspicion of their opponents motives. This was understandable, given 
that not even the combative Nenni raised any objections to a concordatory settlement 
which left the Church all its rights and privileges except where there were clear 
infringements of citizens rights and of those of other beliefs.
Paradoxically, it was the Catholic Bruni who in many ways demonstrated the 
victory of the argument against inclusion of the Pacts. The leader of a party based 
explicitly on Catholic social principles (the Partita sodale cristiano), he gave one of 
the clearest, if not the clearest, and detailed expositions of objections to inclusion of 
the Pacts, and to some of their provisions. The clarity of exposition was 
accompanied, moreover, by his evident lack of hostility to his Catholic colleagues, 
by a firm grasp of democratic principles, and perhaps most revealing of all, by 
repeated appeals to Catholics to be honest in their arguments. Perhaps the greatest 
irony is that if in one sense Bruni was a demonstration of the victory of the la id  in 
the argument, it would be the decision of the Communist leader Togliatti, in the end, 
to support inclusion that would ensure their defeat in the vote.
242
B3 Draft article 5, clauses 4 and 5
Le altre confessioni religiose hanno diritto di organizzarsi secondo i propri 
statuti, in quanto non contrastino con Vordinamento giuridico italiano.
I rapporti con lo Stato sono regolati per legge, sulla base di intese, ove siano 
richieste, con le rispettive rappresentanze.
(i) Religious freedom as a liberty
According to Gianni Long, the origins of twentieth centuiy ideas on religious 
freedom in Italy can be found in the study of ecclesiastical law. Prior to the 1920’s, 
the parameters and definitions of ecclesiastical and canon law were extremely 
blurred, with most of the study being conducted in the Catholic universities. During 
the twenties and thirties, Francesco Scaduto and Francesco Ruffini, helped 
differentiate the two disciplines, introducing their courses on ecclesiastical law to 
State universities. Although their general aims were similar, their opinions did not 
always converge and on one subject in particular -  the equal legal status of religious 
confessions -  they differed substantially:
Per Ruffini essa doveva consistere in un eguaglianza di condizioni pratiche, 
che tenesse conto della diversa consistenza numerica delle confessioni, 
poiche diverso e il rapporto giuridico che vi e con una confessione di poche 
migliaia di fedeli e quello con una molto piu numerosa. Per Scaduto il 
problema e diverso: il rapporto di ciascuna confessione con lo Stato ha la 
stessa natura giuridica . . . ; e voler instaurare rapporti diversi con soggetti 
giuridicamente uguali, sulla base di un dato estrinseco come quello della 
consistenza numerica, significa confondere il fatto con il diritto. La risposta 
di Ruffini e che lo Scaduto confonde ‘liberta religiosa e posizione giuridica 
delle associazioni religiose’, mentre i concetti sono distinti: la liberta 
dev’essere eguale per tutti, la posizione delle associazioni religiose puo essere 
diversa.822
The signing of the Lateran Pacts gave credence to Ruffini’s viewpoint and it was his 
work which was quoted most frequently in the debates of the Constituent Assembly 
on the subject.
In the summer of 1945 the Ministero per la Costituente set up the 
Commissione per la riorganizzazione dello Stato made up of magistrates, civil 
servants and politicians. Its duties were very limited and of little actual significance 
in terms of giving direction to the Constitution. What is interesting about it is the
822 Extracts from Liberta e uguaglianza delle confessioni religiose: la polemica Scaduto-Ruffini, in 
‘Stato e confessioni religiose ’, Vol. II, a cura di Francesco Margiotta-Broglio, Firenze, La Nuova 
Italia, 1976-1978, p.25ff., cited in Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessiortale, p. 307.
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scarce importance it placed on religious liberty. This can be seen from the rather 
casual way with which it dealt with the question, in its subcommission dealing with 
constitutional problems (one of five in all). The subject was included briefly in the 
conclusion of the discussion on the protection of the minorities, and even then it was 
only the political aspect of the problem that was highlighted:
In relazione, poi, alia tutela di attribuire alle minoranze religiose e da 
osservare che tale problema non pare possa assumere uno specifico rilievo 
nella determinazione dei principi relativi alle minoranze, in quanto la 
garanzia religiosa dovrebbe, per ogni cittadino, essere affermata in una 
disposizione di carattere generate che stabilisca per tutti, tra le altre liberta, 
anche quella di religione. Sotto questo aspetto, peraltro, il problema involge 
la valutazione di delicati elementi di ordine politico, alia quale e condizionata 
(in connessione anche col regime concordatario tuttora vigente) una 
affermazione costituzionale al riguardo e che, a tale effetto, dovrebbero 
essere in linea preliminare precisati.823
The subject was again raised later by the Liberal university professor Guido Astuti in 
an address to the first Subcommission on 11th March 1946 dedicated to I  diritti di 
liberta. Astuti makes a distinction between liberta di coscienza and liberta di culto:
Liberta di culto e di opinione. Diritto di credere e professare fede religiosa e 
convinzioni politiche, sociali, filosofiche. Liberty di proselitismo e di 
propaganda-discussione. Divieto di privazione di questo diritto, per rapporto 
di impiego e lavoro. Divieto di obbligo a manifestare le proprie convinzioni 
politiche e la propria fede religiosa. Divieto di obbligo a partecipare a 
pratiche cerimonie di culto o ad usare formule religiose di giuramento.
Liberta di culto e di appartenenza a chiese o confessioni. Diritto di libero 
esercizio di culto pubblico. Diritto di partecipazione ad organizzazioni di 
carattere religioso. Garanzia alf assistenza religiosa, a chi la richieda, 
nell’esercito, nelle case di pena, negli ospedali ed istituti pubblici di 
beneficienza ed assistenza. 24
However, Gaetano Azzariti (presidente di sezione della Corte di cassazione 
and capo ufficio legislativo del Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia) was insistent that 
parity between the religions was out of the question,
essendo l’organizzazione cattolica completa e non altrettanto quella degli altri 
culti. Se lo Stato interviene in senso positivo, pub assicurare T assistenza ai 
cattolici e non agli appartenenti agli altri culti. Cosi accade per i cappellani 
militari, cosi per gli ospedali e cosi per la stessa scuola, ove e agevole 
impartire una istruzione religiosa cattolica e non occuparsi di altre
823 G. D ’Alessio, (Ed.), Alle origini della Costituzione italiana - 1 lavori preparatori della 
‘Commissione per studi attinenti alia riorganizzazione dello Stato ’ (1945-1946), Bologna, II Mulino, 
1979, p. 212.
824 Ibid., p. 262.
244
confessioni. Per le minoranze religiose puo bastare il principio della liberta di 
coscienza. In fondo la parita assoluta finirebbe per risolversi in ateismo, come 
e awenuta in Francia, ove sono state cacciate tutte le monache dagli ospedali. 
L’esistenza del Concordato, d’altra parte, e un insopprimibile dato di fatto e 
non e possibile considerarlo decaduto. 825
The Commission failed to come to any agreement on the relationship between 
religious freedom and the Lateran Pacts and had to admit as much to the Constituent 
Assembly, to which body the resolution of the problem was subsequently entrusted. 
Long highlights some elements of interest from these pre-constitutional discussions: 
the lack of basic preparatory work on religious freedom undertaken by everyone 
involved; the ‘extremely narrow conception of liberty’ of the judiciary and 
government advisors (the ‘tecnici’) who were more concerned with the problems a 
reassessment of religious freedom in the new Constitution would cause in 
rearranging and rebuilding the administrative structures of State and the ‘unpleasant 
phenomenon’ of a variety of small religious groups proselytising freely across the 
country in direct contrast to the terms of the Concordat. The Concordat, they felt, 
should remain central to any discussion on the great principles of liberty and in case 
of conflict, should prevail. As we have seen, this view was challenged during the 
debates by, among others, Nenni and Calamandrei, but they failed to secure enough 
support to prevent it being a major influence in the final voting on religious freedom. 
As D’Avack points out,
i fondamentali principi della liberta di coscienza e di culto, delFugualianza di 
tutti i cittadini di fronte alia legge, della liberta di associazione e di riunione, 
ecc. pur sanciti in modo tanto solenne e assoluto nella nostra Carta 
costituzionale, incontrano sempre il limite della non contrarieta alle singole 
clausole dei Patti lateranensi e solo nell’ambito e nei conflni da queste 
consentiti possono assumere e conservare valore ed efficacia concreta 
nell’ordinamento italiano.827
However, the 19th century liberal tradition had left its mark: already in the 
Commission set up by the Ministry for the Constituent Assembly, Mortati 
maintained that a modem constitution could not avoid making a clear statement on 
religious freedom. As Long points out:
E un principio tanto owio che l’attuale articolo 19 [draft article 14] e passato 
praticamente senza discussione attraverso le varie fasi dei lavori della
825 Ibid., p. 284.
826 Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale, p. 324.
827 D ’Avack, I  rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa, p. 115.
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Costituente. Ma i principi di questa portata non restano senza conseguenze. E 
attraverso 1’ articolo 19 e stata ‘riabilitata’ anche quella che sembrava la piu 
illustre vittima della scelta di privilegiare i culti organizzati: il pensiero ateo, 
o areligioso. Nonostante il tentativo di Labriola in Assemblea. . .  esso non e 
oggetto di una tutela costituzionale specifica. E per molto tempo si e ritenuto, 
in dottrina e in giurisprudenza, che rientrasse solo nella generate tutela della 
manifestazione del pensiero (art. 2 1 ) 828
From the time when the Ministry for the Constituent Assembly set up its 
Commission to look into the issue of Church/State relations, the latter received 
suggested constitutions or even single articles from various minority religious 
organisations across Italy. This process continued throughout the period of the 
Subcommission’s work and that of the Constituent Assembly. One such suggested 
constitution came from the ‘Comitato Nazionale per le Onoranze a Giuseppe Mazzini 
nel LXXIV Anniversario della Morte’. Freedom of religion was addressed by article 
number 45 out of a total of 55: “E garantita e tutelata la liberta di coscienza e di 
culto. Dalla credenza religiosa non dipende l’esercizione dei diritti politici e 
civili.” 829
Subcommission 1
In the preliminary meetings of Subcommission 1, Lelio Basso’s Relazione sulle 
liberta civili regarding freedom of religion {relazione article 7) was worded thus:
Ognuno e libero di professare la propria fede religiosa .. . e puo porre in 
essere ogni atto idoneo a diffondere le proprie credenze e opinioni, purche 
non Ieda i diritti altrui. Nessuna differenza puo farsi tra gli individui in base 
alia religione e alle opinioni politiche, sociali, filosofiche e scientiflche. 
Nessun limite puo porsi alia liberta di coscienza. L’esercizio di ogni culto e 
libero. Nessun limite puo porsi alia liberta di coscienza, che dev’essere in 
ogni tempo e luogo azionabile, verso qualunque autorita. Sembra opportuno 
disciplinare in questa sede la liberta di religione e di culto, anziche rinviarla 
alia norma relativa ai rapporti tra Stato e Chiesa, se dovra esservi. Non appare 
invece necessario scendere a specificazioni delle varie estrinsecazioni della 
liberta di coscienza, di religione e di culto, come fanno alcune costituzioni, in 
ordine, per esempio, al giuramento, ai rapporti di lavoro, al servizio militare, 
ecc., poiche queste specificazioni per un lato non sono complete, onde danno 
luogo a difficolta interpretative per i casi non enunciati; per un altro sono
828 Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale, p. 362. See also: P.A. D ’Avack, La liberta 
religiosa nella normativa della Costituzione repubblicana italiana, in Studi per il XXanniversario 
d e ll’Assemblea costituente, vol. II, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1969, pp. 176ff.
829 ACD, Busta 73, fascicolo 15, Comitato Nazionale per le Onoranze a Giuseppe Mazzini nel LXXIV 
Anniversario della Morte, p. 7,
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superflue, in quanto conseguenze immediate e dirette del principioQOQ
enunciato.
Giorgio La Pira’s first article of his relazione on Principii relativi ai rapporti 
civili is typically spiritual and direct:
Nello Stato italiano che riconosce la natura spirituale, libera, sociale 
dell’uomo, scopo della Costituzione e la tutela dei diritti originari ed 
imprescrittibili della persona umana e delle comunita naturali nelle quali essa 
organicamente e progressivamente si integra e si perfeziona.831
His article 6 -bis on ‘liberty’ states:
La liberta e inalienabile. Nessun gruppo, percio, puo imporre ai propri 
membri obbligazioni che siano incompatibili col libero esercizio dei diritti 
conferiti ai cittadini dalla Costituzione e dalle Ieggi. 832
His article 17 deals more specifically with religious liberty:
Ognuno ha diritto alia libera professione, pratica e propaganda della propria 
fede religiosa. Lo Stato assicura a tutti le condizioni adeguate per il libero 
esercizio di tale diritto. La professione di una determinata fede religiosa o di 
una determinata convinzione sociale, politica o filosoflca non reca pregiudizi 
giuridici. 833
Mario Cevolotto (Pdl) has to open with an apology:
Non ho potuto avere in tempo i contatti col collega Dossetti che mi ero 
proposto di sviluppare, per cercare una linea comune d’intesa nella 
formulazione del primo schema ed abbozzo di quelle che dovranno essere le 
formulazioni della Carta costituzionale sui principii generali dello Stato e sui 
rapporti con le Chiese. Sono costretto quindi a presentare una mia relazione e 
una mia proposta, che la Sottocommissione esaminera e sviluppera in 
confronto con quelle che l’onorevole Dossetti vorra prospettare per suo 
conto.834
330 ACD, Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° Sottocommissione. Relazione del 
Deputato Lelio Basso sulle 'Liberta civili ’, pp. 17-18. This folder contains the relazioni o f the 
individual members o f the Subcommissions appointed to examine single issues relating to 
Church/State relations and the minority religious groups. There are no dates marked on the printed 
documents: the only indication appears in the accompanying catalogue (“Inventario dell’Assemblea 
Costituente”) which says that this folder contains relazioni presented to the Subcommissions between 
27.08.1946 -  13.02.1947; that is, broadly speaking, during the period o f the work o f the 
Subcommissions.
331 ACD, Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° Sottocommissione. Relazione del 
Deputato Giorgio La Pira sui 'Principii relativi a i Rapporti c iv ili', p.27.
332 Ibid., p. 28.
03 Ibid., p. 29.
334 ACD, Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° Sottocommissione. Relazione del 
Deputato Mario Cevolotto sui 'Rapporti fra  Stato e Chiesa (Liberta religiosa), p.37. In fact,
Dossetti’s relazione does not appear in this collection o f the individual proposals o f Subcommission 1. 
Why this was is not clear: but very little could have been more important than producing and
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Regarding freedom in general and particularly of minorities, Cevolotto takes 
inspiration from the Turkish Constitution:
Puo essere suadente .. . dare una definizione della liberta, che ha 
indubbiamente un alto valore etico e quasi religioso: ‘La liberta consiste nella 
facolta di fare tutto cio che non nuoccia agli altri; la liberta di ognuno, che e 
un diritto naturale, ha per limiti quelli della liberta degli altri.’ Ne deriva la 
prova che anche lo Stato aconfessionale ha una sua salda base etica in quei 
sommi principii morali che costituiscono in sostanza il fondamento comune 
di tutte le religioni e non di quelle cristiane soltanto. Ma piu di 
un’affermazione filosofica, nella Costituzione e importante fissare in concreto 
quali liberty sono garantite alle minoranze anche minime, perch6 nel 
riconoscimento e quindi nella tutela dei diritti di liberta delle minoranze e il 
paragone della reale concretizzazione dei principii democratici nella Carta.835
Cevolotto says, in the case of Church/State relations in particular, any proposals must 
take into account two basic principles:
II primo principio e un corollario del diritto di uguaglianza, ed e che la 
confessione religiosa, o il fatto di non professare alcuna fede religiosa, non 
possono essere causa di privilegio, di differenziazione o di inferiorita legale 
per nessun cittadino. L’altro principio e quello della liberta di coscienza. Se 
nel campo delle liberta individual^ quando esse siano riconosciute -  come lo 
e, ormai universalmente la liberta di coscienza -  il diritto del singolo e uguale 
al diritto di tutti gli altri, e il diritto delle minoranze anche minime ha lo 
stesso valore e la stessa protezione del diritto delle grandi maggioranze, e 
evidente che lo Stato non puo non considerare i diritti di tutti i culti e di tutte 
le fedi, qualunque essi siano (purche leciti) risultino professati anche da 
pochissimi cittadini, sotto la specie della piu assoluta uguaglianza nei riguardi 
dei principi costituzionali, salvo quelle necessarie differenziazioni nella 
concrete legislazione amministrativa che derivano dalla diversa importanza e 
dalla diversa diffusione delle varie chiese.836
But even this legislation, varied and necessarily complex, “non potrebbe 
senza cadere nel vizio di incostituzionalita, costituire posizioni di privilegio o 
ragione di persecuzione per nessuna confessione religiosa. ” 837 Cevolotto’s proposed 
articles come under two headings: the State and Religious Freedoms. Article 3 under 
‘Lo Stato’ reads:
presenting a proposal for Church/State relations. His contribution begins in the debates o f the 
Subcommission proper. If this was a deliberate attempt to steamroller his proposals through at this 
stage, then there should have been procedural devices in place to prevent this happening.
835 Ibid., p. 38.
836 Ibid., p. 39.
837 Ibid.
248
Tutti i cittadini sono uguali davanti alia legge ed hanno gli stessi diritti e 
doveri. La nascita, il sesso, la razza, la condizione sociale, le credenze 
religiose, o il fatto di non aver alcuna credenza, non possono costituire la base 
di privilegio o d’inferiorita legale.838
Cevolotto submits four proposals for articles under ‘Le liberta religiose’:
1. A tutti i cittadini e garantita piena liberta di fede e di coscienza.
2. E garantita piena liberta di esercizio e di propaganda a tutti i culti e 
confessioni, che non siano contrari all’ordine pubblico, alia morale o al buon 
costume. E tutelato il diritto di tutti i cittadini di professare qualsiasi culto o 
di non professare alcun culto o anche di abbandonare una confessione 
religiosa per entrare in un’altra.
3. Tutte le organizzazioni confessionali possono propagandas e diffondere 
liberamente la loro fede e possedere gli edifici nei quali il culto viene 
esercitato.
4. Nessuno puo giustificare un reato, o il mancato adempimento di un dovere 
imposto dalla legge, invocando le proprie opinioni religiose o Filosofiche. 839
As we can see, at this stage in proceedings, there appears to have been a great deal of 
common purpose in the principles that the various political parties were expounding. 
The first signs of the problems to come emanated from Dossetti’s interpolation of an 
ecclesio-juridical objection to a point accepted at this stage. In the debates of 
Subcommission 1, Dossetti argues that the internal structure of other churches is in 
general less well defined than in the Catholic Church, and so the phrase “lo Stato 
riconosce” the rules governing other churches presupposes a well-defined internal 
structure and is thus not suitable. He thinks it needs a more precise formulation.840 
The next day, the proposed clause is presented:
Le altre confessione religiose hanno il diritto di organizzarsi secondo propri 
statuti, in quanto non contrastino con Tordinamento giuridico italiano. I loro 
rapporti con Io Stato sono regolati per legge sulla base di intesa, ove lo 
richieggano, con le loro rappresentanze.84
Dossetti’s thrust can be clearly seen in the changes from “Chiese” to “confessioni” 
indicating a subordination of the other churches to the Catholic Church; and “in 
quanto non contengano disposizioni contrarie alia legge” to “in quanto non 
contrastino con Tordinamento giuridico italiano”. The “ordinamento giuridico 
italiano” refers much more clearly to the whole Italian legal system, which in matters 
of Church/State relations is governed by the Lateran Pacts. The following proposals
339 Ibid., p. 42.
?40 CRAC, vol. 6, pp. 158-9. 
U1 Ibid., pp. 166-7.
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on individual freedoms (which became draft article 14) are also put forward by 
Dossetti and Cevolotto:
Dossetti: Ogni uomo ha diritto alia libera professione delle proprie idee e 
convinzioni, purche non contrastino con le supreme norme morali, con la 
liberta e i diritti garantiti dalla presente Costituzione, con i principi 
delfordine pubblico.
Cevolotto: Tutti i cittadini hanno il diritto alia piena liberta di fede e di
842coscienza.
Cevolotto wants equal rights for all religions and, while recognising that the 
administrative regulations for the Catholic Church will differ from other religions, 
juridical equality must be maintained. He fears that old discrepancies in the penal 
code between acts against Catholicism and those against other religions, and in 
particular Protestantism, will re-occur. 843
Concetto Marchesi (Pci) points out that Dossetti, being a fervent Catholic, 
when he talks about ‘supreme norme morali’, can only be referring to Catholic 
morals. As part of his defense of his proposal, Dossetti quotes Jemolo’s ‘Per la pace 
religiosa d’ltalia’, saying that Italy’s new juridical system should begin with a 
declaration of adhesion to the ethical principles of Christianity that represent the 
basis of its conscience and civilisation. 844
Lelio Basso (Psi) expands on Marchesi’s argument: the Pope is the head of 
the Catholic Church and infallible source of morals; therefore all religious thinking, 
whatever one’s faith -  according to Dossetti’s view -  would have to be guided by the 
Pope. Aldo Moro, rather than steering away from this argument, chooses to 
compound it from a Catholic perspective: since Italy is predominantly a Catholic 
country, it is only natural that Catholic moral values should inform the morality of 
the nation.845
Constituent Assembly
In the Constituent Assembly debates, Ugo Damiani (Misto) couples his objection to 
inclusion of the Lateran Pacts with his defence of freedom of conscience and 
religion,
842 Ibid., p. 787.
843 Ibid., p. 718.
844 Ibid., p. 788.
845 Ibid., pp. 791-2.
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perche questi rappresentano un accordo fra lo Stato italiano e lo Stato del 
Vaticano, ed in ogni Costituzione mi pare che non siano stati mai inseriti 
accordi intemazionali. Lo Stato italiano e lo Stato del Vaticano sono due 
Stati, che si accorderanno, ma in un rapporto che deve essere estemo alia 
Costituzione, che non deve influire sulla stessa. . .  Quindi, liberta di 
religione, sostengo; quindi rivediamo il problema, in modo che la liberta di 
religione possa fmalmente affermarsi. . .  Questa liberta fa parte delle grandi 
liberta di quelle quattro liberta basilari della Carta atlantica . . . liberta di 
religione, liberta di parola, liberta dal timore, liberta dal bisogno . . .  e articolo 
5 deve conformarsi alia liberta di religione.846
Dossetti claims that the ethos of bilaterality, that was so essential an element 
of clause 3 for the Dc, is also good for the minority religions. However, the nature of 
their relationship with the State is less secure in that they have no ‘originary’ status 
like the Catholic Church
con cui lo Stato . .. pud e deve entrare in contatto attraverso un atto di diritto 
estemo fra ordinamenti giuridici primari (concordato); mentre le altre Chiese 
non sono ordinamenti primari o non sono afFatto, o non vogliono essere, 
ordinamenti giuridici, e quindi lo Stato con esse non pud entrare in contatto 
se non attraverso ‘intese interne’, come presupposto di atti legislativi intemi 
dello Stato stesso. 847
On behalf of the Republican party, Ugo Della Seta calls for freedom of 
conscience to be sanctioned in the Constitution as the first and most fundamental of 
all public freedoms arguing that it is much broader in scope than simple religious 
freedom as it also encompasses those who choose to worship individually or not at 
all.848
(ii) Equal rights for all religions
As we shall see, a reading of the more detailed debates on equal rights for all 
religions gives a very strong impression that section 3 of the ICAS proposals was the 
starting point for the Catholics. The two fundamental points in this section of the 
proposals are that
La Carta Costituzionale deve riconoscere e garantire per tutti i cittadini 
italiani, di qualsiasi fede od opinione, il principio della liberta di coscienza e 
di culto, come un diritto naturale indispensabile alia persona umana per 
l’adempimento dei suoi doveri verso Dio.
846 CRAC, vol. 1, p280.
847 Ibid., p. 552.
848 Ibid., p. 617.
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But on the other hand this was qualified by the statements that “il principio 
costituzionale della liberta di coscienza e di culto non deve importare una 
equiparazione nelle determinazioni giuridiche” and that
una tale equiparazione nell’ordinamento italiano sarebbe un non senso perche 
-  se pur si voglia prescindere da cio che per se e dovuto alia Chiesa, ai suoi 
istituti, alle sue attivita, nelle varie forme di attuazione del divino comando -  
il principio di giustizia non importa uguaglianza di regolamento per fenomeni 
socialmente disuguali849
Let us examine how these arguments were developed. De Gasperi recognised 
that the strong position of the Catholic Church in Italy was unique, with the presence 
of the Holy See in its capital, and that such a position was not enjoyed in other 
countries. In an essay on the Centro tedesco, published in Vita e Pensiero De Gasperi 
points out the difference in attitude towards multi-faith pluralism in Germany. 
According to Giovagnoli,
l’attenzione di De Gasperi era fortemente attratta da quella situazione ove i 
cattolici, in condizione di minoranza, difficilmente potevano pensare di 
piegare uno Stato totalitario a una logica confessionale, mentre erano portati 
ad apprezzare uno Stato tollerante e rispettoso verso di loro. II Centro, 
scriveva De Gasperi, non aveva mai cercato nulla di diverso che la ‘parita’,
‘la liberta religiosa nel quadro delle liberta civili’ .850
It is interesting to note that De Gasperi is aware of the need for a state like Germany 
to show tolerance and respect to Catholics when they are in the minority, but then 
calls for Italy to be governed as a diarchy between the State and the Catholic Church.
Stefano Riccio (Dc) is quite happy to see other religious groups given equal 
status with the Catholic Church as long as the Pacts are inserted in the Constitution, 
but adds that this should be done when justified by the “realta sociale.”
II richiamo espresso, quindi, ai Patti lateranensi, come il riconoscimento 
specifico della sovranita della Chiesa, rispondono a profonde esigenze di 
natura storica e giuridica. Ne questo richiamo contrasta, in linea di diritto o in 
linea di fatto, con il riconoscimento della liberta e della parita di culti, in 
quanto, come abbiamo piu volte rilevato, essi potranno ben ricevere lo stesso 
regolamento concordato. Noi diciamo: elevate gli altri culti alio stesso 
trattamento della Chiesa cattolica, se volete, e quando ne sorgera la
849 See Appendix III.
850 Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiani, p. 51. Compare this assessment o f De Gasperi’s political 
ideals with the speech made by the Dc leader himself in the Assembly, just prior to the final vote on 
article 7, in which there was a considerable hardening o f attitude towards the rights o f minority 
religious groups. (CRAC, vol. 1, pp. 629-34).
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opportunity politica in conseguenza della realta sociale. Ma non abbassate 
oggi alio stesso piano degli altri culti la Chiesa cattolica, unicamente e 
solamente in vista della opportunity politica e della realta sociale, che noi 
uomini politici non possiamo in nessun momento trascurare.851
Once again, the principle of equality of rights is clearly subordinated to the question 
of number, very much in line with the conclusioni cattoliche provided by IC AS,
Arturo Labriola (Udn) points out a contradiction between articles 5 and 7 of 
the draft proposal:
Grazie all’articolo 5 . . .  la nostra e una Repubblica di cattolici; per Farticolo 
7 siamo una Repubblica di cattolici e non cattolici. . .  Per Farticolo 7 i non 
cattolici sono cittadini di pieno diritto; per Farticolo 5 non lo sono. E vano 
sofisticare: se la nostra e una Repubblica cattolica, i non cattolici sono messi 
in una condizione d’inferiority. Si dice: sono pochi. Fossero pochissimi o uno 
solo, Foffesa c’e . .. Ci sono i protestanti, gli ‘evangelicF dicono loro. Ci 
sono gli ebrei. Ci sono i liberi pensatori. Cotesti comunisti, cotesti socialisti 
sono o non sono marxisti? Lo proclamarono a tutti i momenti. Supponiamo 
che siano. Ma allora non appartengono a nessuno dei culti ufficiali. Possono 
essere anche credenti: deisti, teisti, idealisti, che so io? Cattolici non sono. Ci 
sono i cristiani-sociali? La Chiesa li riconosce? E chi lo sa? Se noi siamo una 
Repubblica democratica, dobbiamo riconoscere il diritto di tutti i cittadini, 
anche dei non cattolici a vivere, senza morale diminuzione, nella comune 
Repubblica. E Finclusione dei Patti Lateranensi nella Costituzione della 
Repubblica -  di una Repubblica democratica, dico! - 1 una potente offesa a 
protestanti, israeliti e soprattutto ai liberi pensatori.852
Carlo Ruggiero (Psli) insists that the most important aspect of religious 
freedom that needs to be enshrined in the Constitution is the principle that all 
minority religions should be free and equal:
La questione, onorevoli colleghi, e stata trattata nel progetto di Costituzione 
in vari articoli: Farticolo 5, Farticolo 7, Farticolo 14. Ma appunto perche e 
stata trattata in tanti articoli e non ha avuta una norma precisa, il principio che 
io modestamente vorrei venisse affermato nella Carta costituzionale appare 
confuso, ambiguo, incerto e pieno di ambagi. Sono costretto, a malincuore, 
ma per una ragione di insopprimibile franchezza, a dichiarare che la ragione 
di questa confusione, di questa ambiguita, di questa incertezza e anche di 
questa reticenza, e stata determinata e voluta dagli onorevoli rappresentanti 
della Democrazia cristiana in seno alia Commissione. Andiamo piano, perche 
se cominciamo con le interruzioni adesso, alia fine FAssemblea diventera un 
inferno! La questione. . .  fu posta in sede di Commissione e fu proprio 
onorevole Cevolotto il quale voile che venisse inserita nel progetto di 
Costituzione una norma che tutelasse alio stesso modo la confessione 
cattolica e le altre confessioni. L’onorevole Dossetti rispose in questa 
maniera: ‘Come cattolici. . .  noi ci riserviamo un giudizio di valore in ordine
851 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 390.
852 Ibid., pp. 483-4.
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alia religione; come riconoscimento costituzionale non abbiamo alcuna 
riserva in ordine al pluralismo delle varie religioni. Ritengo quindi che tutti i 
fautori della liberta di coscienza e di culto dovrebbero sentirsi tranquillizzati 
da questa dichiarazione.’ Senonche, questa rimase solo una dichiarazione, di 
carattere tutto metafisico e astratto, perche non riusci poi a trovare 
applicazione concreta e pratica nel progetto di Costituzione.853
Regarding article 404 of the Italian penal code which states that anyone 
committing an offense against a religion is sentenced on a sliding scale depending on 
the religion the crime is committed against, Ruggiero quotes Moro as saying to the 
Assembly:
‘Se . . .  si tratta di una confessione professata dalla maggioranza degli italiani, 
il danno evidentemente e maggiore’. Questa e la dichiarazione, la quale da 
luogo ad una confusione che non puo essere negata e che, comunque, afferma 
che il principio dell’eguaglianza delle confessioni viene, rispetto alia legge, 
nettamente negato854
Ruggiero warns the Assembly against getting caught up in debates on whether 
crimes against one religion are more serious than crimes committed against another: 
“dobbiamo prendere invece l’altro principio, che e un principio superiore, umano, 
cristiano: il principio dell’uguaglianza di tutti di fronte alia legge. ” 855 He says they 
must constantly refer any decisions they make regarding the Constitution to the 
concept of liberty:
E . . .  non puo essere fatta (come spesso e accaduta in quest’Aula, nelle 
discussioni e sui giomali) la questione che le altre confessioni rappresentano 
una minoranza. E questo un argomento che, secondo la mia molto modesta 
opinione, si ritorce contro di voi, colleghi della Democrazia cristiana. La 
democrazia deve infatti tener conto delle minoranze. Io penso, anzi, che la 
maturita di una democrazia debba valutarsi proprio dal grado di liberta 
concesso alle minoranze. 856
Ruggiero says that this is a principle to which the Constituent Assembly must hold 
fast during its deliberations, and so Moro’s theory cannot be accepted. Neither can 
they take into consideration an argument put forward earlier by Umberto Merlin,
“che la proposta di eguaglianza di trattamento di tutte le confessioni costituirebbe 
un’ingiuria al Capo della religione professata dalla maggioranza degli italiani. ” 857
853 Ibid., p. 504.
854 Ibid., p. 505.
855 Ibid.




Ruggiero says he will refrain from commenting on this statement for fear of insulting 
the Pope, but states plainly that he does not believe this to be an argument that can be 
given any credence in this or any other seat of government. However, such 
preconceptions and ideas have resulted in the creation of what he calls “quel piccolo 
mostro . . .  con tutte le sue incertezze e ambiguita. ” 858
Ruggiero examines the third clause of article 5 (which became part of article 
8  in the Constitution.) Of this he says:
la questione delle confessioni religiose e stata trattata in tante Costituzioni; 
tutte le Costituzioni si sono espresse a questo proposito con una frase lineare, 
semplice, diritta: ‘Tutte le confessioni religiose sono uguali di fronte alia 
legge.’ Quindi si prova un certo senso di diffidenza quando ci si trova di 
ffonte ad una norma espressa in una forma cosi confusa, ambigua e incerta.859
Ruggiero expresses concern over the wording of the clause, especially the 
phrase “hanno diritto di organizzarsi” which, he claims, does not address the rights of 
the minority churches as they are currently constituted, but given that this right is 
granted inso far as their statutes don’t conflict with “Tordinamento giuridico”, and 
that their relations with this “sono regolati per legge” on the basis of agreements to 
be sought, the right can only refer to the possibility of addressing those rights at 
some indeterminate time in the future.
Noi diciamo, queste confessioni religiose diverse dalla cattolica, esistono, 
hanno una storia, hanno una tradizione; sono un fatto. Ed allora perche non 
debbono essere regolate per la tutela dei loro diritti in questa sede, dove viene 
regolato il rapporto fra Chiesa e Stato? Quindi, vedete che T ambiguita e 
palese ed evidente. Perche prendere in considerazione Torganizzazione e non 
l’ente, perche Tattivita e non il fatto? 860
Ruggiero then mentions a previous speech by Togliatti who referred to the 
word ‘tutte’, and couldn’t see why each individual religion could not be named. To 
Togliatti the matter was “una piccola sfumatura”, but to Ruggiero it is very 
important: since the article does not refer to particular religious institutions, he 
claims it is ambiguous. He says they could push for a compact form for the article 
along the lines of “tutte le confessioni religiose sono uguali di fronte alia legge”, but 
he only wants to highlight the need for a precise, pertinent and categorical norm “la 
quale esprime in maniera inconfutabile che esiste un diritto, da parte di tutte le
858 Ibid. He is referring to draft article 5.
859 Ibid., p. 506.
860 Ibid.
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confessioni religiose, ad esercitare il diritto della propria fede.” He argues that the 
present wording smacks of compromise, and they should not allow a compromise on 
such an important issue.
Dovremmo essere tutti d’accordo nello stabilire questo: che la Chiesa 
indipendente e sovrana nel suo ordine intemo, non deve interferire su quella 
che e la coscienza dei singoli; cosi come non deve interferire ne comprimere 
quella che e la necessaria liberta concessa alle altre confessioni, di esercitare 
il loro culto. Invece, egregi colleghi, questo purtroppo non si verifica. Infatti, 
dobbiamo constatare (e questa una constatazione obbiettiva) che la Chiesa 
frequentamente, assiduamente, forse quotidianamente, e portata alia 
compressione del sentimento della liberta. E molte volte -  come posso 
dimostrarvi -  e portata a comprimere il sentimento della liberta nei confronti 
dei lavoratori. Badate che io non voglio assumere il termine ‘lavoratore’ nella 
sua accezione politica e marxista, voglio assumerlo in senso piu universale di 
lavoratori intesi come creature umane. E allora noi, nei confronti di costoro, 
vediamo che la Chiesa non cessa mai di esercitare un’influenza la quale e 
contro la liberta.862
He then refers to a bulletin promulgated by the parish priest of the Ganzirri 
diocese. It begins with a polemic article entitled ‘Socialismo e lavoratori’. In the 
article it says:
E doloroso e vergognoso nello stesso tempo vedere nel nostro Paese i 
lavoratori che si fanno negatori della liberta dell’uomo e della fede cattolica quando 
s’iscrivono ai partiti socialists863 Relativamente a coloro che sono tesserati nel 
socialismo, ci dispiace dover applicare le disposizioni dei superiori, cioe: ‘1 ) coloro 
che sono alia direzione del socialismo sono privati dei Sacramenti anche a Pasqua; 
coloro che hanno aderito alle cooperative, ecc., come i loro capi, sono privati 
dell’uso dei Sacramenti’. Volete sapere che cosa significa questo? Prima di tutto, se e 
consentita un osservazione di carattere morale, significa che a un certo punto la 
Chiesa fa servire il Sacramento da galoppino elettorale . . .  In secondo luogo, vien 
soffocata la liberta di coscienza. Se per esempio un socialista o un comunista si 
rivolge a taluno che stia per entrare in Chiesa e gli dice: se entri in Chiesa sarai 
percosso, sapete che cosa succede? Deve rispondere del reato di violenza privata, che 
e un reato grave. E cosi, quando e minacciata la mancanza propinazione del 
Sacramento.864
He likens the denial of the Sacrament by the Church to the socialist worker to 
the latter threatening to punch a Catholic about to enter a church, the only difference 
being that the Church is allowed to do it, according to its own laws, while the
861 Ibid., pp. 506-7.
862 Ibid., p. 507.




Communist or Socialist is not allowed to by Italian law, “ma di fronte al principio
ore
umano e sovrano dell’etica, della liberta, i due atti si equivalgono.”
Ruggiero then makes an appeal to the Church to show the same respect for 
the liberty of others as they are prepared to extend to the Church.
Noi esprimiamo il massimo rispetto verso la Chiesa cattolica ed anzi 
possiamo affermare, senza tema di smentita, che da parte nostra non e stato 
fatto mai nessun atto di vilipendio nei suoi confronti. Pero e necessario che la 
Chiesa abbia, nei confronti di quelli che sono i valori morali etemi, lo stesso 
rispetto. Siamo disposti a concedere che la Chiesa cattolica abbia una 
posizione di preminenza rispetto alle altre religioni, perche in effetti 
rappresenta la stragrande maggioranza degli italiani e potremo arrivare anche 
a stabilire, per esempio, per la Chiesa cattolica la condizione del primus inter 
pares, che & una condizione giuridica e morale ineccepibile. Puo esistere una 
condizione di privilegio e di preminenza rispetto alle altre confessioni 
religiose, ma di fronte alia liberta che e sempre un principio etemo, tutte le 
confessioni devono essere uguali.866
Giancarlo Pajetta (Pci) says the whole purpose of constitutions is to guarantee 
the rights of the minorities. All the religious minorities in Italy feel that they have 
been freed from the oppression of the last twenty years. However, as far as the 
Constitution is concerned, they are not happy:
non si sentono garantite, protestano, hanno mandato a tutti noi la richiesta che 
sia riveduta quella formulazione [article 5], pur senza nessuno spirito 
anticattolico, senza nessuna awersione alia Santa Sede. E che quello che era 
buono in 1848 non e piu buono oggi. 867
Ugo Della Seta (Pri) presents the following amendment to article 5:
Lo Stato e le singole Chiese sono, ciascuno nel proprio ordine intemo, 
indipendenti e sovrani.
I rapporti tra Io Stato e ogni singola Chiesa sono disciplinati per legge.868
He makes it clear from the outset that he has no religious axe to grind, is not 
speaking on behalf of any Church or specific religious faith, but is simply defending 
a principle, which he would use to defend Catholics if they, in the minority, were 




867 Ibid., p. 524.
868 Ibid., p. 614.
869 Ibid., pp. 614-6.
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Nevertheless, in his speech to the Assembly, De Gasperi conspicuously fails 
to deny that subordination of the minority religions is a problem in Italy; although he 
does make one concession, in relation to ordinary legislation, to the parties of the 
left: “Noi, se e necessario, al momento opportuno siamo disposti a votare con voi per 
togliere dal Codice penale qualsiasi umiliazione alle minoranze.” 870
On the issue of punishment for crimes committed against Catholicism being 
greater than that for crimes against minority religions Mortati, laying aside his 
jurist’s hat and putting on his party political one, says one has to take into account 
public feeling and public reaction to such crimes. “Ed e evidente che questa reazione, 
quest’offesa e piu grave quando tocca le convinzioni della grande maggioranza dei
R71cittadini ed e meno grave negli altri casi.” He says it must be noted that the 
Constitution says nothing in this regard, leaving the door open for future legislatures 
to amend the law in such a way as to realign this discrepancy.
Quella che importa rilevare . .. e che la Democrazia cristiana non porra mai 
ostacolo ai prowedimenti che saranno proposti alio scopo di attuare una 
sempre maggiore uguaglianza di trattamento dei vari culti, nei limiti in cui 
tale uguaglianza sara resa possibile dalla situazione di fatto.872
The magnanimity of the beginning of this comment will hardly have been enriched in 
its sincerity by its codicil.
(iii) The confessional State and the minorities
Cevolotto points out that creating a confessional State would mean that the other 
religions would become inferior to Catholicism, despite there existing a guarantee for 
them in the shape of the law dealing with ‘permitted religions’ and the provisions of 
draft articles 5, 14 and 15. In response, Moro (Dc) says he intends to clarify the 
reasons that he and his colleagues have presented and sustained the clause approved 
by the first Subcommission. To Cevolotto’s claim that article 1 of the Treaty would 
return Italy to the realms of a confessional state, he argues that the clause must be 
considered in relation to all the clauses that regulate the positions of other religious 
denominations within the Italian legal system. He reminds Cevolotto of the 
extraordinary breadth with which the principle of the freedom of other religious 
organisations has been laid down, and particularly the right to proselytise. He again
emphasises the Dc consensus with Terracini’s additional amendment to regulate 
relations between the State and other religious organisations by means of concordats. 
He says that the sense of the clause being discussed is that the Catholic religion is the 
religion of the vast majority of the Italian people. 873
Responding to a typical Giorgio La Pira speech which closed with an 
invocation to the Virgin Mary and the blessing of Almighty God on the 
Constitution,874 Paolo Rossi (Psi) said:
Non sono fra coloro che hanno trovato fuori di luogo il gesto ineffabile del 
divino olocausto con cui l’amico onorevole La Pira ha chiuso ispiratamente le 
sue nobili parole. Tutt’altro. Quel gesto solenne, nato spontaneamente da un 
fervente cristiano, vi assicuro che mi ha toccato. Ma esso ha costituito per me 
un’illumunazione politica: quello Stato che 1’onorevole La Pira ed i suoi 
amici propugnano e uno Stato sicuramente confessionale, uno Stato sotto il 
segno della Croce. Io accetto con deferenza quel segno, ma bisogna anche 
preoccuparsi delle minoranze non cattoliche in Italia. In questo, o amici, e 
vero quello che Kant ha detto: la dignita e la liberta di un uomo sono la 
dignita e la liberta di tutti gli uomini. Debbo, percio, insistere ancora un 
momenta nel richiamare all’Assembles alcuni principi fondamentali. . .  Non 
giova alio Stato l’etichetta confessionale, ne giova alia Chiesa la protezione 
del braccio secolare.875
Costantino Mortati, the eminent Catholic jurist, argues that the apparently 
opposing views found in article 5, allegedly creating a confessional State, and article 
14 (draft), stating that religious freedom is due to all citizens, are easily reconciled: 
“lo spirito liberale che informa 1’articolo 14 offre una riprova del carattere non 
confessionale dello Stato, e del proposito della costituente di porre i vari culti in 
posizione di parita fra di loro. ” 876
Amerigo Crispo (Udn) warns against the recreation of a confessional State if  
the Treaty, with its reintroduction of the first clause of the Albertine Statute, is 
allowed to stand:
Perche qui non si vuol dire gia che la grande maggioranza dei cittadini italiani 
professa la religione cattolica: qui si vuol dire che lo Stato ha una religione; 
mentre Io Stato, come tale, non ha una religione, ma garantisce la religione; e 
si vuole che lo Stato italiano sia uno Stato cattolico, onde e da chiedere se i 
non cattolici facciano parte della Repubblica italiana.877
873 CRAC, vol. 6, pp. 150-1.
874 CRAC, vol. 1, pp. 313-24.
875 Ibid., p. 415.
876 Ibid., p. 740.
877 Ibid., p. 367.
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Tupini replies: “Non bisogna mai commentareper absurdum.” But, as we shall see 
with a brief look at the treatment of the non-Catholic minorities in post-war Italy, 
this was not an absurd comment.
Whilst the first article of the Albertine Statute created a religion of State, 
Ferdinando Targetti (Psi) points out that it also says that the minority religions are to 
be ‘tolerated’, something that is omitted from the Treaty of 1929,878 while Umberto 
Grilli (Psli), Amerigo Crispo, Bruno Villabruna, Giuseppe Fusco and Girolamo 
Bellavista (all Udn) all criticise the inevitable inferiority of status for minority 
religions as a result of the confessional state created by the insertion of the Pacts. 879
(iv) The position of the Catholic Church in relation to the other churches
Riccio argues that the Catholic Church in Italy can in no way be called a ‘society 
privata’: it has too much history, tradition and responsibility for the spiritual well­
being of the Italian people. He makes a clear distinction between the role of the 
Catholic Church and other religions:
La Chiesa cattolica . . .  si pone ovunque di fronte alio Stato come una realta 
sociale, evidentemente molto diversa da altri fenomeni religiosi, che si 
concretizzano in altre confessioni o associazioni religiosi. Questa realta, se 
altrove non e evidente, in Italia e evidente. Onde il richiamo espresso alia 
sovranita della Chiesa ed ai Patti lateranensi e necessario nella Costituzione 
Italiana. Cio non significa che 1’Italia non puo concordatariamente regolare i 
suoi rapporti con altre confessioni; ove queste lo chiedessero e lo Stato lo 
ritenesse, nulla vi sarebbe in contrario. Significa soltanto riconoscere un fatto 
storico e una situazione giuridica, in piena aderenza ad una realta sociale. 
Invero non e creata una situazione di privilegio, lesiva della eguaglianza. Alle 
confessioni religiose e garantita la piena liberty; ed esse, quando venissero 
eventualmente a trovarsi nella stessa situazione della Chiesa cattolica, ben 
potrebbero venire in contatto con lo Stato attraverso un atto bilaterale. 880
In response to an amendment to article 5 clause 1 suggested by Della Seta 
(“Lo Stato e le singole Chiese sono, ciascuno nel proprio ordine intemo, indipendenti 
e sovrane”), Dossetti insists that it is inadmissable because autonomy and 
independence cannot be attributed to the minority churches in Italy as they do not
878 Ibid., p. 433.
879 Ibid., p. 654.
880 Ibid., p. 386. Whether the irony o f this last remark was intentional or not is unclear, although 
Riccio, and members o f  the other parties, would certainly have been aware o f the restrictions placed 
on the ‘culti ammessi’ and the fact that, in a confessional Italy, the latter would have little opportunity 
-  even if  their numbers allowed -  o f achieving spiritual and jurisdictional parity with the Catholic 
Church.
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have as well-defined and complex an organisational, administrative and juridical 
structure as the Catholic Church.
Once the insertion of the Lateran Pacts had been secured, the position of the 
right-wing parties moderated slightly a propos the minority religions. Vincenzo Tieri 
summed up the position of the Uomo qualunque party :
Poiche io sono credente e cattolico secondo la religione cattolica apostolica 
romana. . .  non ho nulla da obiettare ai riconosciuti diritti delle altre religioni, 
appagandomi oggi del fatto che la mia religione sia gia stata riconosciuta, in 
sede costituzionale, come religione dello Stato al quale appartengo.881
It is clearly stated, at this point, by a Catholic that the inclusion of the Pacts 
establishes Catholicism as the State religion.
However as Piero Agostino D’Avack points out:
Non deve . . .  esistere una religione di Stato, o una filosofia di Stato, la quale 
abbia valore normativo per ciascuno dei cittadini dello Stato stesso, 
condizionando in un modo o nell’altro le manifestazioni della loro fede e del 
loro pensiero.882
(v) Problems faced by minority Churches
a) The education issue
Article 36 of the Lateran Concordat states that “L’Italia considera fondamento e 
coronamento della istruzione pubblica l’insegnamento della dottrina cristiana 
secondo la forma ricevuta dalla tradizione cattolica.” 883 Cevolotto makes an 
interesting point which has not hitherto been made: article 36 does not mean that 
religious education will be taught catechistically; it means that all aspects and all 
subjects of state education will be taught within the framework of Catholic religious 
principles. He goes on to point out the inevitable consequences for children of the 
Protestant or Jewish faiths who, already in the minority, would find it even more 
difficult to integrate with the Catholic majority and, moreover, their parents would 
not have the option of sending them to a Protestant or Jewish school simply because 
such schools did not exist. The only acceptable option for Cevolotto and his party 
would be a neutral educational system, that respected the freedom of all citizens. But
881 Ibid., p. 668.
882 D ’Avack, I  rapportifra Stato e Chiesa, p. 316.
883 Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti del Regno d ’ltalia, (a cuia del) Ministeio per la 
Giustizia, Rome, p. 5477; for an English translation see Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism 
(1929-32), p. 213.
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this contradicted article 36 of the Concordat and the fervent view of Pius XI, who 
had stated during negotiations for the latter in his letter to Cardinal Gasparri:
Deve ancora necessariamente essere riconosciuto che il mandato educativo 
non spetta alio Stato, ma alia Chiesa, e che lo Stato non puo impedire o 
menomare l’esercizio di tale mandato educativo che deve ispirarsi al tassativo 
insegnamento della verita religiosa.884
Dossetti also uses article 36 dealing with religious education in State schools 
to argue his case: he asks how one lesson per week of religious instruction (which, he 
says, does not impinge on any other lesson -  nor are those who do not wish to 
participate in such classes coerced into doing so) can be interpreted as symptomatic 
of a confessional State or a violation of freedom of conscience. He then cites article 6
iL
of the culti ammessi laws and article 2 of the law of 5 June 1930 which dispense 
with the obligation to attend those lessons for those students whose parents make 
such a request to the head of the school. He also quotes articles 23 and 24 of the 
decree enforcing the culti ammessi laws, which allows non-Catholic faiths to have
885their own religious instruction, where numbers are sufficient to justify doing so.
b) Institutional paranoia
In the preliminary meetings of the first subcommission, Moro, in his relazione, 
makes a plea on behalf of Catholics:
Noi abbiamo naturalmente vivo non meno degli altri il desiderio di 
salvaguardare la liberta delle coscienze. Ma si potrebbe giustamente, 
democraticamente far violenza alia coscienza religiosa del novantanove per 
cento degli italiani, impedendole di far sentire i suoi palpiti e di trovar il suo
884 Pacelli, Diario della Conciliazione, Appendix XLII and cited in CRAC, vol. 1, p. 544.
885 However, Dossetti does not tell the whole story: article 23 o f the law ratifying the ‘culti ammessi’ 
laws states: “I genitori, o chi ne fa le veci, i quali non desiderano che sia impartita ai loro figli 
l’istruzione religiosa nelle scuole pubbliche, debbono fare apposita dichiarazione scritta al capo 
dell’isituto all’inizio dell’anno scolastico. Quando il numero degli scolari lo giustifichi e quando per 
fondati motivi non possa esservi adibito il tempo, i padri di famiglia professanti un culto diverso dalla 
religione dello Stato possono ottenere che sia messo a loro disposizione qualche locale scolastico per 
1’insegnamento religioso dei loro figli: la domanda e diretta al proweditore agli studi il quale, udito il 
consiglio scolastico, puo prowedere in senso favorevole. In caso diverso e sempre quando creda, ne 
rifersce al Ministero dell’educazione nazionale, che decide di concerto con quello della giustizia e 
degli affari di culto. Nel prowedimento di concessione dei locali si devono determinare i giomi e le 
ore nei quali l’insegnamento deve essere impartito e le opportune cautele.” (R.D. 28 febbraio 1930, n. 
289, Article 23 in De Martino, Leggi d'Italia, p. 319.) See also Giorgio Peyrot’s study, Ilproblem a  
dell'insegnamento della religione nelle pubbliche scuole elementari in relazione ai maestri ed  agli 
alunni evangelici, presented to the Congresso dell 'Associazione Insegnanti Cristiani Evangelici 
(AICE), at Agape (Torino) 26th August, 1954, Firenze, Tipografia Bruno Coppini, 1955. Peyrot’s work 
examines the ostracisation o f non-Catholic students and their parents who attempted to use this option.
262
nutrimento, perche Funo percento degli italiani non abbia una fastidiosa 
convivenza? 86
Moro here is setting the tone for an exaggerated alarmism amply deployed by the Dc 
costituenti, to ensure that freedom of conscience and propaganda for all religions 
would not have deleterious consequences for the Catholic Church. The Pacts, even if 
they had not been mentioned in the Constitution would in all likelihood have 
remained valid until such time as both contracting parties decided to alter them: 
neither the financial position nor the legal position of the Vatican would necessarily 
have been affected.
Even Meuccio Ruini (Misto), the President of the Commission for the 
Constitution, displayed great concern over the risk of minority churches contravening 
state legislature:
Le proposte presentate divergono dal testo della Commissione in questo: 
mentre conservano Faffermazione fondamentale che le altre confessioni 
religiose diverse dalla cattolica hanno diritto di organizzarsi secondo i propri 
statuti, sopprimono con Femendamento Pajetta [Gian Carlo, Pci] 
l’espressione 4 in quanto non contrastino con l’ordinamento giuridico 
italiano’. La Commissione ha ritenuta necessaria questa espressione, che non 
intacca il rispetto agli ordinamenti giuridici intemi delle singole confessioni, 
e si limita a richiedere che non vi sia contraddizione con Fordinamento 
giuridico delFItalia. Non e da dimenticare che oltre alle confessioni -  
venerate, rispettabilissime, che tutti conosciamo -  potrebbero sorgere culti 
strani, bizzarri (FAmerica insegna) che non corrispondessero alFordinamento 
giuridico italiano.887
Such comments certainly suggest a level of institutional paranoia regarding 
the activities of the minority protestant groups: the existing Lateran Pacts, with all 
their contradictions and contraventions of the terms of the Constitution, were allowed 
to become an intrinsic part of that Constitution; whereas minority religious groups, it 
was being argued, with miniscule numbers of followers had to ensure that their 
internal regulatory norms did not contravene the Italian juridical system in any way, 
simply because of the potential risk to the nation o f ‘strange’ and ‘bizarre’ cults 
possibly starting up in Italy at some indeterminate time in the future.
886 ACD, Busta 74, Fasc. 1, Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° Sottocommissione. Relazione del 
Deputato Alda Moro sui ‘Principii dei rapporti sociali (culturali) \  p.92.
887CRAC, vol. l ,p.  659.
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c) Interference by the Catholic Church
Cevolotto discusses the issue of whether one religion has the right to impose its will 
on all other religions active within the same state. He says that if there is to be any 
sort of equality between the different religious groups then “non vi puo essere una 
legge dello Stato che crea ad un culto una posizione superiore, di fronte ad una 
posizione deteriore degli altri culti. ” 888 A religion of state, he argues, presupposes 
that one religion prevails over the others and that, in such circumstances, the very 
essence of freedom of religion and freedom of conscience is violated.
Luigi Preti (Psli) refers directly to the need to protect the minority religions 
from the interference of the Catholic Church via the State:
Bisogna che dalla Carta costituzionale si possa chiaramente evincere che i 
culti non cattolici godranno domani di quella liberta effettiva, che ancora in 
questo momento -  non dimentichiamolo -  la Iegislazione loro nega. Tanto 
piu che la Chiesa cattolica, in quanto si ritiene depositaria della definitiva 
verita, ha sempre creduto legittimo pretendere dallo Stato delle limitazioni 
alia liberta di coloro che essa considera i predicatori dell’errore. 889
Preti then supports this statement by quoting extensively from the letter sent by Pius 
XI to Cardinal Gasparri (quoted earlier in the thesis):
Piu delicata questione si presenta quando con tanta insistenza si parla della 
non menomata liberta di coscienza e della piena liberta di discussione. Non e 
ammissibile che siasi intesa liberta assoluta di discussione, comprese cioe 
quelle forme di discussione, che possono facilmente ingannare la buona fede 
di uditori poco illuminati, e che facilmente diventano dissimulate forme di 
una propaganda, non meno facilmente dannosa alia religione dello Stato, e, 
per cio stesso, anche alio Stato e proprio in quello che ha di piu sacro la 
tradizione del popolo italiano e di piu essenziale la sua unita. Anche meno 
ammissibile Ci sembra che si sia inteso assicurare mcolume, intatta, assoluta 
liberta di coscienza tanto varrebbe dire che la creatura non e soggetto al 
Creatore; tanto varrebbe legittimare ogni formazione o piuttosto 
deformazione della coscienza, anche le piu criminose e socialmente 
disastrose. Se si vuol dire che la coscienza sfugge ai poteri dello Stato, se si 
intende riconoscere, come si riconosce, che, in fatto di coscienza, competente 
e la Chiesa, ed essa sola in forza del mandato divino, viene con cio stesso 
riconosciuto che in Stato cattolico, liberta di coscienza e di discussione 
devono intendersi e praticarsi secondo la dottina e la legge cattolica.890
The significance of the letter for the minority religions becomes apparent when one 
considers that the day before this speech by Preti, Italy effectively became a
889 Ibid., p. 688.
890 Pacelli, Diario della Conciliazione, Appendix XLII & cited in CRAC, vol. 1, p. 689.
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confessional State with the vote for the insertion of the Lateran Pacts into the 
Constitution. But could such a situation exist in a democratic Republic? And if so, 
what would be the consequences for the minority religions? Preti is convinced that 
the situation for the minorities can only worsen:
sta di fatto che, per la Chiesa, vi e una sola vera liberta: quella di assentire 
liberamente alia sua dottrina. La liberta dei non fedeli, come risulta dalle 
dichiarazioni di Pio XI, non e che Terrore, il quale si puo prudentemente 
tollerare in omaggio al libero arbitrio umano, ma che bisogna isolare e 
rendere impotente891
d) Interference by the State
Cevolotto highlights some of the problems the minority churches face in the struggle 
for equality in the postwar period: a ruling by the Court of Appeal in Rome stating 
that since there is a religion of State which is superior to other religions, evangelical 
churches are not allowed to proselytise; when the Waldensian Church in Livorno 
tried to invoke the law that allowed for State help in rebuilding churches destroyed 
by the allied bombing campaigns, the Tuscan chief of public works refused to help
QQ-}
because that particular law referred only to Catholic churches.
Furthermore, Della Seta (Pri) is keen to point out that all Churches should be 
totally free to support and defend their own dogma, their own institutional 
framework and be free to exercise their own form of worship. In the same way, 
religious criticism on a theological and philosophical level must be allowed to 
discuss those dogmas, while on a moral and juridical level one should be allowed to 
discuss the administrative framework of a given Church, and one must be allowed to 
evaluate to what extent a particular liturgy has more of a material or spiritual bias. 
But the key element in all of this is that the Church should remain free from 
interference by the State. Thus, the independence and sovereignty enjoyed by the 
Catholic Church, should also be given to the Churches of the minority religions, 
because they also have statutes (in the case of the Chiesa Valdese) and institutional 
and disciplinary norms (in the case of Judaism). He then explains the difference 
between a question of fact and a question of principle in relation to these Churches:
questi statuti, quando nel fatto esistono, debbono essere riconosciuti come gia 
consacranti la indipendenza e la sovranita di queste Chiese; quando non 
esistono, rimane il principio, che non puo non essere consacrato nella
891 CRAC, vol. 1, pp. 689-90.
892 Ibid., p. 544.
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Costituzione, come diritto potenziale per ogni comunita religiosa costituita o 
costituenda.893
Giancarlo Pajetta, on behalf of the Pci, puts forward the following amendments to 
article 5: in the fourth clause, remove “in quanto non contrastino con rordinamento 
giuridico italiano”; replace clause 5 with the following: “I rapporti con lo Stato sono 
regolati, ove sia richiesto, per legge, sulla base di intese con le rispettive 
rappresentanze.” 894 He wants to present these amendments in order not only to 
clarify the need for absolute respect of the conscience of worshippers whatever 
church they belong to, but also to ensure that the equality and liberty of all the 
churches before the State is explicitly declared:
Mantenere la dizione proposta nel progetto di Costituzione, vorrebbe dire 
porre in una condizione particolare le altre confessioni religiose, sarebbe 
creare per le altre Chiese una sorta di discriminazione che apparirebbe come 
un ingiusto sospetto o almeno come una minorazione che non puo essere
895certo opportuna.
He says that since none of the parties want to have any reference to article one of the 
Albertine Statute, and since no-one wants to discuss the culti tollerati and ammessi, 
but include absolute equality, then his amendment should be accepted. He pointedly 
refers to the many calls for the unity of the nation and suggests that those who do not 
count themselves in the religious majority should not be ignored when discussing 
that unity, because when the nation called on them during the war, they freely gave
O Q /T
their commitment and indeed their lives for the nation.
Even non-believers, says De Gasperi, feel that the State neither has the force 
nor the authority
di afferare e dirigere la coscienza della singola persona e [sente] il bisogno 
dell’apporto dell’insegnamento della morale evangelica che viene dalla 
Chiesa, che sul Vangelo si fonda. Innegabilmente e opinione comune .. . che 
questa morale evangelica sia necessaria per la fermentazione sociale della 
giustizia nelle masse popolari897
Gianni Long identifies a problem in the wording of article 5, clause 5:
893 Ibid., p. 616.
894 Ibid., p. 627.
895 Ibid.
896 Ibid., pp. 627-8.
897 Ibid., p. 629.
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Quale preciso strumento giuridico volessero indicare i Costituenti con la 
parola ‘intese’ resta poco chiaro. Non si trattava di un concetto familiare alia 
cultura giuridica del tempo, ed anche i suggerimenti provenienti dagli studi di 
diritto comparato, predisposti per la Commissione . . .  sono tutf altro che 
determinants L’unico elemento chiaro e che la Costituente ha voluto 
introdurre una regolamentazione che assomigliasse a quella concordataria . ..
n .  , 898senza pero comcidere con essa.
(vi) Draft article 14 and the difficulty of the ‘buon costume’ and ‘ordine 
pubblico’ arguments and their interpretation
Tutti hanno diritto di professare liberamente la propria fede religiosa, in 
qualsiasi forma individuate o associata, di fam e propaganda e di esercitare 
in privato ed in pubblico atti di culto, purche non si tratti di principi o riti 
contrari all ’ordine pubblico o al buon costume.
The first appearance of the two phrases ‘buon costume’ and ‘ordine pubblico’ in state 
legislature was in the ‘culti ammessi’ laws of 1929. During the debates of the 
Constituent Assembly, at subcommission level, both Dossetti and Cevolotto included 
the phrase “in quanto non sia contrario all’ordine pubblico e al buon costume” in 
their original proposals, with Cevolotto adding the phrase “alia morale”. Cevolotto’s 
second article of four proposed reads as follows:
2. E garantita piena liberta di esercizio e di propaganda a tutti i culti e 
confessioni, che non siano contrari all’ordine pubblico, alia morale o al buon
899costume.
However, Ugo Rodino (Dc) does not believe that this goes far enough:
l’affermata e legittima liberta di culto e di propaganda, riconosciuta ad ogni 
fede religiosa, dovrebbe trovare un limite non solo, come gia stabilito, nelle 
esigenze dell’ordine pubblico e del buon costume, ma anche nella opportunity 
di evitare manifestazioni offensive per la religione cattolica e, di 
conseguenza, per la enorme maggioranza dei cittadini.900
With all the indulgence and good will in the world, it is difficult to imagine, unless 
the liturgies of other faiths included public anti-Catholic proclamations, what this 
proposal could mean in practice except a total prohibition of public religious 
expression for other faiths. In a generous interpretation of Rodino’s intentions, it has 
slipped his mind that other religions might be offended, that his proposal allows non-
898 Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale, p. 365.
899 CRAC, vol. 6, p. 788.
900 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 532.
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Catholic religions to offend each other, and that no restraint whatever is imposed on 
Catholics.
Luigi Preti (Psli) mentions a number of cases under Fascism of Protestant 
schools and churches being closed down and pastors being driven away from their 
dioceses as a direct result of the ‘buon costume’ and ‘ordine pubblico’ phrases in the 
culti ammessi laws. He points out that only a matter of days prior to the current 
debate a Protestant church in Trapani had been closed down when it had only just 
reopened after the liberation. After favourable reports from an independent inquiry 
into its activities, the Government was still refusing to subscribe to full liberta di 
culto and sanction it being reopened again. He goes on:
L’articolo 14 [draft] della Costituzione ha indubbiamente un merito: quello di 
affermare esplicitamente la liberta di propaganda religiosa. Ma ha il grave 
torto di sottoporre ancora Fesercizio dei culti acattolici alle famose 
limitazioni dell’ordine pubblico e del buon costume.901
Preti states that in none of the modem constitutions that he has recently examined 
(British,902 American, French and Russian) does such a limitative phrase appear. He 
explains the implications:
Ordine pubblico significa, in pratica, arbitrio della polizia;903 e la clausola del 
buon costume -  a meno che non abbia lo stesso significato della clausola 
dell’ordine pubblico -  e, per lo meno, offensiva nei confronti di un culto 
religioso.904
Ugo Della Seta (Pri) finds the phrase “purche non si tratta di principi o riti 
contrari all’ordine pubblico o al buon costume” as insulting to the minority religions 
as Preti does:
Non che la restrizione, in se, non sia ingiusta; e ingiusta refirirla solo alia fede 
religiosa delle minoranze. Degenerazioni, sotto la parvenza della spiritualita, 
dei sano sentimento religioso, con credenze superstiziose e riti paganeggianti, 
se ne possono avere in tutte le fedi, in tutte le Chiese.905
Walter Binni (Psli) is against the use of the buon costume and ordine 
pubblico phrases in the first clause of draft article 14, which he considers to be “o 
inutilmente offensive o realmente dannose” and calls for their complete removal. He
902 It is difficult to know to what Preti is referring when he mentions the ‘British Constitution’, which 
in written form, does not exist.
903 Mortati later denies that this is the case. See CRAC, vol. 1, p. 741.
904 Ibid., p. 691.
905 Ibid., p. 733.
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dismisses Mortati’s argument that since they appear in decrees and police guidelines, 
they should also be included in the Constitution:
appunto per cio noi dovremmo risparmiare la loro inserzione nel testo della 
Costituzione, che deve avere massima sobrieta e solennita e, secondo me, non 
deve portare neppure l’ombra di qualsiasi irrispettosita, di qualsiasi offesa per 
culti o religioni delle quali noi abbiamo il massimo rispetto.906
In the final version of the article, when it became article 19, the phrase “alTordine 
pubblico”, as a result of pressure from the Protestant Churches and the laid, was 
omitted. The full article read:
Tutti hanno diritto di professare liheramente la propria fede religiosa in 
qualsiasi forma, individuale o associata, di fame propaganda e di 
esercitarne in privato ed in pubblico il culto, purche non si tratti di riti 
contrari al buon costume.
(vii) The Protestants and the Constituent Assembly
As mentioned earlier, after the war, the Protestants looked not only to the Constituent 
Assembly, but also outside Italy for support. In America committees for religious 
liberty in Italy were set up and, to counterbalance the lack of faith they were 
beginning to have in the Italian government, great confidence was placed by the 
Protestants in the ability of the United Nations to intervene at an international level 
on their behalf.907 As Mario Piacentini wrote in Luce\
Anzitutto -  siccome il problema della tutela delle minoranze religiose . . . e di 
fondamentale importanza per la costruzione dell’edificio della pace dei popoli 
-  noi preferiremmo che il problema fosse risoluto sul terreno intemazionale; 
e, cioe, sarebbe indispensabile che presso l’ONU fosse costituito un ufficio 
legale, il quale elaborasse, esso, un progetto-tipo di Costituzione, che 
dovesse, poi, esser preso per modello dai singoli Stati. In tal modo, questo 
problema verrebbe risolto, senza 1’interferenza di quelle opposizioni occulte 
che, nei singoli Stati, per una ragione o per Taltra, sono riuscite, sempre, a 
sacrificare i diritti delle minoranze. Vi dovrebbe essere, altresi, la possibility 
di ricorso all’ONU per la violazione, da parte delle autorita dei singoli Stati, 
di certi punti fondamentali, quando le anzidette autorita trascurassero, esse, di 
far giustizia.908
906 Ibid., p. 818.
907 Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale, pp. 255-6.
908 M.Piacentini, La liberta religiosa e la Costituente, in Luce, 30th June 1946; cited in Long, Alle 
origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 256.
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From the same article Long mentions three dispositions that Piacentini proposes 
should be included at the end of the Constitution:
a) Tabrogazione delle norme tuttora vigenti incompatibili con la Costituzione;
b) il controllo di costituzionalita, da parte della magistratura ordinaria, su tutti 
gli atti legislativi e amministrativi;
c) il diritto di resistenza, da parte del cittadino, contro atti legislativi ed 
amministrativi contrari ai principi costituzionali. 909
Despite the creation of the Federal Council of Churches, the political strategy 
of the minority churches was delineated by the Tavola valdese. They came up with a 
two pronged campaign:
promuovere un netto separatismo eliminante la possibility della formazione di 
uno Stato confessionale; ed in pari tempo essere pronti a fare presente, punto 
per punto, i diritti che vi e necessario veder sanciti e tutelati nelle Ieggi, se in 
tali termini si dovesse ridurre la nostra azione. 910
Their position was extremely weak regarding any discussion of Church/State 
relations because they were considered juridically inferior to the Catholic Church by 
dint of the Lateran Pacts and were thus isolated in any negotiations with the State. 
Their only option, according to Long, was “una scelta senza equivoci, favorevole al 
separatismo e contraria ad ogni tipo di concordato. ” 911
Having established that their primary grievance was against the Catholic 
Church and the Concordat, they had to try to ally themselves with some institution 
with the power in which they were so lacking. The new democratic State, creating its 
new Constitution, seemed to fit the bill perfectly. But to have any influence on the 
format of the Constitution they would need support from political parties, or at least 
prominent individuals within those parties. However, their all-out offensive on the 
confessional State and the Concordat could have done little or nothing to gain the 
Protestants sympathy among the general (i.e. Catholic) population and would 
certainly have made members of the Constituent Assembly think twice about taking 
up their cause -  perhaps symptomatic of their political naivety. Protestant doctrinal 
restrictions added to this problem: many groups (particularly pentecostals) 
considered it illegal to get involved in political wrangling of any kind. At the other 
end of the scale some local churches tried to create their own political parties and
909 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 257.
910 Ibid., p. 258.
911 Ibid., p. 259.
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sought direct alliances with established parties, in some cases even the Christian
912Democrats.
Although the number of documents produced by Protestant sources on 
religious freedom during the period 1946-47 was enormous, Long concentrates on 
those sent to the Assembly by the Consiglio federate. Just before the elections to the 
Assembly, a manifesto signed by ‘I Cristiani evangelici d’Italia’ and backed by the 
Consiglio federate, summarised their position:
Italiani, poiche non puo sussistere autentica liberta umana, civile e politica, se 
non sul fondamento della liberta religiosa uguale per tutti, occorre eliminare 
ogni residuo del vecchio Stato confessionale. Pertanto noi Cristiani 
Evangelici rivendichiamo i seguenti principi: la piena e completa liberta di 
Coscienza e di Religione e quindi liberta assoluta di associazione, 
discussione, stampa e propaganda per tutti, in modo che ciascuno -  se 
credente -  possa adorare Dio e testimonial^ la Sua verita secondo le 
indicazioni della propria coscienza; Vassoluta indipendenza di tutte le Chiese 
dallo Stato, per cui Papertura dei templi, le riunioni religiose, la nomina dei 
ministri di culto, l’ordinamento degli enti ecclesiastici e l’espletamento della 
loro attivitA, awengano in piena liberta, nell’ambito del diritto comune; la 
neutralita religiosa, che non e professione di ateismo, ma imparzialita dello 
Stato, non confessionale e libero di ogni ingerenza ecclesiastica. Alla parity 
dei culti ed alia eguaglianza dei cittadini indipendentemente dal culto 
professato, consegue la libera attivita delle Chiese, la laicitA della scuola 
pubblica [cf. Concordat article 36] e la liberta dell’insegnamento religioso 
privato. 91
Long adds that “una articolata protesta contro la vigente legislazione sui culti era 
stata indirizzata dalla Tavola valdese al govemo italiano sin dal 2 gennaio 1946.”914 
The above document had the backing of the newly formed Centro evangelico di 
cultura, as did an extensive volume by Giorgio Peyrot entitled La liberta. di 
coscienza e di culto di fronte alia Costituente italiana. Peyrot’s essay was an attempt 
to explain the Protestant position to as many people as possible with a special print 
run of 650 copies to be circulated among the newly elected members of the 
Constituent Assembly. After a brief analysis of the current juridical position of the 
Protestants, he outlines the three main areas of concern for them: freedom of 
conscience, which cannot be subject to vague limitations such as reference to public 
order or degrees of morality, should include the individual’s right to choose his faith 
or to choose whether he has a faith or not and should guarantee equal civil and
912 Ibid., p. 261.
913 Per la liberta religiosa, in Testimonianza, June-August 1946, p.60; cited in Long, Alle origini del 
pluralismo confessionale, p. 268.
14 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 269.
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political rights for all citizens irrespective of their religion;915 parity of 
denominations, including equal treatment before the law and the absence of 
privileges or restrictions for any of them; lastly, religious neutrality of the State -  
Peyrot believes the State should not have its own religion, and state schools should 
not be allowed to teach religion, but full approval should be given for private 
religious schools to be set up.916 There is no doubt that the manifesto put forward by 
the Consiglio Federate delle Chiese Evangeliche in Italia was ‘high risk’ and even 
Gianni Long describes it as “forse anche un poco ‘impolitica’ per la sua estrema
Q17chiarezza.”
By the winter of 1947 the number of documents sent to the Constituent 
Assembly by the Consiglio federate had increased again. Equal juridical, civil and 
political rights of all the citizens of Italy, whatever their religion, was still a genuine 
hope for the Consiglio in February 1947 when it sent a letter to the Constituent 
Assembly calling for the latter to finish the work of the Risorgimento started a 
hundred years earlier
proclamando in modo esatto ed esplicito il principio della aconfessionalita 
dello Stato, base essenziale della liberta di coscienza, di religione e di culto, 
affmche nelle leggi che seguiranno, Fltalia non figuri seconda a nessuna 
nazione nella uguaglianza di tutti i suoi cittadini di fronte alia legge. 918
Three days later the Consiglio sent a document privately to all members of 
the lay parties, outlining their concerns about draft articles 5,14 and 15 of the 
Constitution.919 As Gianni Long points out, the first clause of article 5 (“Lo Stato e la 
Chiesa cattolica sono, ciascuno nel proprio ordine, indipendenti e sovrani”) would be 
a positive step if with that affirmation one proceeded to introduce the separatist 
principle. But then came the hammer blow of the second clause, introducing the 
Lateran Pacts, to which the Consiglio federate responded, displaying a much greater 
depth of knowledge of the agreement than many costituentt
915 The idea o f an individual having the right to choose whether he or she has a faith or not, although 
not unique to the Protestants, was only discussed by a handful o f  la id  in the Constituent Assembly, 
and nowhere is such a concept discussed in Catholic arguments.
916 G.Peyrot, La liberta di cosdenza e di culto di fronte alia Costituente italiana, Rome, Centro 
evangelico di cultura, 1946; cited in Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, pp. 269-70.
917 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 271.
918 Lettera del Consiglio Federate delle Chiese Evangeliche d ’Italia a l Presidente dell ’Assemblea 
Costituente italiana in occasione del 17febbraio 1947, in Documentazione per il Corso di Diritto 
ecclesiastico tenuto dal p ro f Giorgio Peyrot (DCDE), doc. B-7; cited in Long, Alle origini del 
pluralismo confessionale, p. 271.
19 G. Peyrot, Note agli articoli 5,14 e 15 del progetto di Costituzione che verra presentato 
a ll ’Assemblea Costituente, Roma, Consiglio Federale delle Chiese Evangeliche d’ltalia, 1947.
272
Questo comma, nel suo insieme, non puo assolutamente essere accettato. 
Tanto meno questa prima parte che sospinge lo Stato verso un dichiarato 
confessionalismo. L’Assemblea Costituente deve chiaramente conoscere e 
valutare in tutta la loro portata le conseguenze dell’eventuale deprecata 
approvazione di questo comma. Esse sono: 1°) La proclamazione di una 
religione di Stato; 2°) La proclamazione di quel confessionalismo che fu 
mantenuto nel nostro Paese dalla politica ecclesiastica di Casa Savoia; 3°) 
L’inserire implicitamente nella costituzione una delle piu illiberali 
realizzazioni giuridiche del fascismo; 4°) La limitazione della sovranita stessa 
dello Stato (specie per via degli artt. 5 e 36 del Concordato); 5°) L’aperta 
violazione del principio di eguaglianza dei cittadini di fronte alia legge (art. 5 
del Concordato); 6 °) L’aperta negazione della liberta di religione in contrasto 
con Tart. 14 della costituzione; 7°) La permanenza a carico dello Stato di 
rilevanti oneri finanziari che non hanno mai avuto una giustificazione logica 
sia giuridica che storica.920
This document, which was not official and had only a limited circulation, accepted 
Togliatti’s alternative formula that (Catholic) Church/State relations “ sono regolati 
in termini concordatari” but wth the proviso “in quanto non contrastino con la 
presente Costituzione”. This wording left open the possibility for the religious 
minorities to negotiate their own concordats with future governments. These 
opinions were put into a formal letter sent to all members of the Constituent 
Assembly on the 21st February 1947 which also contained an explicit condemnation 
of the insertion of the Lateran Pacts into the new Constitution:
Ricorda che i Patti Lateranense: 1°) proclamando lTtalia Stato confessionale e 
la confessione cattolica romana sola religione dello Stato, negano 
Feguaglianza dei culti e distruggono la neutrality religiosa dello Stato; 2°) 
negano Feguaglianza di tutti i cittadini di fronte alia legge, facendo dipendere 
dalla decisione di un tribunale ecclesiastico cattolico Fidoneita di taluni di 
essi ai pubblici uffici; 3°) violano la liberta di coscienza, obbligando tutti i 
cittadini, quali che siano le loro convinzioni, a contribute finanziariamente al
Q71mantenimento di una confessione particolare.
Representatives of the religious minorities were granted an audience with the 
provisional Head of State Enrico De Nicola on the eve of the vote on final article 7, 
which, as shown above, was passed in the least favourable format for the Protestant 
minorities. Immediately after the vote on article 7, the Consiglio federale wrote again 
to all the members of the Constituent Assembly. In a very dry letter they reminded 
the members of all parties of the promise they had made not to harm religious
920 Ibid.; cited in Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 272.
921 In difesa della liberta di religione, Dichiarazione del Consiglio Federale delle Chiese Evangeliche 
d’ltalia (21 febbraio 1947), in DCDE, doc. B-9; cited in Long, Alle origini del pluralismo 
confessionale, p. 273.
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freedom and asked that they apply this promise to the vote on article 14 (draft). In 
another document the Council, whose original demands had by now been totally 
undermined by the outcome of the article 7 vote, put a number of requests to the 
Constituent Assembly.
The first request relates to the suppression of the reference to public order 
contained in draft article 14.922 The second results from the transferral (as debated by 
the Assembly) of points dealing with relations between the State and the non- 
Catholic confessions to article 14. The council asked that the Assembly clearly 
affirm that: “tutte le confessioni religiose sono uguali di ffonte alia legge e si 
reggono sulle base dei propri statuti. ” 923 This, for the Protestants, meant the Catholic 
Church included. But as Long explains, there were two further points in the draft 
with which the Protestants were not satisfied: the fact that the Constitution spoke 
only of the ‘freedom of the individual’ and not of ‘equality between religions’; and 
the reference to the restrictions of the Italian juridical system on the self-governance 
of the confessions themselves.
Although the result of the vote on article 7 was predictable, Protestants felt 
deeply embittered towards the Dc party and the Communists for having delivered the 
vote for the confessional State, as the following condemnation of their collaboration 
shows:
Pur lasciando da parte ogni considerazione di carattere politico, non si pud 
fare a meno di constatare le affinita che esistono fra la mentalita collettivista 
cattolica e quella comunista. Nonostante le opposizioni di principi professati 
resta il fatto che il Cattolicesimo e una religione di autorita imposta come il 
comunismo e un ordinamento di autorita imposta. Nell’uno e nell’altro gli 
individui contano fino a un certo punto. Essi esistono non come fmi a se 
stessi, ma in funzione della collettivita. Ed e forse questa affinita che rende 
piu esasperante la lotta dell’un sistema contro l’altro.924
The issue of religious freedom as dealt with by the Costituenti raised protests 
from all Protestant groups. The following comment appeared in Luce:
E chiaro che ‘eguaglianza di liberta’, esistendo un articolo 7 ed essendo 
costituzionalmente sancito che gli statuti delle minoranze religiose non 
devono ‘contrastare’ con 1’ordinamento giuridico italiano (nel quale 
costituzionalmente sono contemplati Concordato e Trattato Lateranense!), e 
una formula vuota di significato ed atta soltanto a sancire i privilegi materiali
922 This was accepted by the Constituent Assembly: see section B3 (vi) o f  this thesis.
923 Long, A lie origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 274.
924 Manfredi Ronchi, Stato e Chiesa romana nella Costituziom italiana, in Testimonianza, April 1947, 
p.57; cited in Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 275.
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Q9 Se morali della religione della maggioranza, che e anche religione di Stato.
The last clause of draft article 5 which allowed any future negotiations on 
relations between minority churches and the State to be undertaken on the basis of 
‘intese’ or agreements with the respective organisations, was passed with very little 
comment from the Protestants, but was nevertheless the cause of much internal 
debate later. Should the ‘agreements’ be used as a tool to move the debate on? 
Should they be ignored and the religious freedom debate be continued without them? 
Or should the Protestants let the dust settle for a while before reigniting the 
arguments? The Sinodo valdese chose the latter, nominating a commission to study 
the issue. A subsequent general meeting of the Sinodo delle Chiese metodiste e 
valdesi in Torre Pellice, published a document on religious freedom, of which the 
following are extracts:
II Sinodo, rileva che il mantenimento della laicita dello Stato democratico e 
premessa indispensabile al raggiungimento di una autentica liberta religiosa. 
In tale quadro ritiene che sia indispensabile la piena attuazione delle norme 
costituzionali, ed in particolare del comma 3 dell’art. 8  che prevede come 
metodo per definire i rapporti tra Stato e organizzazioni religiose la legge su 
base di Intese . . . E improcrastinabile Tabrogazione della legge sui culti 
ammessi del 1929 . . . Esprime inoltre preoccupazione per i progetti enunciati 
da membri del Govemo per cio che riguarda la scuola, che rischiano di 
impedire il libero dialogo e la convivenza di gruppi di diversa religione e 
quindi di favorire gravi discriminazioni.
This document was not published, as it might appear, in the immediate aftermath of 
the new Constitution, but in August 2001 in the annual report of the Sinodo, 
‘Coscienza e liberty .926 The fact that abrogation of the ‘culti ammessi’ laws had still 
not taken place in 2 0 0 1 , clearly illustrates the inertia from government and 
ecclesiastical sources that the minority religions were, and still are, faced with.
However, in 1947, both the Sinodo valdese and the Consiglio federale 
seemed on the whole quite happy with the situation in which they found themselves 
post-Constitution.927 Such an attitude seems quite naive, given that the position of 
privilege enjoyed by the Catholic Church had been reinforced, the laws dealing with 
the culti ammessi remained untouched and the unaccountability of the police with
925 G.Gonnet, Egualmente liberi?, in Luce, 30th April 1947 & Long, A lie origini del pluralismo 
confessionale, p. 277.
926 Coscienza e liberta, Rivista annuale curata dalla sezione italiana dell ’Associazione Intemazionale 
per la difesa della Liberta Religiosa, Rome, 2001, p. 107.
927 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, pp. 278-9.
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their heavy-handed interpretation of the laws, which continued for years after, 
ensured that the position of the Protestant minorities remained unchanged.
In the Constituent Assembly, Mortati argues that the minority religious 
groups do indeed have equal rights but states that some limitations are necessary :
Attraverso un’interpretazione delle leggi in materia . . .  si potra far valere in 
pratica la parita dei culti, parita che pero non potra non incontrarsi in certi 
limiti naturali che derivano dalla situazione di fatto, e che neppure il 
legislatore pud eliminare. Questo si dica, per esempio, nei confronti della 
proposta, segnalata ai membri della Costituente dal Consiglio delle Chiese 
evangeliche, con cui chiede di osservare le festivita e il riposo festivo non 
secondo il calendario e le prescrizioni della Chiesa cattolica ma secondo le 
prescrizioni dei vari cu lti. . . .  Evidentemente una norma del genere sarebbe 
di impossibile applicazione, date le esigenze del coordinammento delle 
attivita lavorative, che implicano la contemporaneity del lavoro. 928
Mortati’s response to the Evangelical request is perfectly reasonable, but 
nevertheless raises an important question: why was such a relatively trivial request 
dealt with in the Assembly when the Council of Evangelical Churches were making 
continuous demands during this period to have much more fundamental issues, such 
as their basic freedom to worship and proselytise and their harsh treatment by the 
authorities, discussed by the Assembly? Such questions were, in fact, being raised by 
the non-Catholic parties, but were largely ignored by the spokespersons of the 
Catholic parties.
Mario Cevolotto (Pdl) says that despite the laws on the culti ammessi passed 
as a complement to the Lateran Pacts, the liberty they theoretically afforded the 
minority religions never in fact existed:
C’e stata una forma di persecuzione, specialmente contro i Valdesi. Badate 
che io non rattribuisco affatto, come i Valdesi credono, alia Chiesa cattolica; 
l’attribuisco all’esecutivo: la polizia, data l’affermazione della superiority 
della Chiesa cattolica nel Trattato e nel Concordato lateranense, riteneva di 
dover considerare in fatto e in diritto deteriori tutte le altre religioni. Ora voi 
dite sinceramente che, inserendo i Patti lateranensi nella Costituzione, non 
avete voluto creare uno stato confessionale, ne dare una supremazia di azione 
alia Chiesa cattolica a danno alle altre Chiese, e che volete affermare la 
liberty di tutti nella forma piu ampia e pfu concreta. Allora, per evitare quelle 
deformazioni da parte dell’esecutivo che ci sono state in quest’anni, e 
necessaria un’affermazione la quale tolga ogni dubbio.929
928 CRAC, vol. 1, p. 741.
929 Ibid., p. 838. These comments by Cevolotto are in support o f a suggested insertion into draft article 
14 o f the clause “Tutte le confessioni religiose son eguali davanti alia legge” (Ibid., p. 835.) He first 
of all makes it clear to the Assembly that his support is not inspired by the arguments o f the 
Waldensians, who were seeking such provisions in the Constitution. He then responds to a comment
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(viii) The ‘other’ minority churches
Federico Alessandrini’s II Quotidiano (the main Catholic Action newspaper) is 
decidedly dismissive of the principle of “eguaglianza di tutte le confessioni religiose 
di fronte alle leggi” (final article 8 , clause 1). It claims that “per lo Stato italiano la 
verita professata dalla grande maggioranza dei cittadini vale quanto le stravaganze 
soggettive di alcuni piccoli gruppi.” 930 Alessandrini’s extremely disparaging 
reference to ‘alcuni piccoli gruppi’ raises an important question: what exactly did the 
Assembly understand by the term “other confessions”? Certainly, the Waldensians 
and the Jews were mentioned in the debates, but what did the costituenti know of 
them? And what was known of the Methodists and the Salvation Army (or ‘esercito 
della salute’ as Ruini called them)? How did they figure, if at all, in the minds of the 
costituenti when discussing the concept of the minority churches? Long attempts to 
clarify the situation:
I soggetti istituzionali noti alia Costituente erano solo due: i ‘protestanti’ 
(cioe il Consiglio federale, che li rappresentava unitariamente) e gli ebrei. 
Sono questi soggeti che intervengono, scrivono, presentano documenti, fanno 
pressioni; sono loro in fondo, che ottengono ascolto con l’articolo 8  (anche 
se, in gran parte, esso non corrisponde affatto alle loro richieste). Non si e 
quindi lontani dal vero nel ritenere che coloro che votarono l’articolo 8  
fossero convinti che, a parte il Concordato, sarebbe bastate un paio di intese 
per chiudere la ‘questione religiosa’ in Italia: una con i protestanti (visti 
unitariamente e spesso identificati. . . con i valdesi) e una con gli ebrei. 
L’entusiastica difesa delle minoranze religiose fatta da Pajetta davanti alia 
Costituente .. . menzionava appunto i meriti storici dei valdesi e degli ebrei. 
Altri non ce n’erano, o almeno al tempo della Costituente non erano percepiti 
come possibili soggetti di intese931
The articles dealing with Church-State relations and the rights and freedoms 
of the minority churches (final articles 7, 8  and 19) were approved for the final 
version of the Italian Constitution as follows:
Dossetti had just finished making, in which he had attributed the persecution o f the Protestants under 
Fascism to the police, by making it clear that the responsibility for such activities must lie with the 
executive; and that if  Catholics are sincere in their declarations about not wishing to promote the 
interests o f the Catholic Church to the detriment o f the other churches, they will support the clause in 
question, which will make the executive avoid past injustices.
Articolo 15, in i l  Quotidiano, 15 April 1947, p .l.
931 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 366. In his footnote to this paragraph, Long 
says: “I musulmani sono citati per lo piu in senso paradossale, per affermare che essi hanno problemi 
ben diversi da quelli italiani. E, con la perdita delle colonie, non c’era in effetti una ‘questione 




Lo Stato e la Chiesa cattolica sono, ciascuno nel proprio ordine, indipendenti 
e sovrani
I loro rapporti sono regolati dai Patti Lateranensi. Le modificazioni dei Patti, 
accettate dalle due parti, non richiedono procedimento di revisione 
costituzionale.
Article 8
Tutte le confessioni religiose sono egualmente libere davanti alia legge.
Le confessioni religiose diverse dalla cattolica hanno diritto di organizzarsi 
secondo i propri statuti, in quanto non contrastino con Vordinamento 
giuridico italiano.
I loro rapporti con lo Stato sono regolati per legge sulla base di intese con le 
relative rappresentanze.
Article 19
Tutti hanno diritto di professare liberamente la propria fede religiosa in 
qualsiasi forma, individuale o associata, di fame propaganda e di 
esercitarne in privato o in pubblico il culto, purche non si tratti di riti 
contrari al buon costume.
Having discussed the debates surrounding Church/State relations and 
religious freedom we are now, with varying degrees of assurance, in a position to 
provide some concluding assessments. The non-specialist reading articles 7, 8  and 19 
of the Constitution in their final form could be forgiven for assuming that the 
debates on these articles would have taken up a roughly equal amount of time and 
energy leading to their approval; but this is far from having been the case. What we 
now know is that articles 8  and 19 were dependent for their existence and content on 
the outcome of what turned out to be the most difficult and contentious issue, 
resolved in article 7, concerning the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the 
Constitution. Once this issue was decided, articles 8  and 19 were inserted largely to 
meet objections which had already been widely discussed in the debates on article 7.
We are also in a better position to understand the sense of the articles, 
precisely in relation to the problems created by article 7. Without rehearsing these 
arguments, it is evident that proposals by Togliatti, Cevolotto and other laid  could 
easily have guaranteed religious freedom for all faiths in a single article, but this 
became impossible because of the Catholic insistence on the inclusion of the Pacts, 
and the privileges this established for the Catholic Church. In this respect, articles 8  
and 19 can be seen as attempts to modify this imbalance.
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At this point, reference to the conclusioni cattoliche may help to shed some 
light on the problem. What emerges with some clarity from a reading of the debates 
is that the arguments of the Catholics were a mixture of responses, namely to 
demands for complete freedom of conscience by the laid  in the new political 
situation on the one hand, but almost totally conditioned by the need to defend the 
ICAS proposals on the other. In this sense we can say that a certain prioritisation was 
given by the Catholic costituenti to the different components of the ICAS document.
There was total fidelity to the fourth, and clearest, demand in the conclusioni 
for insertion of the Pacts into the Constitution, with the exception of Gerardo Bruni, 
the cristiano-sociali leader who both spoke and voted against it. Catholic 
intransigence and almost total imperviousness to both sound juridical arguments 
against inclusion, and repeated assurances that no-one would oppose the existence of 
the Pacts outside the Constitution demonstrates that they did not treat the conclusioni 
as a simple wish list. Articles from authoritative sources, and in all likelihood 
through other Catholic channels, made it clear that inclusion of the Pacts was a 
Vatican priority, and that it was the duty of Catholics to support it. That the 
conclusioni cattoliche was not an official document would have made little 
difference to most Catholics.
The third demand in the conclusioni was also defended with some rigour. 
While all religious faiths were to enjoy equal freedom, this did not entail 
‘equiparazione’, or identical treatment. Leaving aside the ambiguity of meaning, 
article 8 , with its statements about “le confessioni religiose diverse dalla cattolica” 
having to be reconciled with Italian law both implies that the Catholic religion is 
exempt from such an obligation and also subjects them to existing legislation. Their 
relationship with state legislation, on the basis of ‘intese’, is consigned to future 
arrangements. It was clear from Catholic arguments that the subordination implied in 
the article was intended. This was buttressed by arguments appealing to the second 
demand in the conclusioni, namely that state legislation should reflect the historical, 
numerical and cultural predominance of Catholicism in the Italian nation. The appeal 
to the importance of maintaining the pace religiosa, although appearing in the 
conclusioni as part of the argument against ‘equiparazione’, was employed more 
frequently and vigorously in connection with the inclusion of the Pacts into the 
Constitution.
The ICAS document, in its first demand, would have led, if successful, to a 
separate statement in the Constitution about the special place of the Catholic Church
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in the nation. It added that failure to include such a statement would amount to an 
offence against the Italian sentiment and conscience. The demand was from the 
beginning a total failure, with no hope of success as a proposal, although the idea of 
offending the Italian (Catholic) conscience became yet another argument for 
inclusion of the Pacts. Aside from a few integralists in the Assembly, from the 
important Dc members from Subcommission 1, only Giorgio La Pira was favourable 
to such a statement, and no draft article to this effect was proposed by the Assembly. 
La Pira, moreover, with his invocations to the Virgin Mary and appeals to the 
theories of St. Thomas Aquinas during the debates, was renowned for his piety and 
devotion, and his interventions, although somewhat irritating, usually met with a 
mixture of affectionate opposition and respect.932 Was this reticence to draft an 
article for such a statement an indication of a greater degree of laicita among the Dc 
costituenti than among the broader membership of the Ac?
It is doubtful whether this in itself can support such a supposition. In the first 
place we have to remember that in numerical terms within the Assembly the ‘lay’ 
parties easily outnumbered the Dc. The general tenor and tone of the discussions 
could not be dictated by Catholics alone. In reading the debates one is struck by what 
could almost be called the ‘cranky’ nature of the few speeches in favour of an 
invocation such as that demanded by the first request of the conclusioni. But there is 
a factor which is perhaps even more important in explaining the apparently 
lukewarm Dc response to this demand. From the beginning of the debates on 
Church/State relations in Subcommission 1, both Dossetti and Moro had insisted, in 
response to Togliatti, that their proposals were not ‘ideological’ in nature. 
Subsequently, so much Catholic effort had gone into arguing that inclusion of the 
Lateran Pacts did not amount to the creation of a confessional state, and to 
minimising the importance of the Pacts’ inclusion of Article 1 of the Albertine 
Statute, that they could hardly then propose an article that would undercut their 
arguments. The substance of the demands of the ICAS document had been obtained 
after an extremely bruising battle. To rub salt into the wound of the defeated after 
such a substantial victory by the solemn invocation of Catholic hegemony demanded 
by the conclusioni cattoliche would have caused an eruption that even Togliatti could 
not have prevented.
932 1 have been unable to find a reliable source for the nevertheless characteristic story that while 
Mayor o f Florence in the 1950’s La Pira had to borrow an overcoat for a winter visit to the USA  
because he had given his own to the poor.
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We have already indicated that the role of Togliatti in the debates was 
critical. The crucial vote, on article 7, which would determine the subsequent 
elaboration of articles 8  and 19, took place on the 25th March 1947. At this point, 
although De Gasperi had visited the United States, and some may have suspected 
pressure from the State Department to exclude Communists and Socialists from 
government, these suspicions were not yet as well-formed as later historiography has 
read into them. It is in some ways tempting to speculate whether or not De Gasperi 
had deliberately held back his exclusion of the Communists and Socialists from 
government until April/May 1947 by which time the vote in favour of inclusion of 
the Pacts had been secured.
Those voting in favour of inclusion of the Pacts amounted to 350, those 
against 149. Although there were 8  abstentions and 1 recorded absence, Communist 
discipline was legendary and Togliatti delivered 94 votes for inclusion. 933 If Togliatti 
had decided otherwise, he would undoubtedly have taken the abstentions with him 
and probably have defeated article 7 .934 To the reasons already argued for Togliatti’s 
decision we should add that at this stage the Pci was still part of the government 
coalition. His long-term aim, moreover, was the construction of a Gramscian 
‘historic bloc’ which would itself determine, and not be determined by, the direction 
of government irrespective of the party (or parties) in office. An essential component 
of this ‘historic bloc’ was the Catholic masses. To Togliatti, this was in the long-term 
more important than the compromises over article 7, and, it must be said, those over 
articles 8  and 19.
Some may well think that in the overall scheme of post-war Italian history 
Togliatti was right. But in case we are tempted to think, like Togliatti, that the 
debates we have discussed were conducted largely on the basis of a fear that 
Church/State relations and issues of religious freedom might in future have a greater 
importance than they turned out to have in practice, we need to give a little attention 
to a small chapter of Italian history which has received little attention, to show that 
for some Italian citizens of the Republic this was not the case. The debates did not 
amount to discussions of abstract principles with no consequences.
933 These calculations are based on the recorded votes in CRAC, vol. 1, pp. 662-4.
934 ‘Probably’ to allow for abstentions in the other direction; although this is unlikely, given that his 
difficulty was in persuading his party to vote for, not against, inclusion.
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SECTION C: CONCLUSIONS
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONSTITUTION
Having established in Section B that the Catholic Church and Dc party largely had 
their own way with regard to Church/State relations in the new Constitution, in this 
concluding section we will discuss the consequences of this victory for the minority 
religious groups and indeed the Catholic Church itself We shall also discuss the 
juridical repercussions of article 7 of the Constitution, before examining how these 
factors affected the condition of both Catholic and non-Catholic denominations in the 
immediate aftermath of the Constitution.
(i) A New Democracy?
The horrors of the war years in Italy and the social deprivations and political 
uncertainties of the period immediately after the war had instilled in Catholics the 
conviction that the Church was “a bastion of truth in a hostile world.” 935 Political and 
ecclesiastical integralists also believed that given this perception, the laity was duty 
bound “to unite in defence of the Church and to accept the directives provided by
• • • o q rtheir spiritual leaders.” The authority of the Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy was 
thus strengthened by the war years and manifested itself post-war in the willingness 
of the faithful to follow the instructions of the clergy to the letter. I would have to 
agree with Conway when he claims that to a large extent this explains the electoral 
success enjoyed by the Christian Democrats in Italy and indeed Christian democrat 
parties in much of Western Europe during the post-war years. 937
However, in the institutional elections of 1946, despite the backing of the 
Church and canvassing by the Pope, only a relative majority was achieved by the Dc 
party. This meant it had to tread carefully, as the potential of a combined vote by the 
Left, meant that any thoughts of pushing through a ‘Catholic agenda’ unchallenged 
was quite unfeasible. As Furlong points out
The Communists . . . favoured a Constitution which would be clearly 
committed to specific radical egalitarian values and which should leave their 
implementation to a political system dominated by a single chamber 
legislature. The temporary continuation of Liberal and Fascist norms, 
particularly the Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedure, was accepted 
only as the means of ensuring a peaceful and stable transitional period. To the
935 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 92.
936 Ibid.
937 Ibid., pp. 92-3.
282
legislature should fall the task of guaranteeing the progressive 
implementation of the Constitution and the transformation of Italian politics 
into a radical democratic participatory system 938
That neither of these two last points occurred can be attributed to two main 
developments: a ruling Dc party from 1948 onwards which displayed an inevitable 
reticence, or even inertia, at every opportunity for reform; and a Constitution 
considered by many to be ‘rigid’, and a sound basis for legal, political and 
institutional reform, which turned out in practice to be extremely ‘flexible’ and open 
to abuse by a judiciary, still populated by personnel formed under Fascism and who 
preferred to continue to give precedence to the old Fascist laws even if they 
contravened articles of the Constitution, and ignored by a government equally keen 
to prolong the status quo. The problem was compounded by the fact that
Italian Public Administration in its widest sense ought to be seen as a major 
direct influence on public policy. It is not only that the state apparatus is not 
under effective political control but rather that the capacity of directing public 
administration does not lie with the legislature, the Council of Ministers, the 
Prime Minister or any other formal political body. 939
Furlong claims that the process of post-war reconstruction passed on to future 
governments an awkward compromise between the old mainly pre-Fascist 
institutions of state, the radical idealist hopes of the Constituent Assembly, and the 
internal domestic constraints on freedom of action for the new political classes.940
Apart from this ‘awkward compromise’, a unique set of opposing forces were 
tugging at the new Italian democracy: on one side the dream of a revolution, while 
on the other
Tidea di un ordine oggettivo di verita e di giustizia introducono nella 
rinascente democrazia italiana forti tensioni utopiche che danno calore alia 
vita politica e creano forti motivi di appartenenza e di mobilitazione, ma 
rendono anche piu difficile e incerto il funzionamento dei meccanismi della 
democrazia. 941
Jemolo interpreted later developments in France and the advent of De Gaulle as a 
defeat for democracy which, he believed, made it all the more likely that in Italy an
938 Furlong, M odem  Italy, p. 67.
939 Ibid., p. 78.
940 Ibid., p. 53.
941 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, pp. 28-9. The question o f what is meant by ‘democracy’ as it 
was seen by the Christian democrat party and the Vatican is dealt with in depth in P. Scoppola, La 
democrazia nel pensiero cattolico del Novecento, in Storia delle idee politiche economiche e sociali, 
diretta da L.Firpo, vol. VI, Torino, Utet, 1972.
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authoritarian regime, though perhaps not a repetition of Fascism, might emerge. He 
felt that it would not, however, display the organised violence that was the signature 
and success of Fascism, but an authoritarian regime nevertheless, which, appearing 
to have an air of legality, would bypass the Constitution without reforming it.942
Jemolo’s assessment of the new regime was echoed by the lay parties. The 
Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, in a talk on Giolitti given in Turin on
iL
30 April 1950, referred to the expulsion of the Communists from government, and 
suggested a continuity between Fascism and post-Fascism, which reads as a harsh 
criticism of the politics of the Dc government:
sembrava che il regime mussoliniano fosse stato travolta per sempre .. . 
Ebbene a distanza di sette anni da quel crollo, tutti coloro che hanno sensi di 
liberta sono esterrefatti a vedere come la minaccia di un ritomo ad un regime 
di tirannide e di corruzione, simile, anche se non del tutto uguale, a quello 
fascista, gravi su noi come un incubo. 943
During the autumn conference season of 1952, both the Italian Liberal Party 
and Social Democratic party, in their congresses in Genoa, passed motions criticising 
the government for the numerous violations of Articles 8 , 17, 18 and 19 of the 
Constitution and calling for a complete revision of the “anticostituzionali leggi 
fasciste [which are] la causa degli inconvenienti lamentati. ” 944 The progressive lay 
parties looked at the bigger picture: from their point of view, “gli anni della 
Costituente erano . . .  anni di caduta delle speranze di una democrazia nuova. ” 945 
In an attempt to identify the type of government that Italy had developed 
from the 1940’s, Gianni Long suggests three options:
E nota ai costituzionalisti la distinzione . .. tra forme di govemo: 
monopartitismo, multipartitismo moderato e multipartitismo estremo. 
Applicando questa schema alia recente storia dei rapporti tra Stato e 
confessioni religiose in Italia, possiamo parlare di ‘monoconfessionalismo’ 
dei Patti del 1929, protrattosi di fatto sino agli anni settanta e di diritto sino 
all’approvazione della prima legge sulla base di intesa nel 1984.946
This is but a small selection from the historiography of the post-war Italy which is 
unanimous in its criticisms of the tardiness with which post-war governments
942 AC. Jemolo, Church and State in Italy from unification to the present day, Torino, Einaudi, 1977, 
p. 339.
43 Cited in Scoppola, La repubblica deipartiti, p. 161. See also P. Scoppola, Gli anni della 
Costituente fra  politico e storia, Bologna, II Mulino, 1980, pp. 25-6.
944 Falzone, La Costituzione ed i culti non cattolici, p. 70.
945 Scoppola, Gli cmni della Costituente, p. 28.
946 Long, Alle origini del pluralismo confessionale, p. 367.
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attended to the problems of bringing legislation into line with the requirements of the 
Constitution.
More particularly, in relation to the debates we have examined, Catholics had 
given repeated assurances that any residual problems related to the freedom of 
minority faiths created by the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution 
would be speedily resolved.
(ii) An effective Constitution?
With regard to article 7 of the Constitution, Falzone says, I think incorrectly, that 
even after the Constitution came into force, “le norme del Trattato e del Concordato 
conservano il valore di norme di legge ordinaria, che avevano prima” and so in spite 
of the great weight placed on the insertion of the Pacts into the Constitution by the 
Catholic costituenti, the Catholic press and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, legally the 
status of the Pacts appears to have been the same as when they did not form part of a
947constitution.
However, when the minority religions are factored in the picture becomes 
less clear:
Particolo 81 dello statuto albertino, almeno, disponeva che ‘ogni legge 
contraria al presente statuto e abrogata’ . . .  La Costituzione non ha un 
preambolo che dica di che cosa si tratti. La Iacunosa XVT disposizione 
transitoria ordina la revisione e il coordinamento con la Costituzione, da 
operarsi entro un anno, delle ‘precedenti leggi costituzionali che non siano 
finora esplicitamente o implicitamente abrogate’, ma nulla dice circa la 
revisione delle norme di leggi ordinarie anteriori che siano in contrasto con 
norme della Costituzione. Possono considerarsi anche queste, quasi tutte 
appartenenti alia legislazione fascista, ‘esplicitamente o implicitamente 
abrogate’? La formula di promulgazione, non approvata dall’Assemblea 
Costituente ma apposta dal Presidente della Repubblica, precisa che ‘La 
Costituzione, munita del sigillo dello Stato, sara inserita nella Raccolta 
ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti della Repubblica’, e che essa ‘dovta essere 
fedelmente osservata come legge fondamentale della Repubblica da tutti i 
cittadini e dagli organi dello Stato’ .948
Whether or not the Constitution did indeed have the status of a ‘legge 
fondamentale’ is open to doubt, due to three different theories, prevalent in the 
1940’s and 50’s, of the juridical status of constitutions. 949
947 Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, p. 24.
948 Ibid., p. 46.
949 “La prima, detta della legge fondamentale, pone una graduatoria degli atti giuridici per la quale i 
contratti, i regolamenti, i prowedimenti alle autorita locali, ecc., non hanno un valore proprio: hanno 
valore in quanto lo traggono dalle leggi ordinarie; e queste ultime valgono in quanto traggono la loro
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However, the main point to remember here is that the Constituent Assembly 
had had the opportunity to resolve all of these issues but failed to do so. Indeed, the 
solution was abandoned to the free interpretation of the judiciary, resulting in 
decisions at best unsafe, and at worst completely contradictory. 950 This, according to 
Falzone, is the main reason for the Constitution being progressively discredited in the 
eyes of the public, to the extent that during the 1950’s, he claims that there was much 
confusion as to which parts of the Constitution were still in force.951
It has to be said, however, that a reading of the debates of the Constituent 
Assembly does not suggest that there was any doubt in the mind of the costituenti 
that they were deliberating a Constitution of the strongest kind, one from which the 
legislative framework of the Republic drew its legitimacy. From this point of view 
Falzone, who was not a member of the Assembly, presents an idiosyncratic scenario 
of the status of the Constitution as problematic. In many ways Falzone’s work seems 
to be presenting views of the Constitution which emerged as justifications for not 
implementing some of its provisions.
(iii) The response of the confessions
a) The Catholic Church
The political, spiritual and financial stability of the Vatican had been guaranteed by 
the insertion of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution. In return the Catholic Church 
mobilised Italian Catholics behind the Dc party, as has been shown, in an alliance 
that appeared unshakeable:
La maggior parte degli ambienti ecclesiastici interpreto infatti in chiave piu 
confessionale di Montini il legame fra Chiesa e partito, dando vita a cio che 
Jemolo ha definito il ‘regime clericale’ e di cui uno dei tratti piu caratteristici 
fu la limitazione della liberta delle minoranze protestanti.952
efficacia dalla Costituzione; sicche, trattandosi di una vera e propria gerarchia di norme, la 
Costituzione e cogente solo nei riguardi del legislatore e non contiene obblighi o divieti direttamente 
rivolti ai cittadini e agli organi esecutivi dello Stato. Per la seconda teoria, invece, le costituzioni sono 
leggi, sia pure su un piano morale e politico piu elevato (teoria della superlegge), sicche la loro 
promulgazione ne rende senz’altro obbligatori Tesecuzione e il rispetto da parte di tutti, con la 
conseguente abrogazione di tutte le precedenti norme legislative con esse contrastanti. Per la terza 
teoria (detta mista) le costituzioni sono complessi di norme, di cui talune dirette soltanto al legislatore, 
affinche ad esse uniformi le sue leggi, altre dispositive e quindi direttamente rivolte ai cittadini e agli 
organi esecutivi; altre costruttive, cioe dirette a istituire i massimi organi dello Stato prevedendone e 
regolandone armonicamente le compelenze.” Ibid., pp. 46-7.
950 See ibid., pp. 50-54 for examples o f such judgements.
951 Ibid., pp. 46-7.
952 Giovagnoli, IIpartito italiano, p. 32.
286
Although the ecclesiastical hierarchy was on the whole rather pleased with the 
inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution, which was perceived as by far the 
most important issue for the future of the Catholic Church during the period of the 
Constituent Assembly, it was also concerned about the freedoms afforded to the 
minority religions by articles 8,19 and 20. This concern was reflected primarily in 
the Catholic press: the Vatican’s official newspaper, L ’Osservatore Romano was 
constantly criticising the activities of these minorities throughout the period of the 
Constituent Assembly and beyond. In an article published on 28th October 1956, 
almost ten years after the Constitution came into force, it reported that “the Catholic 
Press has not failed to utter. . .  doubts and perplexities” in response to Protestant 
attempts to push forward negotiations with the government on the basis of ‘intese’ as 
laid down by clause 3 of Article 8  of the Constitution.953
Catholic concern over these new freedoms being handed to the Protestants 
was widespread. The Catholic press was going out of its way to convince its 
readership that the old laws were still in force -  in some instances inventing its own 
laws on the subject. The following is a section of an article from a Bologna 
magazine:
Let Catholics remember the following laws which govern Protestant 
propaganda work in Italy: a) For the spread of printed propaganda of any 
kind, a written authority (sic) must be obtained from the proper local police 
authority: it is not enough to have an over-all permit issued by an Italian 
police authority, b) The organisers of public meetings must make written 
application to the proper police authority, who must give an answer in writing 
within three days, c) For services behind closed doors where there is a 
qualified person present -  minister, elder or lay preacher -  there must be 
regular permission. Adherents may meet freely for prayer together, d) 
Precedence will be given to Catholics if they submit their requests for public 
meetings in good time to the requisite authority. 954
953 Peyrot, Religious liberty and conditions o f Evangelical People in Italy, p. 23.
954 Ibid., pp. 29-30. The quotation comes from an article by Paolo Celli, The Protestant Peril -  
Protestants and the Italian Law, in II Regno, published in Bologna, April 1957, p. 12. The text o f item 
d) apparently referring to legislation which should be imposed on the Protestants, appears nowhere in 
Italian law and had previously been fabricated and promulgated by Don Amedeo Ghetti, Diocesan 
Secretary for the Preservation o f the Faith in the diocese o f Bologna, in another article entitled The 
Protestant Peril, published in Bologna in the Catholic Action newspaper, L ’Awenire d ’Italia on 
January 4th 1957.
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b) The Protestant churches
Examining the problems that faced the non-Catholic denominations in their attempts 
to reach agreement with the State regarding their Constitutional and juridical position 
as laid down in clause 3 of Article 8  of the Constitution, Falzone says that the first to 
make direct approaches to the government were the Pentecostals. On 12th October 
1948, they put forward a request to the Ministry of the Interior aimed at obtaining 
legal recognition for their organisation under the terms of the law of the 24th June 
1929. This request was never given a reply.955
The Chiesa valdese fared little better. In September 1948 it set up a 
commission of five members entrusted with the task of reaching agreement with the 
Italian State on behalf of all churches of the evangelical community. On 20th March 
1951, the commission issued a communique, reproduced in II Diritto ecclesiastico 
(1951, p. 684) indicating that “gravi difflcolta si frappongono tuttora alia 
realizzazione di quelle intese da concordarsi tra lo Stato e i culti diversi dal cattolico 
. . .  II Govemo, infatti, non ha ancora dimostrato di volere attuare le intese predette 
secondo le modalita previste dalla Costituzione. ” 956
In December 1951, the deputies Castellarin and Preti put a series of questions 
to the Minister for the Interior. On 12th of that month Deputy Bubbio, Undersecretary 
of State for the Interior, replied to the Chamber remarking that
si tratta di attuare riforme delle leggi vigenti (del 1929-30) per metterle in 
armonia con le norme della Costituzione. In tal senso fin dallo scorso anno 
intervennero accordi con il presidente del Consiglio federale delle chiese 
evangeliche d’ltalia, precisamente nel senso che il Consiglio avrebbe iniziato 
lo studio delle possibili riforme e avrebbe presentato concrete proposte al 
Ministero dell’intemo, il quale le avrebbe fatte oggetto di esame e avrebbe 
promosso le necessarie intese e, quindi, il prowedimento legislativo. Si e in 
attesa di tali proposte per un esame della materia.957
Preti was less than satisfied with this reply “anche perche la realta e diversa da quella
Q C O
esposta.” Preti complained that the Ministry was playing with words and 
deliberately employing delaying tactics to avoid tackling the issue.
In his reply Bubbio continues to prevaricate on the meaning of the word
‘intese’:
955 Falzone, La Costituzione ed i culti non cattolici, p. 70.
956 Ibid., p. 71.
957 Ibid.., p. 71-2.
958 Ibid., p. 72.
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gli evangelici desiderano la forma del concordato, trattandosi di accordi tra 
ordinamenti giuridici; il Ministero delfintemo .. . ritiene invece che il 
termine generico Tntesa’ non consenta una siffatta ‘specifica precisa portata’, 
la quale ‘importerebbe una parallelismo tra il concordato con la Santa Sede e 
le intese con le rappresentanze delle confessione religiose diverse dalla 
cattolica, che non e giuridicamente ammissibile’ .959
The Consiglio federale delle chiese evangeliche proposed that a commission 
be set up comprising the proper representatives of the State and of the religious 
organisations affected by the issue and indicated the following areas which should 
form the basis of any discussions:
posizione giuridica degli enti di culto e delle istituzioni religiose; posizione 
giuridica delle associazioni religiose esistenti solo di fatto; precisazioni in 
ordine alia liberta di discussione e di testimonianza; istruzione religiosa nelle 
pubbliche scuole; tutela delFesercizio del culto pubblico e della sua 
diffusione; tutela delle liberta delFesercizio privato e pubblico, individuale ed 
associato, del culto e delle associazioni ed attivita di carattere religioso; 
posizione giuridica dei ministri del culto; disciplina del matrimonio religioso; 
posizione giuridica dei templi e dei locali di culto assistenza religiosa negli 
ospedali, negli istituti di cura e nelle case di prevenzione e di pena; assistenza 
religiosa ai militari; rapporti fra enti di culto ed enti di beneflcienza ed 
istruzione e relative rappresentanze; disciplina dei cimiteri960
Paolo Barile contributed to this discussion with an article in II Diritto ecclesiastico, 
1952, p.342, in which he added other suggestions for discussion: “estensione alle 
chiese non cattoliche dei limiti di valore in tema di autorizzazione agli acquisti; 
soppressione delle limitazioni al contributo dello Stato nelle riparazioni e 
ricostruzioni degli ediflci dei culti acattolici.” 961 
Falzone points out that
i costituenti, nel 1947, erano convinti di avere gia proweduto essi stessi ad 
assicurare in Italia Feguaglianza delle confessioni religiose di fronte alia 
legge e la liberta religiosa, con gli articoli 8  e 19 della Costituzione. Non 
potevano immaginare che, cinque anni dopo, fosse ancora materia di 
discussione, e non di rado negata, Fapplicability di questi articoli (dalla 
negazione delF applicability discende che la delicata materia sarebbe tuttora 
regolata dalla legislazione fascista); e nemmeno che vi sarebbero state 
difficolta nella realizzazione di intese e di leggi esplicative delle norme 
costituzionali.962
959 Ibid.
960 Ibid., p. 73.
961 Ibid.
962 Ibid., p. 74.
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From this come two points: why, when there were so many jurists in the 
Constituent Assembly, especially among the ranks of the Dc party, was the 
Constitution allowed to remain so open-ended, with no fixed timescale nor 
framework for translating its principles into laws? Secondly, were the Dc party 
jurists, bolstered by their unofficial, but skilfully manipulated, status as the party of 
the Church, responsible for allowing this to happen?
Falzone criticises the Protestant groups for irritating the government by its 
persistent badgering. He asks: “Non si sono mai chiesti se bussano alia porta giusta, a 
parte il fatto che si sono ostinati a bussare ad una porta che non sembra volersi aprire 
del tutto? ” 963 The Constitution, he says, talks of negotiations with the State, not the 
Government, but how can one have negotiations with a State without going through 
the Government that represents it? A debate in Parliament, he says, has more chance 
of enthusing public opinion and the press, but how can that happen when the 
government refuses to allow even the suggestion of such a debate? He offers the 
following advice to the Protestant churches:
Gli evangelici, se veramente desiderano una nuova legge, raccolgano i loro 
studi in un progetto di legge ben articolato e contenente norme di evidente 
equita; lo facciano presentare, ad esempio alia Camera, da uno o piu deputati 
(laici o anche cattolici) di maggioranza o di paramaggioranza; si assicurino la 
collaborazione di almeno un deputato per ciascuna delle due opposizioni, 
affinche egli induca i suoi colleghi di gruppo a non intervenire se non a fine 
costruttivo, cioe lasciando da parte il piu possibile la politica; il che significa 
astenersi da ogni considerazione o affermazione che possano essere 
interpretate come aventi sapore demagogico (mai parlare, ad esempio, di 
‘persecuzione’ o cose simili). Pud darsi che i presentatori della proposta di 
legge incontrino qualche difficolta a farla discutere rapidamente prima in 
Commissione poi in aula; ma se essi non si stancano di insistere e non 
lesinano i rispettosi appelli al Presidente, fmiranno col far mettere in moto il 
convoglio del procedimento legislativo fino all’approvazione della legge. 
Eguale sistema occorrent seguire poi al Senato. II testo della legge, assai 
probabilmente, sara stato modificato durante la discussione: ma dovra pur 
sempre essere conforme alia Costituzione e rendeme operand gli articoli 8 ,
19 e 20. In ogni caso, la nuova legge segnera un progresso rispetto alia 
legislazione del 1929-30.964
He goes on to list possible pitfalls and suggest possible escape routes on the 
rocky road to creating legislation and then widens the debate out onto the European 
perspective. He quotes article 9 of the International Convention on Human Rights,
963 Ibid.
964 Ibid., p. 75.
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signed in Rome on November 4 1950, as an example of even more pressure on the 
Italian State to resolve the problem of the minority religions. It states:
Ogni uomo ha diritto alia liberta di pensiero, di coscienza e di religione; 
questo diritto implica la liberta di cambiare di religione o di convinzione, e 
cosi pure la liberta di manifestare la sua religione o la sua convinzione 
individualmente o collettivamente, in pubblico o in privato, per il culto, 
Finsegnamento, le pratiche e Fesecuzione dei riti. La liberta di manifestare la 
propria religione o la propria convinzione non puo formare oggetto di altre 
restrizioni che quelle, previste dalla legge, costituenti misure necessarie, in 
una societa democratica, alia sicurezza pubblica, alia protezione dell’ordine, 
della salute o della morale pubbliche, o alia protezione dei diritti e liberta 
altrui.965
Article 1 0  ensures freedom of expression and article 11, freedom of congregation and 
association. He sums up by obliquely suggesting that they should be satisfied with all 
of these proclamations.
Anche il diritto europeo, in atto o nascente, dunque, assicura la piena liberta 
di culto (compresa la propaganda e il cambiare di fede) nei paesi aderenti, tra 
cui FItalia. Nessun dubbio, ormai, che Fintolleranza religiosa sia esclusa in 
Italia, dal diritto intemo e da quello intemazionale. Non si vuole qui discutere 
se in Italia la situazione di fatto sia conforme al diritto. Se cosi non fosse, 
qual beneficio ne verrebbe alio Stato italiano o alia Chiesa cattolica? 
L’intolleranza inasprisce gli animi, fomisce occasioni al vittimismo e spunti 
alia demagogia; irrita i laici e i cattolici liberali, che non sono affatto pochi; 
porge motivo a rilievi in sede intemazionale; offre il destro a rappresaglie, nei 
paesi di religione prevalentamente non cattolica, contro la liberta religiosa dei 
cattolici; ossia ere a ostacoli alia missione nel mondo della Chiesa cattolica. 
Non per nulla, cattolico significa universale.966
In January 1955, the authorities of the Protestant Churches in Italy wrote to 
the State highlighting their situation under the regulations governing religious liberty 
as follows:
1. The Ministry of the Interior is clearly unwilling to accept the new import 
given by the Constitution to the question of religious liberty. It still retains 
firm and unaltered the legislation of 1929/30 on the subject of “recognised 
religious bodies” (Culti Ammessi). It still has to express its willingness to 
enter into discussions with a view to reaching the agreements referred to in 
article 8  of the Constitution.
2. Consequently restrictions continue to be imposed by both the central and 
the local police on the activities of Protestant groups, which turn out to be
965 Cited in ibid., p. 77.
966 Ibid., p. 78. Falzone’s position seems to change from an initial open sympathy for the demands of 
the mhority religions to one inspired by caution in response to irritation caused by these demands.
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quite ultra vires, and penal charges are laid against ministers of religion in 
respect of actions which do not constitute legal offences.
3. Although the various cases resulting have terminated in many instances in 
full acquittal, the Ministry of the Interior and the local authorities have shown 
no sign of willingness to accept these verdicts, even those of the Court of 
Cassation, giving in this way an example of disrespect for the Constitution 
and the Courts 9
(iv) The problem of unifying the legal system with the Constitution
As has been shown, the main problem faced by the minority religions was the lack of 
co-ordination between court rulings, which by and large ended in decisions based on 
the old freedom of religion laws (i.e. the culti ammessi laws) that were still in force 
at the time, and the terms of the new Constitution. Adams and Barile point out that 
the Albertine Statute of 1848 was susceptible to amendment by ordinary legislative 
enactment, whereas the Republican Constitution of 1948 was of the type jurists call 
‘rigid’ and according to which “laws are invalid if, in the opinion of a judicial 
authority, they conflict with the Constitution and the Constitution cannot be amended 
by ordinary legislation. ” 968
A state of inertia existed in the magistrature regarding the application and 
interpretation of laws of all kinds in relation to the Constitution. This was 
particularly problematical in cases brought by and against the religious minorities, 
where a kind of legal stalemate operated in the many attempts by the judiciary to 
reconcile articles 8  and 19 of the Constitution with its article 7 and the laws dealing 
with the permitted religions. And compounding the problem of whether the 
Constitution had the status of legge fondamentale (discussed earlier), was the 
problem of interpretation of the concepts of norme precettive and norme 
programmatiche. Galante Garrone explains the difficulty:
alFindomani stesso delFentrata in vigore della Costituzione, ebbe largo corso 
(specialmente ad opera della Corte di Cassazione, il supremo organo 
giudicante) la distinzione fra norme precettive e norme programmatiche. Le 
prime, si disse, sanciscono veri e propri diritti, pongono limiti al potere 
legislativo e divieti alle autorita pubbliche; le seconde enunciano soltanto dei 
principi generali, e contengono -  piu che precetti e comandi -  orientamenti,
967 Taken from “ Religious liberty and the condition o f Protestants in Italy”, a memorandum approved 
by the Federal Council o f Churches, Jan. 17th 1955, and sent to the Government, members o f  
Parliament and the headquarters o f the political parties. Rome, Ferraiolo: 1955, pp. 9-10; cited in 
Peyrot, Religious liberty and conditions o f  Evangelical People in Italy, pp. 5-6.
968 J.C. Adams, & P. Barile, The Government o f  Republican Italy, London, George Allen & Unwin, 
1961, p. 53.
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direttive, programmi. Cio premesso, la tendenza che si profilo fu di 
riconoscere un vero e proprio valore giuridico alle prime, negandolo alle 
seconde, e nello stesso tempo di annoverare tra le seconde il maggior numero 
possibile di articoli della Costituzione. Con cio si giunse a svuotare di 
contenuto molte norme costituzionali, a escludeme qualsiasi incidenza sul 
nostro attuale ordinamento giuridico. (E le cose si vennero ancor piu 
complicando in quanto, nella prima categoria, si vollero ancora distinguere le 
norme precettive a esecuzione immediata, e cioe senz’altro operanti ed 
efficaci, dalle norme precettive a esecuzione diferite: un ulteriore modo per 
ridurre la diretta influenza della Costituzione. Possiamo ammettere che a 
questo orientamento la Corte di Cassazione fosse anche indotta da 
preoccupazioni di carattere tecnico; e cioe dal timore di scardinare il si sterna 
delle leggi in vigore, di create dei peri col osi ‘vuoti legislativi’ . 969
To clarify the status of ordinary laws in relation to these norme of the Constitution, 
he says
una legge e da riconoscersi e dichiararsi costituzionalmente illegittima non 
solo quando sia contraria a un tassativo precetto {norma precettiva) della 
Costituzione, ma anche quando sia contraria a un principio generale, un 
orientamento, un indirizzo {norma programmatica) della Costituzione 
stessa. 970
Once the Constitutional Court had begun passing sentences the conceptual 
gap between norme precettive and norme programmatiche became less distinct and 
some new and even existing laws, considered contrary to norme progammatiche
971were either not passed or, if already in force, abrogated. However, even the 
process of abrogation was far from straightforward:
La Corte puo essere investita della questione soltanto se, nel corso di un 
processo civile o penale o amministrativo, venuta in discussione una legge da 
applicare al caso concreto, qualcuna delle parti in giudizio sollevi la 
questione della sua ‘incostituzionalita’; e il giudice, ritenuta la questione ‘non 
manifestatamente infondata’, sospenda il giudizio e rimetta la questione 
stessa alia Corte costituzionale. Inoltre il giudice stesso puo, di sua iniziativa 
(anche quando le parti non gliene abbiano fatto richiesta, ma egli abbia un 
dubbio sulla costituzionalita di una legge che dovrebbe applicare) rimettere la 
decisione alia Corte. 972
Galante Garrone points out that this system has one fundamental weakness: if a court 
case does not come up that directly relates to a particular law considered
969 A. Galante Garrone, Questa Nostra Repubblica, Torino, Loescher, 1982, pp. 24-5.
970 Galante Garrone, Questa Nostra Repubblica, p. 202.
971 Ibid., p. 25.
972 Ibid., p. 202.
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‘unconstitutional’ according to the normeprecettive/programmatiche doctrine, that 
law could remain on the statute book for years or even decades.973
(v) Religious freedom: the reality
a) The condition of the Protestants post-Constitution
Falzone, steering clear of the political arguments which he says only serve to make 
the exchanges more bitter and less objective, concentrates on the juridical debate.
The Constitution had only just come into force when on 3rd April 1948 padre Cavalli 
S.J., in an unequivocal summary of the Catholic Church’s view of the Protestants in 
the post-Constitution period, wrote in La Civilta cattolica that
i protestanti partono dal diritto alia liberta, i cattolici dal diritto della verita. 
Che, in caso di conflitto tra questi due principi, almeno in linea teorica, la 
supremazia spetta alia verita, neppure i protestanti negheranno . . .  La Chiesa 
cattolica, convinta, per le sue divine prerogative, di essere l’unica vera 
Chiesa, deve reclamare per se sola il diritto alia liberta, perche alia verita, non 
mai all’errore, questa puo competere. Quanto alle altre religioni, essa non 
impugnera la scimitarra, ma domandera che, con mezzi legittimi e degni della 
persona umana, non sia loro consentito di difendere false dottrine. Per 
conseguenza, in uno Stato in cui la maggioranza e cattolica, la Chiesa 
chiedera che alle altre chiese non sia data un’esistenza legale e che, se 
esisteranno minoranze di religione divers a, queste abbiano soltanto 
un’esistenza di fatto senza la possibility di divulgare le loro credenze.974
Although such thinking was no doubt behind the arguments of many Catholics at the 
costituente, none of them had dared to come out so openly with such an explicitly 
integralist statement, which would have left no doubts about the restrictive intentions 
and interpretations some would give in the future to articles 8 and 19 of the 
Constitution. To this Jesuit argument Giorgio Spini replied in II Ponte: “se tale 
veramente e la dottrina del cattolicesimo in materia religiosa, e legittimo pensare che 
principi non dissimili informino l’azione degli uomini di govemo di parte cattolica, 
che reggono attualmente le sorti della Repubblica”; he then calls for the government 
to respect articles 8 and 19 of the Constitution.975
In a useful analysis of the condition of the Protestants post-Constitution, 
Peyrot defines a series of phases through which the minority religions passed on the 
road to full liberty. The first phase, lasting from 2nd June 1946 until 18th April 1948,
973 Ibid., p. 203.
974 Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, pp. 61-2.
975 Cited in ibid.
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covered the period of the liberation of the nation and the hopeful period of the 
formation of the Constitution during which they assumed that the oppressive Fascist 
laws that had for so long curbed their activities would finally be dismantled.
However, these expectations were doomed to speedy disappointment with the 
second phase which began on April 18th 1948, when the Christian Democrats gained 
an absolute majority in the Italian General Elections and lasted for the whole period
i L
of De Gasperi’s administration, until June 7 1953. As far as the religious minorities 
were concerned this was a period of marked reaction on behalf of the Government. 
Through police action there followed an unbroken sequence of acts of violent 
intolerance, clearly aimed at preventing the Protestants from enjoying their new 
freedom and rights allowed under the Constitution, and with the purpose of 
subjecting them to the full weight of the body of restrictions enacted by the previous 
legislature. In the period immediately following the adoption of the Constitution, 
both the Ministiy of the Interior and the local authorities set in motion again the 
regulations of 1929/30 in their most oppressive interpretations against the 
Protestants, in whom the Fascist regime had detected ‘widespread, if at times 
unacknowledged, hostility towards Fascism, rooted in their fundamental religious 
principles’ [Circular of the Minister of the Interior, 441/02977, March 13th 1940, 
published in ‘II diritto ecclesiastico’, 1951, p.213]. The effect of these measures that 
predated the Constitution being reasserted was felt in many provinces, especially in 
Southern Italy: Protestant meetings were broken up by force; ministers of religion 
were forbidden to exercise their spiritual office; places of worship were closed. 
Where orders were disregarded, the police had recourse to repatriation of ministers, 
interdictions, arrests and criminal procedures.976
As if confirming the link between the Dc majority governments and the 
increase in harassment of the Protestants, when they lost their absolute majority 
following the elections for the second legislature on June 7th 1953, there followed a 
gradual slackening in intensity of these acts of intolerance. As Peyrot says,
thus opened a new chapter in which police interference gradually lost its 
violent character, but only to assume new guises of seeming legality. In this 
phase, extending from June 7th 1953 to June 14th 1956, the public authorities 
have lent their aid to ideas emanating from Catholic sources [in particular
976 For details o f such instances o f police action, see G. Spini, Le minoranze protestanti in Italia, in II 
Ponte, 1950, no. 6, pp. 667-9; G. Salvemini, I  protestanti in Italia, in II Mondo, 09.08.1952; G. Spini, 
Le persecuzioni contro gli evangelici in Italia, in IIPonte, 1953, no. 1, pp. 1-14; A.C. Jemolo, Per la 
liberta religiosa in Italia, in Nuovi Argomenti, 1953, no. 2, pp. 1-46. All cited in Peyrot, Religious 
liberty and conditions o f  Evangelical People in Italy, p. 7.
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Padre S. Lener, in a series of articles for La Civilta Cattolica, written between 
1951 and 1953] and shown a remarkable thoroughness of research in all the 
variety of cases, into all the possible ways of repressing with every 
appearance of legality the religious activities of the Protestant Communities, 
and especially every effort at propaganda or expansion977
This new phase resulted in quibbling interpretation of the laws on the religious 
minorities coupled with attempts to reconcile their restrictions with the freedoms laid 
down by the new Constitution and, according to Peyrot, even attempts by the 
authorities to explain how, and in what manner, the Constitution, despite its most 
explicit statements, had not really made any innovations as regards the legal position 
of the Protestant minorities, which, it was intended, were to be fixed once and for all 
by the regulations of the Fascist era.978
The fourth phase, from June 14th 1956, had its origin in the first 
pronouncement by the Constitutional Court. Although it had nothing to do with the 
laws on religious minorities specifically, it was, as Peyrot suggests, a “momentous 
sentence”:979
The hypothesis that the new canon of constitutional illegitimacy refers only to 
laws passed since the Constitution came into being, and not to laws passed 
before that date, cannot be entertained, since it is axiomatic that the 
relationship between ordinary and constitutional law, and the degree of 
precedence, deriving from their origin, that they enjoy in the hierarchy of law, 
do not change in any way, whether the ordinary laws be made before or after 
the constitutional ones. In either case, the constitutional law, being by nature 
inherent in the system of the established constitution, must take precedence 
over ordinary law.980
However, as Peyrot points out, those laws anterior to and contradicting the terms of 
the Constitution were not, as a result of this judgement automatically abrogated. As 
already shown, all it meant was that if cases were to be brought to trial that applied to 
those laws, they could, at the discretion of the magistrate, be brought before the 
Constitutional Court to test whether they were legitimate under the Constitution. 
Peyrot’s view of the relevant articles in the Constitution dealing with the individual’s 
right to religious worship of their own choosing is very clear. With reference to 
articles 3, 8 (clause 1), 19 and 20, he says it is enough
977 Ibid., p. 8.
978 Ibid.
979 Ibid., p. 13.
980 Constitutional Court sentence No. 1. 5/14. VI. 1956, in Gius. pen., 1956,1, 238; cited in ibid., 
pp. 12-13.
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to stress how complete they each are. Both from the point of view of 
formulation, and of content, they have all the elements of full legal authority, 
including directions as to the means and limits within which the rights they 
recognise may be exercised. These principles quite clearly can be applied in 
their specific field without waiting for laws, even executive directions, to be 
made. 81
He clarifies this point adding:
The Constitution recognises complete religious equality in Article 3, as a 
general rule, and consequently establishes the principle of equal freedom 
(Article 8), specifying for each individual and for the various religious bodies 
the right to manifest and propagate their beliefs, and to worship in public or 
private. Article 19 lays down the way in which these rights may be exercised 
and the limits set to them. Finally, in Article 20, the State is expressly 
forbidden to apply to these rights, as to others, any restrictive measures of its 
own making.9 2
This seems to imply that all the police action taken under the protection of the Fascist 
laws was constitutionally illegal. But without an effective Constitutional Court such 
actions would continue unchallenged. So, in theory, all minority religious groups 
should, even in 1948, have been free from all restrictions and discrimination which 
would have put them in an unfavourable position as compared to the Roman Catholic 
Church.983 It appears, therefore, that, apart from the complication of article 7 of the 
Constitution, the quagmire of contradictory legal and constitutional norms could 
have been quite simply dealt with by giving juridical prominence to the principles of 
articles 8, 19 and 20 and abrogating all anterior laws that contradicted them. Peyrot 
agrees:
The problem of the position of Protestants in Italy will automatically be 
solved by simply putting into effect the principles expressed in the 
Constitution. This will mean, however, that their clear and unequivocal tones 
must be allowed to prevail over the spoiling tactics of a reactionary and 
intolerant spirit, which, itself, a survivor from the past, tries to write into the 
new legal order relics of a legislation whose existence can only be justified by 
the political atmosphere of the times in which it was imposed. 84
Despite all the manoeuvring at judicial and constitutional levels, the condition of the 
Protestants remained the same, as stressed even by the Catholic Jemolo:
981 Ibid., p. 19.
982 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
983 Ibid., p. 21.
984 Ibid., p. 25.
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A superficial study of the Italian penal code at once reveals the confessional 
character of the law which prescribes penalties for the vilification of the 
Catholic religion but not of other religions, and which makes the severity of 
the punishment imposed for offences against ministers of religion and for the 
creation of disturbances at religious ceremonies dependent on whether the 
misdemeanours in question are committed at the expense of the Catholic 
religion or of other religions . . .  A cursory glance at the corpus of Italian law 
immediately confirms that the State has exceeded its formal obligations 
towards the Church, in the sense that it continues to accord its economic aid 
over and above the amount promised, providing subsidies for the building 
and repair of churches which, though certainly not very large in relation to 
the State budget as a whole, are generally considered substantial enough in 
view of the conditions in which the poorer classes in Italy are condemned to 
live . . .  [In] every programme of public works sponsored by the State much 
prominence is given to plans for the erection of churches and presbyteries. . .  
where there are areas to be reclaimed or transformed the authorities always 
accord priority to [Catholic] ecclesiastical building.985
But it is the State’s treatment of the non-Catholic minorities where the confessional
character of the State is most clearly revealed, and there is an open, undisguised
intention to disregard the Constitution.
There is no anti-Semitism. But outside the Communist and Socialist parties, 
which are a law unto themselves, no Jew has held a political position of 
importance since a few venerable survivors from the pre-Fascist era ceased to 
be members of the Senate . . . [The] authorities reveal an inflexible 
determination not to allow the ancient Waldensian sect to extend its influence 
beyond the boundaries of its two small Alpine Communes and not to permit 
any Protestant propaganda. The most savage persecution is reserved for the 
Pentecostals, of whom there are many among the poorer classes in the south 
of Italy. But no member of a Protestant sect is allowed to carry on his 
activities outside the handful of non-Catholic churches . . . Failure to comply 
with the provisions of the Constitution [i.e. Articles 8 and 19] is justified by 
the whole Catholic press with the usual arguments about religious unity, the 
violation of consciences and the rights of the dominant confession in a 
country where religious dissenters amount to about 1.1 per cent ( but where 
votes cast for parties condemned by the Church amount to 33 per cent) and 
with the truth’s right to be protected against error.986
However, according to Jemolo, it would be a mistake to see in the ‘intense Catholic
sensibility’ displayed by the judiciary,
an expression of government policy (which is reflected, on the other hand, 
clearly and unmistakably, in the persecution of the Pentecostals). This tinge 
of confessionalism in the body politic is largely due to the pressure of public 
opinion, to the presence of a ‘conformist’ tradition, and to the continuance of
985 Jemolo, Church and State in Italy, p. 310. It is worth noting that from May 1947 until January 
1950 Umberto Tupini (Dc) was Minister for Public Works.
986 Ibid., pp. 315-7. For anecdotal evidence o f the persecution indicated above, see ibid., pp. 318-9.
298
the mental habit fostered by Fascism . . .  whereby the civil servant and the 
judge allow their actions to be influenced by the thought of what their 
superiors may think and how they are likely to react9 7
Long agrees with Jemolo’s assessment, and also displays a decidedly low 
opinion of the judiciary:
Non e difficile comprendere, sulla base dei comportamenti degli autorevoli 
magistrati presenti nella commissione del Ministero per la Costituente, quali 
fossero le tendenze prevalent! tra i giudici: ed appare allora chiaro come, 
negli anni successivi della Costituente, le norme sui culti troveranno una 
interpretazione parziale e persecutoria da parte dell’alta magi stratum e della 
pubblica amministrazione, al di la delle stesse intenzioni dei govemanti. 988
But were the intentions of the magistrature or civil servants in fact any different to 
those of the government in wanting to prevent minority religions operating freely? If 
they were different, why did the latter not put systems in place to ameliorate the lot 
of the minorities by reducing police harassment, removing obsolete laws from the 
statute books and thus not giving the judiciaiy the legal means to shut down these 
groups and arrest or even extradite their leaders? Indeed, the actions of both 
government and judiciary would seem to stem from the same root: an unwillingness 
to incur the wrath of a Church intent (and very able) to play moral mind-games with 
institutions of state in order to satisfy its own unfounded anxieties in relation to a tiny 
minority of religious organisations whose doctrines did not coincide with its own 
‘truth’.
Even the Catholic scholar Scoppola admits that one should not be tempted to 
think that the fall of Fascism implied the end of Catholic intolerance towards the 
Protestants:
Troppo noti sono gli episodi di intolleranza che accompagnano la rinascita 
democratica del Paese e che non si possono certo attribuire 
semplicisticamente ad ottusita o insensibilita dei govemi del tempo: in essi 
non pud non vedersi il segno del perdurare fra i cattolici di diffusi sentimenti 
di ostilita agli evangelici e in genere di scarsa sensibilita ai valori di liberta
i • • 989religiosa.
Scoppola sees a shift in attitude only in the 1960’s following the Second Vatican 
Council “nel clima di un nuovo ecumenismo.” 990
987 Ibid., p. 320.
988 Long, Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale, pp. 324-5.
989 Scoppola, Ilfascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, pp. 366-7.
990 Ibid., p. 367.
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Regarding Article 8  of the Constitution, interpretation has been guided by a 
single ruling, pronounced by the lower Court judge of Buccino on the 22 December 
1949 and published in II Diritto ecclesiastico (1951, p. 838):
L’art. 8 , comma 1° della Costituzione della Repubblica, per la sua 
compiutezza e concretezza, deve ritenersi di indole precettiva e di immediata 
applicazione. Pertanto, avendo detto articolo riconosciuto che tutte le 
confessioni sono egualmente libere davanti alia legge, non possono ritenersi 
in vigore le disposizioni contrastanti a tale precetto di natura imperativa. 
Entrata in vigore la nuova Costituzione italiana, che stabilisce il principio 
della liberta di culto, e stata regolata diversamente la relativa materia, per cui 
i principi contenuti nella precedente legge 24 giugno 1929, n.l 159, sui culti 
ammessi sono divenuti incompatibili con i nuovi. Con Pentrata in vigore 
della Costituzione della Repubblica, la legge 24 giugno, n. 1159, e il relativo 
regolamento non sono piu in vigore in ordine alia approvazione govemativa 
richiesta per i ministri dei culti ammessi991.
Falzone details three incidents which, despite this court ruling, show how intolerant 
the State was towards non-Catholic religions in the post-war years despite the 
provisions of articles 8 , 19 and 20 of the new Constitution. One of the incidents 
concerns an Italo-american pastor called Caliandro who set up an Tstituto biblico’ at 
Portici to take in apostate Catholic priests, who found themselves in dire straits as a 
result of article 5 of the Concordat. In four years the institution sheltered thirteen 
priests, but in February 1953, the Questore of Naples ordered that it be shut down 
and that Caliandro should leave Italy, because he had allegedly failed to renew his 
residency permit. Caliandro wrote to the Interior Ministry but they only confirmed 
the ruling of the Questore. The Catholic newspaper// Quotidiano (21 February 1953, 
editorial) emphasised that the incident simply related to the renewal of the permit, 
but added:
la posizione dei cattolici italiani nei riguardi della propaganda protestante non 
e nuova. Noi non neghiamo agli acattolici il diritto di praticare il loro culto e 
di vivere, nell’ambito della legge, secondo le loro convinzioni: non possiamo 
ammettere, invece, il proselitismo protestante, perche 1’Italia, paese di 
cristianesimo antico, non e terra di missione per sette difformi, non poche 
delle quali sono lontano tra di loro almeno quanto distano dal cattolicesimo.
II proselitismo ci offende e dirlo apertamente, senza perifrasi, e il nostro 
diritto . . . Siamo pronti ad accettare l’accusa di intolleranza e a rispondere, se
991 Cited in Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, p. 54. Falzone gives a brief list o f 
interesting articles on the subject o f religious freedom, some in II Ponte (G., Spini, Le minoranze 
protestanti in Italia ’, 1950, p.670; G. Spini, Lapersecuzione contro gli evangelici in Italia, 1953, fasc. 
1, p. Iff); others in the weekly IlM ondo  (G. Salvemini, I  protestanti in Italia, 9th August 1952; 
Ritomo dell’inquisitore, (editorial), 28th October 1952). Cited in ibid., p. 55.
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del caso, come di dovere. Ma fin d’ora e bene si sappia, dalle autorita, dagli 
amici e dagli awersari, che cosa pensano i cattolici. 92
Falzone notes that the right to proselytism is allowed by article 19 of the 
Constitution.
Two of the main protagonists of the debate on religious freedom for the 
minorities were liberal Catholic Arturo Carlo Jemolo and the Jesuit padre Salvatore 
Lener, “fermo assertore della ‘verita’ cattolica”, to use Falzone5s words. In the July -  
September 1952 edition of II Diritto ecclesiastico, Jemolo wrote an article entitled Le 
liberta garantite dagli articoli 8, 19 e 21 della Costituzione. As regards the Catholic 
Church’s reticence to allow the minority religions to proselytise, despite the 
provisions of articles 19 and 20, Jemolo says: “Non c’e piu liberta se io non posso 
comunicare ad altri, a voce e per scritto, cio che penso in qualsiasi argomento: 
filosofico o cosmologico o naturalistico o religioso.” 993
Highlighting just one of the conflicts between the culti ammessi laws and 
article 8 , Jemolo explains how
dalla elaborazione del primo comma dell’articolo 8  (‘tutte le religioni sono 
egualmente libere davanti alia legge’) trae motivo per sostenere la 
soppressione dell’articolo 1 del regio decreto 28 febbraio 1930, n. 289, ‘in 
quanto comportava la necessita di un autorizzazione per aprire tempi ed 
oratori’; necessita di autorizzazione che e in insanabile contrasto con 
Vegualmente libere dell’articolo 8  e con l’esercizio in pubblico del culto 
dell’articolo 19; comunque il diritto di far propaganda e esplicito . . .  Si 
nega . . .  la liberta di propaganda, pure senza osare di enunciare chiaramente 
questo diniego, quando si dice che la propaganda non deve offendere le 
opinioni che possono essere piu care a chi ascolta. Nei paesi dove c’e una 
tradizione di liberta, anche i sostenitori delle dottrine piu stravaganti sono 
liberi di esporle in pubblico; ed i cittadini sono liberi di non ascoltare chi le 
espone, o di ridere delle stravaganze che si sentono propinare: e le autoritA 
religiose sono libere di ordinare ai loro fedeli di non ascoltare. Ma se sorgono 
poi tumulti sar A chiaro che il contrawentore alia legge sarA colui che, invece 
di allontanarsi o di scrollare le spalle nell’udire quelle che per lui erano 
stravaganze o anche dottrine ripugnanti, avra preteso usare la violenza per 
ridurre al silenzio chi le enunciava.994
Lener’s reply to Jemolo’s article came in two parts: in the January 3rd and March 21st 
1953 editions of La Civilta cattolica. Above all he emphasised that the discussion 
should contribute to
992 Ibid., pp. 56-7.
993 Ibid., p. 62.
994 Cited in ibid., pp. 62-4.
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render certo il diritto vigente, in una materia che, a torto o a ragione, divenuta 
ancora una volta incandescente. Di fronte ad una legge certa, ancorche meno 
favorevole ad una minoranza confessionale, i suoi membri piu sereni possono 
ben dire: dura lex sed lex,; di fronte ad una norma equivoca, che sembra per se 
poter favorire tanto le aspirazioni di quel gruppo quanto quelle contrarie della 
maggioranza, Tapplicazione che se ne faccia dagli organi dello Stato 
offendera sempre e intollerabilmente gli uni, che si diranno perseguitati, e gli 
altri, che lamenteranno la violazione di diritti ritenuti sacri. II guaio e che gli 
interpreti della sponda liberale non possono concede re neppure in ipotesi che 
i principi di liberta enunciati nella Costituzione siano non diciamo dubbi, ma 
incompleti, inidonei cioe a regolare tutta la materia che potenzialmente si 
riferiscono; con cio stesso, infatti, essi ammetterebbero quello che 
assolutamente non vogliono, essere cioe le norme preesistenti tuttora in
995vigore.
Lener points out that article 19 differentiates between Tesercizio di culto e di rito’:
Yatto di culto e atto col quale intemamente o estemamente, in privato o in 
pubblico, si venera la divinita. Per riti si intendono, invece, quelle forme 
secondo cui devono svolgersi gli atti del culto estemo, specialmente pubblico; 
forme stabilite dalle norme liturgiche, dai rituali, dagli statuti e consuetudini 
delle singole confessioni. . .  Per se, la sfera delFindividuale liberta di culto 
comprende gli atti, non i riti in senso proprio. Questi, in quanto 
determinazione normativa delle fonne del culto, sono qualcosa che appartiene 
alia comunita dei fedeli, e alia comunita che abbia gia una sua fisonomia 
specifica e una relativa stabilita . . . Non solo il rito appartiene alia comunita, 
ma esso e elemento essenziale e costitutivo della sua realta sociale\ e anzi 
talvolta il vincolo precipuo che unisce i fedeli in societa spirituale . . . Nelle 
confessioni cristiane, nelle quali Tunica autorita dottrinale e la Bibbia 
liberamente interpretata e una vera e propria gerarchia giuridiea non e 
ammessa, il solo connettivo sociale che valga a distinguerle fra di loro e 
appunto il rito (o complessi di riti) . 996
Peyrot points out that one significant change in the law in favour of the
iL
religious minorities was that on 16 April 1955, 20 years after it was issued and after 
more than 7 years of the Republican Constitution, the Protestant Churches succeeded 
in obtaining an official pronouncement revoking the Buffarini-Guidi Circular of 
April 9th 1935. The circular ordered the disbanding of Pentecostal groups and the 
closure of their chapels, forbidding any expression of their religion on the specious 
grounds of preserving “the physical and psychological integrity of the race” . 997
995 Cited in ibid, p. 65.
996 Cited in ibid., p. 66. Falzone explains the apparently different interpretations assumed by Jemolo 
and Lener on the term ‘rito’. Lener uses it in a strictly theological sense which suits his argument, but 
does not at all coincide with the more common open interpretation given to the word as used in 
juridical language (and hence in the Constitution). Ibid., p. 67.
997 Peyrot, Religious liberty, p. 6.
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b) The condition of the Catholic Church post-Constitution 
Unlike the situation of the minority churches, it can be quite safely said that there 
was no diminution of the powers, scope and influence of the Catholic Church in the 
aftermath of the Constitution. Indeed, the debt owed to it by the Dc party for its 
support in the national elections from 1948 onwards ensured that it could add to its 
armoury a political influence at least on a par with that which it enjoyed during the 
early years of Fascism.
However, the support of the Vatican proved to be a mixed blessing for De 
Gasperi and the Dc. Catholic success in the 1948 elections gave rise to a spirit of 
Catholic triumphalism, to a climate of confessional intolerance in which Italy in the 
1940's and 1950's has been described as ‘the Papal State of the Twentieth Century’. 
Thanks to Italy's napoleonic, highly centralized administrative system, Catholic 
power at a national level was effectively replicated at local government level, 
creating a repressive atmosphere for political and religious minorities. Moreover, the 
Italian Catholic world sought to match political dominance with the establishment of 
a cultural hegemony, though in this case not so successfully, over Italian society. In 
these circumstances, Pope Pius XII tended to see the Dc as merely the long, secular 
arm of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Without a solidly established organisational base 
of its own, the Dc under De Gasperi had to fight hard to escape the more extreme 
demands of the Pope and his advisors.998
Even the eminent Catholic commentator, Scoppola, concedes this point:
Alla base della societa italiana la Chiesa era . . . una realta cosi capillarmente 
presente e cosi efficacemente operante che i suoi orientamenti e le sue scelte 
avevano immediate ripercussioni e conseguenze decisive anche sul piano 
civile e politico. 999
In another work, Scoppola states categorically th a t‘TItalia fu sede in quegli anni di 
‘un grandioso esperimento cattolico’ .” 1000 However, their dominant position in the 
peninsula following the promulgation of the Constitution did little to alleviate the 
deep-seated concerns the Church had regarding the freedom to proselytise afforded 
to the protestant denominations by the Constitution. This concern can be clearly seen 
in a circular promulgated by Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop of Milan and published 
in II Diritto ecclesiastico (1952, October-December, p. 576):
998 Buchanan and Conway, Political Catholicism in Europe, p. 88.
999 Scoppola, Gli anni della Costituente, p. 42.
1000 Scoppola, La repubblica deipartiti, p. 98.
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In una nazione che nella sua immensa maggioranza e cattolica di professione, 
di tradizione e di civilta, il protestantesimo viene subdolamente ad incrinare 
questa unita tradizionale, fondando altre ed opposte associazioni religiose al 
commando e al soldo dei capi esteri. Lo Stato non vede nessun pericolo in 
quest’altra colonna straniera che ormai va diramandosi largamente nelle 
nostre contrade? Intendiamoci. La fede non s’impone, e la Chiesa ha sempre 
tutelato la liberta di coscienza, ordinando che persino gli ebrei possedessero 
indisturbati le loro sinagoghe ove svolgere il loro culto. In Italia sono molte 
colonie forestiere eterodosse, che nei propri templi svolgono liberamente il 
loro servizio religioso. Ma altra e liberta di coscienza e di culto di cui 
legalmente godono quei forestieri, e altra invece e la illegale propaganda che 
subdolamente vanno facendo dei pastori e missionari protestanti tra le nostre 
popolazioni cattoliche, per indi disseminate la discordia nelle famiglie, la 
scissione nei paesi, la divisione religiosa nella Nazione Cattolica . . .
Mettendo in guardia sacerdoti e fedeli centre il pericolo protestantico, che 
cosa domandiamo? Che sia rispettata, giusta le leggi, la liberta di coscienza 
soprattutto per riguardo dei cittadini stranieri; ma che, per motivi superiori 
d’ordine religioso e politico, sia raffrenata la liberta, specialmente a preti e 
frati apostati, d’incrinare con le loro storture l’unita degli italiani, per 
costituire nei territorio nazionale delle seste colonne all’alto comando 
gerarchi stranieri, 1001
The tone of his article raised concerns in the mind of Deputy Luigi Preti (Psli) who 
tabled a number of questions for the Ministro dell 'interno during October 1952 
asking the minister to denounce the article and defend the right of Protestants to 
proselytise as laid down by the Constitution. Preti saw this Church posturing as
una dimostrazione di superficialita di pensiero e di ristrettezza di idee, posto 
che, in fondo, quei pochi fedeli che la Chiesa puo perdere per la propaganda 
protestante sono ben poca cosa di fronte ai milioni di cittadini che, per effetto 
delle nuove idee scientifiche e filosofiche, sono diventati e stanno diventando 
liberi pensatori, e anche di fronte ai milioni di fedeli che, praticamente, la 
Chiesa viene a perdere per la penetrazione di certe ideologic politiche, che 
sostituiscono, nell’animo delle classi lavoratrici, la religione tradizionale. 1002
In the morning session of 30th October 1952 Deputy Bogoni tabled a motion in which 
he proposed that the Chamber affirm that “devono essere garantite effettivamente 
anche agli acattolici la liberta di coscienza e di culto (pubblico o privato, individuate 
o collettivo) e la liberta di propaganda religiosa. ” 1003 That same afternoon the 
Minister for the Interior, Mario Scelba (Dc) refused to accept his motion “per lo 
spirito che lo anima” It was put to the vote and thrown out, at best ignoring and at 
worst in clear breach of the Constitution.
1001 Cited in Falzone, La Costituzione ed  i culti non cattolici, p. 68.




Although Catholic politicians throughout the 1940’s and 50’s truly believed that their 
ideals were different from those of the Fascists, the reality of the situation was that 
“the almost messianic belief’ in the integralist ideals nurtured and put into practice 
first by the Catholic Action groups and subsequently by the Dc were in fact no 
different from the “‘totalitarian’ ambition of fascist movements to control all sectors 
of national life.” 1004
It must be remembered that throughout the Constituent Assembly years and 
beyond, the status quo of a dominant Catholic Church and a penal system based, not 
only in the realm of religious liberty, on a potent concoction of oppressive Fascist 
legislation and Catholic integralist ideals was deemed acceptable to the ruling Dc 
party, even though they contravened not only the basic principles of democracy, but 
also several articles of the new Republican Constitution. Jemolo strongly criticised 
this lack of motivation for change in the Constituent Assembly:
It was not only that in the matter of ecclesiastical policy they proclaimed their 
support for the Concordat, without reservation and in defiance of the 
principle that all religions are equal before the State, but in every other field 
too their one concern was to go slowly, to avoid coming to grips with 
concrete problems, to change nothing. 1005
Furlong points out that “the only issues which underwent radical amendment were 
State/Church relations, regional government, the Constitutional Court and the role of 
the Senate. There was no substantial support for the Constitution to be submitted to 
popular referendum.” 1006 Even then, it was seven years before the constitutional court 
was established, twenty two years before the first elections for the ordinary regions 
and twenty before the referendum law was approved. 1007
Calamandrei (Pda) later referred to the text of the Constitution as ‘that old 
aunt, a bit eccentric and a bit of a visionary’, suggesting rather more fondness than 
respect for the Constitution, 1008 while according to Giovagnoli,
il testo finale della Costituzione repubblicana appare l’espressione di una 
stratificazione giuridica plurisecolare che recepisce anzitutto i principi 
fondamentali della cultura liberal -  democratica. . .  II testo del ’48, inoltre, 
malgrado il suo carattere dichiaratamente rigido, ha mostrato inaspettate doti
1004 Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, p. 61.
1005 Jemolo, Church and State in Italy, pp. 335-6.
1006 Furlong, Modern Italy, p. 64.
1007 Ibid., pp. 71-2.
1008 Cited in ibid., p. 66.
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di elasticity1009
This attribute of ‘elasticity, as we have seen, allowed the judiciary, in cases 
involving the religious minorities, either to openly ignore articles of the Constitution 
when passing judgements, or to interpret them in so many ways as to render them 
unworkable.
Scoppola describes the Constitution as the “figlia della politica, si e formata 
in una Assemblea. . .  attraverso una serie di scontri, confronti e compromessi dei 
quali furono protagonisti i partiti politici. ” 1010 Although Scoppola’s statement is 
correct, with regard to articles relating to Church/State relations and religious 
freedom it needs to take into consideration the fundamental role played by the 
Vatican in the background to the debates. As already discussed, during the post-war 
period, the Vatican enjoyed an enormous degree of respect and influence throughout 
Europe and the world -  a situation that was particularly evident in Italy, where 
directives from the highest level were carried out to the letter in the dioceses and 
parishes. The Holy See recognised this trend of overweening allegiance and gratitude 
for the way it conducted itself, at least on a spiritual level, throughout the war, and 
capitalised on it to secure the guarantees it sought for itself in the Constitution, 
principally the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts. In this respect, a comparison of the 
conclusions in the document produced by ICAS (a branch of Catholic Action) and 
the arguments put forward by the Catholic costituenti show striking similarities. 1011 
Although the Vatican had no official voice in the constitutional debates, it is worth 
noting the connection between ICAS and the Catholic hierarchy. As has been shown 
in Section A3, in the Catholic Action Statutes of 1940, Pius XII replaced all the lay 
leaders of Catholic Action organisations with high level ecclesiastics. Although this 
level of control by the Vatican on the work of Catholic Action was relaxed somewhat 
after the war, the various branches of the organisation (ICAS included) remained 
under the control of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. This, and the fact that a 
copy of the document was sent to the Vatican Secretariat of State, suggests at least a 
very keen interest at the highest levels of the Holy See in the conclusions reached by 
the ICAS commission.
No doubt with these and other manoeuvres of the Catholic hierarchy and its 
affiliated organisations in mind, Francesco Saverio Nitti accused Subcommission 1
1009 Giovagnoli, Ilpartito  italicmo, pp. 24-5.
1010 Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti, p. 181.
1011 See Section A3 (vii) c) and Section B o f this thesis.
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of “incompetence” in the preparation of the Constitution, although his accusation 
was roundly denounced by Meuccio Ruini, President of the Commission of 75, who 
asserted that
nella nostra Commissione i partiti hanno designato essi i propri membri; 
potevano scegliere; hanno gli uomini che credevano piu adatti a questa 
bisogna. Nella Commission vi erano i capi, i dirigenti, di quasi tutti i partiti. 
Vi erano gli esponenti alia testa delle organizzazioni operaie; ed anche della 
associazione delle societa per azioni; vi erano giuristi -  il fiore dei 
costituzionalisti italiani -  vi erano economicisti; basta che ricordi il nome del 
maggiore economista italiano: Einaudi. Non era un commissione di 
incompetenti. 1012
However, the plethora of compromises and patently contradictoiy articles that found 
their way through the subcommissions, past the debates of the full Constituent 
Assembly, with its phalanx of civil and ecclesiastical law experts, and into the 
Constitution, which then caused the subsequent difficulties in the application of laws 
throughout the countiy, certainly seems to suggest to the laicista mind-set of Nitti 
and others, if not incompetence a conscious neglect of some fundamental principles 
concerning religious freedom, which is perhaps worse. In this connection, one 
cannot overlook the critical role of the Pci in the debates, and its decision to vote 
with the Dc to secure the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the Constitution. The 
Communists, with their decision not to do battle beyond a certain point at the 
costituente in the interests of a longer-term strategy, left unresolved problems which 
subsequently contributed to juridical confusions and real cases of religious 
oppression. Consequently, any real change that could, and clearly should, have 
occurred in the area of religious liberty did not happen for a number of reasons: 
primarily, the reticence of a government paralyzed by inertia and a fear of 
fundamental changes to the Italian legal system on the one hand, and the 
determination of the Catholic Church, intent on exploiting the advantages of a 
sympathetic government for its own benefit on the other. As a result both institutions 
were perfectly prepared to leave the country’s political, administrative and juridical 
system in a weak state, while the Constitution, which was in many ways quite radical 
and forward looking, ultimately had little impact on a legal system that condoned the 
same oppressive treatment of religious minorities as had been meted out under 
Fascism.




Archivio della Camera dei Deputati (ACD), Camera dei Deputati, Inventario 
dell 'Assembled Costituente, Quademi dell’Archivio storico -  No.6 , Roma, Camera 
dei Deputati: 1999, Busta 73, fascicolo 15, Comitato Nazionaleper le Onoranze a 
Giuseppe Mazzini nei LXXIV Anniversario della Morte.
Archivio della Camera dei Deputati (ACD), Camera dei Deputati, Inventario 
dell'Assembled Costituente, Quademi dell’Archivio storico -  No.6 , Roma, Camera 
dei Deputati: 1999, Busta 74, Fascicolo 1, Commissione per la Costituzione: 1° 
Sottocommissione. Relazione del Deputato Aldo Moro sui ‘Principii dei rapporti 
sociali (culturali). *
Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Serie P.S. 1920-45 (Divisione A.G.R.), Categoria G.l, 
busta 155, fascicolo 116, sottofascicolo 2, ‘Corrispondenza varia’.
Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Serie P.S. 1920-45 (Divisione A.G.R., Categoria G.l, 
busta 155, fascicolo 116, sottofascicolo 11, ‘Societa biblica e forestiere’.
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Exchange o f Letters by His Excellency Harry S. 
Truman, President o f the United States o f America, and His Holiness Pope Pius XII, 
August 1947, BAV (Published Books Section) R.G.MisceII.IV.328.
Blet, P., Martini, A., Schneider, B. (Eds.), Actes et documents du Sainte Siege 
relatifs a la seconde Guerre Mondiale, (11 vols.) Citta del Vaticano: Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, 1965-1981.
Carlen, C. (Ed.), The Papal Encyclicals (5 Volumes), Raleigh (U.S.A.): The Pierian 
Press, 1990.
Damilano, A. (Ed.) Atti e Documenti della Democrazia Cristiana (1943 -1967), 
Roma: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1968.
De Martino, V. Leggi d'ltalia (Testo Vigente) XVEdizione, Novara: De Agostini 
Giuridica, 1999.
Pio XI, Discorsi: 1929-1933, (Vols. I - VI), Citta del Vaticano: Tipografia Poliglotta 
Vaticana, 1985.
Pope Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris (Translated by Joseph Kirwan), London: Catholic 
Truth Society, 1978.
Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti del Regno d'ltalia, (a cura del) Ministero 
per la Giustizia, Roma.
Segretario Generale (Ed.), La Costituzione della Repubblica nei lavoripreparatori 
della Assemblea Costituente, ( 8  Volumes) Roma: Camera dei Deputati, 1970.
308
Secondary Sources
AA.VV., Igiorni della storia d'ltalia (dal Risorgimento ad oggi): Cronaca 
quotidiana dal 1815, Novara: De Agostini, 1997.
Acerbi, A. La Chiesa nei tempo, Milano: Vita e pensiero, 1979.
Adams, J.C. & Barile, P., The Government of Republican Italy, London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1961.
Alessandrini, F., Art. 5 e democrazia, in 11 Quotidiano, 22nd March 1947, p. 1.
Antonazzi, G. (Ed.) Luigi Sturzo -  Alcide De Gasperi: Carteggio (1920 
-  1953) Vol. 1V-3, Brescia: Morcelliana, 1999.
Antonetti, N., L 'ideologia della sinistra cristiana: I cattolici tra Chiesa e 
comunismo (1937-1945), Milano: FrancoAngeli Editore, 1976.
Arangio-Ruiz, La Citta del Vaticano, in “Rivista di diritto pubblico”, fasc. VI, 1929.
Armani, G., La Costituzione italiana, Milano: Garzanti, 1988.
Ayassot, E., 1 protestanti in Italia, Milano: Area, 1962.
Baget Bozzo, G., IIpartito cristiano alpotere. La Democrazia cristiana di De 
Gasperi e di Dossetti, 1945-1954, Firenze: Vallecchi, 1974.
Ballini, P.L. (Ed.), 1946-1948 Repubblica, Costituente, Costituzione, Firenze: 
Edizioni Polistampa, 1998.
Bedani, G.L.C., The Dossettiani and the concept of the secular state in the 
constitutional debates: 1946-7, in Modern Italy, Journal of the Association for the 
Study of Modem Italy, Vol.l, No.2, Autumn 1996, pp. 3-22.
Bedani, G.L.C., Pluralism, integralism and the framing o f the republican 
constitution in Italy: the role o f the Catholic left in Bedani, G.L.C. et alia (Eds.) 
Sguardi sulVItalia, Exeter: Society for Italian Studies, 1997, pp. 158-170.
Bertola, A., 11 clero cattolico nei vigente diritto italiano, in Chiesa e Stato,
Vol.II, Studi Giuridici, Milano: Unione Tipografico, 1939.
Calamandrei, P., Commentario sistematico alia Costituzione italiana, Firenze:
G. Barbera, 1950.
Calogero, G., La scuola, la scienza e le arti, in Calamandrei, P., Commentario 
sistematico alia Costituzione italiana, Firenze: G.Barbera, 1950.
www. caro vanoperlacostituzione. it.
Casella, M., Cattolici e Costituente: orientamenti e iniziative del cattolicesimo 
organizzato (1945 -  1947), Perugia: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1987.
309
Ciaffi, A., 11 concordatopost-conciliare e la liberta religiosa, Macerata: Coopedit,
1991.
Clark, M., Modern Italy: 1871-1995, London: Longman, 1998.
Conway, M., Catholic Politics in Europe (I9I8-I945), London: Routledge, 1997.
Coscienza e liberta, Rivista annuale curata dalla sezione italiana delVAssociazione 
Internazionale per la Difesa della Liberta Religiosa, Rome, 2001.
D ’ Alessio, G. (Ed.), Alle origini della Costituzione italiana - 1 lavori 
preparatori della ‘Commissione per studi attinenti alia riorganizzazione dello Stato ’ 
(1945-1946), Bologna: II Mulino, 1979.
D ’Avack, P. A., Irapportifra Stato e Chiesa, in Calamandrei, P., Commentario 
sistematico alia Costituzione italiana, Firenze: G.Barbera, 1950.
D’Avack, P. (Ed.) La legislazione ecclesiastica, Milano: Istituto per la scienza 
dell’amministrazione pubblica, 1967.
De Gasperi, M.R. (Ed.), De Gasperi Scrive, (2 Vols) Brescia: Morcelliana, 1974.
De Luca, L., Considerazioni sull ’autonomia e la pubblicita della Chiesa nei diritto 
italiano, Milano: Giuffre, 1946.
Di Loreto, P., Togliatti e la Doppiezza: il Pci tra democrazia e insurrezione (1944- 
1949), Bologna: II Mulino, 1991.
Dizionario di storiografia, Milano: Mondadori, 1996.
Dossetti, G., La ricerca costituente: 1945-1952, Bologna: II Mulino, 1994.
Dossetti, G., Costituzione e Resistenza, Roma: Sapere, 1995.
Dossetti, G., La Costituzione: le radici, i valori, le riforme, Rome: Edizioni Lavoro, 
1996.
Durand, J.-D., L ’Eglise catholique dans la crise de Vltalie (1943-1948), Rome: 
Ecole frangaise, 1991.
Falco, M., The legal position o f the Holy See before and after the Lateran 
Agreements, (Two lectures delivered in the University of Oxford by the author) 
translated by A.H.Campbell, London: 1935.
Falconi, C., Gedda e TAzione cattolica, Firenze: Parenti, 1958.
Falzone, V., La Costituzione ed i culti non cattolici, Milano: A.Giuffre, 1953.
Furlong, P., Modern Italy: Representation and Reform, London: Routledge, 1993.
Galante Garrone, A., Questa Nostra Repubblica, Torino: Loescher, 1982.
310
Gedda, L., Memorie inedite delVartefice della sconfitta del Fronte Popolare, Milano: 
Mondadori, 1998.
Giacchi, O., L ’ordinamento della Chiesa nei diritto italiano attuale in Chiesa e 
Stato, Vol.II, Studi Giuridici, Milano: Unione Tipografico, 1939.
Giordani, I., Insegnamento sociale dei Papi, Roma: A.V.E., 1944.
Giordani, I. (Ed.), Le encicliche sociali dei Papi, da Pio IX a Pio X ll (1864- 
1946), Roma: Studium, 1946.
Giovagnoli, A., La cultura democristiana: La Chiesa cattolica e identita italiana 
(1918-1948), Bari: Laterza, 1991.
Giovagnoli, A., IIpartito italiano: La Democrazia Cristiana dal 1942 al 1994, 
Roma: Laterza, 1996.
Gismondi, P., II nuovo giurisdizionalismo italiano, Milano: Giuffre, 1946.
Giuntella, M.C., 1 fatti del 1931 e la formazione della ‘seconda generazione, in 
Scoppola, P. & Traniello, F. (Eds.), I cattolici fra fascismo e democrazia, Bologna: II 
Mulino, 1975.
Gonella, G., Lo Stato e la tolleranza, in ‘Civitas ’ Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello 
Stato, April & May, 1947.
Gramsci, A , Note sulMacchiavelli, sullapolitica e sullo stato moderno, Torino: 
Einaudi, 1949.
Ignazi, P., I partiti italiani, Bologna: II Mulino, 1997.
iL
IIpericolo protestante in Italia, in Osservatore Romano, 19 June 1929. 
www.iubilatedeo.it/storiachiesa.htm.
Hebblethwaite, P., Paul VI: The first modern Pope, London: Harper-Collins, 1993.
Jemolo, A.C., Per la pace religiosa d'ltalia, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1944.
Jemolo, A.C., Per la liberta religiosa in Italia, in Nuovi Argomenti, no. 2, 1953, 
pp. 1-46.
Jemolo, A.C., Chiesa e Stato in Italia dalla unificazione ai giorni nostri, Torino: 
Einaudi, 1977.
Jemolo, A.C., Church and State in Italy from unification to the present day, Torino: 
Einaudi, 1977.
Kass, L., Der Konkordatstyp des faschistischen Italien, in Zeitschrift fur 
auslandisches djfentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, III.l, 1933, pp. 488-522.
‘Laicita dello Stato’, L ’Osservatore Romano, 19th September 1946.
311
La Pira, G., La Pira: Autobiografico, Torino: Societa Editrice Intemazionale, 1994.
La propaganda protestante, in L ’Avvenire d'ltalia, 2nd July 1929.
Liberta e uguaglianza delle confessioni religiose: la polemica Scaduto-Ruffini, in 
‘Stato e confessioni religiose \  Vol. II, a cura di Francesco Margiotta Broglio, 
Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1976-1978.
Liberta o accordi, in Unione evangelica, 15th March 1946.
Long, G., Alle origini delpluralismo confessionale: 11 dibattito sulla liberta 
religiosa nell'eta della Costituente, Bologna: II Mulino, 1990.
Magister, S., Lapolitica vaticana e L 'Italia (1943-1978'), Rome: Riuniti, 1979.
Malgeri, F., La Chiesa italiana e la guerra 1940-45, Roma: Studium, 1980.
Mantelli, B. “Repubblica sociale italiana” in B.Bongiovanni andN. Tranfaglia 
Dizionariostorico dell'Italia unit a, Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1996.
Margiotta-Broglio, F., Italia e Santa Sede dalla grande guerra alia Conciliazione, 
Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1966.
Marottoli, S.M., La Santa Sede nei Diritto Intemazionale, www.studiocelentano.it 
(Thesis published on the Internet)
Martinelli, R., Storia del Partito comunista italiano (Vol. VI), Torino: Einaudi, 1995.
McCarthy, P., The Crisis of the Italian State: From the Origins of the Cold War to 
the Fall o f Berlusconi and Beyond, London: Macmillan, 1995.
Melloni, A. (Ed.), Giuseppe Dossetti: La ricerca costituente (1945-1952), Bologna,
II Mulino: 1994.
Miegge, G., L 'Eglise sous le joug fasciste, Geneve: 1946.
Mirabelli, C ., L'appartenenza confess ionale, Padova: Cedam, 1975.
Monteleone, F., Storia della radio e della televisione in Italia: societa, politica, 
strategic, programmi, 1922-1992, Venezia: Marsilio, 1992.
Moro, A., L ’apporto democristiano alia nuova Costituzione, in II Popolo, 4th March 
1947.
Moro, R., La formazione della classe dirigente cattolica, 1929-1937, Bologna, II 
Mulino, 1979.
Oddone, A., Liberta moderne, in Civilta cattolica, 1945, III, pp.75-6.
Orfei, R., Andreotti, Milano: Feltrinelli, 1975.
312
Pacelli, F., Diario della Conciliazione (con verbali e appendice di documenti),
Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1959.
Pallieri, G.B., La Sovranita Temporale della Santa Sede e i Trattati del Laterano, in 
Chiesa e Stato, Vol.II, Studi Giuridici, Milano: Unione Tipografico, 1939.
Pestalozza, L., La Costituzione e lo Stato, Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1975.
Peyrot, G., Note agli articoli 5,14 e 15 del progetto di Costituzione che verra 
presentato all ’Assemblea Costituente, Roma: Consiglio Federale delle Chiese 
Evangeliche d’ltalia, 1947.
Peyrot, G., 11 problema dell *insegnamento della religione nelle pubbliche scuole 
elementari in relazione ai maestri ed agli alunni evangelici, presented to the 
Congresso dell'Associazione Insegnanti Cristiani Evangelici (AICE), at Agape 
(Torino) on 26th August, 1954, Firenze: Tipografia Bruno Coppini, 1955.
Peyrot, G., Religious liberty and conditions o f Evangelical People in Italy,
Rome: Ferraiolo, 1957.
Peyrot, G., La legislazione sulle confessioni religiose diverse dalla cattolica in 
D’Avack, P. (Ed.), [Extract from the volume:] La legislazione ecclesiastica, pp. 521- 
547.
Peyrot, G., La situazione della liberta religiosa negli ultimi 20 anni, in 
Protestantesimo, Rivista trimestrale della Facolta Valdese di Teologia. Anno 
XVIII, n.3, 1963, pp. 133-147.
Piacentini, M., I culti ammessi nello Stato italiano, Milano: Hoepli, 1934.
Poggi, G., Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology o f a Sponsored Organization, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.
Pollard, J.F., The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929 -1932: a study in conflict, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Pollard, J.F., Italy, in Buchanan, T. & Conway, M. (Eds.), Political Catholicism in 
Europe, 1918-1965, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 69-96.
Pombeni, P., II gruppo dossettiano e lafondazione della democrazia italiana: 1938- 
1948, Bologna: II Mulino, 1979.
Pombeni, P., Potere costituente e riforme costituzionali, Bologna: II Mulino, 1992.
Pombeni, P., La Costituente: unproblema storico-politico, Bologna: II Mulino,
1995.
Prandi, A., Chiesa epolitica: La gerarchia e Vimpegnopolitico dei cattolici in Italia, 
Bologna: II mulino, 1968.
Prediera, A., I partiti politici, in Calamandrei, P., Commentario sistematico alia 
Costituzione italiana, Firenze: G.Barbera, 1950.
313
Reese, Father T. J., (S.J.), Inside the Vatican: The politics and organisation o f  
the Catholic Church, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1996.
Resoconti delle Giornate teologiche del Ciabcis dedicate al tema: Concordato e 
separazione nei rapporti tra Chiesa e Stato, special edition of the magazine 
L 'Appello, 1943, pp. lxxvii -  lxxviii.
Riccardi, A., Roma ’citta sacra '?Dalla conciliazione alia operazione Sturzo, Milano:
1979.
Riccardi, A., IIpartito romano, Brescia: Morcelliana, 1984.
Riccardi, A., II potere del papa da Pio XII a Paolo VI, Rome: Laterza, 1988.
Rochat, G., Polizia fascista e chiese evangeliche, in I Valdesi e I 'Europa, Torino: 
Brandoni, 1982, pp. 407-434.
www.romacivica.net/anpiroma/rsi/rsicartadiverona.htm.
Romano, S., Uordinamento g/wrzii/co, Firenze: Sansoni, 1946.
Romeo, G.A., La stagione costituente in Italia (1943-1947), Milano: FrancoAngeli,
1992.
Ronchi, M., Punti e linee, in Testimonianza, 1945, p. 124.
Ruffini, F., Cor so di diritto ecclesiastico italiano; la liberta religiosa come diritto 
pubblico subiettivo, Torino: 1924.
Ruffini, F., Relazioni tra Stato e Chiesa: lineamenti storici e sistematici, Bologna: II 
Mulino, 1974.
Saba, V., Quella specie di laburismo cristiano: Dossetti, Pastore, Romani e 
Talternativa a De Gasperi (1946-1951), Roma: Edizioni Lavoro, 1996.
tViSalvemini, G., 1 protestanti in Italia, in II Mondo, 9 August, 1952.
Sassoon, D., Contemporary Italy: Economy, Society and Politics since 1945,
London: Longman, 1997.
Scaduto, F., Guarentigiepontificie e rapporti tra Chiesa e Stato, Torino: 1884.
Scoppola, P., La Chiesa e ilfascismo. Documenti ed interpretazioni, Bari: Laterza, 
1971.
Scoppola, P., La democrazia neipensiero cattolico del Novecento, in Storia delle 
idee politiche economiche e sociali, (diretta da L.Firpo) vol. VI, Torino: Utet, 1972.
Scoppola, P., II fascismo e le minoranze evangeliche, in Fontana, S. (Ed.) 11 fascismo 
e le autonomie locali, Bologna: II Mulino, 1973, pp. 331-394.
314
Scoppola, P. & Traniello, F. (Eds.), I cattolici fra fascismo e democrazia, Bologna: II 
Mulino, 1975.
Scoppola, P. Gli anni della Costituente fra politica e storia, Bologna: II Mulino,
1980.
Scoppola, P., La Proposta Politica di De Gasperi, Bologna: II Mulino, 1988.
Scoppola, P., La repubblica dei partiti: Profilo storico della democrazia in Italia 
(1945-1990), Bologna: II Mulino, 1991.
Soffieti, I., Lo Statuto Albertino, Torino: Giappichelli, 1999.
Spiazzi, R. (Ed.), Enciclopedia del pensiero sociale cristiano, Bologna: Edizioni 
Studio Domenicano, 1992.
Spini, G., Le minoranze protestante in Italia, in 11 Ponte, no. 6 , 1950, p. 670ff.
Spini, G. Lepersecuzioni contro gli evangelici in Italia, in 11 Ponte, no. 1, 1953, 
pp. 1-14.
Sturzo, L., The Catholic Church and Christian Democracy, in Social Action, Journal 
of the Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches, New 
York (Eds. Pope, L. & Underwood, K.) vol.X, no.5, May 15 1944. p. 41ff.
Sturzo, L., Lettere ai Democratici cristiani (settembre 1946 -  ottobre 1947),
Roma: S.E.L.I., 1947.
Tassani, G., Identita e appartenenza: I cattolici italiani e la sinistra che cambia, 
Roma: Edizioni Lavoro, 1991.
Togliatti, P. “The Communist Policy of National Unity (1944)”, translated by Derek 
Boothman in On Gramsci and Other Writings London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1979.
Traniello, F. & Campanini, G., Dizionario storico del movimento cattolico in Italia: 
1860-1980, Torino: Marietti, 1981.
Veneruso, D., 11 seme della pace. La cultura cattolica e il nazionalimperialismo tra 
le due guerre, Roma: Studium, 1987.




ie members of the Constituent Assembly1
- i  Giuseppe
p n i n o ,  Giovanni Battista 
janti, Giuseppe di Angelo 













o ,  Mario Frixos di Felice 
nazini, Ennio 

















tianetto , Celeste 
isti, Luigi 
Stefano 
U d e le  
> Angelo 
Uavista, Girolamo 




























































Bertone, Giovanni Battista Dc
Bettiol, Giuseppe Dc
Biagioni, Loris Dc






























: ^ formation detailed here is taken from the Biblioteca della Camera dei Deputati (a cura di) Indice generate dell attivita 
**"tare dei Deputati (Assemblea Costituente -  Camera dei Deputati -  dal 25 giugno 1946 al 31 gennaio 1948) Vol.30 
f Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati, 1949. The political parties appended against each name refers to the parties 
, ftey belonged to at the end o f the Constituent Assembly’s work. Those members whose names are followed by a f  died 













a r i, Emilio Psli
SOi Bartolomeo Udn







I n i ,  Nicold Udn
( ia r i ,  Luigi Dc
ni, Angelo Psli
mi, Enrico Dc














































Corazzin, Luigi f Dc
Corbellini, Guido
















Croce, Benedetto (Senatore) Udn
Cuomo, Giovanni Udn
D
D ’Agata, Antonino Pci
Damiani, Ugo Misto
D ’Amico, Diego Dc
D’Amico, Michele Pci
D ’Aragona, Lodovico Psli
De Caro, Gerardo Dc
De Caro, Raffaele Udn
De Falco, Giuseppe Udn
De Filpo, Luigi Pci
De Gasperi, Alcide Dc
Del Curto, Giovanni Dc
Della Seta, Ugo Pri
Delli Castelli, Filomena Dc
Del Vecchio, Gustavo
(Ministro Segretario di Stato per il tesoro)
De Maria, Beniamino Dc
De Martino, Carmine Dc
De Mercurio, Ugo Pri
De Michele, Luigi Dc
De Michelis, Paolo Psi
De Palma, Giacomo Dc
De Unterrichter, Jervolino Maria Dc
De Vita, Francesco Pri
Di Fausto, Florestano Dc
Di Giovanni, Eduardo Psli
Di Gloria Calogero, Lino Psli
Di Vittorio, Giuseppe Pci
Dominedo, Francesco Maria Dc
Donati, Antigono Pdl
?



















































































































































La Gravinese, Nicola 
Lagravinese, Pasquale 
La Malfa, Ugo 
Lami Stamuti, Edgardo 
Landi, Romolo 
La Pira, Giorgio 









Lombardi, Giovanni f  
Lombardi, Riccardo 


































































ab r iz io  
i Catullo 
Marinno




i ti ,  Piero 











l i ,  Mario
, Edoardo A n g e lo





i ,  Cesare
A, Umberto












‘.P ie ro  
'■ M ar io
)A"gelina L iv ia  
’Lmberto 
■ Cesare










Bnl Montagnana Togliatti, Rita Pci
Psi Montagnani, Pietro Pci
Psi Montalbano, Giuseppe Pci
Auto Montemartini, Gabriele Luigi Psli
Monterisi, Vito Dc
Monticelli, Reginaldo Dc
Pri Montini, Lodovico Dc
Pci (brother o f Giovanni Battista Montini)
Uq Morandi, Rodolfo Psi
Pci Moranino, Francesco Pci
Pri Morelli, Luigi Dc
Pri Morelli, Renato Udn
Psi Morini, Attilio Psli
Pci Moro, Aldo Dc
Dc Mortati, Costantino Dc
Psi Moscatelli, Vincenzo Pci
Dc Motolese, Alfonso Dc
Dc Murdaca, Filippo Dc
Dc Murgia, Francesco Dc
Pci Musolino, Eugenio Pci
Dc Musotto, Francesco Psi
Psi
Psi N
Udn Natoli Lamentea, Aurelio Pri
Bnl Nasi, Virgilio Pdl
Pri Negarville, Celeste Carlo Pci
Dc Negro, Antonio Pci
Nenni, Pietro Psi
’enza del Nicotra, Maria Dc
Nitti, Francesco Saverio Udn
Pri Nobile, Umberto Pci
Udn Nobili, Oro Tito Achille Psi
Dc Noce Longo, Teresa Pci
Pci Notarianni, Giuseppe Dc
Pci Novella, Agostino Pci
Dc Numeroso, Rafaele Dc
Auto
Uq O
Dc Orlando, Camillo Dc
Pci Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele Udn
Psi
Psli P
Misto Pacciardi, Randolfo Pri
Pri Pajetta, Gian Carlo Pci
Psli Pajetta, Giuliano Pci
Dc Pallastrelli, Giovanni Dc
Dc Paolucci, Silvio Pri
Dc Paratore, Giuseppe Udn
Psi Paris, Danilo Psli
Psi Parri, Ferruccio Pri





Pat, Bortolo Manlio Dc
Patricolo, Gennaro Udn
Dc Patrissi, Emilio Udn
Pci Pecorari, Fausto Dc
Pci Pella, Giuseppe Dc
Psli Pellegrini, Giacomo Pci
Pdl Pellizzari, Achille Dc
Pci Penna Buscemi, Ottavia Udn

































!, Quinto (formerly Udn, moved to) Pli
Tommaso 
' Giovanni 










Aldo E nzo  












































































































Taddia, Gherardo Ruggero 
Tambroni Armaroli, Fernando 
Targetti, Ferdinando 









































































I  Secondo 
















































































SARY (Appendices I and II)
Autonomista
Blocco nazionale della liberta 
Concentrazione democratica repubblicana 
Democrazia cristiana
Fronte democratico progressista repubblicano 
Independente








Partito socialista italiano di unione proletaria
Partito socialista dei lavoratori italiani
Unione democratica nazionale
Uomo qualunque
■UP.L.Ballini (Ed.), 1946-1948: Repubblica, Costituente, Costituzione, Firenze, Edizioni Polistampa, 1998, Table 2,
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ICAS1: Conclusioni cattoliche for Church/State relations
The following ‘conclusioni cattoliche’ on Church/State relations were first submitted 
for the approval of the Vatican Secretariat of State and the directors of ‘Civilta 
cattolica’. Then copies were sent to President Umberto Tupini of Subcommission 1
thand Giuseppe Dossetti, its Dc spokesman. Thereafter, it was forwarded on 25 
November to Monsignor Urbani, Secretary of the Commissione Episcopate per T Alta 
Direzione dell’ACI, to Presidente Giuseppe Saragat of the Constituent Assembly and 
to Meuccio Ruini, President of the Commission of 75. The ‘conclusioni’, dated 21st 
November, 1946 read as follows:
1) II far mancare nella Carta Costituzionale dello Stato l’invocazione 
preliminare del Nome di Dio e I’adesione ai grandi principi morali del 
Cristianesimo, sarebbe un ferire il sentimento religioso universale del popolo 
italiano e un offendere la coscienza comune che sta a base della civile attuale 
del popolo stesso. Lo Stato e l’organizzazione politico-giuridica della vita 
della nazione (la quale risulta dalla convivenza di persone umane) e percio 
appunto deve essere l’interprete fedele della vita medesima, principalmente 
per cio che riguarda le esigenze e le attivita piu essenziali e piu elevate della 
persona umana, che sono la religiosita e la coscienza morale.
2) La Carta Costituzionale non pud prescindere dal fatto che la Religione 
Cattolica Apostolica Romana e la religione della nazione italiana. Essa e 
professata dalla quasi totalita degli italiani; essa costituisce uno dei fattori 
principali della civilta, della cultura e dell’unita italiana; e lo Stato ha 
l’obbligo di riconoscere praticamente e in modo degno le tradizioni storiche 
piu fondamentali e piu attuali della nazione. Lo stato deve quindi dare 
rilevanza giuridica a questo fatto con un positivo impegno costituzionale a 
svolgere la sua attivita, nella legislazione e nella pratica amministrativa, con 
quel pieno ed effettivo rispetto alia Religione Cattolica, che e domandata 
dalla coscienza dei cattolici.
3) La Carta Costituzionale deve riconoscere e garantire per tutti i 
cittadini italiani, di qualsiasi fede od opinione, il principio della liberta di
1 Istituto Cattolico per T Attivita Sociale.
1
coscienza e di culto, come un diritto naturale indispensabile alia persona 
umana per l’adempimento dei suoi doveri verso Dio.
Ma il principio costituzionale della liberta di coscienza e di culto non 
deve importare una equiparazione nelle determinazioni giuridiche relative 
alia vita e alle attivita di tutti i gruppi o istituzioni sociali a fmalita religiose 
non in contrasto con l’ordine pubblico.
Una tale equiparazione nelFordinamento italiano sarebbe un non 
senso perche -  se pur si voglia prescindere da cio che per se £ dovuto alia 
Chiesa, ai suoi istituti, alle sue attivita, nelle varie forme di attuazione del 
divino comando -  il principio di giustizia non importa uguaglianza di 
regolamento per fenomeni socialmente disuguali (tanto piu quando questi 
sono, come in Italia i gruppi sociali a fmalita religiosa, enormemente 
disuguali tra loro per entita ed efficienza), ma regolamento adeguato alia 
diversita di tali fenomeni. La pace religiosa non puo essere che reffetto del 
congruo regime giuridico delle istituzioni confessionali, pur nel rispetto della 
liberta religiosa individuale. E dunque dovere e supremo interesse dello Stato 
non solo di conservare o meglio determinare la condizione giuridica 
opportuna per la vita degli istituti ecclesiastici, ma di cooperare attivamente 
con la Chiesa a che le fmalita religioso-morali di questa siano realizzate.
Le quali fmalita, mentre soddisfano le piu alte esigenze della pubblica 
coscienza, assicurano il maggior bene anche temporale della collettivita 
nazionale.
4) Per quanto ha riguardo agli specifici rapporti giuridici fra lo Stato e la 
Chiesa, la nuova Carta Costituzionale deve dichiarare la conservazione 
integrale dei Patti Lateranensi e sancire la non possibility di modificazione di 
alcuno di essi, o di qualsiasi delle loro disposizioni, senza preventiva intesa e 
accordo con la Santa Sede.
Nei Patti Lateranensi -  occorre tenerlo sempre presente -  trova 
adeguata soluzione un annoso problema storico, proprio del popolo italiano; 
al quale popolo sarebbe estremamente dannoso se un siffatto problema 
venisse riaperto.2
2 Full text appears in “L ’i.c .a .s”, 1-15 December 1946, no. 20-21, p.4, ‘Le fondamentati conclusioni 
dell'ICAS sugli attuali problemi sociali. Cited in Casella, Cattolici e Costituente, pp. 297-8.
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APPENDIX IV 
Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana
(published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale on 7th December 1947) 
Cross-Referenced with 
The Debates of the Constituent Assembly
Introduction
The aim of this work is primarily to facilitate my own research into the Catholic 
influence on the Debates of the Constituent Assembly, but I hope it will also be of 
benefit to those who wish to study, whether for professional reasons, academic 
research or personal interest, the Debates of the Constituent Assembly. This work 
acts as a cross-reference aid between the Articles of the Italian Constitution and the 
Debates of the Constituent Assembly including those o f the three Subcommissions 
entrusted with the task of drawing up the Republican Constitution of 1948.
In the course of the Debates, topics were divided and sub-divided in different 
ways, leading to numerous changes in the numbering of the articles. I have listed in 
chronological order the debates that took place covering the substance of the articles 
as they appeared in their final form on 1st January, 1948. The reader will therefore be 
able to follow the development of the discussions leading up to the final version of 
each article.
Once the three Subcommissions had finished their initial deliberations, a draft 
constitution was produced for discussion in the full Constituent Assembly. The 
numbers that appear in brackets after the article numbers therefore refer to the 
corresponding article (or articles) of the Draft Constitution as presented on 
31.01.1947. Where an article number is not followed by a number in brackets, it 
signifies that the article only appeared in the final version. The full transcript of the 
draft document can be seen on pages LVII-LXXIII in Volume I of ‘La Costituzione 
della Repubblica nei lav or i preparatori della Assemblea Costituente ’. It is also 
worth bearing in mind that between January 1947 and January 1948, as the final 
version of each article was agreed, the article numbers mentioned in the debates refer 
to both the final article (where discussions are complete) and draft article (where 
discussions are still in progress).
Before the final decisions about exactly which topics were to be covered by 
each article, there was frequent overlap in the debates. In order to ensure that nothing 
is missed for the reader who wishes to follow the whole discussion of any article, I 
have made reference to the full debate under each relevant article. The same 
discussion will therefore appear under more than one article. Furthermore, when two 
or more Subcommissions or Subsections discussed the same article on the same day, 
the debates are listed in chronological order wherever possible.
The Subcommissions began debating topics on 26.07.1946. Prior to and on 
various occasions after this date, procedural matters regarding the appointment of 
Presidents and Secretaries, the work of the Subcommissions, draft proposals of 
topics the Constitution should cover, voting systems, the different constitutional 
models to be used etc. were discussed. These appear under the heading “General 
Discussions”.
Some of these “General Discussions” listed on page 3 of this Appendix, also 
include discussion of specific articles. Where such an overlap occurs, the entry will 
also be found under the relevant article.
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Glossary
AP Adunanza Plenaria (Full meeting of the ‘Commission of 75’)
SI Subcommission 1
S2 Subcommission 2
S2i Section One of Subcommission 2
S2ii Section Two of Subcommission 2
S3 Subcommission 3
CA Constituent Assembly (Full Session)
2
General Discussions on the Constitution
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
02.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1333-1359 CA
05.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1399-1426 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
09.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2269-2275 CA
10.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2291-2292 CA
11.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2293-2294 CA
13.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2345-2346 CA
14.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2347-2366 CA
16.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2367-2368 CA
25.06.1947 Vol. Ill p. 2387 CA
26.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2389-2391 CA
09.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2761-2766 CA
22.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4579-4595 CA
22.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4597-4608 CA
Principi Fondamentali
Art. 1. (1)
L’ltalia e una Repubblica democratica fondata sul lavoro.
La sovranita appartiene al popolo, che la esercita nelle forme e nei limiti della 
Costituzione.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
09.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2079-2084 S3
10.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2085-2089 S3
13.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 995-1005 S2
04.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 491-498 SI
08.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 499-509 SI
16.10.1946 Vol. VI p. 562 SI
18.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 563-566 SI
28.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 727-736 SI
03.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 747-754 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2023-2028 S2ii
22.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 138-143 AP
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24.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 161-164 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I p. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
15.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 427-451 CA
17.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 455-476 CA
20.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 503-536 CA
21.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 537-561 CA
22.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 565-587 CA
Discussion of individual articles begins today (22.03)
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
12.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1617-1656 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
Art. 2. (6)
La Repubblica riconosce e garantisce i diritti inviolabili dell’uomo, sia come singolo 
sia nelle formazioni sociali ove si svolge la sua personality e richiede l’adempimento 
dei doveri inderogabili di solidarieta politica, economica e sociale.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
09.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 316-324 SI
10.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 325-331 SI
11.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 333-342 SI
04.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 491-498 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
15,03,1947 pm Vol. I pp, 427-451 CA
17.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 455-476 CA
20.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 503-536 CA
22.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 565-587 CA
24.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 591-612 CA
03.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4319-4346 CA
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Art. 3. (1,7)
Tutti i cittadini hanno pari dignita sociale e sono eguali davanti alia legge, senza 
distinzione di sesso, di razza, di lingua, di religione, di opinioni politiche, di 
condizioni personali e sociali.
E compito della Repubblica rimuovere gli ostacoii di ordine economico e sociale, 
che, limitando di fatto la liberta e l’eguaglianza dei cittadini, impediscono il pieno 
sviluppo della persona umana e l'effettiva partecipazione di tutti i lavoratori 
all'organizzazione politica, economica e sociale del Paese.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
11.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 333-342 SI
13.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2105-2112 S3
18.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2113-2119 S3
19.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2121-2126 S3
01.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 467-470 SI
02.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 471-478 SI
04.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 491-498 SI
03.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 747-754 SI
12.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1903-1911 S2ii
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
24.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 167 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
15.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 427-451 CA
17.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 455-476 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
20.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 503-536 CA
21.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 537-561 CA
22.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 565-587 CA
Discussion of individual articles begins today
24.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 591-612 CA
25.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 613-664 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
10.04.1947 Vol. I pp. 753-784 CA
11.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 785-801 CA
11.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 803-816 CA
12.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 825-846 CA
14.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 847-865 CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 941-962 CA
24.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1213-1243 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
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22.05.1947 Vol. Ill
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V
26.11.1947 am Vol. V






La Repubblica riconosce a tutti i cittadini il diritto al lavoro e promuove le 
condizioni che rendano effettivo questo diritto.
Ogni cittadino ha il dovere di svolgere, secondo le proprie possibilita e la propria 
scelta, una attivitd o una funzione che concorra al progresso materiale o spirituale
della societa.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
09.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2079-2084 S3
10.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2085-2089 S3
04.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 491-498 SI
08.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 499-509 SI
18.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 563-566 SI
15.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 685-698 SI
28.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 727-736 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
22.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 138-143 AP
24.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 167 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
15.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 427-451 CA
22.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1117-1153 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
09.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1536-1558 CA
10.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1581-1614 CA
12.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1617-1656 CA
13.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1657-1682 CA
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
15.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2627-2661 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
26.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4093-4113 CA
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Art. 5. (106)
La Repubblica, una e indivisibile, riconosce e promuove le autonomie locali; attua 
nei servizi che dipendono dallo Stato il piu ampio decentramento amministrativo; 
adegua i principi ed i metodi della sua legislazione alle esigenze dell'autonomia e del 
decentramento.
Debates:
(See also Articles 114 -  133)
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
24.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 591-612 CA
03.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2103-2136 CA
04.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2137-2152 CA
04.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2153-2177 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
02.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2471-2485 CA
04.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4367-4399 CA
Art. 6.
La Repubblica tutela con apposite norme le minoranze linguistiche.
Debates:
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
22.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2721-2727 CA
Art. 7. (5)
Lo Stato e la Chiesa cattolica sono, ciascuno nel proprio ordine, indipendenti e
sovrani.
I loro rapporti sono regolati dai Patti Lateranensi. Le modificazioni dei Patti,
accettate dalle due parti, non richiedono procedimento di revisione costituzionale.
Debates:
21.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 717-726 SI
03.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 747-754 SI
04.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 755-763 SI
05.12.1946 Vol. VI p.768 SI
11.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 775-780 SI
13.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1913-1920 S2ii
18.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 781-793 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 795-806 SI
23.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 145-159 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
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04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
15.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 427-451 CA
17.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 455-476 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
20.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 503-536 CA
21.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 537-561 CA
25.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 613-664 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
12.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 817-823 CA
12.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 825-846 CA
14.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 847-865 CA
Art. 8. (5)
Tutte le confessioni religiose sono egualmente libere davanti alia legge.
Le confessioni religiose diverse dalla cattolica hanno diritto di organizzarsi secondo i 
propri statuti, in quanto non contrastino con l'ordinamento giuridico italiano.
I loro rapporti con lo Stato sono regolati per legge sulla base di intese con le relative 
rappresentanze.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
13.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1913-1920 S2ii
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 795-806 SI
24.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 166-167 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
17.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 455-476 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
20.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 503-536 CA
21.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 537-561 CA
25.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 613-664 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
12.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 817-823 CA
12.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 825-846 CA
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Art. 9. (29)
La Repubblica promuove lo sviluppo della cultura e la ricerca scientifica e tecnica. 



















L'ordinamento giuridico italiano si conforma alle norme del diritto intemazionale 
generalmente riconosciute.
La condizione giuridica dello straniero e regolata dalla legge in conformif delle 
norme e dei trattati intemazionali.
Lo straniero, al quale sia impedito nel suo paese 1'effettivo esercizio delle liberta 
democratiche garantite dalla Costituzione italiana, ha diritto d'asilo nel territorio 
della Repubblica, secondo le condizioni stabilite dalla legge.
Non e ammessa l'estradizione dello straniero per reati politici.
Debates:
01.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 467-470 SI
02.10.1946 Vol. VI p. 478 SI
04.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 755-763 SI
11.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 775-780 SI
13.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1913-1920 S2ii
24.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 164-166 AP
24.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 169-172 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
15.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 427-451 CA
17.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 455-476 CA
24.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 591-612 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
11.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 785-801 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 941-962 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
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A r t  11. (4)
L'ltalia ripudia la guerra come strumento di offesa alia liberty degli altri popoli e 
come mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie intemazionali; consente, in condizioni 
di parita con gli altri Stati, alle limitazioni di sovranita necessarie ad un ordinamento 
che assicuri la pace e la giustizia fra le Nazioni; promuove e favorisce le 
organizzazioni intemazionali rivolte a tale scopo.
Debates:
03.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 747-754 SI
24.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 166 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
15.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 427-451 CA
17.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 455-476 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
20.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 503-536 CA
24.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 591-612 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
21.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3387-3401 CA
A r t  12. (2)
La bandiera della Repubblica e il tricolore italiano: verde bianco e rosso, a tre bande 
verticali di eguali dimensioni.
Debates:
03.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 747-754 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
24.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 591-612 CA
22.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1105-1116 CA
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PARTE I 




La liberta personate e inviolabile.
Non e ammessa forma aicuna di detenzione, di ispezione o perquisizione personale, 
ne qualsiasi altra restrizione della liberta personale, se non per atto motivato 
dall'autorit& giudiziaria e nei soli casi e modi previsti dalla legge.
In casi eccezionali di necessita ed urgenza, indicati tassativamente dalla legge, 
l'autorita di pubblica sicurezza pud adottare prowedimenti prowisori, che devono 
essere comunicati entro quarantotto ore alia autorita giudiziaria e, se questa non li 
convalida nelle successive quarantotto ore, si intendono revocati e restano privi di 
ogni effetto.
6  punita ogni violenza. fisica e morale sulle persone comunque sottoposte a 
restrizioni di liberta.
La legge stabilisce i limiti massimi della carcerazione preventiva.
Debates:
12.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 343-352 SI
17.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 353-360 SI
10.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 769-773 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
24.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 168 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
29.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 743-751 CA
10.04.1947 Vol. I pp. 753-784 CA
14.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 847-865 CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
27.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4141-4156 CA
Art. 14.
II domicilio e inviolabile.
Non vi si possono eseguire ispezioni o perquisizioni o sequestri, se non nei casi e 
modi stabiliti dalla legge secondo le garanzie prescritte per la tutela della liberta 
personale.
Gli accertamenti e le ispezioni per motivi di sanita e di incolumita pubblica o a fini 
economici e fiscali sono regolati da leggi speciali.
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Debates:
19.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 375-383 SI
24.01.1947 Vol. VI p.168 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
10.04.1947 Vol. I pp. 753-784 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
Art. 15. (9)
La liberta e la segretezza della corrispondenza e di ogni altra forma di 
comunicazione sono inviolabili.
La loro limitazione puo awenire soltanto per atto motivato dell'autorita giudiziaria 
con le garanzie stabilite dalla legge.
Debates:
20.09.1946 Vol. VI p. 390 SI
21.09.1946 Vol. VI p. 391 SI
24.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 168 AP
28.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 203 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
10.04.1947 Vol. I pp. 753-784 CA
11.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 785-801 CA
Art. 16. (10)
Ogni cittadino puo circolare e soggiomare liberamente in qualsiasi parte del territorio 
nazionale, salvo le limitazioni che la legge stabilisce in via generale per motivi di 
sanita o di sicurezza. Nessuna restrizione puo essere determinata da ragioni politiche. 
Ogni cittadino e libero di uscire dal territorio della Repubblica e di rientrarvi, salvo 
gli obblighi di legge.
Debates:
20.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 385-390 SI
24.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2135-2138 S3
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
11.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 785-801 CA
11.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 803-816 CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
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Art. 17. (12)
I cittadini hanno diritto di riunirsi pacificamente e senz’armi.
Per le riunioni, anche in luogo aperto al pubblico, non e richiesto preawiso. 
Delle riunioni in luogo pubblico deve essere dato preawiso alle autorita, che 
possono vietarle soltanto per comprovati motivi di sicurezza o di incolumitd
pubblica.
Debates:
25.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 421-422 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
11.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 803-816 CA
Art. 18. (13)
I cittadini hanno diritto di associarsi liberamente, senza autorizzazione, per fini che 
non sono vietati ai singoli dalla legge penale.
Sono proibite le associazioni segrete e quelle che perseguono, anche indirettamente, 
scopi politici mediante organizzazioni di carattere militare.
Debates:
25.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 422-429 SI
10.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 519-522 SI
11.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 523-534 SI
10.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 769-773 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
11.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 803-816 CA
12.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 825-846 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
21.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1829-1871 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
Art. 19. (14)
Tutti hanno diritto di professare liberamente la propria fede religiosa in qualsiasi 
forma, individuale o associata, di fame propaganda e di esercitame in privato o in 
pubblico il culto, purche non si tratti di riti contrari al buon costume.
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Debates:
18.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 781-793 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 795-806 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
20.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 503-536 CA
21.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 537-561 CA
25.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 613-664 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
12.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 817-823 CA
12.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 825-846 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 941-962 CA
Art. 20. (15)
II carattere ecclesiastico e il fine di religione o di culto d'una associazione od 
istituzione non possono essere causa di speciali limitazioni legislative, n6 di speciali 
gravami fiscali per la sua costituzione, capacita giuridica e ogni forma di attivita.
Debates:
18.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 781-793 SI
19.12.1946 am Vol. VI pp. 795-806 SI
19.12.1946 pm Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 395-423 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
12.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 825-846 CA
14.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 847-865 CA
Art. 21. (16)
Tutti hanno diritto di manifestare liberamente il proprio pensiero con la parola, lo 
scritto e ogni altro mezzo di diffusione.
La stampa non puo essere soggetta ad autorizzazioni o censure.
Si pud procedere a sequestro soltanto per atto motivato dell'autorita giudiziaria nel 
caso di delitti, per i quali la legge sulla stampa espressamente lo autorizzi, o nel caso 
di violazione delle norme che la legge stessa prescriva per l'indicazione dei 
responsabili.
In tali casi, quando vi sia assoluta urgenza e non sia possibile il tempestivo 
intervento dell'autorita giudiziaria, il sequestro della stampa periodica puo essere 
eseguito da ufficiali di polizia giudiziaria, che devono immediatamente, e non mai 
oltre ventiquattro ore, fare denunzia all'autorita giudiziaria. Se questa non lo 
convalida nelle ventiquattro ore successive, il sequestro si intende revocato e privo 
d'ogni effetto.
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La legge puo stabilire, con norme di carattere generate, che siano resi noti i mezzi di 
fmanziamento della stampa periodica.
Sono vietate le pubblicazioni a stampa, gli spettacoli e tutte le altre manifestazioni 
contrarie al buon costume. La legge stabilisce prowedimenti adeguati a prevenire e a 
reprimere le violazioni.
Debates:
26.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 431-441 SI
27.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 443-455 SI
01.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 457-460 SI
12.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1903-1911 S2ii
25.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 173-176 AP
28.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 205-206 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
10.04.1947 Vol. I pp. 753-784 CA
12.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 825-846 CA
14.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 847-865 CA
14.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 867-885 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 941-962 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
A rt 22.(17)
Nessuno pu6 essere privato, per motivi politici, della capacita giuridica, della 
cittadinanza, del nome.
Debates:
21.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 391-399 SI
24.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 401-413 SI
25.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 413-421 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
14.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 867-885 CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
Art. 23.(18)




19.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 699-707 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
14.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 867-885 CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
Art. 24. (19, 22)
Tutti possono agire in giudizio per la tutela dei propri diritti e interessi legittimi. 
La difesa e diritto inviolabile in ogni stato e grado del procedimento.
Sono assicurati ai non abbienti, con appositi istituti, i mezzi per agire e difendersi 
davanti ad ogni giurisdizione.
La legge determina le condizioni e i modi per la riparazione degli errori giudiziari.
Debates:
17.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 360-366 SI
03.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 747-754 SI
12.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1903-1911 S2ii
14.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1921-1927 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
14.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 847-865 CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
15.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 913-937 CA
24.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4007-4021 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
02.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4277-4303 CA
Art. 25. (20)
Nessuno puo essere distolto dal giudice naturale precostituito per legge.
Nessuno puo essere punito se non in forza di una legge che sia entrata in vigore 
prima del fatto commesso.
Nessuno pud essere sottoposto a misure di sicurezza se non nei casi previsti dalla 
legge.
Debates:
17.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 360-366 SI
18.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 367-374 SI
12.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1903-1911 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
24.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4007-4021 CA
02.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4277-4303 CA
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Art. 26.
L’estradizione del cittadino puo essere consentita soltanto ove sia espressamente 
prevista dalle convenzioni intemazionali. Non puo in alcun caso essere ammessa per 
reati politici.
Debates:
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
Art. 27. (21)
La responsabilita penale £ personale.
L' imputato non e considerato colpevole sino alia condanna definitiva.
Le pene non possono consistere in trattamenti contrari al senso di umanita e devono 
tendere alia rieducazione del condannato. Non e ammessa la pena di morte, se non 
nei casi previsti dalle leggi militari di guerra.
Debates:
17.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 360-366 SI
18.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 367-374 SI
19.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 375-383 SI
10.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 769-773 SI
12.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1903-1911 S2ii
25.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 180-185 AP
25.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 187-189 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
29.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 743-751 CA
10.04.1947 Vol. I pp. 753-784 CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
02.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4277-4303 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 . 4 4 5 2 CA
A rt 28. (22)
I funzionari e i dipendenti dello Stato e degli enti pubblici sono direttamente
responsabili, secondo le leggi penali, civili e amministrative, degli atti compiuti in 
violazione di diritti. In tali casi la responsabilita civile si estende alio Stato e agli enti 
pubblici.
Debates:
01.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 460-467 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
26.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 665-692 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
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10„04.1947 Vol. I
14_04.1947 pm Vol. I
15.04.1947 am Vol. I











Art. 29. (23, 24)
La Repubblica riconosce i diritti della famiglia come societa naturale fondata sul 
matrimonio.
II matrimonio e ordinato sull’eguaglianza morale e giuridica dei coniugi, con i limiti 
stabiliti dalla legge a garanzia dell'unit& familiare.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
13.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2105-2112 S3
18.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2113-2119 S3
19.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2121-2126 S3
30.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 630-636 SI
05.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 637-641 SI
06.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 643-654 SI
07.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 655-662 SI
12.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 663-668 SI
13.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 669-676 SI
15.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 101-106 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
15.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 913-937 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 941-962 CA
17.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 963-983 CA
18.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 985-993 CA
18.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 996-1024 CA
19.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1025-1054 CA
21.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1055-1071 CA
21.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1073-1104 CA
22.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1105-1116 CA
22.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1117-1153 CA
23.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1155-1211 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
10.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1559-1580 CA
18
Art. 30. (25)
E dovere e diritto dei genitori mantenere, istruire ed educare i figli, anche se nati 
fuori del matrimonio.
Nei casi di incapacity dei genitori, la legge prowede a che siano assolti i loro 
compiti.
La legge assicura ai figli nati fuori del matrimonio ogni tutela giuridica e sociale, 
compatibile con i diritti dei membri della famiglia legittima.
La legge detta le norme e i limiti per la ricerca della patemita.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
13.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2105-2112 S3
18.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2113-2119 S3
19.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2121-2126 S3
20.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2127-2133 S3
22.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 576-585 SI
23.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 588-598 SI
30.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 630-636 SI
05.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 637-641 SI
06.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 643-654 SI
07.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 655-662 SI
12.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 663-668 SI
13.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 669-676 SI
16.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 111-115 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
15.04.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 913-937 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. 11 pp. 941-962 CA
17.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 963-983 CA
18.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 985-993 CA
18.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 996-1024 CA
19.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1025-1054 CA
21.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1055-1071 CA
21.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1073-1104 CA
22.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1105-1116 CA
22.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1117-1153 CA
23.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1155-1211 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
10.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1559-1580 CA
Art. 31. (23, 25)
La Repubblica agevola con misure economiche e altre prowidenze la formazione 
della famiglia e I'adempimento dei compiti relativi, con particolare riguardo alle 
famiglie numerose.
















15.04.1947 pm Vol. I
17.04.1947 am Vol. II
17.04.1947 pm Vol. II
18.04.1947 am Vol. II
18.04.1947 pm Vol. II
19.04.1947 pm Vol. II
21.04.1947 am Vol. II
21.04.1947 pm Vol. II
22.04.1947 am Vol. II
22.04.1947 pm Vol. II
23.04.1947 Vol. II
08.05.1947 Vol. II



























La Repubblica tutela la salute come fondamentale diritto dell'individuo e interesse 
della collettivita, e garantisce cure gratuite agli indigenti.
Nessuno puo essere obbligato a un determinato trattamento sanitario se non per 
disposizione di legge. La legge non pub in nessun caso violare i limiti imposti dal 
rispetto della persona umana.
Debates:
25.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 180 AP
28.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 203-205 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
27.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 695-718 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 941-962 CA
19.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1025-1054 CA
21.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1055-1071 CA
21.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1073-1104 CA
22.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1117-1153 CA
23.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1155-1211 CA
24.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1213-1243 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
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Art. 33. (27)
L'arte e la scienza sono libere e libero ne e l'insegnamento.
La Repubblica detta le norme generali sull’istruzione ed istituisce scuole statali per 
tutti gli ordini e gradi.
Enti e privati hanno il diritto di istituire scuole ed istituti di educazione, senza oneri 
per lo Stato.
La legge, nel fissare i diritti e gli obblighi delle scuole non statali che chiedono la 
parita, deve assicurare ad esse piena liberta e ai loro alunni un trattamento scolastico 
equipollente a quello degli alunni di scuole statali.
E prescritto un esame di Stato per l'ammissione ai vari ordini e gradi di scuole o per 
la conclusione di essi e per i'abilitazione all’esercizio professionale.
Le istituzioni di alta cultura, universita ed accademie, hanno il diritto di darsi 
ordinamenti autonomi nei limiti stabiliti dalle leggi dello Stato.
Debates:
19.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2121-2126 S3
20.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2127-2133 S3
18.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 567-573 SI
22.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 576-585 SI
23.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 588-598 SI
24.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 599-608 SI
29.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 609-620 SI
30.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 621-629 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
25.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 613-664 CA
28.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 721-742 CA
29.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 743-751 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 941-962 CA
17.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 963-983 CA
18.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 985-993 CA
18.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 996-1024 CA
19.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1025-1054 CA
21.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1055-1071 CA
21.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1073-1104 CA
22.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1105-1116 CA
22.04.1947 pm V ol.n pp. 1117-1153 CA
23.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1155-1211 CA
24.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1213-1243 CA
28.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1245-1270 CA
29.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1271-1299 CA
30.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1301-1332 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
04.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2499-2524 CA
08.07.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2529-2550 CA
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Art. 34. (28)
La scuola £ aperta a tutti.
L'istruzione inferiore, impartita per almeno otto anni, e obbligatoria e gratuita.
I capaci e meritevoli, anche se privi di mezzi, hanno diritto di raggiungere i gradi piu 
alti degli studi.
La Repubblica rende effettivo questo diritto con borse di studio, assegni alle famiglie 
ed altre prowidenze, che devono essere attribuite per concorso.
Debates:
19.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2121-2126 S3
20.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2127-2133 S3
18.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 567-573 SI
22.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 576-585 SI
23.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 588-598 SI
24.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 599-608 SI
29.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 609-620 SI
30.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 621-629 SI
11.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 775-780 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
25.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 613-664 CA
17.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 941-962 CA
17.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 963-983 CA
18.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 985-993 CA
18.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 996-1024 CA
19.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1025-1054 CA
21.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1055-1071 CA
21.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1073-1104 CA
22.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1105-1116 CA
22.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1117-1153 CA
23.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1155-1211 CA
24.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1213-1243 CA
28.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1245-1270 CA
29.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1271-1299 CA
30.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1301-1332 CA
09.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1536-1558 CA
04.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2499-2524 CA




Discussioni generali sui Rapporti Economici
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
Art. 35. (10, 30)
La Repubblica tutela il lavoro in tutte le sue forme ed applicazioni.
Cura la formazione e I'elevazione professionale dei Iavoratori.
Promuove e favorisce gli accordi e le organizzazioni intemazionali intesi ad 
affermare e regolare i diritti del lavoro.
Riconosce la liberta di emigrazione, salvo gli obblighi stabiliti dalla legge 
nell’interesse generale, e tutela il lavoro italiano all'estero.
Debates:
09.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2079-2084 S3
10.09.1946 Vol. VTII pp. 2085-2089 S3
24.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2135-2138 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
04.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 491-498 SI
08.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 499-509 SI
18.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 563-566 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 233-257 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
26.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 665-692 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
12.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1617-1656 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
Art. 36. (32)
II lavoratore ha diritto ad una retribuzione proporzionata alia quantita e qualita del 
suo lavoro e in ogni caso sufficiente ad assicurare a se e alia famiglia un'esistenza 
libera e dignitosa.
La durata massima della giomata lavorativa e stabilita dalla legge.




11.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2091-2098 S3
12.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2099-2103 S3
13.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2105-2112 S3
18.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2113-2119 S3
19.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2121-2126 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
08.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 499-509 SI
15.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 535-548 SI
16.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 549-562 SI
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
11.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 313-339 CA
27.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 695-718 CA
15.04.1947 pm Vol.I pp. 913-937 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05. 1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
10.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1559-1580 CA
10.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1581-1614 CA
12.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1617-1656 CA
Art. 37. (33)
La donna lavoratrice ha gli stessi diritti e, a parita di lavoro, le stesse retribuzioni che 
spettano al lavoratore. Le condizioni di lavoro devono consentire radempimento 
della sua essenziale funzione familiare e assicurare alia madre e al bambino una 
speciale adeguata protezione.
La legge stabilisce il limite minimo di eta per il lavoro salariato.
La Repubblica tutela il lavoro dei minori con speciali norme e garantisce ad essi, a 
parita di lavoro, il diritto alia parita di retribuzione.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
13.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2105-2112 S3
18.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2113-2119 S3
19.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2121-2126 S3
24.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2135-2138 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
08.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 499-509 SI
10.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 519-522 SI
25.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 189 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol.I pp. 479-502 CA
22.04.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1105-1116 CA
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03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
10.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1559-1580 CA
10.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1581-1614 CA
12.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1617-1656 CA
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3693-3716 CA
Art. 38. (34)
Ogni cittadino inabile al lavoro e sprowisto dei mezzi necessari per vivere ha diritto 
al mantenimento e all’assistenza sociale.
I lavoratori hanno diritto che siano preveduti ed assicurati mezzi adeguati alle loro 
esigenze di vita in caso di infortunio, malattia, invalidity e vecchiaia, disoccupazione 
involontaria.
Gli inabili ed i minorati hanno diritto alVeducazione e all'awiamento professional. 
Ai compiti previsti in questo articolo prowedono organi ed istituti predisposti o 
integrati dallo Stato.
L'assistenza privata e libera.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
11.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2091-2098 S3
12.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2099-2103 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
08.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 499-509 SI
09.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 511-518 SI
10.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 519-522 SI
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
11.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 313-339 CA
21.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1073-1104 CA
22,04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1117-1153 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
10.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1559-1580 CA
10.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1581-1614 CA
12.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1617-1656 CA
Art. 39. (35)
L'organizzazione sindacale e libera.
Ai sindacati non pub essere imposto altro obbligo se non la loro registrazione presso 
uffici locali o centrali, secondo le norme di legge.
E condizione per la registrazione che gli statuti dei sindacati sanciscano un 
ordinamento intemo a base democratica.
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I sindacati registrati hanno personality giuridica. Possono, rappresentati 
unitariamente in proporzione dei loro iscritti, stipulare contratti collettivi di lavoro 
con efficacia obbligatoria per tutti gli appartenenti alle categorie alle quali il 
contratto si riferisce.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
04.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2229-2237 S3
04.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2239-2243 S3
11.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 523-534 SI
15.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 535-548 SI
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
13.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 359-391 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05,1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
10.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1581-1614 CA
13.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1657-1682 CA
Art. 40. (36)













03.05.1947 pm Vol. II
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II
08.05.1947 Vol. II
12.05.1947 pm Vol. II



















Art. 41. (37, 39)
L'iniziativa economica privata e libera.
Non puo svolgersi in contrasto con l'utilita sociale o in modo da recare danno alia 
sicurezza, alia liberta, alia dignita umana.
La legge determina i programmi e i controlli opportuni perchd Tattivitd economica 
pubblica e privata possa essere indirizzata e coordinata a fini sociali.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
01.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2179-2187 S3
01.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2189-2197 S3
02.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2199-2206 S3
02.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2207-2212 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
04.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2229-2237 S3
04.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2239-2243 S3
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
12.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 341-358 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol.I pp. 395-423 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
09.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1536-1558 CA
13.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1657-1682 CA
14.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1715-1747 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
Art. 42. (38)
La proprieta & pubblica o privata. I beni economici appartengono alio Stato, ad enti o 
a privati.
La proprieta privata d riconosciuta e garantita dalla legge, che ne determina i modi di 
acquisto, di godimento e i limiti alio scopo di assicurame la funzione sociale e di 
renderla accessibile a tutti.
La proprieta privata puo essere, nei casi preveduti dalla legge, e salvo indennizzo, 
espropriata per motivi d'interesse generale. La legge stabilisce le norme ed i limiti 
della successione legittima e testamentaria e i diritti dello Stato sulle eredita.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2073-2078 S3
25.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2139-2149 S3
26.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2151-2158 S3
27.09.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2159-2167 S3
27.09.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2169-2174 S3
30.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2175-2177 S3
01.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2179-2187 S3
01.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2189-2197 S3
02.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2199-2206 S3
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02.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2207-2212 S3
03.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2213-2222 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
03.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2223-2227 S3
16.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 549-562 SI
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
13.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1657-1682 CA
13.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1685-1714 CA
14.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1715-1747 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 . 4 4 5 2 CA
Art. 43. (40)
A fini di utilita generale la legge puo riservare originariamente o trasferire, mediante 
espropriazione e salvo indennizzo, alio Stato, ad enti pubblici o a comunita di 
lavoratori o di utenti determinate imprese o categorie di imprese, che si riferiscano a 
servizi pubblici essenziali o a fonti di energia o a situazioni di monopolio ed abbiano 
carattere di preminente interesse generale.
Debates:
25.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2139-2149 S3
26.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2151-2158 S3
27.09.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2159-2167 S3
27.09.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2169-2174 S3
30.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2175-2177 S3
01.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2179-2187 S3
01.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2189-2197 S3
02.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2199-2206 S3
02.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2207-2212 S3
03.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2213-2222 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
03.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2223-2227 S3
06,02.1947 Vol.I pp, lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol.I pp. 395-423 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
13.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1657-1682 CA
13.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1685-1714 CA
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Art. 44. (41)
Al fine di conseguire il razionale sfruttamento del suolo e di stabilire equi rapporti 
sociali, la legge impone obblighi e vincoli alia propriety terriera privata, fissa limiti 
alia sua estensione secondo le regioni e le zone agrarie, promuove ed impone la 
bonifica delle terre, la trasformazione del latifondo e la ricostituzione delle unitd 
produttive; aiuta la piccola e la media proprieta.
La legge dispone prowedimenti a favore delle zone montane.
Debates:
25.09.1946 Vol. "VIII pp. 2139-2149 S3
26.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2151-2158 S3
27.09.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2159-2167 S3
27.09.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2169-2174 S3
30.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2175-2177 S3
01.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2179-2187 S3
01.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2189-2197 S3
02.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2199-2206 S3
02.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2207-2212 S3
03.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2213-2222 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
03.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2223-2227 S3
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol.I pp. 395-423 CA
17.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 963-893 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
13.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1657-1682 CA
13.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1685-1714 CA
Art. 45. (42)
La Repubblica riconosce la funzione sociale della cooperazione a carattere di 
mutualita e senza fmi di speculazione privata. La legge ne promuove e favorisce 
l'incremento con i mezzi piu idonei e ne assicura, con gli opportuni controlli, il 
carattere e le finalitd.
La legge prowede alia tutela e alio sviluppo dell'artigianato.
Debates:
01.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2179-2187 S3
01.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2189-2197 S3
02.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2199-2206 S3
02.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2207-2212 S3
03.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2213-2222 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
03.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2223-2227 S3
04.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2229-2237 S3
04.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2239-2243 S3
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25.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 189-190 AP
28.01.1947 Vol. VI p. 206 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
11.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 313-339 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
14.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1715-1747 CA
Art. 46. (43)
Ai fini della elevazione economica e sociale del lavoro e in armonia con le esigenze 
della produzione la Repubblica riconosce il diritto dei Iavoratori a collaborare, nei 
modi e nei limiti stabiliti dalle leggi, alia gestione delle aziende.
Debates:
01.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2179-2187 S3
01.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2189-2197 S3
02.10.1946 am Vol. VIII pp. 2199-2206 S3
02.10.1946 pm Vol. VIII pp. 2207-2212 S3
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
16.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 549-562 SI
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
14.03.1947 pm Vol.I pp. 395-423 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
10.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1559-1580 CA
13.05.1947 am Vol. II pp. 1657-1682 CA
14.04.1947 Vol. II pp. 1715-1747 CA
Art. 47. (44)
La Repubblica incoraggia e tutela il risparmio in tutte le sue forme; disciplina, 
coordina e controlla l’esercizio del credito.
Favorisce l'accesso del risparmio popolare alia proprieta dell'abitazione, alia 
proprieta diretta coltivatrice e al diretto e indiretto investimento azionario nei grandi 
complessi produttivi del paese.
Debates:
03.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 481-490 SI
10.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 519-522 SI
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
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03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
10.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1581-1614 CA
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
TITOLO IV 
Rapporti Politici
Discussioni generali sui Rapporti Politici
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
21.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1829-1871 CA
A rt 48. (45)
Sono elettori tutti i cittadini, uomini e donne, che hanno raggiunto la maggiore eta. 
II voto e personale ed eguale, libero e segreto. II suo esercizio e dovere civico.
II diritto di voto non puo essere limitato se non per incapacita civile o per effetto di 
sentenza penale irrevocable o nei casi di indegnita morale indicati dalla legge.
Debates:
12.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 985-993 S2
13.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 995-1005 S2
14.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 677-684 SI
15.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 685-698 SI
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 203-230 CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363=1396 CA
06.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1429-1467 CA
07.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1472-1496 CA
08.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1497-1531 CA
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
21.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1829-1871 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
09.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3157-3186 CA
29.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3581-3590 CA
29.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3591-3634 CA
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Art. 49. (47)
Tutti i cittadini hanno diritto di associarsi liberamente in partiti per concorrere con 
metodo democratico a determinare la politica nazionale.
Debates:
15.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 685-698 SI
19.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 699-707 SI
20.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 709-715 SI
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 135-166 CA
11.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 341-358 CA
03.05.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1363-1396 CA
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
21.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1829=1871 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915=1947 CA
29.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3581-3590 CA
29.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3591-3634 CA
Art. 50. (46)
Tutti i cittadini possono rivolgere petizioni alle Camere per chiedere prowedimenti 
legislativi o esporre comuni necessita.
Debates:
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
24.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1235-1241 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
29.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 743-751 CA
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
21.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1829-1871 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
Art. 51. (48)
Tutti i cittadini dell’uno o dell'altro sesso possono accedere agli uffici pubblici e alle 
cariche elettive in condizioni di eguaglianza, secondo i requisiti stabiliti dalla legge. 
La legge puo, per l'ammissione ai pubblici uffici e alle cariche elettive, parificare ai 
cittadini gli italiani non appartenenti alia Repubblica.
Chi e chiamato a funzioni pubbliche elettive ha diritto di disporre del tempo 
necessario al loro adempimento e di conservare il suo posto di lavoro.
Debates:
20.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2127-2133 S3
15.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 685-698 SI
25.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 190-191 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
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05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
25.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 613-664 CA
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
21.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1829-1871 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
14.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3225-3238 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335-3366 CA
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3693-3716 CA
12.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3805-3832 CA
20.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3925-3963 CA
26.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4093-4113 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
A rt 52. (49)
La difesa della Patria e sacro dovere del cittadino.
II servizio militare e obbligatorio nei limiti e modi stabiliti dalla legge. II suo 
adempimento non pregiudica la posizione di lavoro del cittadino, nell’esercizio dei 
diritti politici.
L’ordinamento delle Forze armate si informa alio spirito democratico della 
Repubblica.
Debates:
15.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 685-698 SI
19.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 699-707 SI
25.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 191-192 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
21.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1829-1871 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335-3366 CA
21.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3387-3401 CA
03.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4319-4346 CA
A rt 53.
Tutti sono tenuti a concorrere alle spese pubbliche in ragione della loro capacita 
contributiva.
II sistema tributario e informato a criteri di progressive.
Debates:
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
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Art. 54. (50, 51)
Tutti i cittadini hanno il dovere di essere fedeli alia Repubblica e di osservame la 
Costituzione e le leggi. I cittadini cui sono affidate funzioni pubbliche hanno il 
dovere di adempierle con disciplina ed onore prestando giuramento nei casi stabiliti
dalla legge.
Debates:
15.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 685-698 SI
19.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 699-707 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 795-806 SI
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
07.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 233-257 CA
10.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 287-309 CA
21.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1073-1104 CA
19.05.1947 Vol. II pp. 1749-1790 CA
20.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1791-1827 CA
21.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1829-1871 CA
22.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1873-1914 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
14.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3225-3238 CA




10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
11.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
15.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2841-2850 CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
TITOLO I 
II Parlamento
Sezione I - Le Camere
Art. 55. (52)
II Parlamento si compone della Camera dei deputati e del Senato della Repubblica.




03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. vn pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
24.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1081-1091 S2
23.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1229-1233 S2
21.12.1946 vol. vn pp. 1621-1630 S2
22.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 137-138 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 233-257 CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
10.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 287-309 CA
11.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 341-358 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
23.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2975-2993 CA
10.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3187-3203 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
21.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3387-3401 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
Art. 56. (53, 54)
La Camera dei deputati e eletta a suffragio universale e diretto, in ragione di un 
deputato per ottantamila abitanti o per frazione superiore a quarantamila.
Sono eleggibili a deputati tutti gli elettori che nei giomo delle elezioni hanno 
compiuto i venticinque anni di et&.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
10.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 973-983 S2
12.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 985-993 S2
13.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 995-1005 S2
18.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1019-1033 S2
07.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1273-1276 S2
08.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1277-1284 S2
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27.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 193-196 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
12.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 341-358 CA
12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
23.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2975-2993 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
Art. 57. (55)
II Senato della Repubblica e eletto a base regionale. A ciascuna Regione e attribuito 
un senatore per duecentomila abitanti o per frazione superiore a centomila.
Nessuna Regione puo avere un numero di senatori inferiore a sei. La Valle d'Aosta 
ha un solo senatore.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
18.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1019-1033 S2
24.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1081-1091 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
26.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1109-1115 S2
27.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1117-1126 S2
28.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1127-1131 S2
01.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1133-1140 S2
02.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1141-1149 S2
03.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1151-1160 S2
10.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1161-1165 S2
15.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1167-1178 S2
16.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1179-1186 S2
22.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1219-1228 S2
05.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1262-1263 S2
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1859-1869 S2i
23.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1685-1695 S2
24.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1697-1705 S2
27.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 196-198 AP
29.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 215-226 AP
29.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 227-230 AP
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 247-251 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
06.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 203-230 CA
07.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 233-257 CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
12.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 341-358 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
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10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
11.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
15.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2841-2850 CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
24.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2997-3026 CA
25.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3029-3053 CA
07.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3083-3103 CA
08.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3105-3114 CA
08.10.1947 pm Vol. IV p p .3115-3143 CA
06.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4 4 5 3 - 4 4 7 2 CA
13.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4511-4522 CA
16.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4527-4529 CA
Art. 58. (55, 56)
I senatori sono eletti a suffragio universale e diretto dagli elettori che hanno superato 
il venticinquesimo anno di eta.
Sono eleggibili a senatori gli elettori che hanno compiuto il quarantesimo anno. 
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
27.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1117-1126 S2
28.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1127-1131 S2
01.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1133-1140 S2
02.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1141-1149 S2
03.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1151-1160 S2
10.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1161-1165 S2
15.10,1946 Vol. VII pp. 1167-1178 S2
16.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1179-1186 S2
17.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1187-1195 S2
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1859-1869 S2i
22.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1677-1683 S2
23.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1685-1695 S2
24.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1697-1705 S2
27.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 196-198 AP
29.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 215-226 AP
29.01.1941 Vol. VI pp. 227-230 AP
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 247-251 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
12.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 341-358 CA
11.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
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12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
23.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2975-2993 CA
24.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2997-3026 CA
25.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3029-3053 CA
07.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3083-3103 CA
08.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3105-3114 CA
08.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3115-3143 CA
09.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3157-3186 CA
Art. 59. (56)
E senatore di diritto e a vita, salvo rinunzia, chi e stato Presidente della Repubblica.
II Presidente della Repubblica puo nominare senatori a vita cinque cittadini che 
hanno illustrato la Patria per altissimi meriti nei campo sociale, scientifico, artistico e
letterario.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
11.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 313-339 CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
24.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2997-3026 CA
08.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3115-3143 CA
09.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3145-3155 CA
Art. 60. (58)
La Camera dei deputati e eletta per cinque anni, il Senato della Repubblica per sei.
La durata di ciascuna Camera non puo essere prorogata se non per legge e soltanto in 
caso di guerra.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. v n pp. 959-971 S2
13.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 995-1005 S2
20.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1051-1067 S2
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25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
27.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1117-1126 S2
15.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1167-1178 S2
22.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1219-1228 S2
23.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1229-1233 S2
06.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1265-1272 S2
27.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 196-198 AP
27.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 198-201 AP
29.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 215-226 AP
29.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 227-230 AP
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 247-251 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
15.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2841-2850 CA
09.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3157-3186 CA
Art. 61. (58)
Le elezioni delle nuove Camere hanno luogo entro settanta giomi dalla fine delle 
precedenti. La prima riunione ha luogo non oltre il ventesimo giomo dalle elezioni. 
Finche non siano riunite le nuove Camere sono prorogati i poteri delle precedenti.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
20.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1051-1067 S2
06.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1265-1272 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 287-309 CA
15.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2841-2850 CA
09.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3157-3186 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
12.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4485-4496 CA
12.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4497-4508 CA
20.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4543-4558 CA
Art. 62. (59)
Le Camere si riuniscono di diritto il primo giomo non festivo di febbraio e di ottobre. 
Ciascuna Camera puo essere convocata in via straordinaria per iniziativa del suo 
Presidente o del Presidente della Repubblica o di un terzo dei suoi componenti. 




03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
20.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1051-1067 S2
23.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1229-1233 S2
06.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1265-1272 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
09.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3157-3186 CA
10.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3187-3203 CA
12.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4485-4496 CA
Art. 63. (60)
Ciascuna Camera elegge fra i suoi componenti il Presidente e l'Ufflcio di presidenza. 
Quando il Parlamento si riunisce in seduta comune, il Presidente e ITJfficio di 
presidenza sono quelli della Camera dei deputati.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
20.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1051-1067 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
10.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3187-3203 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
Art. 64. (61)
Ciascuna Camera adotta il proprio regolamento a maggioranza assoluta dei suoi 
componenti.
Le sedute sono pubbliche; tuttavia ciascuna delle due Camere e il Parlamento a 
Camere riunite possono deliberare di adunarsi in seduta segreta.
Le deliberazioni di ciascuna Camera e del Parlamento non sono valide se non e 
presente la maggioranza dei loro componenti, e se non sono adottate a maggioranza 
dei presenti, salvo che la Costituzione prescriva una maggioranza speciale.
I membri del Govemo, anche se non fanno parte delle Camere, hanno diritto, e se 
richiesti obbligo, di assistere alle sedute. Devono essere sentiti ogni volta che lo 
richiedono.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
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05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
20.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1051-1067 S2
24.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1235-1241 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
10.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3187-3203 CA
24.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3511-3524 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
Art. 65. (62)
La legge determina i casi di ineleggibilita e di incompatibility con l'ufficio di 
deputato o di senatore.
Nessuno puo appartenere contemporaneamente alle due Camere.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
13.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 995-1005 S2
18.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1019-1033 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
02.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1141-1149 S2
10.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1161-1165 S2
15.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1167-1178 S2
16.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1179-1186 S2
17.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1187-1195 S2
18.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1197-1210 S2
19.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1211-1218 S2
24.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1235-1241 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3187-3203 CA
Art. 66. (57, 63)
Ciascuna Camera giudica dei titoli di ammissione dei suoi componenti e delle cause 
sopraggiunte di ineleggibilita e di incompatibility.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
19.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1035-1049 S2
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25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
15.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1167-1178 S2
16.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1179-1186 S2
17.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1187-1195 S2
19.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1211-1218 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
09.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3157-3186 CA
10.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3187-3203 CA
10.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3205-3221 CA
Art. 67. (64)
Ogni membro del Parlamento rappresenta la Nazione ed esercita le sue funzioni 
senza vincolo di mandato.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
19.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1035-1049 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
10.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3205-3221 CA
Art. 68. (65)
I membri del Parlamento non possono essere perseguiti per le opinioni espresse e i 
voti dati nell'esercizio delle loro funzioni.
Senza autorizzazione della Camera alia quale appartiene, nessun membro del 
Parlamento puo essere sottoposto a procedimento penale; ne puo essere arrestato, o 
altrimenti privato della liberta personale, o sottoposto a perquisizione personale o 
domiciliare, salvo che sia colto nell'atto di commettere un delitto per il quale e 
obbligatorio il mandato o fordine di cattura.
Eguale autorizzazione e richiesta per trarre in arresto o mantenere in detenzione un 
membro del Parlamento in esecuzione di una sentenza anche irrevocabile.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
19.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1035-1049 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3205-3221 CA
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A r t  69. (66)
I membri del Parlamento ricevono una indennita stabilita dalla legge. 
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
07.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 959-971 S2
20.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1051-1067 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3205-3221 CA
Sezioite II - La formazione delle leggi 
Art. 70. (67)
La funzione legislativa e esercitata collettivamente dalle due Camere. 
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
21.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1069-1080 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
26.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1109-1115 S2
27.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1117-1126 S2
02.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1141-1149 S2
03.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1151-1160 S2
15.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1167-1178 S2
23.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1229-1233 S2
25.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1243-1249 S2
06.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1265-1272 S2
12.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1291-1298 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1631-1639 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
14.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3225-3238 CA
16.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3295-3309 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335-3366 CA
23.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3489-3509 CA
Art. 71. (68)
L'iniziativa delle leggi appartiene al Govemo, a ciascun membro delle Camere ed 
agli organi ed enti ai quail sia conferita da legge costituzionale.
II popolo esercita l'iniziativa delle leggi, mediante la proposta, da parte di almeno 
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Art. 72. (69, 70)
Ogni disegno di legge, presentato ad una Camera secondo le norme del suo 
regolamento, esaminato da una commissione e poi dalla Camera stessa, che l’approva 
articolo per articolo e con votazione finale.
II regolamento stabilisce procedimenti abbreviati per i disegni di legge dei quali d 
dichiarata l’urgenza.
Puo altresi stabilire in quali casi e forme l'esame e l'approvazione dei disegni di legge 
sono deferiti a commissioni, anche permanenti, composte in modo da rispecchiare la 
proporzione dei gruppi parlamentari. Anche in tali casi, fino al momento della sua 
approvazione definitiva, il disegno di legge e rimesso alia Camera, se il Govemo o 
un decimo dei componenti della Camera o un quinto della commissione richiedono 
che sia discusso e votato dalla Camera stessa oppure che sia sottoposto alia sua 
approvazione finale con sole dichiarazioni di voto. II regolamento determina le forme 
di pubblicM dei lavori delle commissioni.
La procedura normale di esame e di approvazione diretta da parte della Camera e 
sempre adottata per i disegni di legge in materia costituzionale ed elettorale e per 
quelli di delegazione legislativa, di autorizzazione a ratificare trattati intemazionali, 
di approvazione di bilanci e consuntivi.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. V I pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. V I pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. V I pp. 925-944 S2
21.09.1946 Vol. V I pp. 1069-1080 S2
24.10.1946 Vol. V I pp. 1235-1241 S2
25.10.1946 Vol. V I pp. 1243-1249 S2
26.10.1946 Vol. V I pp. 1251-1256 S2
06.11.1946 Vol. V I pp. 1265-1272 S2
08.11.1946 Vol. V I pp. 1277-1284 S2
09.11.1946 Vol. V I pp. 1285-1290 S2
12.11.1946 Vol. V I pp. 1291-1298 S2
28.01.1947 Vol. V pp. 206-213 AP
29.01.1947 Vol. V pp. 231-233 AP
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06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 287-309 CA
12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
14.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3239-3257 CA
15.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3259-3261 CA
15.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3263-3294 CA
16.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3295-3309 CA
Art. 73. (71)
Le leggi sono promulgate dai Presidente della Repubblica entro un mese 
dall'approvazione.
Se le Camere, ciascuna a maggioranza assoluta dei propri componenti, ne dichiarano 
l'urgenza, la legge 6 promulgata nei termine da essa stabilito.
Le leggi sono pubblicate subito dopo la promulgazione ed entrano in vigore il 
quindicesimo giomo successivo alia loro pubblicazione, salvo che le leggi stesse 
stabiliscano un termine diverso.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
21.09.1946 Vol.VII pp. 1069-1080 S2
26.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1251-1256 S2
08.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1277-1284 S2
09.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1285-1290 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1631-1639 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
12.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 341-358 CA
16.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3295-3309 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
23.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3469-3488 CA
23.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3489-3509 CA
29.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4259-4273 CA
03.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4305-4317 CA
Art. 74. (70)
II Presidente della Repubblica, prima di promulgare la legge, puo con messaggio 
motivato alle Camere chiedere una nuova deliberazione.
Se le Camere approvano nuovamente la legge, questa deve essere promulgata.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
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26.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1251-1256 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1631-1639 S2
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
14.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3225-3238 CA
15.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3263-3294 CA
16.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3295-3309 CA
23.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3469-3488 CA
03.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4319-4346 CA
A rt 75. (70, 72, 73)
E indetto referendum popolare per deliberare l’abrogazione, totale o parziale, di una 
legge o di un atto avente valore di legge, quando Io richiedono cinquecentomila 
elettori o cinque Consigli regionali.
Non 6 ammesso il referendum per le leggi tributarie e di bilancio, di amnistia e di 
indulto, di autorizzazione a ratificare trattati intemazionali.
Hanno diritto di partecipare al referendum tutti i cittadini chiamati ad eleggere la 
Camera dei deputati.
La proposta soggetta a referendum e approvata se ha partecipato alia votazione la 
maggioranza degli aventi diritto, e se e raggiunta la maggioranza dei voti 
validamente espressi.
La legge determina le modalita di attuazione del referendum.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VTI pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
24.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1235-1241 S2
26.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1251-1256 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1631-1639 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1641-1650 S2
18.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1651-1657 S2
20.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1659-1668 S2
21.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1669-1676 S2
22.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1677-1683 S2
29.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 231-233 AP
06.02.1947 Vol.I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 167-200 CA
08.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 259-285 CA
10.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 287-309 CA
11.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 313-339 CA
13.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 359-391 CA
20.03.1947 Vol.I pp. 503-536 CA
11.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
14.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3225-3238 CA
15.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3263-3294 CA
16.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3295-3309 CA
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16.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3311-3333 CA
21.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3387-3401 CA
23.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3469-3488 CA
29.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4259-4273 CA
03.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4305-4317 CA
03.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4319-4346 CA
Art. 76. (74)
L'esercizio della funzione legislativa non pud essere delegato al Govemo se non con
determinazione di principi e criteri direttivi e soltanto per tempo Iimitato e per
oggetti defmiti.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
09.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1285-1290 S2
12.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1291-1298 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
11.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2595-2620 CA
10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
16.10,1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3311-3333 CA
28.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4201-4219 CA
Art. 77.
11 Govemo non puo, senza delegazione delle Camere, emanare decreti che abbiano
valore di legge ordinaria.
Quando, in casi straordinari di necessita e di urgenza, il Govemo adotta, sotto la sua 
responsabilita, prowedimenti prowisori con la forza di legge, deve il giomo stesso 
presentarli per la conversione alle Camere che, anche se sciolte, sono appositamente 
convocate e si riuniscono entro cinque giomi.
I decreti perdono efficacia sin dall'inizio, se non sono convertiti in legge entro 
sessanta giomi dalla loro pubblicazione. Le Camere possono tuttavia regolare con 
legge i rapporti giuridici sorti sulla base dei decreti non convertiti.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05,09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
21.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1069-1080 S2
06.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1265-1272 S2
09.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1285-1290 S2
12.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1291-1298 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
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11.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
16.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3311-3333 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335-3366 CA
12.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4485-4496 CA
Art. 78. (75)
Le Camere deliberano lo stato di guerra e conferiscono al Govemo i poteri necessari. 
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
26.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1109-1115 S2
02.10.1946 Vol. VI pp.478-480 SI
06.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1265-1272 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335-3366 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
21.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3387-3401 CA
21.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3403-3427 CA
03.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4319-4346 CA
Art. 79. (75)
L'amnistia e l'indulto sono concessi dal Presidente della Repubblica su legge di 
delegazione delle Camere.
Non possono applicarsi ai reati commessi successivamente alia proposta di 
delegazione.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
26.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1109-1115 S2
29.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 233-237 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
16.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2853-2877 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335-3366 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
21.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3387-3401 CA
21.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3403-3427 CA
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Art. 80. (76)
Le Camere autorizzano con legge la ratifica dei trattati intemazionali che sono di 
natura politica, o prevedono arbitrati o regolamenti giudiziari, o importano variazioni 
del territorio od oneri alle finanze o modificazioni di leggi.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
23.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1229-1233 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
25.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 613-664 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335*3366 CA
Art. 81. (77)
Le Camere approvano ogni anno i bilanci e il rendiconto consuntivo presentati dal 
Govemo.
L'esercizio provvisorio del bilancio non pud essere concesso se non per legge e per 
periodi non superiori complessivamente a quattro mesi.
Con la legge di approvazione del bilancio non si possono stabilire nuovi tributi e 
nuove spese.
Ogni altra legge che importi nuove o maggiori spese deve indicare i mezzi per farvi 
fronte.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
24.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1081-1091 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
26.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1109-1115 S2
23.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1229-1233 S2
24.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1235-1241 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335-3366 CA
A rt 82. (78)
Ciascuna Camera puo disporre inchieste su materie di pubblico interesse.
A tale scopo nomina fra i propri componenti una commissione formata in modo da 
rispecchiare la proporzione dei vari gmppi. La commissione di inchiesta procede alle 




03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
20.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1051-1067 S2
21.09.1946 Vol.VII pp. 1069-1080 S2
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3187-3203 CA
17.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3335-3366 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
TITOLO II 
I] Presidente della Repubblica 
Art. 83. (79)
II Presidente della Repubblica e eletto dal Parlamento in seduta comune dei suoi 
membri.
All'elezione partecipano tre delegati per ogni Regione eletti dal Consiglio regionale 
in modo che sia assicurata la rappresentanza delle minoranze. La Valle d'Aosta ha un 
solo delegato.
L'elezione del Presidente della Repubblica ha luogo per scrutinio segreto a 
maggioranza di due terzi della assemblea. Dopo il terzo scrutinio e sufficiente la 
maggioranza assoluta.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1739-1749 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
15.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2841-2850 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
21.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3403-3427 CA
22.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3429-3436 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
23.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3489-3509 CA
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Art. 84. (80)
Pud essere eletto Presidente della Repubblica ogni cittadino che abbia compiuto 
cinquanta anni di eta e goda dei diritti civili e politici.
L'ufficio di Presidente della Repubblica e incompatibile con qualsiasi altra carica. 
L'assegno e la dotazione del Presidente sono determinati per legge.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1739-1749 S2i
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1751-1761 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
Art. 85. (81)
II Presidente della Repubblica e eletto per sette anni.
Trenta giomi prima che scada il termine, il Presidente della Camera dei deputati 
convoca in seduta comune il Parlamento e i delegati regionali, per eleggere il nuovo 
Presidente della Repubblica.
Se le Camere sono sciolte, o manca meno di tre mesi alia loro cessazione, la elezione 
ha luogo entro quindici giomi dalla riunione delle Camere nuove. Nel frattempo sono 
prorogati i poteri del Presidente in carica.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1739-1749 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
Art. 86. (82)
Le funzioni del Presidente della Repubblica, in ogni caso che egli non possa 
adempierle, sono esercitate dal Presidente del Senato.
In caso di impedimento permanente o di morte o di dimissioni del Presidente della 
Repubblica, il Presidente della Camera dei deputati indice la elezione del nuovo 
Presidente della Repubblica entro quindici giomi, salvo il maggior termine previsto 
se le Camere sono sciolte o manca meno di tre mesi alia loro cessazione.
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Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1739-1749 S2i
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1751-1761 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
29.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 230-231 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
Art. 87. (83)
II Presidente della Repubblica e il capo dello Stato e rappresenta l'unita nazionale. 
Puo inviare messaggi alle Camere.
Indice le elezioni delle nuove Camere e ne fissa la prima riunione.
Autorizza la presentazione alle Camere dei disegni di legge di iniziativa del 
Govemo.
Promulga le leggi ed emana i decreti aventi valore di legge e i regolamenti.
Indice il referendum popolare nei casi previsti dalla Costituzione.
Nomina, nei casi indicati dalla legge, i funzionari dello Stato.
Accredita e riceve i rappresentanti diplomatici, ratifica i trattati intemazionali, 
previa, quando occorra, l'autorizzazione delle Camere.
Ha il comando delle Forze armate, presiede il Consiglio supremo di difesa costituito 
secondo la legge, dichiara lo stato di guerra deliberato dalle Camere.
Presiede il Consiglio superiore della magistratura.
Pub concedere grazia e commutate le pene.
Conferisce le onorificenze della Repubblica.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1751-1761 S2i
21.12.194 6 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
04.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1763-1767 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
11.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
16.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3295-3309 CA
21.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3387-3401 CA
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22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV
23.10.1947 am Vol. IV
23.10.1947 pm Vol. IV






II Presidente della Repubblica puo, sentiti i loro Presidenti, sciogliere le Camere o 
anche una sola di esse.
Non puo esercitare tali facolta negli ultimi sei mesi del suo mandato.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
06.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1265-1272 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1631-1639 S2
04.01.1947 am Vol. VIII pp. 1763-1767 S2i
04.01.1947 pm Vol. VIII pp. 1769-1778 S2i
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1837-1842 S2i
13.01.1947 pm Vol. VIII pp. 1849-1857 S2i
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1859-1869 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
11.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
21.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3403-3427 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
23.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3469-3488 CA
23.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3489-3509 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
Art. 89. (85)
Nessun atto del Presidente della Repubblica e valido se non e controfirmato dai 
ministri proponenti, che ne assumono la responsabilita.
Gli atti che hanno valore legislativo e gli altri indicati dalla legge sono controfirmati 
anche dal Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
04.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1769-1778 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
11.09.1947 pm Vo], IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
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19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
21.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3403-3427 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
23.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3489-3509 CA
03.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4305-4317 CA
Art. 90. (85)
II Presidente della Repubblica non e responsabile degli atti compiuti nell'esercizio 
delle sue funzioni, tranne che per alto tradimento o per attentato alia Costituzione. 
In tali casi e messo in stato di accusa dal Parlamento in seduta comune, a 
maggioranza assoluta dei suoi membri.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
04.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1769-1778 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
11.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2781-2804 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
23.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3489-3509 CA
24.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3511-3524 CA
Art. 91.
II Presidente della Repubblica, prima di assumere le sue funzioni, presta giuramento 
di fedelta alia Repubblica e di osservanza della Costituzione dinanzi al Parlamento in 
seduta comune.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 911-923 S2
05.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 925-944 S2
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1739-1749 S2i
21.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 131-136 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
14.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3225-3238 CA




Sezione I - H Consiglio dei ministri 
A rt 92. (86)
II Govemo della Repubblica e composto del Presidente del Consiglio e dei ministri, 
che costituiscono insieme il Consiglio dei ministri.
II Presidente della Repubblica nomina il Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri e, su
proposta di questo, i ministri.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1769-1778 S2i
08.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1797-1803 S2i
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1805-1816 S2i
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1823-1835 S2i
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
23.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3469-3488 CA
23.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3489-3509 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
A rt 93. (86-bis)
II Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri e i ministri, prima di assumere le funzioni, 
prestano giuramento nelle mani del Presidente della Repubblica.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
25.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3567-3575 CA
Art. 94. (87, 88)
II Govemo deve avere la fiducia delle due Camere.
Ciascuna Camera accorda o revoca la fiducia mediante mozione motivata e votata 
per appello nominale.
Entro dieci giomi dalla sua formazione il Govemo si presenta alle Camere per 
ottenere la fiducia.
II voto contrario di una o d'entrambe le Camere su una proposta del Govemo non 
importa obbligo di dimissioni.
La mozione di sfiducia deve essere firmata da almeno un decimo dei componenti 




03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
06.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1265-1272 S2
04.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1769-1778 S2i
07.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1785-1788 S2i
08.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1789-1795 S2i
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1805-1816 S2i
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1817-1822 S2i
13.01.1947am Vol. VIII pp. 1843-1848 S2i
13.01.1947pm Vol. VIII pp. 1849-1857 S2i
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
12.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2805-2837 CA
17.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2881-2907 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
23.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3469-3488 CA
24.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3511-3524 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
Art. 95. (89)
II Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri dirige la politica generale del Govemo e n e e  
responsabile. Mantiene l’unita di indirizzo politico ed amministrativo, promuovendo 
e coordinando l'attivita dei ministri.
I ministri sono responsabili collegialmente degli atti del Consiglio dei ministri, e 
individualmente degli atti dei loro dicasteri.
La legge prowede all'ordinamento della Presidenza del Consiglio e determina il 
numero, le attribuzioni e l'organizzazione dei ministeri.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
04.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1769-1778 S2i
07.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1779-1784 S2i
08.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1797-1803 S2i
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1805-1816 S2i
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1823-1835 S2i
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
12.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3805-3832 CA
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Art. 96. (90)
II Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri e i ministri sono posti in stato d'accusa dal 
Parlamento in seduta comune per reati commessi nell’esercizio delle loro funzioni.
Debates:
03.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 895-909 S2
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1837-1842 S2i
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
10.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 287-309 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
Sezione II - La Pubblica Amministrazione 
Art. 97. (91)
I pubblici uffici sono organizzati secondo disposizioni di legge, in modo che siano 
assicurati il buon andamento e fimparzialita deHfamministrazione.
Nell'ordinamento degli uffici sono determinate le sfere di competenza, le attribuzioni 
e le responsabilit& proprie dei funzionari.
Agli impieghi nelle pubbliche amministrazioni si accede mediante concorso, salvo i 
casi stabiliti dalla legge.
Debates:
30.07.1946 Vol. VII p. 855 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
13.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 995-1005 S2
20.09.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 2127-2133 S3
25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
27.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1117-1126 S2
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1983-1990 S2ii
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1859-1869 S2i
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
Art. 98. (91, 94)
I pubblici impiegati sono al servizio esclusivo della Nazione.
Se sono membri del Parlamento, non possono conseguire promozioni se non per 
anzianita.
Si possono con legge stabilire limitazioni al diritto d'iscriversi ai partiti politici per i 
magistrati, i militari di camera in servizio attivo, i funzionari ed agenti di polizia, i 
rappresentanti diplomatici e consolari all estero.
Debates:
30.07.1946 Vol. VII p. 855 S2
06.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 945-958 S2
13.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 995-1005 S2
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25.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1093-1107 S2
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1961-1966 S2ii
08.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1967-1974 S2ii
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1983-1990 S2ii
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1859-1869 S2i
15.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1871-1879 S2i
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
24.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3525-3565 CA
13.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3833-3853 CA
14.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3873-3894 CA
20.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3925-3963 CA
05.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4401-4415 CA
Sezione HI - Gli organi ausiliari 
Art. 99. (92)
II Consiglio nazionale dell'economia e del lavoro e composto, nei modi stabiliti dalla 
legge, di esperti e di rappresentanti delle categorie produttive, in misura che tenga 
conto della loro importanza numerica e qualitativa.
E organo di consulenza delle Camere e del Govemo per le materie e secondo le 
funzioni che gli sono attribuite dalla legge.
Ha l'iniziativa legislativa e puo contribuire alia elaborazione della legislazione 
economica e sociale secondo i principi ed entro i limiti stabiliti dalla legge.
Debates:
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1751-1761 S2i
28.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1719-1726 S2
30.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1727-1736 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
25.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3567-3575 CA
Art. 100. (93)
II Consiglio di Stato e organo di consulenza giuridico-amministrativa e di tutela della 
giustizia nelfamministrazione.
La Corte dei Conti esercita il controllo preventivo di legittimita sugli atti del 
Govemo, e anche quello successivo sulla gestione del bilancio dello Stato. Partecipa, 
nei casi e nelle forme stabiliti dalla legge, al controllo sulla gestione fmanziaria degli 
enti a cui lo Stato contribuisce in via ordinaria. Riferisce direttamente alle Camere 
sul risultato del riscontro eseguito.
La legge assicura l'indipendenza dei due istituti e dei loro componenti di fronte al 
Govemo.
Debates:
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1751-1761 S2i
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2005-2012 S2ii
27.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1707-1717 S2
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30.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1727-1736 S2
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
25.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3567-3575 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
20.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3925-3963 CA




23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
06.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3659-3680 CA
07.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3681-3692 CA
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3693-3716 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
11.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3743-3756 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
12.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3789-3803 CA
12.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3805-3832 CA
13.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3833-3853 CA
14.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3857-3871 CA
14.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3873-3894 CA
15.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3895-3919 CA
20.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3925-3963 CA
Sezione I - Ordinamento giurisdizionale 
Art. 101. (94)
La giustizia e amministrata in nome del popolo.
I giudici sono soggetti soltanto alia legge.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S 2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
12.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1903-1911 S2ii
13.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1913-1920 S2ii
17.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1929-1934 S2ii
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1941-1950 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
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21.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 537-561 CA
06.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3659-3680 CA
07.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3681-3692 CA
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3693-3716 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
11.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3743-3756 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
12.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3789-3803 CA
12.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3805-3832 CA
13.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3833-3853 CA
20.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3925-3963 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
26.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4093-4113 CA
Art. 102. (95, 96)
La funzione giurisdizionale e esercitata da magistrati ordinari istituiti e regolati dalle 
norme suirordinamento giudiziario.
Non possono essere istituiti giudici straordinari o giudici speciali. Possono soltanto 
istituirsi presso gli organi giudiziari ordinari sezioni specializzate per determinate 
materie, anche con la partecipazione di cittadini idonei estranei alia magistratura.
La legge regola i casi e le forme della partecipazione diretta del popolo 
all'amministrazione della giustizia.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
13.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1913-1920 S2ii
14.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1921-1927 S2ii
17.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1929-1934 S2ii
18.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1935-1940 S2ii
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1941-1950 S2ii
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1951-1959 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
27.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2067-2069 S2ii
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 251-256 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
06.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3659-3680 CA
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3693-3716 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
11.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3743-3756 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
12.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3789-3803 CA
12.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3805-3832 CA
13.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3833-3853 CA
14.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3857-3871 CA
15.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3895-3919 CA
20.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3925-3963 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
22.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3997-4005 CA
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24.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4007-4021 CA
24.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4023-4041 CA
27.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4141-4156 CA
27.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4157-4199 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 . 4 4 5 2 CA
Art. 103. (95)
II Consiglio di Stato e gli altri organi di giustizia amministrativa hanno giurisdizione 
per la tutela nei confronti della pubblica amministrazione degli interessi Iegittimi e, 
in particolari materie indicate dalla legge, anche dei diritti soggettivi.
La Corte dei Conti ha giurisdizione nelle materie di contabilit& pubblica e nelle altre 
specificate dalla legge.
I tribunali militari in tempo di guerra hanno la giurisdizione stabilita dalla legge. In 
tempo di pace hanno giurisdizione soltanto per i reati militari commessi da 
appartenenti alle Forme armate.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
12.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1903-1911 S2ii
17.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1929-1934 S2ii
18.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1935-1940 S2ii
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1941-1950 S2ii
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1983-1990 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2005-2012 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
18.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2911-2931 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
11.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3743-3756 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
13.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3833-3853 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
22.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3997-4005 CA
27.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4157-4199 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 - 4 4 5 2 CA
Art. 104. (97)
La magistratura costituisce un ordine autonomo e indipendente da ogni altro potere. 
II Consiglio superiore della magistratura e presieduto dal Presidente della 
Repubblica.
Ne fanno parte di diritto il primo presidente e il procuratore generale della Corte di 
cassazione.
Gli altri componenti sono eletti per due terzi da tutti i magistrati ordinari tra gli 
appartenenti alle varie categorie, e per un terzo dal Parlamento in seduta comune tra 
professori ordinari di universita in materie giuridiche ed awocati dopo quindici anni 
di esercizio.
II Consiglio elegge un vicepresidente fra i componenti designati dal Parlamento.
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I membri elettivi del Consiglio durano in carica quattro anni e non sono 
immediatamente rieleggibili.
Non possono, finche sono in carica, essere iscritti negli albi professional, ne far 
parte del Parlamento o di un Consiglio regionale.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
18.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1935-1940 S2ii
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1961-1966 S2ii
08.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1967-1974 S2ii
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1975-1981 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2005-2012 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 256-259 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
22.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3437-3468 CA
06.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3659-3680 CA
07.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3681-3692 CA
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3693-3716 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
11.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3743-3756 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
12.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3805-3832 CA
13.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3833-3853 CA
14.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3857-3871 CA
14.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3873-3894 CA
20.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3925-3963 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
24.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4023-4041 CA
25.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4043-4067 CA
25.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4069-4091 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
Art. 105. (97)
Spettano al Consiglio superiore della magistratura, secondo le norme 
delfordinamento giudiziario, le assunzioni, le assegnazioni ed i trasferimenti, le 
promozioni e i prowedimenti disciplinari nei riguardi dei magistrati.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
08.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1967-1974 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
30.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 239-246 AP
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06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
11.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3743-3756 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
25.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4069-4091 CA
A r t  106. (98)
Le nomine dei magistrati hanno luogo per concorso.
La legge sulFordinamento giudiziario puo ammettere la nomina, anche elettiva, di 
magistrati onorari per tutte le funzioni attribuite a giudici singoli.
Su designazione del Consiglio superiore della magistratura possono essere chiamati 
all'ufficio di consiglieri di cassazione, per meriti insigni, professori ordinari di 
universita in materie giuridiche e awocati che abbiano quindici anni d'esercizio e 
siano iscritti negli albi speciali per le giurisdizioni superiori.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
18.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1935-1940 S2ii
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1941-1950 S2ii
08.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1967-1974 S2ii
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1983-1990 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1991-2003 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 261-264 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
20.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3925-3963 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
26.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4093-4113 CA
03.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4305-4317 CA
A r t 107. (99)
I magistrati sono inamovibili. Non possono essere dispensati o sospesi dal servizio 
ne destinati ad altre sedi o funzioni se non in seguito a decisione del Consiglio 
superiore della magistratura, adottata o per i motivi e con le garanzie di difesa 
stabilite dalfordinamento giudiziario o con il loro consenso.
II Ministro della giustizia ha facolta di promuovere l'azione disciplinare.
I magistrati si distinguono fra loro soltanto per diversita di funzioni.
II pubblico ministero gode delle garanzie stabilite nei suoi riguardi dalle norme 
sull'ordinamento giudiziario.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1941-1950 S2ii
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10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1991-2003 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2005-2012 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
07.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3681-3692 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
14.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3873-3894 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
26.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4093-4113 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
27.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4157-4199 CA
Art. 108.
Le norme sull'ordinamento giudiziario e su ogni magistratura sono stabilite con 
legge.
La legge assicura l’indipendenza dei giudici delle giurisdizioni speciali, del pubblico 
ministero presso di esse, e degli estranei che partecipano all’amministrazione della 
giustizia.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
17.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1929-1934 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1991-2003 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2005-2012 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
06.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3659-3680 CA
26.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4093-4113 CA
Art. 109. (100)
L'autorita giudiziaria dispone direttamente della polizia giudiziaria.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VTII pp. 1991-2003 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2005-2012 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3693-3716 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
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Art. 110.
Ferme le competenze del Consiglio superiore della magistratura, spettano al Ministro 
della giustizia I'organizzazione e il funzionamento dei servizi relativi alia giustizia.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
Sezione II - Norme sulla giurisdizione 
Art. 111.(101, 102)
Tutti i prowedimenti giurisdizionali devono essere motivati.
Contro le sentenze e contro i prowedimenti sulla liberta personale, pronunciati dagli 
organi giurisdizionali ordinari o speciali, e sempre ammesso ricorso in Cassazione 
per violazione di legge. Si pu6 derogare a tale norma soltanto per le sentenze dei 
tribunali militari in tempo di guerra.
Contro le decisioni del Consiglio di Stato e della Corte dei Conti il ricorso in 
Cassazione e ammesso per i soli motivi inerenti alia giurisdizione.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
13.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1913-1920 S2ii
14.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1921-1927 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
12.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3789-3803 CA
12.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3805-3832 CA
13.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3833-3853 CA
15.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3895-3919 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
24.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4023-4041 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
27.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4141-4156 CA
27.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4157-4199 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
Art. 112.(101)
II pubblico ministero ha l'obbligo di esercitare l'azione penale.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1991-2003 S2ii
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11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
27.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4141-4156 CA
22.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4579-4595 CA
Art. 113.(103)
Contro gli atti della pubblica amministrazione e sempre ammessa la tutela 
giurisdizionale dei diritti e degli interessi legittimi dinanzi agli organi di 
giurisdizione ordinaria o amministrativa.
Tale tutela giurisdizionale non pu6 essere esclusa o limitata a particolari mezzi di 
impugnazione o per determinate categorie di atti.
La legge determina quali organi di giurisdizione possono annullare gli atti della 
pubblica amministrazione nei casi e con gli effetti previsti dalla legge stessa.
Debates:
05.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1889-1897 S2ii
06.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1899-1902 S2ii
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1941-1950 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2005-2012 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
15.04.1947 am Vol. I pp. 887-911 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
26.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4115-4139 CA
27.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4157-4199 CA
22.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4579-4595 CA
TITOLO V 
Le Regioni, le Provincie, i Comuni 
Discussioni Generali
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
27.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1949-1983 CA
28.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1985-2019 CA
29.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2019-2057 CA
30.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2059-2088 CA
31.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2089-2101 CA
03.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2103-2136 CA
04.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2137-2152 CA
04.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2153-2177 CA
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2179-2201 CA
06.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2203-2238 CA
07.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2239-2268 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
12.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2297-2316 CA
13.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2321-2344 CA
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Art. 114. (107)
La Repubblica si riparte in Regioni, Provincie e Comuni. 
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 267-272 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
11.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 313-339 CA
21.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 537-561 CA
27.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1949-1983 CA
03.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2103-2136 CA
04.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2137-2152 CA
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2179-2201 CA
06.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2203-2238 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
09.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3157-3186 CA
Art. 115.(108)
Le Regioni sono costituite in enti autonomi con propri poteri e funzioni secondo i 
principi fissati nella Costituzione.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
31.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2089-2101 CA
12.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2297-2316 CA
13.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2321-2344 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
01.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2443-2468 CA
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19.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 2935-2970 CA
Art. 116.(108)
Alla Sicilia, alia Sardegna, al Trentino-Alto Adige, al Friuli-Venezia Giulia e alia 
Valle dAosta sono attribuite forme e condizioni particolari di autonomia, secondo 
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Art. 117.(109, 110, 111)
La Regione emana per le seguenti materie norme legislative nei limiti dei principi 
fondamentali stabiliti dalle leggi dello Stato, sempreche le norme stesse non siano in 
contrasto con l'interesse nazionale e con quello di altre Regioni:
* ordinamento degli uffici e degli enti amministrativi dipendenti dalla Regione;
* circoscrizioni comunali;
* polizia locale urbana e rurale;
* fiere e mercati;
* beneficenza pubblica ed assistenza sanitaria ed ospedaliera;
* istruzione artigiana e professional e assistenza scolastica;
* musei e biblioteche di enti locali;
* urbanistica;
* turismo e industria alberghiera;
* tramvie e linee automobilistiche d'interesse regionale;
* viabilita, acquedotti e lavori pubblici di interesse regionale;
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* navigazione e porti lacuali;
* acque minerali e termali;
* cave e torbiere;
* caccia;
* pesca nelle acque interne;
* agricoltura e foreste;
* artigianato;
* altre materie indicate da leggi costituzionali.
Le leggi della Repubblica possono demandare alia Regione il potere di emanare 
norme per la loro attuazione.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
01.02.1947 Vol. VI pp. 275-276 AP
01.02.1947 Vol. VI p. 277 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
22.04.1947 pm Vol. II pp. 1117-1153 CA
28.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1985-2018 CA
29.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2019-2057 CA
31.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2089-2101 CA
03.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2103-2136 CA
04.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2137-2152 CA
04.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2153-2177 CA
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2179-2201 CA
06.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2203-2238 CA
07.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2239-2268 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
12.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2297-2316 CA
13.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2321-2344 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
01.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2443-2468 CA
02.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2471-2485 CA
03.07.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2487-2495 CA
04.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2499-2524 CA
08.07.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2529-2550 CA
09.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2553-2571 CA
10.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2575-2591 CA
11.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2595-2620 CA
16.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2665-2680 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
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Art. 118.(112)
Spettano alia Regione le funzioni amministrative per le materie elencate nei 
precedente articolo, salvo quelle di interesse esclusivamente locale, che possono 
essere attribuite dalle leggi della Repubblica alle Provincie, ai Comuni o ad altri enti 
locali. Lo Stato pud con legge delegare alia Regione l'esercizio di altre funzioni 
amministrative.
La Regione esercita normalmente le sue funzioni amministrative delegandole alle 
Provincie, ai Comuni o ad altri enti locali, o valendosi dei loro uffici.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
28.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1985-2018 CA
29.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2019-2057 CA
03.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2103-2136 CA
03.07.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2487-2495 CA
04.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2499-2524 CA
08.07.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2529-2550 CA
09.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2553-2571 CA
11.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2595-2620 CA
16.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2665-2680 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
04.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4367-4399 CA
Art. 119.(113)
Le Regioni hanno autonomia finanziaria nelle forme e nei limiti stabiliti da leggi 
della Repubblica, che la coordinano con la fmanza dello Stato delle Provincie e dei 
Comuni.
Alle Regioni sono attribuiti tributi propri e quote di tributi erariali, in relazione ai 
bisogni delle Regioni per le spese necessarie ad adempiere le loro funzioni normali. 
Per prowedere a scopi determinati, e particolarmente per valorizzare il Mezzogiomo 
e le Isole, lo Stato assegna per legge a singole Regioni contributi speciali.
La Regione ha un proprio demanio e patrimonio, secondo le modalita stabilite con 
legge della Repubblica.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
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01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
30.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1727-1736 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
01.02.1947 Vol. VI p. 276 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
27.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1949-1983 CA
28.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1985-2018 CA
29.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2019-2057 CA
03.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2103-2136 CA
06.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2203-2238 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
04.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2499-2524 CA
11.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2595-2620 CA
15.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2627-2661 CA
Art. 120.(113)
La Regione non puo istituire dazi d'importazione o esportazione o transito fra le 
Regioni.
Non puo adottare prowedimenti che ostacolino in qualsiasi modo la libera 
circoiazione delie persone e delle cose fra le Regioni.
Non puo limitare il diritto dei cittadini di esercitare in qualunque parte del territorio 
nazionale la loro professione, impiego o lavoro.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
27.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1949-1983 CA
28.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1985-2018 CA
04.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2153-2177 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
15.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2627-2661 CA
Art. 121.(114, 115, 116)
Sono organi della Regione: il Consiglio regionale, la Giunta e il suo Presidente.
II Consiglio regionale esercita le potesta legislative e regolamentari attribuite alia 
Regione e le altre funzioni conferitegli dalla Costituzione e dalle leggi. Puo fare 
proposte di legge alle Camere.
La Giunta regionale e l'organo esecutivo delle Regioni.
71
II Presidente della Giunta rappresenta la Regione: promulga le leggi ed i regolamenti 
regionali; dirige le funzioni amministrative delegate dallo Stato alia Regione, 
conformandosi alle istruzioni del Govemo centrale.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
30.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2059-2088 CA
04.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2137-2152 CA
04.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2153-2177 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
16.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2665-2680 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
Art. 122.
II sistema d'elezione, il numero e i casi di ineleggibilita e di incompatibility dei 
consiglieri regionali sono stabiliti con legge della Repubblica.
Nessuno puo appartenere contemporaneamente a un Consiglio regionale e ad una 
delle Camere del Parlamento o ad un altro Consiglio regionale.
II Consiglio elegge nel suo seno un presidente e un ufficio di presidenza per i propri 
lavori.
I consiglieri regionali non possono essere chiamati a rispondere delle opinioni 
espresse e dei voti dati nell'esercizio delle loro funzioni.
II Presidente ed i membri della Giunta sono eletti dal Consiglio regionale tra i suoi 
componenti.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
01.02.1947 Vol. VI pp. 277-279 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
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Art. 123.
Ogni Regione ha uno statuto il quale, in armonia con la Costituzione e con le leggi 
della Repubblica, stabilisce le norme relative all’organizzazione interna della 
Regione. Lo Statuto regola l'esercizio del diritto di iniziativa e del referendum su 
leggi e prowedimenti amministrativi della Regione e la pubblicazione delle leggi e 
dei regolamenti regionali.
Lo Statuto e deliberato dal Consiglio regionale a maggioranza assoluta dei suoi 
componenti, ed e approvato con legge della Repubblica.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
01.02.1947 Vol. VI p. 278 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2179-2201 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
08.07.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2529-2550 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
22.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2721-2727 CA
23.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2731-2732 CA
04.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4367-4399 CA
22.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4579-4595 CA
Art. 124.
Un commissario del Govemo, residente nel capoluogo della Regione, sopraintende 
alle funzioni amministrative esercitate dallo Stato e le coordina con quelle esercitate
dalla Regione.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
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Art. 125.
II controllo di legittimita sugli atti amministrativi della Regione e esercitato, in forma 
decentrata, da un organo dello Stato, nei modi e nei limiti stabiliti da leggi della 
Repubblica. La legge puo in determinati casi ammettere il controllo di merito, al solo 
effetto di promuovere, con richiesta motivata, il riesame della deliberazione da parte 
del Consiglio regionale.
Nella Regione sono istituiti organi di giustizia amministrativa di primo grado, 
secondo l'ordinamento stabilito da legge della Repubblica. Possono istituirsi sezioni 
con sede diversa dal capoluogo della Regione.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
21.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1621-1630 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
01.02.1947 Vol. VI pp. 279-280 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
28.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1985-2018 CA
30.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2059-2088 CA
04.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2137-2152 CA
07.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2239-2268 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
22.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2721-2727 CA
04.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4 3 4 7 . 4 3 6 5 CA
04.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4367-4399 CA
Art. 126.(117)
II Consiglio regionale puo essere sciolto quando compia atti contrari alia 
Costituzione o gravi violazioni di legge, o non corrisponda alfinvito del Govemo di 
sostituire la Giunta o il Presidente, che abbiano compiuto analoghi atti o violazioni. 
Pub essere sciolto quando, per dimissioni o per impossibility di formare una 
maggioranza, non sia in grado di funzionare. Puo essere altresi sciolto per ragioni di 
sicurezza nazionale.
Lo scioglimento e disposto con decreto motivato del Presidente della Repubblica, 
sentita una Commissione di deputati e senatori costituita, per le questioni regionali, 
nei modi stabiliti con legge della Repubblica.
Col decreto di scioglimento e nominate, una Commissione di tre cittedini eleggibili al 
Consiglio regionale, che indice le elezioni entro tre mesi e prowede all'ordinaria 
amministrazione di competenza della Giunta e agli atti improrogabili, da sottoporre 
















04.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill
07.06.1947 Vol. Ill
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V





















Ogni legge approvata dal Consiglio regionale e comunicata al Commissario che, 
salvo il caso di opposizione da parte del Govemo, deve vistarla nei termine di trenta 
giomi dalla comunicazione.
La legge b promulgata nei dieci giomi dall'apposizione del visto ed entra in vigore 
non prima di quindici giomi dalla sua pubblicazione. Se una legge e dichiarata 
urgente dai Consiglio regionale, e il Govemo della Repubblica lo consente, la 
promulgazione e l'entrata in vigore non sono subordinate ai termini indicati.
II Govemo della Repubblica, quando ritenga che una legge approvata dal Consigio 
regionale ecceda la competenza della Regione o contrasti con gli interessi nazionali o 
con quelli di altre Regioni, la rinvia al Consiglio regionale nei termine fissato per 
l'apposizione del visto.
Ove il Consiglio regionale la approvi di nuovo a maggioranza assoluta dei suoi 
componenti, il Govemo della Repubblica puo, nei quindici giomi dalla 
comunicazione, promuovere la questione di legittimM davanti alia Corte 
Costituzionale, o quella di merito per contrasto di interessi davanti alle Camere. In 
caso di dubbio, la Corte decide di chi sia la competenza.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
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01.02.1947 Vol. VI p. 276 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
04.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2153-2177 CA
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2179-2201 CA
07.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2239-2268 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
02.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2471-2485 CA
03.07.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2487-2495 CA
11.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2595-2620 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
23.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2731-2732 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
04.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4347-4365 CA
Art. 128.(121)
Le Provincie e i Comuni sono enti autonomi nell'ambito dei principi fissati da leggi 
generali della Repubblica, che ne determinano le funzioni.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 267-272 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2179-2201 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
11.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2595-2620 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
22.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2721-2727 CA
04.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4367-4399 CA
Art. 129. (107, 120)
Le Provincie e i Comuni sono anche circoscrizioni di decentramento statale e 
regionale.
Le circoscrizioni provinciali possono essere suddivise in circondari con funzioni 
esclusivamente amministrative per un ulteriore decentramento.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
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29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
31.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 267-272 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
30.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2059-2088 CA
03.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2103-2136 CA
04.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2137-2152 CA
06.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2203-2238 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
11.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2595-2620 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
A r t 130. (122)
Un organo della Regione, costituito nei modi stabiliti da legge della Repubblica, 
esercita, anche in forma decentrata, il controllo di legittimita sugli atti delle 
Provincie, dei Comuni e degli altri enti locali. In casi determinati dalla legge puo 
essere esercitato il controllo di merito, nella forma di richiesta motivata, agli enti 
deliberanti, di riesaminare la loro deliberazione.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
28.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1985-2018 CA
30.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2059-2088 CA
04,06,1947 am Vol. Ill pp, 2137-2152 CA
07.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2239-2268 CA
10.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2277-2290 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
22.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2721-2727 CA
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Art. 131. (123)





















26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
05.11.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1262-1263 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
01.02.1947 Vol. VI pp. 280-285 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
27.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1949-1983 CA
29.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2019-2057 CA
30.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2059-2088 CA
04.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2137-2152 CA
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2179-2201 CA
06.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2203-2238 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
01.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2443-2468 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
22.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2721-2727 CA
29.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3591-3634 CA
30.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3635-3647 CA
04.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4367-4399 CA
06.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4453-4472 CA
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Art. 132.(119, 125)
Si puo con legge costituzionale, sentiti i Consigli regionali, disporre la fusione di 
Regioni esistenti o la creazione di nuove Regioni con un minimo di un milione 
d'abitanti, quando ne facciano richiesta tanti Consigli comunali che rappresentino 
almeno un terzo delle popolazioni interessate, e la proposta sia approvata con 
referendum dalla maggioranza delle popolazioni stesse.
Si puo, con referendum e con legge della Repubblica, sentiti i Consigli regionali, 
consentire che Provincie e Comuni, che ne facciano richiesta, siano staccati da una 
Regione ed aggregati ad un'altra.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
01.02.1947 Vol. VI p. 283 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
06.06.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2179-2201 CA
06.06.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2203-2238 CA
27.06.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2393-2434 CA
08.07.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 2529-2550 CA
17.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2685-2712 CA
22.07.1947 am Vol. Ill pp. 2721-2727 CA
29.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3591-3634 CA
04.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4367-4399 CA
Art. 133.
II mutamento delle circoscrizioni provinciali e la istituzione di nuove Provincie 
nell’ambito d’una Regione sono stabiliti con leggi della Repubblica, su iniziative dei 
Comuni, sentita la stessa Regione.
La Regione, sentite le popolazioni interessate, puo con sue leggi istituire nei proprio 
territorio nuovi Comuni e modificare le loro circoscrizioni e denominazioni.
Debates:
26.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 815-818 S2
27.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 819-832 S2
29.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 833-852 S2
30.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 853-866 S2
31.07.1946 Vol. VII pp. 867-882 S2
01.08.1946 Vol. VII pp. 883-894 S2
14.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1007-1017 S2
18.12.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1299-1595 S2
17.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 117-130 AP
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23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
Sezione I - La Corte Costituzionale 
Art. 134. (126)
La Corte Costituzionale giudica:
sulle controversie relative alia legittimita costituzionale delle leggi e degli atti, aventi 
forza di legge, dello Stato e delle Regioni;
sui conflitti di attribuzione tra i poteri dello Stato e su quelli tra lo Stato e le Regioni, 
e tra le Regioni;
sulle accuse promosse contro il Presidente della Repubblica ed i Ministri, a norma 
della Costituzione.
Debates:
13.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1913-1920 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1837-1842 S2i
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2023-2028 S2ii
15.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2029-2039 S2ii
23.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2051-2058 S2ii
24.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2059-2065 S2ii
01.02.1947 Vol. VI pp. 289-294 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
05.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 167-200 CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
23.05.1947 Vol. Ill pp. 1915-1947 CA
10.09.1947 Vol. IV pp. 2767-2778 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
12.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3805-3832 CA
27.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4157-4199 CA
28.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4201-4219 CA
28.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4221-4251 CA
03.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4305-4317 CA
03.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4319-4346 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 . 4 4 5 2 CA
Art. 135. (127)
La Corte Costituzionale e composta di quindici giudici nominati per un terzo dal 
Presidente della Repubblica, per un terzo dal Parlamento in seduta comune e per un 
terzo dalle supreme magistrature ordinaria ed amministrative.
I giudici della Corte Costituzionale sono scelti tra i magistrati anche a riposo delle 
giurisdizioni superiori ordinaria ed amministrative, i professori ordinari di universita 
in materie giuridiche e gli awocati dopo venti anni d'esercizio.
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La Corte elegge il presidente fra i suoi componenti. I giudici sono nominati per 
dodici anni, si rinnovano parzialmente secondo le norme stabilite dalla legge e non 
sono immediatamente rieleggibili.
L’ufficio di giudice della Corte e incompatibile con quello di membro del Parlamento 
o d'un Consiglio regionale, con Tesercizio della professione d'awocato, e con ogni 
carica ed ufficio indicati dalla legge.
Nei giudizi d'accusa contro il Presidente della Repubblica e contro i Ministri 
intervengono, oltre i giudici ordinari della Corte, sedici membri eletti, all'inizio di 
ogni legislatura, dal Parlamento in seduta comune tra cittadini aventi i requisiti per 
l'eleggibilita a senatore.
Debates:
20.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1961-1966 S2ii
08.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1967-1974 S2ii
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2023-2028 S2ii
15.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2029-2039 S2ii
21.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2041-2044 S2ii
23.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2051-2058 S2ii
24.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2059-2065 S 2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
07.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 233-257 CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
18.10.1947 Vol. IV pp. 3367-3383 CA
07.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3681-3692 CA
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp, 3693-3716 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
28.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4201-4219 CA
28.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4221-4251 CA
29.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4253-4257 CA
29.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4259-4273 CA
02.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4277-4303 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 - 4 4 5 2 CA
Art. 136.(128)
Quando la Corte dichiara l'illegittimita costituzionale di una norma di legge o di atto 
avente forza di legge, la norma cessa di avere efficacia dal giomo successivo alia 
pubblicazione della decisione.
La decisione della Corte 6 pubblicata e comunicata alle Camere ed ai Consigli 
regionali interessati, affinche, ove lo ritengano necessario, prowedano nelle forme 
costituzionali.
Debates:
13.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1913-1920 S2ii
14.01.1947 Vol. VTII pp. 2023-2028 S2ii
15.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2029-2039 S2ii
22.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2045-2049 S2ii
23.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2051-2058 S2ii
24.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2059-2065 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
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12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
28.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4201-4219 CA
28.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4221-4251 CA
29.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4259-4273 CA
02.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4277-4303 CA
03.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4305-4317 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 - 4 4 5 2 CA
Art. 137. (129)
Una legge costituzionale stabilisce le condizioni, le forme, i termini di proponibilM 
dei giudizi di legittimit& costituzionale, e le garanzie d’indipendenza dei giudici della 
Corte.
Con legge ordinaria sono stabilite le altre norme necessarie per la costituzione e il 
funzionamento della Corte.
Contro le decisioni della Corte Costituzionale non e ammessa alcuna impugnazione.
Debates:
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2023-2028 S2ii
15.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2029-2039 S2ii
22.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2045-2049 S2ii
23.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2051-2058 S2ii
24.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2059-2065 S2ii
01.02.1947 Vol. VI p. 294 AP
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
12.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 341-358 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
29.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4259-4273 CA
03.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4305-4317 CA
22.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4579-4595 CA
Sezione II - Revisione della Costituzione. Leggi costituzionali.
Art. 138.(130)
Le leggi di revisione della Costituzione e le altre leggi costituzionali sono adottate da 
ciascuna Camera con due successive deliberazioni ad intervallo non minore di tre 
mesi, e sono approvate a maggioranza assoluta dei componenti di ciascuna Camera 
nella seconda votazione.
Le leggi stesse sono sottoposte a referendum popolare quando, entro tre mesi dalla 
loro pubblicazione, ne facciano domanda un quinto dei membri di una Camera o 
cinquecentomila elettori o cinque Consigli regionali. La legge sottoposta a 
referendum non e promulgata, se non e approvata dalla maggioranza dei voti validi. 
Non si fa luogo a referendum se la legge e stata approvata nella seconda votazione da 
ciascuna delle Camere a maggioranza di due terzi dei suoi componenti.
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Debates:
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1837-1842 S2i
14.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2023-2028 S2ii
15.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1871-1879 S2i
16.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1881-1885 S2i
24.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2059-2065 S2ii
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
20.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 503-536 CA
11.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3757-3788 CA
28.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4221-4251 CA
03.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4305-4317 CA
03.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4319-4346 CA
Art. 139. (131)
La forma repubblicana non puo essere oggetto di revisione costituzionale. 
Debates:
02.10.1946 Vol. VI pp. 478-480 SI
28.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 727-736 SI
29.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 737-746 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1837-1842 S2i
06.02.1947 Vol. I pp. lxxv-lxxxviii CA
04.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 135-166 CA
06.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 203-230 CA
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
14.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3225-3238 CA
03.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4319-4346 CA
Disposizioni Transitorie e Finali
L
Con l'entrata in vigore della Costituzione il Capo prowisorio dello Stato esercita le 
attribuzioni di Presidente della Repubblica e ne assume il titolo.
Debates:
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
n.(V)
Se alia data della elezione del Presidente della Repubblica non sono costituiti tutti i 
Consigli regionali, partecipano alia elezione soltanto i componenti delle due Camere.
Debates:
06.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4453-4472 CA
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HL(V)
Per la prima composizione del Senato della Repubblica sono nominati senatori, con 
decreto del Presidente della Repubblica, i deputati delVAssemblea Costituente che 
posseggono i requisiti di legge per essere senatori e che: 
sono stati presidenti del Consiglio dei ministri o di Assemblee legislative; hanno 
fatto parte del disciolto Senato; hanno avuto almeno tre elezioni, compresa quella 
all'Assemblea Costituente; sono stati dichiarati decaduti nella seduta della Camera 
dei deputati del 9 novembre 1926; hanno scontato la pena della reclusione non 
inferiore a cinque anni in seguito a condanna del tribunale speciale fascista per la 
difesa dello Stato.
Sono nominati altresi senatori, con decreto del Presidente della Repubblica, i membri 
del disciolto Senato che hanno fatto parte della Consulta Nazionale.
Al diritto di essere nominati senatori si pub rinunciare prima della firma del decreto 
di nomina. L'accettazione della candidatura alle elezioni politiche implica rinuncia al 
diritto di nomina a senatore.
Debates:
19.10.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1211-1218 S2
25.09.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3029-3053 CA
08.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3115-3143 CA
09.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3157-3186 CA
06.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4453-4472 CA
12.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4485-4496 CA
12.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4497-4508 CA
13.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4511-4522 CA
16.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4527-4529 CAIV.
Per la prima elezione del Senato il Molise e considerato come Regione a se stante, 
con il numero dei senatori che gli compete in base alia sua popolazione.
Debates:
06.12.1947 Vol. V pp. 4453-4472 CA
V.
La disposizione dell'art. 80 della Costituzione, per quanto conceme i trattati 
intemazionali che importano oneri alle finanze o modificazioni di legge, ha effetto 
dalla data di convocazione delle Camere.
Debates:
20.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4543-4558 CA
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VL (VII)
Entro cinque anni dall'entrata in vigore della Costituzione si procede alia revisione 
degli organi speciali di giurisdizione attualmente esistenti, salvo le giurisdizioni del 
Consiglio di Stato, della Corte dei Conti e dei tribunali militari.
Entro un anno dalla stessa data si prowede con legge al riordinamento del tribunale 
supremo militare in relazione all'art. III.
Debates:
09.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 1983-1990 S2ii
10.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2005-2012 S2ii
11.01.1947 Vol. VIII pp. 2013-2016 S2ii
07.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3693-3716 CA
08.11.1947 Vol. V pp. 3717-3739 CA
13.11.1947 am Vol. V pp. 3833-3853 CA
21.11.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 3967-3994 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 . 4 4 5 2 CA
VII.
Fino a quando non sia emanata la nuova legge sull'ordinamento giudiziario in 
conformita con la Costituzione, continuano ad osservarsi le norme dell'ordinamento 
vigente.
Fino a quando non entri in funzione la Corte Costituzionale, la decisione delle 
controversie indicate nell’articolo 134 ha luogo nelle forme e nei limiti delle norme 
preesistenti all'entrata in vigore della Costituzione.
I giudici della Corte Costituzionale nominati nella prima composizione della Corte 
stessa non sono soggetti alia parziale rinnovazione e durano in carica dodici anni.
Debates:
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
VHL (VIII)
Le elezioni dei Consigli regionali e degli organi elettivi delle amministrazioni 
provinciali sono indette entro un anno dall'entrata in vigore della Costituzione 
Leggi della Repubblica regolano per ogni ramo della pubblica amministrazione il 
passaggio delle funzioni statali attribuite alle Regioni. Fino a quando non sia 
proweduto al riordinamento e alia distribuzione delle funzioni amministrative fra gli 
enti locali restano alle Provincie ed ai Comuni le funzioni che esercitano attualmente 
e le altre di cui le Regioni deleghino loro l’esercizio.
Leggi della Repubblica regolano il passaggio alle Regioni di funzionari e dipendenti 
dello Stato, anche delle amministrazioni centrali, che sia reso necessario dal nuovo 
ordinamento. Per la formazione dei loro uffici le Regioni devono, tranne che in casi 
di necessita, trarre il proprio personale da quello dello Stato e degli enti locali.
Debates:
01.02.1947 Vol. VI pp. 286-287 AP
11.07.1947 pm Vol. Ill pp. 2595-2620 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
85
IX.
La Repubblica, entro tre anni dall'entrata in vigore della Costituzione, adegua le sue 
leggi alle esigenze delle autonomie locali e alia competenza legislativa attribuita alle 
Regioni.
Debates:
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
X.
Alla Regione del Friuli-Venezia Giulia, di cui all'articolo 116, si applicano 
prowisoriamente le norme generali del Titolo V della parte seconda, ferma restando 
la tutela delle minoranze linguistiche in conformita con l'articolo 6.
Debates:
(See articles 6 and 116 debates)
XL
Fino a cinque anni dall’entrata in vigore della Costituzione si possono, con leggi 
costituzionali, formare altre Regioni, a modificazione dell'elenco di cui all’articolo
131, anche senza il concorso delle condizioni richieste dal primo comma dell’articolo
132, fermo rimanendo tuttavia I’obbligo di sentire le popolazioni interessate.
Debates:
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
XII. (I)
E vietata la riorganizzazione, sotto qualsiasi forma, del disciolto partito fascista.
In deroga all'articolo 48, sono stabilite con legge, per non oltre un quinquennio dalla 
entrata in vigore della Costituzione, limitazioni temporanee al diritto di voto e alia 
eleggibilita per i capi responsabili del regime fascista,
Debates:
19.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 699-707 SI
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
29.10.1947 am Vol. IV pp. 3581-3590 CA
29.10.1947 pm Vol. IV pp. 3591-3634 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
Xffl. (II, III)
I membri e i discendenti di Casa Savoia non sono elettori e non possono ricoprire 
uffici pubblici ne cariche elettive.
Agli ex re di Casa Savoia, alle loro consorti e ai loro discendenti maschi sono vietati 
l'ingresso e il soggiomo nei territorio nazionale.
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I beni, esistenti nei territorio nazionale, degli ex re di Casa Savoia, delle loro consorti 
e dei loro discendenti maschi, sono avocati alio Stato. I trasferimenti e le costituzioni 
di diritti reali sui beni stessi, che siano awenuti dopo il 2 giugno 1946, sono nulli.
Debates:
18.09.1946 Vol. VII pp. 1019-1033 S2
28.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 727-736 SI
29.11.1946 Vol. VI pp. 737-746 SI
19.12.1946 Vol. VIII pp. 1739-1749 S2i
19.12.1946 Vol. VI pp. 807-814 SI
01.02.1947 Vol. VI pp. 294-299 AP
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4 4 1 7 . 4 4 5 2 CA
XIV. (IV)
I titoli nobiliari non sono riconosciuti.
I predicati di quelli esistenti prima del 28 ottobre 1922 valgono come parte del nome. 
L'Ordine mauriziano e conservato come ente ospedaliero e funziona nei modi 
stabiliti dalla legge
La legge regola la soppressione della Consulta araldica.
Debates:
24.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 401-413 SI
25.09.1946 Vol. VI pp. 415-421 SI
25.01.1947 Vol. VI pp. 177-180 AP
30.01.1947 Vol. VII pp. 1727-1736 S2
01.02.1947 Vol. VI pp. 299-300 AP
08.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 259-285 CA
13.03.1947 Vol. I pp. 359-391 CA
18.03.1947 pm Vol. I pp. 479-502 CA
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
XV.
Con l'entrata in vigore della Costituzione si ha per convertito in legge il decreto 
legislativo luogotenenziale 25 giugno 1944, n. 151, sulVordinamento prowisorio 
dello Stato.
Debates:
05.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4417-4452 CA
XVI.
Entro un anno dall'entrata in vigore della Costituzione si procede alia revisione e al 
coordinamento con essa delle precedenti leggi costituzionali che non siano state 
finora esplicitamente o implicitamente abrogate.
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Debates:
22.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4579-4595 CA
XVII.
L'Assemblea Costituente sard convocata dal suo Presidente per deliberare, entro il 31 
gennaio 1948, sulla legge per la elezione del Senato della Repubblica, sugli statuti 
regionali speciali e sulla legge per la stampa.
Fino al giomo delle elezioni delle nuove Camere, l'Assemblea Costituente puo essere 
convocata, quando vi sia necessita di deliberare nelle materie attribuite alia sua 
competenza dagli articoli 2, primo e secondo comma, e 3, comma primo e secondo, 
del decreto legislativo 16 marzo 1946, n. 98.
In tale periodo le Commissioni permanenti restano in funzione. Quelle legislative 
rinviano al Govemo i disegni di legge, ad esse trasmessi, con eventuali osservazioni 
e proposte di emendamenti.
I deputati possono presentare al Govemo interrogazioni con richiesta di risposta 
scritta.
L'Assemblea Costituente, agli effetti di cui al secondo comma del presente articolo, e 
convocata dal suo Presidente su richiesta motivata del Govemo o di almeno duecento 
deputati.
Debates:
12.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4485-4496 CA
12.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4497-4508 CA
20.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4 5 4 3 . 4 5 5 8 CA
20.12.1947 pm Vol. V pp. 4559-4564 CA
XVIII. (IX)
La presente Costituzione e promulgata dal Capo prowisorio dello Stato entro cinque 
giomi dalla sua approvazione da parte dell’Assemblea Costituente ed entra in vigore 
il 1 gennaio 1948.
II testo della Costituzione d depositato nella sala comunale di ciascun Comune della 
Repubblica per rimanervi esposto, durante tutto l'anno 1948, affinche ogni cittadino 
possa prendeme cognizione.
Debates:
11.09.1946 Vol. I p. 52 AP
20.12.1947 am Vol. V pp. 4543-4558 CA
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